企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文4150字</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The effects of enterprise risk management on firm performance</p><p>　　Pagach. Donald P. and Warr. Ric

2、hard S</p><p>　　We study the effect of adoption of enterprise risk management (ERM) principles on firms’ long-term performance by examining how financial, asset and market characteristics change around the t

3、ime of ERM adoption. Using a sample of 106 firms that announce the hiring of a Chief Risk Officer (an event frequently accompanied by adoption of Enterprise Risk Management) we find that some firms adopting ERM experienc

4、e a reduction in earnings volatility. In general however, we find little impact from ERM </p><p>　　1、Introduction</p><p>　　Enterprise risk management (ERM) is an increasingly popular strategy th

5、at attempts to holistically evaluate and manage all of the risks faced by the firm. In doing so, ERM uses the firm’s risk appetite to determine which risks should be accepted and which should be mitigated or avoided. Whi

6、le there has been a considerable increase in practitioner attention on ERM in recent years, little academic research exists about ERM, and in particular about the consequences of ERM on firm performance. This </p>

7、<p>　　This purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ERM implementation, and to establish whether firms adopting ERM actually achieve observable results consistent with the claimed benefits of ERM. We belie

8、ve that our work is important and timely because although many surveys have stated the benefits of adopting ERM (Marsh and McLennan, 2005), there has been little empirical evidence on how ERM affects firms. We argue that

9、 the primary goal of ERM is to reduce the probability of financial distr</p><p>　　Our research focuses on the following questions. First, do firms’ experience a change in earnings volatility around ERM adopt

10、ion? This research question examines the proactive nature of ERM and whether companies adopting ERM are able to protect themselves from severe earnings events and generate smoothed earnings. The COSO ERM framework states

11、 that ERM aids in reducing operational surprises and losses by allowing managers to better identify potential events that cause such surprises. Firms can t</p><p>　　Second, do firms’ adopting ERM improve fin

12、ancial performance relative to past performance and after controlling for industry performance? This research question provides evidence on the view that ERM has value creating ability; captured in the following statemen

13、t: “There is clearly a heightened awareness of the need to manage risks more strategically in order to achieve expected shareholder value (The Conference Board, July 2005)”. Under this view ERM creates value by identifyi

14、ng and proactively</p><p>　　Third, do firms’ financial characteristics, such as leverage, growth and asset opacity change after ERM implementation? This research question examines the effect that ERM has on

15、the firm and whether ERM processes change critical risk interdependencies. Proponents argue that an additional benefit of initiating ERM is that it allows firms to seize opportunities by allowing managers to better ident

16、ify and more effectively assess capital needs and improve capital allocation (COSO, 2004).</p><p>　　Understanding whether or not ERM is achieving its stated goals is an important question. First, significant

17、 resources, both corporate and governmental are being expended on understanding, developing and implementing ERM programs. Second, even if ERM provides a consistent process for risk identification it is possible that the

18、 benefits are not significant enough to become evident in the firm’s financial performance. ERM is not a costless activity, and as such, if it fails to deliver observable be</p><p>　　As a preview of our resu

19、lts we find little evidence that adoption of ERM results in significant changes in our sample firms. However, when we examine a subset of firms for whom the market perceived ERM adoption as most beneficial, we find some

20、evidence of risk reduction.</p><p>　　2. Hypothesis Development</p><p>　　In a frictionless capital market with no asymmetric information, risk management at the firm level should be a negative NP

21、V project. However, Stulz (1996, 2003) and Nocco and Stulz (2006) present arguments under which risk management activities could be value increasing for shareholders when agency costs, market imperfections and informatio

22、n asymmetries interfere with the operation of perfect capital markets.</p><p>　　Although risk is generally considered to be the possibility of outcomes that deviate from what was expected, it is primarily ne

23、gative outcomes that are of most concern to firms. Stulz (1996, 2003) argues that any potential value creation role for risk management is in the reduction or elimination of “costly lower-tail outcomes.” Lower tail outco

24、mes are primarily negative earnings and cash flow shocks and can have both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are incurred in events such as bankrup</p><p>　　In addition, indirect costs hamper the abili

25、ty to pursue profitable growth options, and the ability to realize the full value of intangible assets upon liquidation. A decline in debt ratings and the resulting increase in borrowing costs can also be costly for shar

26、eholders in that previously positive NPV projects may now have to be foregone. Direct costs also include the costs associated with missing earnings targets and violating debt covenants. Stulz (1996, 2003) argues that ri

