外文翻譯--紅利和資本收益的稅收策略和在雙重稅收標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下的分紅決策（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3000字,1800單詞，9800英文字符</p><p>　　出處： Kari S, Karikallio H. Tax treatment of dividends and capital gains and the dividend decision under dual income tax[J]. International Tax and Public Finance, 20

2、07, 14(4):427-456.</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Tax treatment of dividends and capit

3、al gains and the dividend decision under dual income tax</p><p>　　Seppo Kari，Hanna Karikallio</p><p>　　The paper analyses efficiency aspects of a dual income tax system with a higher t

4、ax on capital gains than dividends. It argues that apart from the distortions to investments claimed in earlier literature, the system puts even more emphasis in creating incentives for entrepreneurs to participate in ta

5、x planning. The paper suggests that the owner of a closely held company can avoid all personal taxes on entrepreneurial income by two tax-planning strategies. The first is the avoidance of distributi</p><p>

6、　　The taxation of dividends has attracted renewed attention in public economics literature in recent years, partly because of the US 2003 tax reform which introduced considerable cuts to the tax rates on dividend income.

7、 Several studies have used the reform as a “natural” experiment to bring new understanding on the effects of dividend taxation on corporate behaviour. One of the issues is how the change in the relative tax burden betwee

8、n dividends and capital gains affected dividend pay-out behavi</p><p>　　Another topical theme in public economics is income shifting between different tax bases. While the US literature has mainly focused on

9、 shifting between corporate and individual income tax bases (Gordon and Slemrod 2000), the European debate also pays attention to the incentives generated by the tax rate differentials between individual labour and capit

10、al income (Sørensen 2005b). On the background is the recent trend towards low nominal tax rates on capital income.</p><p>　　The Nordic dual income taxation (DIT), which combines progressive taxation of

11、labour income with proportional tax on capital income, has received growing attention in the international debate.1 As the literature explains, there are several theoretical and practical arguments in favour of DIT. Howe

12、ver, since there is a large tax-rate gap between the proportional rates on capital income and the top marginal rates levied on labour income, the system is likely to provide incentives for tax-minimisin</p><p&

13、gt;　　The question of whether the tax rules of income-splitting have behavioural implications has attracted some attention among Nordic tax economists. Hagen and Sørensen (1998) provide a verbal analysis of the probl

14、em and Kari (1999), Lindhe etal. (2002, 2004) and Hietala and Kari (2006) report on the effects on investment decisions using standard corporate tax models. Kanniainen (2007) discusses the effects on entrepreneurship. So

15、me studies have also dealt with the issue of income-shifting. Alstadsæ</p><p>　　This paper analyses the taxation of closely held companies (CHC) under the variant of DIT applied in Finland since 1993. I

16、t centres on tax-planning, especially on how dividends and financial investments should be arranged to maximise after-tax income in the long run. Evidence using a large set of micro data is also provided.</p><

17、p>　　The Finnish DIT combines a broad-based flat tax on capital income with a progressive tax on labour income (Table 1). The tax rate difference between the top marginal tax rate (MTR) and the proportional capital inc

18、ome tax rate was close to 26% in 2004 and even larger before the gradual MTR cuts implemented in the last decade. There is relief on owner-level taxation of dividends so that in practice owners receive normal dividends t

19、ax-free.3 Realised capital gains from the sale of shares are taxed </p><p>　　The Nordic countries have adopted differing definitions of the capital base (Hagen and Sørensen 1998; Lindhe et al. 2002). Un

20、der the Norwegian gross method, the base is measured as the firm’s non-financial gross assets.4 Sweden’s approach is to define the base as the acquisition cost of the shares. Finland chose a third alternative and defines

21、 the base as the firm’s net business assets. The Finnish base thus includes all types of business assets, including financial assets, and deducts liabiliti</p><p>　　Besides the splitting system, another unco

22、nventional feature of the Finnish tax system is that it has combined single taxation of dividends with non-relieved taxation of capital gains, the latter implying double taxation of retained profits. Sweden and Norway to

23、ok a different approach in their DIT reforms in the early 1990s: both countries aimed at neutrality. While Norway’s strategy was to implement single taxation of both distributed and retained profits, Sweden chose the oth

24、er extreme: double</p><p>　　Tax literature suggests that the relative tax burden on distributed and retained profits may induce higher dividend distributions (e.g. Poterba 2004; Gordon and Dietz 2006). Furth

25、ermore, Sinn (1987) shows it to establish incentives for what he calls a distribute-and-call-back policy, where profits are converted into new equity capital by distributing them and then collecting them back through new

26、 share issues. This paper presents a formal analysis of the financial behaviour of a CHC under the Fi</p><p>　　Observe the non-standard features of the entire dynamic solution to the firm’s problem. Dividend

