胎兒權(quán)利的法律保護(hù) 外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　胎兒和法律</b></p><p>　　SHELLEY BURTT</p><p>　　美國(guó)耶魯大學(xué)政治系，New Haven，CT 06520-8301 </p><p>　　劃定孕婦的性質(zhì)和權(quán)力范圍不完全是美國(guó)中央的

2、問題。通過其本國(guó)法律和司法審判，每一個(gè)州對(duì)這個(gè)問題采取的立場(chǎng)并非總是一致的。然而在美國(guó)，結(jié)合最近的一些事態(tài)發(fā)展，孕婦的政治地位被以特有的方式而關(guān)注。最熟悉的也許是辯論如何在懷孕期間控制日益嚴(yán)重的藥物濫用。全國(guó)衛(wèi)生統(tǒng)計(jì)中心記錄了從1986年到1988年增加了百分之五十的嬰兒出生時(shí)產(chǎn)婦藥物使用的跡象。參議院的一個(gè)文件表明百分之十一新生兒有藥品濫用的跡象。隨著探討孕婦的性質(zhì)和權(quán)力的范圍，引發(fā)一些對(duì)孕婦的引人注目的醫(yī)療措施，迅速進(jìn)步的醫(yī)療技術(shù)使

3、早期發(fā)現(xiàn)和治療胎兒的違規(guī)行為增多，新的理解和注意那些健康危害的工作場(chǎng)所和損害胎兒發(fā)育的環(huán)境，不可避免地，在美國(guó)每年那些墮胎沖突持續(xù)不斷。</p><p>　　提出上述各領(lǐng)域的爭(zhēng)議問題：關(guān)于父母和社區(qū)對(duì)尚未出生兒童的責(zé)任程度。醫(yī)生應(yīng)該將治療的胎兒作為一個(gè)第二個(gè)病人？還是應(yīng)該確定他們的中心完全根據(jù)與他們協(xié)商的健康和有福利的成年人？</p><p>　　我對(duì)這些問題的措辭，以強(qiáng)調(diào)照顧出生的孩子是

4、一項(xiàng)共同的責(zé)任，女子愿意或不情愿地發(fā)現(xiàn)自己懷孕對(duì)這個(gè)健康的結(jié)果并不是唯一一個(gè)負(fù)責(zé)任的。我為州立法支持“緊急家庭”而制訂案例，我會(huì)說更多的是采取在政體中的作用，確保幸福期待父母和他們對(duì)后代的預(yù)期。但是與胎兒權(quán)利爭(zhēng)論的核心相抵觸是有關(guān)某一個(gè)婦女對(duì)胎兒進(jìn)行的責(zé)任。一個(gè)女人的“注意義務(wù)” 是以她的孩子在出生時(shí)開始?還是在胎兒能發(fā)育的時(shí)候開始？或是在她要是決定懷孕的時(shí)候開始?甚至是在她意識(shí)前到她已經(jīng)懷孕的時(shí)候開始？</p><

5、p>　　這或許是值得在這里說，這種看法可能意味著對(duì)道德和政治的人工流產(chǎn)。簡(jiǎn)單地說，我的立場(chǎng)是，婦女照顧她的胎兒義務(wù)不排除在某些情況下墮胎作為一種道德上可以接受的選擇。此外，一個(gè)事實(shí)即墮胎是不是在所有情況下都可行，在道德上都可接受處理自己的懷孕方式，而本身不會(huì)以任何州的判例或責(zé)任來確保婦女使自己懷孕的決定在道德上正確。我在此重點(diǎn)論述當(dāng)一個(gè)女人決定（通過不行使其權(quán)利去流產(chǎn)）妊娠到足月時(shí)，提供照顧的職責(zé)和適當(dāng)?shù)恼苤啤?</p&

6、gt;<p>　　幸運(yùn)的是，大多數(shù)婦女在美國(guó)都有決定孕育嬰兒這樣的選擇。雖然，照顧胎兒并不取決于是否有這樣的選擇。由于至少在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)墮胎仍然存在，一個(gè)在道德上可以接受的選擇是，發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)人懷孕本身并不強(qiáng)加一種照顧胎兒的義務(wù)，也并不強(qiáng)加選擇繼續(xù)懷孕。懷孕的責(zé)任是將導(dǎo)致生產(chǎn)嬰兒和照顧兒童這是相當(dāng)合理的期望。 </p><p>　　胎兒權(quán)利的辯論不是每個(gè)人都認(rèn)為母嬰關(guān)系屈服于過度單純化特點(diǎn)。一定數(shù)量強(qiáng)有力

7、的努力，確定了孕婦開始被確認(rèn)道義上獨(dú)特性質(zhì)的責(zé)任和非凡的道德復(fù)雜性的關(guān)系。一定數(shù)量強(qiáng)有力的努力開始設(shè)法對(duì)婦女和一個(gè)在子宮內(nèi)的孩子之間通過肯定關(guān)系確定孕婦獨(dú)特的本質(zhì)道德責(zé)任和非凡復(fù)雜道德。在我自己思考這個(gè)問題，我發(fā)現(xiàn)最有力強(qiáng)調(diào)這一特殊的關(guān)系的以下特點(diǎn)。 </p><p>　　正如出生或收養(yǎng)，婚姻或婚約創(chuàng)立了新的關(guān)系，因懷孕帶來了新的責(zé)任。在子宮內(nèi)植入形成受精卵的婦女參與了一個(gè)獨(dú)特而復(fù)雜的關(guān)系，從受孕的一刻將許多個(gè)月

