餐飲股利理論【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　A Catering Theory of Dividends</p><p>　　Material Source:The journal of finance Author:Malcolm baker and

2、Jeffrey wurgler</p><p>　　Miller and Modigiliani(1961) prove that dividend policy is irrelevant to share value in perfect and efficient capital markets. In that setup, no rational investor has a preference be

3、tween dividends and capital gains. Arbitrage ensures that dividend policy is irrelevant.</p><p>　　Forty-plus years later, the only assumption in this proof that has not been thoroughly scrutinized is market

4、efficiency.In this paper, we argue for a view of dividends that relaxes this assumption. It has three basic ingredients. First,for either psychological or institutional reasons, some investors have an uninformed and perh

5、aps time-varying demand for dividend-paying stocks. Second,arbitrage fails to prevent this demand from driving apart the prices of payers and nonpayers. Third, managers ra</p><p>　　The prediction of the mode

6、l that we focus on in our empirical work is that the propensity to pay dividends depends on a dividend premium (or sometimes discount) in stock prices. To test this hypothesis, we use time-variation in four proxies for t

7、his dividend premium. The broadest one, which we simply call “the”dividend premium, is the difference between the average market-to-book ratio of dividend payers and nonpayers. The other measures are the difference in th

8、e prices of Citizens Utilities’ (C</p><p>　　We then examine whether the aggregate rate of dividend initiations and omissions are connected to these dividend premium proxies. The results on initiations are th

9、e strongest. Each of the four dividend premiumproxies is a significant predictor of the initiation rate. The lagged dividend premium variable by itself explains a remarkable 60% of the annual variation in the initiation

10、rate between 1963 and 2000. We also find that when the initiation rate increases by one standard deviation, returns o</p><p>　　At face value, these results suggest that dividends are highly relevant to share

11、 price, but in different directions at different times. Moreover, the dependence of dividend payment decisions on the dividend premium proxies suggests that managers do cater to time-varying investor demand in an effort

12、to maximize current share price. After a review of alternative hypotheses, we conclude that the results are indeed best explained by this catering dynamic. Explanations based on time-varying firm char</p><p>

13、;　　Such as agency or asymmetric information, also do not address many key results, such as the connection between dividend payment and the CU dividend premium or future returns.</p><p>　　We then investigatew

14、hich source of investor demand creates the time-varying dividend premiumthat attracts caterers. One possibility is traditional dividend clienteles, such as those discussed in Black and Scholes (1974), which are generated

15、 by taxes, transaction costs, or institutional investment constraints.One expects these clienteles to be satisfied by changes in the overall level of dividends,not the number of shares that pay them. But the evidence poi

16、nts the oppositeway—initiations and omis</p><p>　　Another possibility is that the dividend premiumvariables are driven by sentiment. We tentatively endorse this explanation. One possibility is that when the

17、dividend premium is high, investors are seeking firms that exhibit salient characteristics of safety, including dividend payment; when it is low, investors prefer firms with the characteristics of maximum capital appreci

18、ation potential, which means no dividends. This view fits the full set of results well. Further evidence that points to sen</p><p>　　In summary, we develop and test a catering view of dividends that relaxes

19、the market efficiency assumption of the Miller and Modigliani dividend irrelevance proof. The theory thus adds to the collection of theories that relax other assumptions of the proof. It also adds to the literature of be

20、havioral corporate finance. Shefrin and Statman (1984) develop behavioral theories of investor preference for dividends based on self-control problems, prospect theory, and regret aversion. Our paper is clo</p>&l

21、t;p>　　We propose a viewof dividends that is based on relaxing themarket efficiency assumption of the dividend irrelevance proof. It adds to the collection of dividend theories that relax other assumptions of the proof

22、. The essence of the catering theory is that managers give investors what they currently want. In the case of dividends, catering implies that managers tend to initiate dividends when investors put a relatively high stoc

23、k price on dividend payers, and tend to omit dividends when investors</p><p>　　Our empirical work focuses on the prediction that the rates of dividend initiation and omission depend on the current “dividend