27、sk management ca</p><p>　　Risk management in the traditional sense usually implies offsetting known risks by purchasing insurance or engaging in financial engineering using derivatives .Enterprise risk manag

28、ement (ERM) takes a holistic view of risk management and attempts to reduce the probability of large negative earnings and cash flows by coordinating and controlling offsetting risks across the enterprise. For example, T

29、he COSO framework defines ERM as follows:</p><p>　　“Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across

30、 the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.”</p>

31、;<p>　　COSO summarizes ERM as</p><p>　　“help(ing) an entity get to where it wants to go and avoid pitfalls and surprises along the way.”</p><p>　　Although there are many variations in the

32、 definition of ERM, the basic theme is that ERM is primarily a way of measuring understanding and controlling the risks facing the firm. In some cases ERM is also viewed as a management tool that can identify profitable

33、opportunities to enhance shareholder wealth. Risk management in this manner can ensure that no single project risk has an adverse effect on the overall firm. Thus ERM provides the potential benefit of reducing the direct

34、 and indirect costs</p><p>　　Consistent with this view of ERM Standard and Poor’s states that evaluations of firms' enterprise risk management structures will focus on ensuring that firms are addressing

35、all of their risks, setting proper expectations about which risks are and are not taken and setting methods that ensures that firms’ avoid losses outside tolerance levels. Standard and Poor’s also states that ERM is not

36、a process to ensure that a firm eliminates all risks or a guarantee that losses will be avoided or a repla</p><p>　　Previous research has sought to understand the benefits of ERM by examining the stock marke

37、t reaction to ERM adoption, as proxied by the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer or equivalent. Examining a sample of 120 companies appointing CROs Beasley, Pagach and Warr (2007) find no significant stock price reactio

38、n (positive or negative) to announcements of ERM adoption. However, a cross-sectional analysis finds that firms in non-financial industries that are more likely to experience costly lower t</p><p>　　In this

39、paper, we seek to examine whether ERM adoption has a material change on a range of observable financial measures. We fully recognize that ERM may be working very effectively, but observable financial measures are unaffec

40、ted. This unobservability could be a result of ERM working properly and mitigating problems such that the firm’s performance is better than if it had not used ERM. In addition, we may not be able to observe changes in fi

41、nancial performance because the firm has not had any</p><p>　　To specifically examine the effect of ERM on the firm, we look at a range of characteristics. We group these characteristics in four broad catego

42、ries: risk characteristics, financial characteristics, asset characteristics and market characteristics. We compare changes in a sample of ERM adopters to a carefully selected control group. In addition, because the adop

43、tion of ERM is more advanced in the financial industry we examine a sub-sample of banks using industry-specific characteristics.</p><p>　　Risk Characteristics</p><p>　　As a goal of ERM is to red

44、uce operational surprises, we expect ERM adopting firms to see a reduction in earnings and stock price volatility. This reduced volatility is the expected result of a successful implementation of ERM which should lead to

45、 smoother earnings and a reduced probability of experiencing a lower tail outcome.</p><p>　　Financial Characteristics</p><p>　　The financial characteristics we examine are related to the likelih

46、ood of the firm experiencing a costly lower tail outcome. The first financial characteristic is leverage. Firms with higher leverage are more likely to suffer financial distress. Excessive leverage may also limit a firm’

47、s flexibility when pursuing additional profitable investment projects. The effect of ERM adoption on leverage is dependent upon whether the firm decides that it needs to lower its risk exposure in these areas, or </p&

48、gt;<p>　　Asset Characteristics</p><p>　　The asset characteristics used provide information about the degree to which a firm’s assets are likely to be impaired in financial distress. The first asset ch

49、aracteristic we examine is opacity. In a period of financial distress brought on by a operating shortfall, firms that derive much of their operating income from opaque assets may have difficulty quickly liquidating these

50、 assets at fair market value in order to raise capital to avert financial distress. This is due to the information asymm</p><p>　　The second asset characteristic we examine is growth options. Firms with grow

51、th options have much of the firm’s value tied to future, and as yet, unrealized cash flows. Because of the uncertain nature of the payoff from such assets, the value of these investments is unlikely to be fully realized

52、in bankruptcy. If, after adopting ERM, the firm considers financial distress to be less likely (through a reduction in lower tail outcomes), we expect to observe greater investment in opaque assets and a</p><p

53、>　　Source: Pagach, Donald P. and Warr, Richard S. 2010 “The Effects of Enterprise Risk Management on Firm Performance”. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1155218, July 6, 2008.</p><p><b>