27、s are paid during the (second) real investment growth phase, and not only in the steady state. In this respect, the outcome differs from Sinn (1991), who shows that under a linear dividend tax profits are only distribut

28、ed in the steady state. We also observe an unambiguous incentive to invest excess profits in financial assets. The firm is not indifferent in respect of the use of funds, but strictly </p><p>　　Our theoretic

29、al model adds financial investments to the standard investment model for CHCs. The model predicts that under the Finnish DIT, which splits dividends from a CHC using the firm’s net assets as the capital base, the owner a

30、voids taxes on earned income using firm-level financial investments as the tax-planning vehicle. This is shown to eliminate the tax distortion to real investment decisions reported in earlier literature.</p><p

31、>　　The firm’s growth path contains several non-standard features. Unlike in the standard dividend-tax model by Sinn (1991), here the firm pays out dividends not only in the steady-state but also during its growth path

32、. The CHCs dividend policy is determined by the rule that the maximum amount of normal dividends is distributed. This occurs both in the second real investment regime and the financial investment regime. Moreover, the CH

33、C faces an incentive to collect new equity at the same time as it </p><p>　　The opposite holds when considering financial holdings; The probability of distributing maximum normal dividends increases when the

34、 corporation’s financial holdings increase. This is evident also when we are considering only dividend-paying corporations. This finding gives strong support to our theoretical result of the investment behaviour in CHCs.

35、 We argued that firms have an incentive to increase net assets by investing in financial assets and simultaneously pay dividend the maximum amount ta</p><p>　　The owner dummies are contained in the two last

36、estimations. Because of the data restrictions we are now only considering dividend-paying corporations. When the owner of the corporation is another firm or foreign, the probability of dividends being distributed to the

37、maximum amount of normal dividends decreases. This is exactly what can be expected for tax reasons. The results are consistent with the intuitive presentation in Fig.</p><p>　　In the first estimations, the e

38、ntire data set is considered. As can be expected, profit has a very significant influence on dividend distribution. It can also be seen that the more the firm invests in real assets, the less it pays dividends; real inve

39、stments and dividends are more or less alternative uses of funds. They also take in all likelihood places in different growth stages. The influence of financial investments on dividends is positive and significant. This

40、is very much in line with exp</p><p>　　In the second estimations, we consider corporations that have distributed dividends the maximum amount of normal dividends. In this case we require that dividends corre

41、spond 7–12% return on the firm’s net assets. There are few differences comparing to the results in the previous case; the significance of financial holdings variable increases, whilst the significance of profit and real

42、investments decreases. Compared to the previous case, this reflects that there are also other factors than profi</p><p>　　We conclude by noticing that the fixed-effects model seems to fit the data well:the r

43、esults of the Hausman specification tests reject the null hypothesis of random effects. This is consistent with our expectation of the importance of effects that vary across corporations but are constant over time.</p

44、><p><b>　　二、翻譯文章</b></p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　紅利和資本收益的稅收策略和在雙重稅收標(biāo)準(zhǔn)下的分紅決策</p><p>　　這篇論文有效分析了在高額賦稅的情況下，資本收益于紅利相比更有效的部分。這篇文章討論之前除了提到早期文獻(xiàn)中說(shuō)的投資不合理，還

45、強(qiáng)調(diào)了要加強(qiáng)企業(yè)參與稅收計(jì)劃的積極性。這篇文章還建議私營(yíng)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)者能夠通過(guò)采取雙重稅收策略計(jì)劃來(lái)避免個(gè)人在企業(yè)中全部的所得稅。第一個(gè)策略是避免分配，必須按照個(gè)人收入的稅率來(lái)納稅。這些資金可以投資在金融市場(chǎng)。第二個(gè)策略是分配與召回策略，把現(xiàn)存利益轉(zhuǎn)換成新的股票資金。有趣的是，在實(shí)際投資中的結(jié)果在長(zhǎng)期的平衡沒(méi)有歪曲。</p><p>　　最近幾年中在公共經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中紅利問(wèn)題重新引起了人們的關(guān)注，部分原因是美國(guó)2003年

46、的稅收改革在紅利收入的基礎(chǔ)上實(shí)行了大規(guī)模的減輕稅率的政策。幾個(gè)研究把改革作為一次試驗(yàn)。這個(gè)試驗(yàn)會(huì)給企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)中的紅利稅收帶來(lái)影響。其中的一個(gè)問(wèn)題是紅利和資本收益在相關(guān)課稅負(fù)擔(dān)中如何變化。這些都會(huì)影響紅利的付出款項(xiàng)。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)在公共經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中很熱門(mén)的話題是收入在不同的課稅基礎(chǔ)上的轉(zhuǎn)移。盡管美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)主要集中在企業(yè)和個(gè)人所得稅上的轉(zhuǎn)移。歐洲的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也集中在個(gè)人的稅收負(fù)擔(dān)和資本收益在不同稅率下利益驅(qū)動(dòng)。