8、與另一個(gè)人擁有一個(gè)單獨(dú)的（基因）身份，不像子女或配偶，他沒有單獨(dú)存在。這個(gè)問題，他們必須處理的是其中一個(gè)男人或一個(gè)不孕婦女將永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)面對(duì)的：對(duì)界定不是對(duì)另一個(gè)人的照管義務(wù)，也不是一個(gè)人的配偶，父母或后代，而是另一個(gè)在有限的時(shí)間內(nèi)與自己共存的人。 </p><p>　　接受懷孕作出道義上的差異并不是在于本身，我們州的限制可能會(huì)因此發(fā)生被期待母親的行為。一個(gè)期待女人的懷孕（情愿或不情愿地），假設(shè)新的道義上的義務(wù)與未來

9、的父親一樣，但是政府不一定擁有相應(yīng)的權(quán)力，以確保這種道德履行職責(zé)。這個(gè)問題仍然存在，社會(huì)能恰當(dāng)?shù)匾笠幻袐D有什么樣的犧牲，在多大程度上可以合法地限制她的行為。</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯原文</b></p><p>　　The fetus and the law</p><p>　　SHELLEY BURTT</p>

10、<p>　　Department of Political Science，Yale University，New Haven，CT 06520-8301，USA</p><p>　　The fetus and the law： Maternalist vs． natalist perspectives Delimiting the nature and scope of state authori

11、ty over pregnant women I snot an exclusively American problem． Through its laws and judicial decisions， every nation takes a position (not always logical or coherent or just) on this question． In the United States，howeve

12、r， a number of recent developments have combined to focus attention on the possibly unique political status of the expectant mother in a particularly striking way．Most fam</p><p>　　Each of these areas of con

13、troversy raises questions：about the extent of parental and community responsibility to children who have not yet been born．Ought doctors to treat the fetus as 30 % patient? Or should they define their concerns exclusivel

14、y in terms of the health and welfare of the adult who consults them?</p><p>　　I have phrased these questions so as to underline the fact that caring for the unborn child is a shared responsibility； the woman

15、 who willingly or unwillingly finds herself bringing a pregnancy to term is not the only one responsible for a healthy outcome． In elaborating my case for state action in support of the＂emergent family＂I will say more ab

16、out what I take to be the polity＇s role in ensuring the well-being of expectant parents and their anticipated off-spring．But at the core of the fetal r</p><p>　　It is perhaps worthwhile to say something here

17、 about what this view might mean for the morality and politics of abortion． Briefly，my position is that the duty of care a women owes to her fetus does not rule out abortion as a morally acceptable choice in some circums

18、tances and as a morally flawed but still allowable choice in others．Furthermore， the fact that abortions are not in all circumstances a morally acceptable way of managing one＇s pregnancy does not in itself give the state

19、 either the au</p><p>　　I speak in this paper about a decision to bring a baby to term because，fortunately，most women in the United States have such a choice to make．However，the care owed to the fetus is not

20、 dependent on the availability of this choice (as if having no choice about going through with a pregnancy might lessen one＇s responsibility to the child growing inside one)． Because abortion remains，for at least some pe

21、riod of time， a morally acceptable option，discovering one is pregnant does not itself impose a du</p><p>　　Given these disparate characterizations of an identical physical condition， it is perhaps hard to ac

22、cept that maternalists and natalists share any common ground． In fact，both sides in this debate reach their conclusions on the basis of partial and partisan depictions of the fetus　status． Declaring the fetus a separate

23、creature from the moment of conception　does not transform a pregnant woman into a mother with maternal duties towards the separate creatureattached by an umbilical cord to a placen</p><p>　　Not everyone who

24、thinks about the maternal-fetal relationship succumbs to the oversimplification characteristic of participants in the fetal rights debate． A number of powerful efforts to define the moral responsibilities of pregnant wom

25、en manage to begin (or conclude) by affirming the unique nature and extraordinary moral complexity of the relationship between a woman and a developing child in uterus．Any one of these accounts represents a significant i

26、mprovement on what passes for moral reflect</p><p>　　Just as a birth or an adoption，a marriage or an engagement creates a new relationship that brings with it new responsibilities， so does a pregnancy．The

27、implanting of the fertilized egg in the womb creates for the woman involved a unique and complex relationship with another human being - one who possesses，from the moment of conception，a separate (genetic) identity yet w

28、ho will for many months， and unlike a child or spouse， have no separate existence．The problem with which they must grapple is </p><p>　　To accept that pregnancy does make a moral difference does not in itsel

29、f tell us anything about the sort of limits the state may therefore place on an expectant mother＇s behavior．A woman who anticipates carrying her pregnancy to term (willingly or unwillingly) assumes new moral duties，as do

30、es the prospective father，but neither her government nor her obstetrician necessarily possess any corresponding authority to assure that such moral duties are fulfilled．The question remains open of what sort o</p>