外文翻譯--心態(tài)比模型更重要的原因

1、<p><b>　　中文6259字</b></p><p><b>　　外文資料翻譯</b></p><p>　　Why the Mindset Matters More Than the Model.</p><p>　　Peter Bernstein</p><p>　　Forecas

2、ting used to be straightforward. Over the years, by the end of the first quarter, managers usually had a fairly reliable sense of how the business was shaping up and whether targets would be met, missed or exceeded. Conf

3、idence in quarterly and annual predictions was so high that coming in above or below by even the smallest amount was considered a surprise and set off moves in stock prices. This year, however, things have changed. Compa

4、nies like Unilever, Union Pacific and Visteon are dec</p><p>　　According to company reports, the problem is not that these firms are reluctant to provide a gloomy outlook. Instead, the companies say they jus

5、t don't know which way the markets will go; it seems the global economy is so shaky that executives have little confidence in their projections. This means that more and more managers are growing unwilling, at least

6、temporarily, to make judgments about the future and then to act on those beliefs. The danger is that these businesses will become paralyzed </p><p>　　The fundamental issue, of course, is understanding and ma

7、naging risk. Any time a merger is considered, a new product concept funded or an investment made, success is never guaranteed. Over the years, business has become increasingly sophisticated in developing tools that can h

8、elp in this analysis, especially in financial matters. Complex mathematical models were created to analyze potential outcomes and probabilities, based on past performance. Yet, as has been widely reported in the media, m

9、any</p><p>　　At the same time, experts at Wharton and elsewhere argue that too much blame is being placed on the risk management model and other tools of the trade, in banking and beyond. The models are not

10、necessarily broken, but instead are only as good as the decisions that get made based on them, they say. As a result, the current crisis may represent an opportunity for companies to re-visit and re-think historical appr

11、oaches to risk management. When it comes to planning for the future, the new thinking </p><p>　　"I think we've learned a lot recently about the limitations of models," says Richard J. Herring,

12、a professor of international banking and co-director of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center. "We've also seen that the governance of risk is not as good as it ought to be." Herring notes that top mana

13、gers in many companies need to understand what can happen when the assumptions that drive a model change, and then subsequently communicate these scenarios to their boards. </p><p>　　Internal audit risks inc

14、lude the inherent risks and control risks. The inherent risks is the assumption that has nothing to do with internal accounting controls, the units being audited financial statements and the overall balance of the accoun

15、t of a business or the possibility of a major error, that is caused by the audit unit economic characteristics of business and accounting work itself the formation of the lack of audit risk. Some enterprises such as the

16、lack of due attention to the account</p><p>　　Re-defining Risk</p><p>　　The first step is to get a fuller picture of risk. Most recent coverage of the global economic crisis and its origins, par

17、ticularly from a risk perspective, has focused on the financial industry; the problems with identifying and measuring the risk in this sector kicked off the chain of events that brought the global economy to a near stand

18、still. Some banks were dramatically more exposed to risks than they thought they were. Most others simply did not know; they could not assess with any confide</p><p>　　But there is more than one kind of risk

19、. U.S. food giant Cargill, for example, earlier this month suffered a blow related to what is typically called "sovereign risk." Accusing the company of having failed to lower food prices, Venezuelan President

20、Hugo Chavez stunned Cargill by ordering the seizure of one of its rice plants in the country. </p><p>　　Another category of risk that companies face -- which is even more common -- is operational. The delays

21、 Airbus encountered in the development of its 380 super-size jetliner are a perfect example. Over the course of 2005 and 2006, Airbus pushed back the launch of the new aircraft three times, ultimately leading to the depa

22、rture of its CEO and a projected earnings shortfall of more than 4 billion euros. Iridium, a company backed by Motorola, experienced an infamous failure related to operational r</p><p>　　These stories illust

23、rate some key points about risk from a manager's perspective. The first is that traders, economists and academics think about risk very differently than do most business managers. For the former, the key issue in ris

24、k is variance -- the expected spread of possible outcomes. But that is not how managers think about it. For them, the biggest issue in risk is the potential for loss. As a result, they ask, "What's the downside?