54、　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響</p><p>　　我們研究企業(yè)采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理（ERM）原則對(duì)公司長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生的影響，通過分析使用ERM期間公司財(cái)務(wù)、 資產(chǎn)和市場(chǎng)特征發(fā)生的變化。以一個(gè)有106個(gè)公司組成的樣本為例，這些公司宣稱聘用了首席風(fēng)險(xiǎn)經(jīng)理人（實(shí)施風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理后經(jīng)常伴隨出現(xiàn)的事件）我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一些正在實(shí)施ERM的公司在減少收入變動(dòng)上取得了成績(jī)

55、。但是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)實(shí)施 ERM 對(duì)大量的固定變量影響甚微。雖然我們得出的結(jié)果可以歸因于有限的調(diào)查，他們也提出 ERM 是否能實(shí)現(xiàn)其既定的目標(biāo)。從整體上看，我們未找到論點(diǎn)支持ERM 能創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，但還是呼吁進(jìn)一步研究的，特別是研究如何來(lái)衡量 ERM取得的成功。</p><p><b>　　1、引言</b></p><p>　　企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理(ERM)是一項(xiàng)越來(lái)越受歡迎的戰(zhàn)略，

56、該戰(zhàn)略嘗試進(jìn)行全面評(píng)估和管理公司所面臨的所有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在這情況下， ERM 根據(jù)該公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好以確定應(yīng)接受哪些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而哪些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是應(yīng)減少或避免的。雖然近年關(guān)注ERM 的人士大量增加，關(guān)于ERM的各種小型研究一直存在，特別是有關(guān)ERM對(duì)公司績(jī)效影響的研究。這是真實(shí)的即使會(huì)議委員會(huì)已發(fā)現(xiàn)大量的公司現(xiàn)開始使用 ERM 作為一種戰(zhàn)略管理工具（會(huì)議理事會(huì)2005年7月），情況也是如此。另外標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾已將企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理分析納入其正開始的2008年第三季全球

57、企業(yè)資信評(píng)級(jí)進(jìn)程中（標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾2008 年5月）。</p><p>　　這篇文章的目的是探討研究ERM 實(shí)施作用，證實(shí)公司采用 ERM 實(shí)際上取得的成果是否與所聲稱能取得的利益相一致。我們認(rèn)為我們的工作是重要的并且及時(shí)的，因?yàn)槎囗?xiàng)調(diào)查都顯示采用ERM能夠帶來(lái)好處（Marsh and McLennan, 2005），盡管如此，能說(shuō)明ERM 如何影響公司的實(shí)證證據(jù)還是很少。我們認(rèn)為 ERM 的主要目標(biāo)是盡可能降低財(cái)務(wù)困

58、境，并允許公司繼續(xù)其投資戰(zhàn)略通過降低由意外結(jié)果帶來(lái)的影響，這些結(jié)果由收入或是現(xiàn)金流量造成。具有持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的收入和良好的現(xiàn)金流表現(xiàn)可讓公司更多的利用杠桿作用，追求更多的增長(zhǎng)或是更多的利益。</p><p>　　我們的研究重點(diǎn)是以下幾個(gè)問題。第一，在實(shí)施ERM后是否會(huì)改變企業(yè)原有對(duì)收入波動(dòng)的認(rèn)識(shí)？這一研究問題探討的是ERM的積極性質(zhì)和采用 ERM 的公司是否能夠保護(hù)自己免受收入狀況變化帶來(lái)的影響。COSO企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)管理框

59、架顯示ERM通過管理人員更好地識(shí)別潛在的會(huì)導(dǎo)致發(fā)生意外的事件能夠幫助減少經(jīng)營(yíng)意外和損失。然后，公司可設(shè)立反饋站減少這些意外的影響(COSO, 2004)。</p><p>　　第二，相對(duì)于過去的財(cái)務(wù)狀況和行業(yè)績(jī)效事后控制的現(xiàn)象，企業(yè)在采用ERM后是否得到改善？這一研究的問題為ERM有價(jià)值創(chuàng)造能力這一觀點(diǎn)提供了證據(jù)；研讀下面的語(yǔ)句："我們需要更具戰(zhàn)略性地管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，以達(dá)到預(yù)期的股東價(jià)值明顯，這是一個(gè)深刻的認(rèn)