47、最近在這樣的背景下企業(yè)的資本收入朝向有名無(wú)實(shí)的稅率趨勢(shì)發(fā)展。</p><p>　　北歐的雙重收入征稅，是把勞動(dòng)收入的累進(jìn)稅率和在資本收益中的比例稅結(jié)合在一起。這個(gè)問(wèn)題也在國(guó)際上引起了廣泛的關(guān)注。正如字面解釋的一樣，有一些理論和實(shí)際的爭(zhēng)論支持雙重收入征稅。然而，資本收益中的比例稅和勞動(dòng)收入最高的邊際率有很大的稅率差別。當(dāng)實(shí)施雙重收入征稅時(shí)最低稅率的動(dòng)機(jī)可以解決稅率差別這一問(wèn)題，企業(yè)的收入是企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)和勞動(dòng)收入結(jié)合的結(jié)

48、果。為了解決這些問(wèn)題，北歐國(guó)家已經(jīng)制定了稅收規(guī)則，對(duì)他們而言是所謂的分擔(dān)原則。對(duì)于私營(yíng)企業(yè)和未成為法人企業(yè)的公司。這些分擔(dān)規(guī)則把資本收入部分不作為公司的固定資產(chǎn)，把剩余的部分看做是勞動(dòng)者的收入。</p><p>　　在是否收入分配的稅收規(guī)則行為上吸引了北歐國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的注意。哈根和 森對(duì)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了書(shū)面的分析，他們使用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的稅收模式發(fā)表了一篇是否收入分配的稅收規(guī)則對(duì)投資決定影響的文章，討論了對(duì)企業(yè)的影響。一

49、些研究也涉及到了收入轉(zhuǎn)移的問(wèn)題。檢查了以前的挪威原則對(duì)于稅收策略的影響，特別是組織形式的選擇，提供了勞動(dòng)收入和資本收入基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。</p><p>　　這篇文章分析了自從1993年私營(yíng)企業(yè)在不同制度下在荷蘭的應(yīng)用。它集中研究稅收計(jì)劃，特別是關(guān)于紅利和金融投資怎么樣在長(zhǎng)期過(guò)程中獲得最大的稅后利潤(rùn)。證據(jù)使用了大量微型的數(shù)據(jù)。</p><p>　　芬蘭制度結(jié)合了資金收入的廣泛稅收和累進(jìn)收入的

50、稅收。最大的差額利潤(rùn)稅率和資金收入稅率之間是不同的。在2004年比例稅收稅率接近26%，甚至在過(guò)去10年差額利潤(rùn)逐步減少。在個(gè)人稅收水平上股利分紅被減免，實(shí)際上，有者得到正規(guī)的紅利稅收免稅。把股本從股票的銷(xiāo)售部分扣出來(lái)。這些稅是資本收入的正規(guī)稅率。從私營(yíng)企業(yè)得到的紅利被分成了資本收入和所得，并且考慮把企業(yè)的凈收入作為資本收入，把剩余的收入作為所得。資本收入的9.6%用來(lái)去計(jì)算分紅，分紅后的資本被定義為企業(yè)稅收的凈得。</p>

51、<p>　　北歐國(guó)家已經(jīng)對(duì)資本進(jìn)行不同定義。在挪威的通常計(jì)算方法中，企業(yè)國(guó)內(nèi)非金融總資產(chǎn)做為計(jì)算的基礎(chǔ)。芬蘭選擇1／3并且定義了企業(yè)的凈商業(yè)資本作為計(jì)算基礎(chǔ)。因此芬蘭基礎(chǔ)包括了各種類(lèi)型的商業(yè)資本，包括扣除債務(wù)的金融資本。正向這篇論文所提到的一樣。這個(gè)定義對(duì)于企業(yè)行為和稅收的有效性都有很有趣的暗示。</p><p>　　除了分擔(dān)體系，另一個(gè)不是傳統(tǒng)的芬蘭稅收系統(tǒng)的特點(diǎn)是它把單獨(dú)的紅利稅率和非相關(guān)的資金

52、所得聯(lián)系在一起，后者指的是既定利率的雙重稅率。瑞典和挪威在19世紀(jì)90年代對(duì)于這個(gè)制度采取了不同的方法，兩國(guó)都保持中立狀態(tài)。但是挪威的策略是實(shí)施分配和保留利潤(rùn)的單獨(dú)稅率。瑞典采取了另一種極端的方法，即采取雙重稅率。</p><p>　　在這個(gè)方面芬蘭采取非中立的方法，表明了稅收對(duì)于分紅和金融決定來(lái)說(shuō)十分重要。分紅少而稅收壓力大也許會(huì)刺激高的紅利分配。例外，斯恩表示這個(gè)稅收體系為他建立所謂的分配策略帶來(lái)了動(dòng)力，在這