25、" If the risk is too high -- or even unknown -- compa</p><p>　　The second point is that risk management has no silver bullet. As a result, many companies need to develop a more integrated view of risk.

26、"We have seen a tendency to separate risks into rigid silos -- operational risk, market risk, credit risk and so on," says Wharton's Herring. "But what we have found is that major shocks and problems d

27、o not come that way. For instance, in the financial world, you would see trading desks staffed with people who were experts in market risk, but they were tradin</p><p>　　Nevertheless, risk taking remains wha

28、t managing is all about, and not just in financial services but in every industry. Indeed, from an economic perspective, all firms fundamentally are in the business of taking risks based on their core capabilities. For t

29、he manager, then, the basic objective is simple: As one executive noted in Zur Shapira's 1995 book, Risk Taking: A Managerial Perspective: "You have to be a risk taker. But you have to win more than you lose.&qu

30、ot; The catch is that managers are al</p><p>　　Constructing a New 'Risk Architecture'</p><p>　　Given recent events, "What I see now is a new risk architecture emerging for organizat

31、ions," says Erwann Michel-Kerjan, managing director of Wharton's Risk Management and Decision Processes Center. "Whatever industry you consider, it is always the same pattern. Things are getting faster, and

32、 therefore we need to make decisions faster, but based on information that we often don't have. Of course, we would like to have time to get all the information, but the reality is that managers have to make </p&g

33、t;<p>　　To overcome the problem, Michel-Kerjan sees some companies moving beyond traditional risk management practices, which have largely been internally focused. Call it "Risk Management 1.0" -- essent

34、ially, looking at a company's existing position or investments and analyzing what could go wrong.  However, organizations need to look beyond the boundaries of the firm and consider what is happening elsewhere.

35、In recent years, businesses around the globe have become increasingly interdependent, which br</p><p>　　"We were trained to solve problems with clear questions and clear scientific knowledge," says

36、 Michel-Kerjan. "Knowing the historic risk profile, we made investment decisions. But historic data does not shape the future anymore, given how rapidly the world is changing. We usually look at the known issues and

37、 make a nice diagram with probability on one axis and impact on the other. That's Risk Management 1.0. Risk Management 2.0 is [going] beyond the known issues to look at the links and interdepe</p><p>　　T

38、he key, Michel-Kerjan adds, is to have knowledgeable people in the organization who are looking broadly and challenging assumptions about the future. "Form a team of people and mandate that they come back with two o

39、r three major links that the company has not yet thought about," he suggests. "Not 25 links -- three links that they believe are important but not fully visible. And then bring some data about that to prove to

40、you that it is something the company has to think about." </p><p>　　In addition, new techniques and technologies are now coming into the picture. For instance, so called "track-and-trace" tech

41、nologies, integrating software and advanced scanning and identification technologies, are improving visibility across companies' supply chains, so they can precisely identify which components are coming from whom and

42、 where. Similarly, Michel-Kerjan is working on a project to identify the "DNA" of financial products, in an effort to provide more visibility into the component</p><p>　　As the need of audit qualit

43、y to the all social sectors have become more and more ,the audit risk has become higher and higher. Just under this background ，modern audit method made new headway and came to a new audit model——risk-oriented audit. Ris

44、k-oriented auditing has many typical characteristics and rigorous audit procedure. It is also beneficial to assign audit resources and improve effectiveness and efficiency of audit. This article mainly elaborated the ris

45、k-oriented audit production, deve</p><p>　　Philippe Hellich, vice president of risks, control and audit at Danone, is already moving to the new model. "We use very few mathematical models," he says

46、, although the organization is working on a small set of new ones for certain risks. "Instead, we rely much more on interviews and benchmarking with peers outside the group and between our subsidiaries around the wo

47、rld. Our approach is based on listening and challenging the operational management, common sense analysis, sound judgment and good </p><p>　　Looking ahead, Hellich sees even more focus on risk from Danone

48、9;s leadership, a consequence of the increasing volatility in markets and the potential severity of impact. "Top managers are convinced of the necessity to use enterprise risk management. We now have an effective wo