60、識(shí)（會(huì)議委員會(huì)，2005年7月）"。這一觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為ERM通過識(shí)別和主動(dòng)解決風(fēng)險(xiǎn)創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。</p><p>　　第三，在ERM 實(shí)施后企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)特征，如杠桿作用、成長(zhǎng)狀況和資產(chǎn)不透明度發(fā)生了怎樣的變化？此研究的問題檢驗(yàn)的是ERM對(duì)公司的影響和 ERM 的進(jìn)行是否會(huì)改變相互依賴關(guān)鍵風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。支持者認(rèn)為引進(jìn)ERM 的另一個(gè)好處是公司可以在通過管理人員更好地、更有效地評(píng)估資本的需要量和提高資本分配后抓住各個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)（CO

61、SO，2004年）。</p><p>　　了解 ERM 是否實(shí)現(xiàn)其既定的目標(biāo)是一個(gè)重要的問題。第一，不斷讓企業(yè)和政府的知道發(fā)展和實(shí)施 ERM 計(jì)劃是項(xiàng)重要的資源。第二，即使ERM提供可靠的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別方法，但還是可能不足以對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)有明顯影響。ERM不是一項(xiàng)無(wú)償?shù)男袨榛顒?dòng)，為此，如果它無(wú)法帶來(lái)明顯的收益，它的可實(shí)施性將被質(zhì)疑。</p><p>　　作為對(duì)我們得出的結(jié)果的預(yù)測(cè)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了個(gè)小現(xiàn)象

62、就是那些實(shí)施了ERM的樣本公司發(fā)生了重大的變化。然而，當(dāng)我們?cè)诤瞬椴糠职咽袌?chǎng)企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理作為最有效管理策略的企業(yè)時(shí)，我們找到了一些可以降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的證據(jù)。</p><p><b>　　2、假設(shè)的發(fā)展</b></p><p>　　在完善的資本市場(chǎng)中不存在信息不對(duì)稱，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理在企業(yè)層面應(yīng)該是一個(gè)負(fù)的凈現(xiàn)值項(xiàng)目。但是，Stulz（1996，2003年）、Nocco 和 Stul

63、z（2006年）提出的論點(diǎn)：在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理下當(dāng)代理成本、市場(chǎng)缺陷、信息不對(duì)稱問題解決，資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作完善時(shí)能增加股東價(jià)值。</p><p>　　雖然風(fēng)險(xiǎn)通常被認(rèn)為是結(jié)果偏離了預(yù)期的可能性，但卻是企業(yè)最關(guān)注的負(fù)面結(jié)果。Stulz（1996，2003年），辯稱任何潛在的價(jià)值為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理在減少或消除"成本低效"發(fā)揮作用。低效結(jié)果主要有負(fù)收益和現(xiàn)金流沖擊，也可以是直接和間接成本。直接成本發(fā)生在如破產(chǎn)與財(cái)務(wù)困境

64、的這些事件中，此時(shí)公司必須對(duì)債權(quán)人、 律師和法庭進(jìn)行支出。關(guān)聯(lián)負(fù)收益和現(xiàn)金流沖擊的間接成本，包括可能會(huì)影響客戶和供應(yīng)商關(guān)系的聲譽(yù)的損失。</p><p>　　另外，間接成本妨礙了追求利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)和實(shí)現(xiàn)無(wú)形資產(chǎn)全部?jī)r(jià)值的能力。債券評(píng)級(jí)下降和借款費(fèi)用的增加對(duì)所有者來(lái)說(shuō)也是成本，此時(shí)先前具有較好凈現(xiàn)值的項(xiàng)目現(xiàn)在可能出現(xiàn)損失。直接成本還包括與未實(shí)現(xiàn)的收入目標(biāo)和違反債務(wù)協(xié)議相關(guān)的成本。Stulz (1996, 2003)稱風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

65、管理可以創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，如果它能夠減少這些負(fù)面收入帶來(lái)的沖擊，并幫助公司避免由直接和間接成本引起的財(cái)務(wù)困境。</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)意義上的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理通常是通過購(gòu)買保險(xiǎn)或使用金融衍生工具消除已知的風(fēng)險(xiǎn). 企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理（ERM）將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的視為一個(gè)整體，并嘗試通過協(xié)調(diào)控制消除企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)減少出現(xiàn)負(fù)收益和現(xiàn)金流的可能性。例如，COSO企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)管理框架對(duì)ERM的定義：</p><p>　　“企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理是