24、premium,” or the difference between the current stock prices of payers and nonpayers. We test this prediction by forming four stock price-based proxies for the dividend premium. We find that the aggregate initiation rate

25、 is significantly positively related to all four of our proxies. (In one case, this does not amount to more than a common trend.) In addition, the rate </p><p>　　We then inquire about the source of investor

26、demand for dividends. We do not find much evidence that it springs from traditional dividend clienteles. Instead, sentiment appears to be a key factor. This is suggested in the connection between the closed-end fund disc

27、ount and the dividend premium variable,and in instrumental variables estimates of the effect of the dividend premium on dividend payment. In Baker and Wurgler (2002b), we review academic histories of the capital markets

28、and historical </p><p>　　Finally, we remind the reader that both the model and the empirical results are about the discrete decision whether to pay dividends, not how much to pay.Once dividends are initiated

29、, increases and decreases appear to be governed more by firm-level profitability than by the relative valuations of payers and nonpayers. Thus in terms of aggregate economic significance, catering explains the number of

30、payers but not the total payouts by existing payers. As a result,we suggest that catering be taken</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　餐飲股利理論</b></p><p>　　資料來(lái)源:金融

31、雜志, 2004（06）. 作者：馬爾科姆貝克和杰弗瑞沃勒</p><p>　　米勒和摩的吉拉尼(1961)證明了股利政策與股票價(jià)值在完善和高效率的資本市場(chǎng)上是毫不相關(guān)的。在這個(gè)設(shè)定下,合理的投資者沒(méi)有在股息和資本收益之間的特選。套利可以確保股利政策是毫不相關(guān)的。</p><p>　　四十多年過(guò)去了，還沒(méi)有被徹底審查證明其唯一假設(shè)是市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)。本文中，我們?yōu)楣上⒄叻艑掃@一假設(shè)爭(zhēng)論。它有三

32、個(gè)基本要素，首先，無(wú)論是心理還是體制的原因，也許隨時(shí)間變化的需求一些投資者對(duì)支付股息的股票的不了解。其次，除了價(jià)格這一需求,套利未能防止主導(dǎo)的納稅人成為未被支付者。第三，管理者合理迎合投資者的需求，當(dāng)他們支付股利時(shí)，投資者對(duì)納稅人提出更高的價(jià)格，他們不支付時(shí)，投資者寧愿不支付。我們?cè)谝粋€(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的模型證實(shí)這種對(duì)紅利規(guī)定的看法。</p><p>　　該模型是根據(jù)我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和我們的工作重點(diǎn)來(lái)預(yù)測(cè)建立的，并且根據(jù)傾向支付股

33、息股票價(jià)格的溢價(jià)（或有時(shí)折扣）而定。為了檢驗(yàn)這一假設(shè)，我們用四個(gè)代理使用的時(shí)間作為此項(xiàng)股息溢價(jià)變化的時(shí)間。最普遍的一個(gè)，我們簡(jiǎn)單地稱(chēng)之為“紅利溢價(jià)”，是與市場(chǎng)平均對(duì)書(shū)派息和不繳納比例的差異。另一措施是公用事業(yè)中的公民（CU）的現(xiàn)金股利和股票紅利份額類(lèi)的價(jià)格差（1956年至1989年有兩個(gè)類(lèi)別的股份的形式不同，但不是他們的支出水平），其結(jié)果表明最近發(fā)起股息和納稅人之間的未來(lái)股票收益存在差異。直覺(jué)告訴人們，保費(fèi)分紅，紅利溢價(jià)開(kāi)始影響到當(dāng)前納

34、稅人的超額需求并且呈正相關(guān)。與此相反，在未來(lái)的回報(bào)付款人和不繳納差別是呈負(fù)相關(guān)的，這方面對(duì)納稅人的需求是如此之高，如果他們目前的相對(duì)過(guò)高，會(huì)導(dǎo)致其未來(lái)的回報(bào)會(huì)比較低。 </p><p>　　然后，我們研究關(guān)于發(fā)起的股息率和遺漏是否總會(huì)聯(lián)系到這些紅利溢價(jià)代理。結(jié)果發(fā)起的股息率的影響是最強(qiáng)的。四股息代理保費(fèi)每一個(gè)都是起始率有顯著的預(yù)測(cè)。紅利本身的滯后變量解釋了保費(fèi)在1963年至2000年引發(fā)速率的年際顯著變化60％。