49、rking session with part of the executive committee twice a year. And we continue to rely on yearly updates of the risk maps of all major business units worldwide."</p><p>　　reduce the risk of internal a

50、udit ways Strengthen the internal audit of the legal system Improve and perfect the legal system for the audit of internal audit is the basis of risk control measures. Audit norms, the audit staff code of conduct a

51、nd guidelines, not only to control and reduce audit risk, but also to measure auditors liability standards. China's internal audit late start compared with Western countries in the relevant system-building there are

52、many imperfections. In order to ada</p><p>　　In the last pages of the 1996 bestseller on risk, Against the Gods, Peter Bernstein anticipated the challenge many companies are facing today. "Nothing is mo

53、re soothing or more persuasive than the computer screen, with its imposing arrays of numbers, glowing colors and elegantly structured graphs," he wrote. "As we stare at the passing show, we become so absorbed w

54、e tend to forget that the computer only answers questions; it does not ask them.... Those who live only by the numbers may find that </p><p>　　Phil Rosenzweig, professor of strategy and international busines

55、s at IMD in Switzerland and author of The Halo Effect and Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, agrees. "I would caution executives not to rely on models that are appealing for their apparent sophist

56、ication. They may delude us into thinking we've understood the underlying factors, when really we've done nothing of the kind. It's what I call the Delusion of Rigorous Research -- if the quantity of data is

57、impressive, w</p><p>　　On the other hand, well-designed efforts to look ahead even three to five years can be stunningly prescient. Consider the annual Global Risks Report, published by the World Economic Fo

58、rum in cooperation with Citigroup, Marsh & McLennan Companies, Swiss Re, the Wharton School's Risk Management and Decision Processes Center and Zurich Financial Services, which is based on a qualitative assessmen

59、t of global risks, workshops and input from business leaders and experts around the world. In the 2007 r</p><p>　　Also effective are company-specific assessments, if done right. Michael Hession, senior vice

60、president at Woodside Energy, Australia's largest energy company, offers an example based his experiences both at company headquarters and in running local operations in diverse places like Algeria, Azerbaijan, Indon

61、esia, Lybia and Vietnam. In these settings, risk has a much more tangible profile, which Hession says taught him many lessons. </p><p>　　First and foremost, Hession notes, "You have to be proactive. Und

62、erstand the risks as well as the environment you are operating in. In entering a new country, we would put considerable effort into understanding the full risk picture for the business. Each of the risks was analysed and

63、 then mitigation strategies were put in place. Very importantly, input to this process was not just from within the company. We sought advice from many external sources, including the authorities and peer companies.</

64、p><p>　　IMD's Rosenzweig adds that companies also need to think about what level of risk-taking is required to win in their specific industry. "The great unspoken issue is about payoffs, and the degree

65、 to which payoffs are skewed in an industry," he says. "In an industry with many players, low barriers to entry and where only a small number will make a lot of money, the payoffs are highly skewed. If this is

66、the case, you cannot afford to take a conservative approach. So winning is not about limiting the</p><p>　　Ultimately, then, the new thinking about risk management is becoming much more a strategic discussio

67、n, turning risk managers into strategists and vice versa. "Strategy is making choices under conditions of uncertainty," says Rosenzweig. "And you cannot make the right strategic choices without understandi

68、ng your industry and how much risk you need to take on." </p><p>　　As a result, risk management promises to become an even more central part of managing any business. In Danone's case, for instance,

69、 Hellich says risk considerations are now embedded at multiple stages during the course of business -- at the strategic planning stage, the budgeting stage, etc. -- and should be discussed more often during quarterly rev

70、iews and whenever there are major changes or new projects. "Again, it relies pragmatically on common sense and business judgment, shared with peers a</p><p>　　Wharton's Michel-Kerjan shares the sent

71、iment. "We have to be careful -- not all the models were bad. What we are really seeing now is a need to integrate decision-making processes into the evaluation. These things are not at the margin; they are central.