66、一個(gè)受到企業(yè)董事會(huì)、管理層和其他人員影響的過程，這個(gè)過程從企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略制定一直貫穿到企業(yè)的各項(xiàng)活動(dòng)中，旨在識(shí)別那些可能影響企業(yè)的潛在事件并管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，使之在企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)容量之內(nèi)，從而合理確保企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)其既定目標(biāo)。”</p><p>　　COSO總結(jié)ERM是：幫助一個(gè)實(shí)體達(dá)到它的目標(biāo)，避免在此過程中的陷阱和意外。</p><p>　　雖然對(duì)ERM的定義有多種，但基本觀點(diǎn)都認(rèn)為ERM 是估測(cè)了解和控制該

67、公司面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的主要方法。在某些情況下 ERM 也被視為一種管理工具，可以識(shí)別潛在的盈利機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)增加股東財(cái)富。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理以這種方式確保單個(gè)項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不會(huì)對(duì)公司整體產(chǎn)生不良影響。因此， 企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理為避免財(cái)政危機(jī)而降低直接成本和間接成本提供了潛在的好處。ERM 通過對(duì)成本中心和收入來(lái)源風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上的控制來(lái)減少不穩(wěn)定性以對(duì)利潤(rùn)產(chǎn)生最大影響。</p><p>　　對(duì)ERM持相同觀點(diǎn)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾認(rèn)為，公司的企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理結(jié)構(gòu)的評(píng)價(jià)重點(diǎn)將

68、是確保公司解決了所有的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有正確的預(yù)期，該風(fēng)險(xiǎn)沒有被迫采取和設(shè)置方法以確保企業(yè)不會(huì)失去外在免疫力。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與普爾還認(rèn)為ERM不是一個(gè)為確保公司消除所有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)或保證避免損失或取代其內(nèi)部控制的過程。ERM 分析將被標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾納入定期信貸審查中，還是分析企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)管理文化的一部分，同時(shí)也包括公司治理、 會(huì)計(jì)政策、業(yè)績(jī)和衍生工具。</p><p>　　早期的研究已設(shè)法通過觀察實(shí)施ERM后股票市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng)來(lái)了解 ERM 的優(yōu)點(diǎn)

69、，通過首席風(fēng)險(xiǎn)官或等效的任命作為代理。觀察120家委任Beasley，Pagach 和 Warr（2007）為CROs的樣本公司，發(fā)現(xiàn)在宣布實(shí)施ERM后股價(jià)沒有發(fā)生重大的變化（積極的或消極的）。但是，對(duì)現(xiàn)況的分析發(fā)現(xiàn)在實(shí)施ERM股票價(jià)格出現(xiàn)正面反應(yīng)的情況下非金融行業(yè)中的公司更有可能遇到成本低效。這些結(jié)果是符合 Stulz（1996，2003）提出的，他認(rèn)為公司只有在面對(duì)這些低效結(jié)果時(shí)才能從ERM受益，而其他公司將無(wú)法收益，這些還有可能因

70、為在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理上發(fā)生公司資源的支出而失去它的價(jià)值。</p><p>　　在這篇文章中，我們尋求發(fā)現(xiàn)實(shí)施ERM是否會(huì)讓可觀察到的財(cái)務(wù)措施發(fā)生一系列重大的改變。我們充分認(rèn)識(shí)到 ERM 可以非常有效，并且觀察到的財(cái)務(wù)措施不會(huì)受到影響。如果沒采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理，公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)不會(huì)這么好，因此這種不可能觀察的狀態(tài)是有企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理工作的合理性和逐漸減少的問題共同作用的結(jié)果。另外，我們可能觀察不到財(cái)務(wù)方面的變化，因?yàn)樽圆捎闷髽I(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理

71、以來(lái)，公司沒有包括經(jīng)營(yíng)在內(nèi)的任何形式的收益。這類似于一家有保險(xiǎn)的公司，但它不需要依靠保險(xiǎn)而生存。然而，在這兩種情況下雖然我們沒有看到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)直接降低，但通過更穩(wěn)定的收入，我們可以預(yù)期資本結(jié)構(gòu)、盈利能力和資產(chǎn)組成發(fā)生改變，使公司在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理上更有信心。</p><p>　　為專門研究ERM對(duì)公司的影響，我們看一系列不同的特征。我們把這些特征分為四個(gè)大類：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)特征、財(cái)務(wù)特征、資產(chǎn)特征和市場(chǎng)特征。通過企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理采用者的這個(gè)