53、個(gè)策略中利潤(rùn)被轉(zhuǎn)換為新的股本。股本是把利潤(rùn)分配并且通過(guò)新的股份回收得到的。</p><p>　　觀察整個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)解答企業(yè)的非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)特點(diǎn)。股息在產(chǎn)權(quán)投資成長(zhǎng)階段是有償而且是相對(duì)穩(wěn)定的。但此結(jié)論與斯姆 (1991)不同，在一種線性純收益的稅收下贏利。我們從財(cái)政收入也觀察到一個(gè)刺激投資獲得超額利潤(rùn)的現(xiàn)象，企業(yè)關(guān)于資金使用不是冷漠的，而是更喜歡對(duì)金融性資產(chǎn)的投資。此外,沒(méi)有哪個(gè)人的個(gè)人所得稅是在分配后的利潤(rùn)中支付的。信用抵消了

54、正常股息的稅收，依據(jù)高稅金負(fù)擔(dān)的剩余股息，從不用交稅，這是因?yàn)檎５亩愋庞每鄢硕嘤嗟墓上ⅰ?lt;/p><p>　　我們金融投資的理論模型增加了CHCs標(biāo)準(zhǔn)投資模型。該模型預(yù)測(cè)芬蘭在DIT下，CHC的股息用企業(yè)凈資產(chǎn)作為計(jì)算基礎(chǔ)，所有者可以在金融投資時(shí)對(duì)勞動(dòng)收入進(jìn)行稅收籌劃。這在更早的報(bào)告文學(xué)中證明，企業(yè)應(yīng)該在降低稅負(fù)時(shí)做出投資決策。</p><p>　　中小企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)道路中包含幾個(gè)非標(biāo)準(zhǔn)特點(diǎn)

55、。不同于森姆的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)股息稅模型(1991)，此模型下企業(yè)在它的成長(zhǎng)道路期間穩(wěn)定付出股息。裁決取決于CHCs股息政策分布最大金額正常股息。這種情況發(fā)生時(shí),利用金融外商的政權(quán)直接投資。此外，需積極去收集新股在同一時(shí)間內(nèi)支付股息的信息，這個(gè)比芬蘭的稅收制度，更激勵(lì)企業(yè)獲得更高利潤(rùn)。非線性模型與典型的數(shù)據(jù)相結(jié)合，在這些情況下,高斯混合模型(GMM)的方法是一種很好的選擇。所有相關(guān)性的假設(shè)都沒(méi)有忽視誤差大的問(wèn)題。這些假設(shè)和初始條件所提及的問(wèn)題可以輕

56、松通過(guò)估計(jì)固定線性概率效應(yīng)模型解決。我們估計(jì)時(shí)也可以使用高斯混合(GMM)的線性概率模型，其結(jié)果比較吻合隨機(jī)效應(yīng)模型。他們未提示這些研究結(jié)果似乎是相當(dāng)強(qiáng)勁的不同模型的規(guī)格說(shuō)明細(xì)看一遍。這些研究似乎對(duì)不同模型詳細(xì)解釋了一遍。</p><p>　　相反,在考慮金融控股時(shí),企業(yè)正常分紅派息的概率增加，這是明顯的只考慮分紅企業(yè)。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)能夠提供很強(qiáng)的理論來(lái)支持我們CHCs投資行為。我們認(rèn)為，企業(yè)在一個(gè)誘因的情況下,提高投

57、資金融資產(chǎn)的凈資產(chǎn)同時(shí)支付股利的最高金額應(yīng)稅作為資本收入。這些結(jié)論支持了投資行為以及股利政策。</p><p>　　有些數(shù)據(jù)吸引我們現(xiàn)在只考慮分紅企業(yè)，即企業(yè)的主人是另一家母公司或外國(guó)人。紅利被分發(fā)后，股息的數(shù)量大大下降了，這一結(jié)果也比較吻合直觀的表現(xiàn)圖。因變量滯后是極顯著的因素,表明了應(yīng)該控制財(cái)務(wù)與不可觀察性等因素, 我在一定的程度上堅(jiān)持芬蘭公司的紅利政策。</p><p>　　我們?cè)诘?/p>

58、一次估算中對(duì)整個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)集中考慮?？梢灶A(yù)料,利潤(rùn)對(duì)股利分配有非常顯著的影響，可以也看到更多的企業(yè)投資固定資產(chǎn), 這樣可以少支付股息。真正的投資和股息或多或少都在多種不同的用途，它們有可能用在企業(yè)不同的生長(zhǎng)階段。金融投資對(duì)股利的影響積極而又重大。這些都非常符合期望。</p><p>　　我們最后關(guān)注了固定模型合適的數(shù)據(jù)，這些都符合我們的期望,但對(duì)企業(yè)的影響不盡相同。</p><p>　　在第二次