72、 You can assess the risks very carefully with the best experts, but if you don't think about [them] and integrate [them] with the strategic decision process, you don't get anywhere."</p><p>　　心態(tài)

73、比模型更重要的原因</p><p>　　以前，預(yù)測往往是直截了當(dāng)?shù)?。過去數(shù)年來，每到第一個季度結(jié)束的時候，通常情況下，公司的經(jīng)理都能對企業(yè)的運營態(tài)勢如何，企業(yè)的目標(biāo)是已經(jīng)實現(xiàn)、未能實現(xiàn)還是超額完成，擁有非常切實的感覺。因為他們對企業(yè)季度表現(xiàn)和年度表現(xiàn)的預(yù)測充滿信心，所以，即便超出或者低于預(yù)測的數(shù)量微乎其微，也會令人驚訝，從而會引發(fā)股票價格的動蕩。然而，今年的情況卻發(fā)生了改變。就未來幾個月的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)，聯(lián)合利華公司、

74、聯(lián)合太平洋公司和偉世通公司等企業(yè)拒絕做出任何預(yù)測。換句話說，一切預(yù)測都是徒勞的。</p><p>　　根據(jù)公司的報告來看，問題并不在于這些企業(yè)不愿意推出一個令人沮喪的展望，相反，這些公司聲稱，它們確實不知道市場將會走向何方，全球經(jīng)濟看起來如此之不穩(wěn)定，以至于高管們對自己的預(yù)測毫無信心可言。這就意味著有越來越多的經(jīng)理不愿意就企業(yè)的未來做出判斷并據(jù)此付諸行動了，至少暫時如此。危險在于，這些企業(yè)會陷于癱瘓——并進而殃及

75、全球經(jīng)濟。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，基本的問題是要認(rèn)識和管理風(fēng)險。無論何時，當(dāng)人們考慮一樁購并、為某個新產(chǎn)品概念提供資金或者進行一項投資時，成功從來都不是萬無一失的。過去數(shù)年來，企業(yè)在開發(fā)有助于自己進行這類分析——尤其是進行財務(wù)分析——的工具方面，已經(jīng)變得越來越老練了。為了分析潛在的結(jié)果和可能性，人們根據(jù)既往的表現(xiàn)情況開發(fā)出了復(fù)雜的數(shù)學(xué)模型。然而，正如媒體廣泛披露的，其中的很多模型并沒能準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測到目前這場全球性

76、經(jīng)濟危機，也沒能讓公司為這場危機做好準(zhǔn)備，現(xiàn)在，華爾街正在為完善這些系統(tǒng)付出巨大的努力。</p><p>　　與此同時，沃頓商學(xué)院和其他地方的專家們認(rèn)為，人們對風(fēng)險管理模型以及其他交易工具的指責(zé)過多了，他們認(rèn)為，實際上，那些模型并不一定那么蹩腳，只不過和基于它們的決策彼此相當(dāng)而已。因此，對公司來說，目前這場危機也提供了對過去的風(fēng)險管理手段重新考察的機會。至于說到未來規(guī)劃問題，這一新思想認(rèn)為，重要的并不是模型本身，

77、而是人們的思想傾向。</p><p>　　“我想，就模型的局限性問題，我們最近已經(jīng)得到了很多教訓(xùn)?！?沃頓金融學(xué)院國際銀行學(xué)教授、沃頓金融學(xué)院研究中心聯(lián)席主任理查德·賀林說。“此外，我們也看到，風(fēng)險管理并沒有取得應(yīng)有的效果?！辟R林談到，在很多公司中，高管都需要明白，當(dāng)驅(qū)動某一模型運轉(zhuǎn)的假定條件發(fā)生變化以后會發(fā)生什么情況，隨后，應(yīng)該將這些可能出現(xiàn)的情況告知董事會。</p><p>