72、例子，我們把改革比作是一個(gè)精心選擇控制的團(tuán)隊(duì)。其次是因?yàn)槠髽I(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理在財(cái)務(wù)產(chǎn)業(yè)領(lǐng)域更為先進(jìn)，我們也查實(shí)了一個(gè)關(guān)于銀行利用這種行業(yè)方法的樣本。</p><p><b>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)特征：</b></p><p>　　減少經(jīng)營(yíng)意外是ERM的一個(gè)目標(biāo)，我們期望實(shí)施ERM的公司在減少收益和股價(jià)波動(dòng)上取得成就。減少波動(dòng)是成功實(shí)施ERM所期望得到的結(jié)果，ERM的成功應(yīng)是具有更穩(wěn)定的收

73、入和降低出現(xiàn)低效結(jié)果的概率。</p><p><b>　　財(cái)務(wù)特征：</b></p><p>　　對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)特征我們研究的是公司遇到一個(gè)代價(jià)高昂但低效結(jié)果的相關(guān)可能性。財(cái)務(wù)的第一個(gè)特征是杠桿作用。擁有高財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的公司更有可能遭受財(cái)務(wù)困境。過度利用財(cái)務(wù)杠桿也可能會(huì)限制一家公司的靈活性特別是追求高利潤(rùn)投資項(xiàng)目時(shí)。實(shí)施ERM對(duì)杠桿作用的影響取決于該公司是否決定需要降低其在這些領(lǐng)

74、域的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)程度，或是該公司是否決定因?yàn)镋RM而承擔(dān)更多的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此實(shí)施ERM對(duì)杠桿作用的影響尚不清楚，不過，對(duì)于企業(yè)在之前的目標(biāo)杠桿水平下，如果企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的很好，將建議企業(yè)可以增加債務(wù)資本。</p><p>　　在資金短缺時(shí)期，有效地資金或財(cái)務(wù)盈余提供了一種測(cè)量公司堅(jiān)持能力的方法。財(cái)務(wù)盈余能測(cè)量一個(gè)公司所擁有的流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)，用于彌補(bǔ)短時(shí)間的資金流失。公司采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理可能是為了加大財(cái)務(wù)盈余的幅度，以便于更好

75、的應(yīng)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)困境。就像舉債經(jīng)營(yíng)，它很少有財(cái)務(wù)盈余，因此它們特別需要風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理。</p><p>　　當(dāng)一些人說(shuō)采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理會(huì)使公司處于一個(gè)更好的狀態(tài)，對(duì)此，我們通過各種方法來(lái)檢測(cè)公司的盈利。相反的，如果企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理導(dǎo)致運(yùn)營(yíng)成本的增加，那么盈利就會(huì)受損。正如舉債經(jīng)營(yíng)，采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理而得到的盈利的可能性的不確定的。通過合作管理、減少課避免的損失可能就會(huì)增加盈利。然而更多的精力應(yīng)放在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理上，它能減少大筆的支出。盈

76、利在根本上是由企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的應(yīng)用而決定的。例如，由于一些損失，盈利不斷下降的公司會(huì)采用企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理，希望阻止類似狀況的再次出現(xiàn)。</p><p><b>　　資產(chǎn)特征：</b></p><p>　　資產(chǎn)特征提供有關(guān)那些財(cái)務(wù)困境損害公司資產(chǎn)的信息。我們研究的第一個(gè)資產(chǎn)特點(diǎn)是資產(chǎn)的不透明性。在由經(jīng)營(yíng)不善所帶來(lái)的財(cái)務(wù)困境期內(nèi)，公司營(yíng)業(yè)收入大部分來(lái)自不透明的資產(chǎn)，而這些資產(chǎn)無(wú)

77、法以公平的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值快速變現(xiàn)，但公司為了籌集資金以避免財(cái)務(wù)困境會(huì)這樣做。對(duì)這樣的資產(chǎn)而言，由于信息的不對(duì)稱，與之相關(guān)是不透明資產(chǎn)和市場(chǎng)供需的的缺失。</p><p>　　我們研究的第二個(gè)資產(chǎn)特點(diǎn)是增長(zhǎng)期權(quán)。增長(zhǎng)期權(quán)的公司擁有較好的企業(yè)價(jià)值，這些價(jià)值關(guān)系到企業(yè)未來(lái)以及還未實(shí)現(xiàn)的現(xiàn)金流。因?yàn)閺倪@些資產(chǎn)中獲得的收益不確定，這些投資的價(jià)值在出現(xiàn)破產(chǎn)時(shí)很難得到充分實(shí)現(xiàn)。在實(shí)施 ERM后，如果該公司認(rèn)為減少財(cái)務(wù)困境有可能（通過