78、　　內(nèi)部審計風(fēng)險包括固有風(fēng)險和控制風(fēng)險。固有風(fēng)險是指在假定與內(nèi)部會計控制無關(guān)的情況下，被審計單位整體財務(wù)報表和各賬戶余額或某項業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)生重大差錯的可能性，即由于被審計單位經(jīng)濟業(yè)務(wù)的特點和會計核算工作本身的不足而形成的審計風(fēng)險。如某些企業(yè)缺乏對會計制度應(yīng)有的重視，賬戶體系龐雜、會計信息明晰性降低，報表利用困難，成本、費用缺乏成本核算概念等?？刂骑L(fēng)險是指由于被審單位內(nèi)部控制制度不夠健全完善，內(nèi)部控制行為不力，不能及時發(fā)現(xiàn)和糾正某個賬戶或某種業(yè)

79、務(wù)中的重大錯誤而形成的審計風(fēng)險。有時即使審計人員確認(rèn)被審計單位的內(nèi)部控制制度不合理或在關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)上失控，其提出的修正建議能否真正適合被審計單位的經(jīng)營活動，也會形成一種修正風(fēng)險。</p><p><b>　　對風(fēng)險的重新定義</b></p><p>　　第一步就是獲得更完整的風(fēng)險全景。最近，對這場全球性經(jīng)濟危機及其起源的大部分報道，都專注于金融業(yè)——尤其是從風(fēng)險角度，都專

80、注于辨識和測算這一領(lǐng)域中所存在問題——這些風(fēng)險激發(fā)出了讓全球經(jīng)濟陷于幾近停滯的連鎖事件。有些銀行面臨的風(fēng)險比它們自己想象的要大得多，而其他大部分銀行則根本不清楚自己面臨的風(fēng)險如何，它們無法自信地評估自己以及其他機構(gòu)的金融資產(chǎn)狀況。</p><p>　　但是，風(fēng)險并不僅限于一種。比如，本月早些時候，美國的食品業(yè)巨頭嘉吉公司就遭受了人們通常稱之為 “主權(quán)風(fēng)險”（也稱為“國家主權(quán)風(fēng)險”，指一個國家的政府由于政策改變而不

81、能履行合約的風(fēng)險?！g者注）的沖擊。該公司被指未能降低食品價格，為此，委內(nèi)瑞拉總統(tǒng)查韋斯下令沒收了該公司設(shè)在委內(nèi)瑞拉的一家大米加工廠，此舉讓嘉吉公司大感震驚。</p><p>　　公司面臨的另一種風(fēng)險，而且也是更常見的風(fēng)險，就是運營風(fēng)險?？罩锌蛙嚬陂_發(fā)其380型巨型飛機過程中所遭遇的延誤就是個經(jīng)典例證。在2005年到2006年期間，空中客車公司三次推遲了這一新機型的推出時間，最終導(dǎo)致公司的首席執(zhí)行官黯然離去，

82、同時，給公司的預(yù)期收入減少了40億歐元。另一個例子是，得到摩托羅拉公司支持的銥星系統(tǒng)公司（摩托羅拉公司于1987年提出的低軌全球個人衛(wèi)星移動通信系統(tǒng)，與現(xiàn)有通信網(wǎng)結(jié)合，可實現(xiàn)全球數(shù)字化個人通信?！g者注），也因為運營風(fēng)險而經(jīng)歷了聲名狼藉的失敗。這個備受矚目的衛(wèi)星電話機構(gòu)成立于1998年年末，媒體給予了連篇累牘的報道，然而，還不到一年，這個公司就失敗了。公司因為沒有能力將足夠多的衛(wèi)星以足夠快的速度送入軌道，從而，造成了客戶對這一系統(tǒng)的需

83、求遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于預(yù)期水平。</p><p>　　從一位經(jīng)理人的角度來看，這些案例都表明了風(fēng)險管理中的某些關(guān)鍵點。第一個關(guān)鍵點就是股票交易者、經(jīng)濟學(xué)家和學(xué)者與大部分企業(yè)經(jīng)理人考慮風(fēng)險的方式具有顯著的差異。對前者來說，風(fēng)險管理中的關(guān)鍵問題是變化——即結(jié)果可能出現(xiàn)的變化。但是，這并不是企業(yè)經(jīng)理人思考風(fēng)險的方式。對他們來說，最大的風(fēng)險是損失。因此，他們會問：“不好的那一面會如何？”如果風(fēng)險過高，或者根本不知道風(fēng)險狀況如何，那么

84、，公司通常都會撤退。</p><p>　　第二個關(guān)鍵點在于，風(fēng)險管理并沒有靈丹妙藥。因此，很多公司都應(yīng)該對風(fēng)險擁有更完整的判斷?！拔覀円呀?jīng)看到了這樣一種傾向：將風(fēng)險劃分為界限分明的不同部分——運營風(fēng)險、市場風(fēng)險、信用風(fēng)險，等等。”沃頓商學(xué)院的賀林談到?！暗?，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)的實際情況是，重大的動蕩和重大的問題并不是以這種方式出現(xiàn)的。比如，在金融領(lǐng)域，你會看到，坐在交易臺后面的人都是市場風(fēng)險專家，但是，他們正在交易的產(chǎn)品

85、卻頗具信用風(fēng)險。周全考慮每一種風(fēng)險的技能都各不相同，但是除非你對風(fēng)險擁有全面認(rèn)識的能力，否則，你就會遇到大麻煩?！?lt;/p><p>　　盡管如此，承擔(dān)風(fēng)險卻一直都是管理的目標(biāo)，而且不僅限于金融服務(wù)領(lǐng)域，所有行業(yè)都是如此。的確，從經(jīng)濟角度而言，所有企業(yè)從根本上說都在根據(jù)自己的核心能力承擔(dān)風(fēng)險。所以，經(jīng)理人的基本目標(biāo)很簡單：那就是祖爾?沙皮拉在其1995年的著作《從管理的視角談風(fēng)險承擔(dān)中引述的一位總經(jīng)理的觀點：“你必

86、須承受風(fēng)險。但是，你一定要勝多負(fù)少?！笨蓡栴}在于，經(jīng)理人總是在還沒有確定哪些風(fēng)險是“好風(fēng)險”，哪些風(fēng)險是“壞風(fēng)險”的情況下，就試圖勝多負(fù)少。</p><p>　　建立一種全新的“風(fēng)險管理架構(gòu)”</p><p>　　風(fēng)險管理與決策過程研究中心的主任艾萬?米歇爾-克嘉談到，考慮到最近發(fā)生的諸多事件，“我現(xiàn)在看到的是，一種全新的風(fēng)險管理架構(gòu)正在企業(yè)中顯露出來?！彼f：“無論你考察哪個行業(yè)，情況都

87、是一樣的。因為情況變化得越來越快了，所以，我們也需要更快做出決定，但是，往往沒有可供我們依據(jù)的信息。我們當(dāng)然希望擁有獲取所有信息的從容時間，不過，現(xiàn)實情況則是，經(jīng)理人必須在沒有把握的情況下，甚至在對情況一無所知的情況下做出決策?！?lt;/p><p>　　為了解決這一難題，米歇爾-克嘉看到，有些公司已經(jīng)超越了傳統(tǒng)的風(fēng)險管理策略，那些策略主要專注于內(nèi)部風(fēng)險，這種管理方式可稱為“風(fēng)險管理1.0版”，從本質(zhì)上說，它關(guān)注公司

88、的現(xiàn)有地位或者現(xiàn)有的投資，并對可能出現(xiàn)的問題進行分析。然而，組織還需要放眼其邊界以外，并仔細(xì)考慮其他地方正在發(fā)生的情況。近年來，全球企業(yè)的相互依賴性已經(jīng)變得越來強烈了，這種變化使企業(yè)的效率和創(chuàng)新受益匪淺，但是，同時也使公司面臨的風(fēng)險日益增多——在很多情況下，公司甚至根本不知道風(fēng)險到底是什么。的確，正是目前這場危機的系統(tǒng)性特點，以及影響的廣泛性，讓人深感震驚。</p><p>　　“我們受到的訓(xùn)練是，面對清楚的問題

89、，用清楚的科學(xué)知識來解決問題?！泵仔獱?克嘉談到?！耙驗橹里L(fēng)險的歷史狀況，所以，我們會據(jù)此做出投資決策。但是，考慮到這個世界變化得如此之快，歷史數(shù)據(jù)已經(jīng)不能對未來產(chǎn)生決定性作用了。通常情況下，我們會關(guān)注已知的結(jié)果，之后，以事件發(fā)生的可能性為一個軸，以事件所產(chǎn)生的影響為另一個軸，做出一個完美的圖表，這就是‘風(fēng)險管理1.0版本’。而‘風(fēng)險管理2.0版’則會超越已知的結(jié)果，去關(guān)注各個風(fēng)險之間的聯(lián)系和相互依存。你不能再孤立地審視每個風(fēng)險了?！?/p>

90、</p><p>　　米歇爾-克嘉補充說，關(guān)鍵在于要將見多識廣的人員安排在企業(yè)中，讓他們負(fù)責(zé)眼觀六路、耳聽八方，并對有關(guān)未來的假設(shè)提出質(zhì)疑?！敖M建一個團隊，并要求他們發(fā)現(xiàn)2-3個公司尚未想到的重要環(huán)節(jié)?！彼ㄗh說?！安皇?5個環(huán)節(jié)，而是他們認(rèn)為很重要但公司尚未察覺的三個環(huán)節(jié)。之后，提供有關(guān)那些環(huán)節(jié)的數(shù)據(jù)向你證明，公司必須要認(rèn)真思考這些問題?！?lt;/p><p>　　此外，新技術(shù)和新工藝現(xiàn)在正

91、在不斷涌現(xiàn)。比如，將軟件和先進的掃描技術(shù)和識別技術(shù)整合到一起的所謂“軌跡追蹤”技術(shù)，就能提升公司整個供應(yīng)鏈的“可見度”。公司可以據(jù)此準(zhǔn)確識別哪些部件出自何人、來自何處。同樣地，米歇爾-克嘉現(xiàn)在正在從事一個識別金融產(chǎn)品“DNA”的項目，該項目旨在使金融產(chǎn)品中各個組件的“可見度”更高，并為金融產(chǎn)品的審計提供更有效的工具。就公司所面臨的風(fēng)險問題，咨詢顧問機構(gòu)也正在為它們加緊提供更全面、更多維的觀點。甚至連“商業(yè)智慧”的定義，也從專注于公司的運

92、營表現(xiàn)，擴展到了更大的范疇——越來越多地將風(fēng)險監(jiān)測囊括進來，而監(jiān)測的風(fēng)險既包括企業(yè)內(nèi)的，也包括企業(yè)外的風(fēng)險。</p><p>　　達能公司負(fù)責(zé)風(fēng)險管理、控制和審計的副總裁菲利普·海利奇已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)向了全新的模式。他談到，盡管企業(yè)仍在利用規(guī)模很小的一組模型評估某些風(fēng)險，不過，“我們很少使用數(shù)學(xué)模型?！彼f：“相反，我們更多地倚重訪談結(jié)果，我們會將自己的情況以集團之外的同行為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進行檢查，并在公司全球各地的子公司

93、之間進行比較。我們采用的行動步驟基于傾聽和對運營管理的質(zhì)疑，基于常識性的分析、客觀的判斷以及高層的出色管理?！?lt;/p><p>　　瞻望未來，海利奇認(rèn)為，達能公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層會更加專注于風(fēng)險管理，這是市場變化日益無常以及由此產(chǎn)生的潛在影響日益增加的結(jié)果?！案吖軐Σ捎闷髽I(yè)風(fēng)險管理的必要性如今篤信不疑?，F(xiàn)在，我們每年要與總裁委員會舉辦兩次卓有成效的工作會議。同時，我們將繼續(xù)依靠全球所有重要企業(yè)風(fēng)險狀況的年度更新數(shù)據(jù)?！?

94、lt;/p><p>　　降低內(nèi)部審計風(fēng)險的途徑 加強內(nèi)部審計的法制建設(shè) 完善和健全審計法規(guī)體系是內(nèi)部審計風(fēng)險控制的基礎(chǔ)措施。審計規(guī)范是審計人員的行為規(guī)范和工作準(zhǔn)則，不僅可以控制和減少審計風(fēng)險，而且也是衡量審計人員法律責(zé)任的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。我國內(nèi)部審計起步較晚，與西方國家相比，在相關(guān)制度建設(shè)上存在著許多不完善的地方。為了適應(yīng)現(xiàn)代內(nèi)部審計不斷發(fā)展的要求，就必須加強審計工作法制化、規(guī)范化建設(shè)，盡量減少審計工作的盲目性和隨

95、意性。 保證內(nèi)部審計的獨立性 獨立性可以使內(nèi)部審計師提出公正的和不偏不倚的專業(yè)判斷，這對審計工作的恰當(dāng)開展是必不可少的。內(nèi)部審計機構(gòu)獨立性的內(nèi)涵應(yīng)主要表現(xiàn)為形式上的獨立和實質(zhì)上的獨立兩方面。形式上的獨立要求內(nèi)部審計在組織內(nèi)具有較高的組織地位，內(nèi)部審計師的工作應(yīng)能夠獲得高級管理層和董事會的支持。實質(zhì)上的獨立是指內(nèi)部審計人員在精神上必須保持必要的獨立性，應(yīng)以公正的態(tài)度，避免利益沖突，在開展內(nèi)部審計工作時，保持誠實的信念，遵守職業(yè)

96、道德準(zhǔn)則，在整個審計過程中不做出重大的妥協(xié)。</p><p><b>　　做出更出色的決策</b></p><p>　　在其1996年有關(guān)風(fēng)險管理的暢銷書《與天為敵：風(fēng)險探索傳奇》的最后幾頁，彼得·伯恩斯坦預(yù)測了很多公司今天所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)?！皼]有什么比羅列著令人難忘的系列數(shù)字、光彩奪目的顏色以及設(shè)計優(yōu)雅的圖表的計算機屏幕更能使人感到安慰、更具說服力的了?！彼麑?/p>

97、道?！爱?dāng)我們盯著不斷閃現(xiàn)著數(shù)據(jù)的屏幕時，我們會全神貫注，而忘了計算機只能回答問題，它并不能提出問題……那些以數(shù)字為生的人可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)，計算機完全取代了‘神諭’，在古代，人們常?？可裰I為自己的風(fēng)險管理和決策提供指導(dǎo)?！?lt;/p><p>　　瑞士國際管理發(fā)展學(xué)院（IMD）、《光環(huán)效應(yīng)以及騙過管理人員的其他八個商業(yè)幻覺》的作者費爾·羅森茲維格對此表示贊同?！拔乙嬲]公司高管們，不要仰賴因其外表頗具迷惑性而極具吸

98、引力的模型。它們會盅惑我們，讓我們自以為弄清了風(fēng)險的潛在因素所在，可實際上，我們根本沒有做過探究工作。這就是我稱之為‘規(guī)范化研究的幻覺’的現(xiàn)象——如果數(shù)據(jù)的數(shù)量給人以深刻的印象，那么，我們就會忘記，它們的潛在質(zhì)量可能很糟糕?！?lt;/p><p>　　但從另一方面來說，那些甚至能展望三年到五年以后狀況的設(shè)計精良的預(yù)測，其先見之明則令人震驚。不妨考慮一下《全球風(fēng)險報告》的情形，這是一份由世界經(jīng)濟論壇與花旗集團、威達信集

99、團公司、瑞士再保險公司、沃頓商學(xué)院風(fēng)險管理與決策過程研究中心和蘇黎世金融服務(wù)集團聯(lián)合出版的報告，該報告基于對全球風(fēng)險、研討會以及來自全球的企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和專家意見的定性評估編制而成。在2007年的報告中，一場資產(chǎn)價格的全球性崩潰被確認(rèn)為主要風(fēng)險，并將其視為最可能發(fā)生而且會產(chǎn)生最大影響的風(fēng)險之一。2008年1月，另一份報告同樣發(fā)出了這樣的警告：“在未來12個月內(nèi)，流動性危機將會引發(fā)美國的經(jīng)濟衰退”是極可能發(fā)生的事件，同時，要求人們對系統(tǒng)性金融