35、我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差引發(fā)速率的增加，對(duì)付款人的回歸低于不繳納的每年九個(gè)百分點(diǎn)在以后的三年。相反，漏報(bào)率增加時(shí)股利保費(fèi)變低，而當(dāng)對(duì)納稅人未來(lái)的回報(bào)也高?；貧w結(jié)果的具有可預(yù)測(cè)性，特別是具有和分紅相關(guān)的并且隨時(shí)間變化的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)暗示。</p><p>　　就票面價(jià)值而言，這些結(jié)果表明，股息與股票形式是高度相關(guān)的用不同的方向在不同的時(shí)刻。此外，對(duì)股息紅利代理保費(fèi)的決定表明，經(jīng)理人的依賴(lài)是隨時(shí)間變化的，是為了最大限度地提

36、高當(dāng)前股價(jià)投資者的需求而變化的。經(jīng)過(guò)審查替代假說(shuō)，我們得出這樣的結(jié)論確實(shí)是最好的結(jié)果，是這個(gè)飲食動(dòng)態(tài)的解釋?；诮忉寱r(shí)變特征，如公司的投資機(jī)會(huì)或盈利，不僅僅為取得的結(jié)果：股息保費(fèi)變化有助于解釋殘余“傾向，倡導(dǎo)”分紅后改變公司特征，包括改變投資的機(jī)會(huì)仍然被控制，利潤(rùn)和企業(yè)規(guī)模使用的方法和法國(guó)法瑪（2001）等，數(shù)據(jù)許多其他特點(diǎn)也與這個(gè)解釋不一致?；跁r(shí)間的替代假說(shuō)變承包的問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　作為這些機(jī)構(gòu)和信

37、息部對(duì)稱(chēng)，也沒(méi)有解決許多關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題，例如中和CU股息紅利溢價(jià)或連接未來(lái)收益的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　隨后，我們調(diào)查投資者的需求來(lái)源，創(chuàng)造了隨時(shí)間變化的股息溢價(jià)吸引供應(yīng)商。一種可能性是傳統(tǒng)的分紅的客戶(hù)群，如在布萊克和斯科爾斯（1974年）中談到的，這是由稅收,交易成本，或機(jī)構(gòu)投資來(lái)限制。預(yù)計(jì)這些客戶(hù)群被更改，滿足了整體水平所產(chǎn)生的股息，薪酬都挺不錯(cuò)的，而不僅僅是股份。但是證據(jù)點(diǎn)相反，發(fā)起和遺漏有關(guān)股息溢價(jià)，但總股

38、息收益率，總支出比例，增加總量的股息率都沒(méi)有變化。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，發(fā)起和遺漏之間的關(guān)系是保費(fèi)分紅同樣明顯的需求后，為客戶(hù)代理所合理控制的。</p><p>　　另一種可能性是，股息溢價(jià)變量是由情緒驅(qū)動(dòng)的。我們初步贊同這種解釋。這種可能性是，當(dāng)紅利溢價(jià)高，投資者正在尋求企業(yè)的安全表現(xiàn)出鮮明的特色，包括股息，當(dāng)它是低，投資者更喜歡最大資本潛力特征的企業(yè)，這意味著公司沒(méi)有分紅的特點(diǎn)。這種觀點(diǎn)很好的符合全套的結(jié)果。進(jìn)一步的指

39、向情緒與優(yōu)質(zhì)股息和定額基金折扣正相關(guān)。 </p><p>　　總之，我們開(kāi)發(fā)和測(cè)試的餐飲股息認(rèn)為，放寬對(duì)米勒和莫迪利亞尼股利無(wú)關(guān)市場(chǎng)效率假設(shè)的證據(jù)。從而增加了該理論的論證，放寬證明其他假設(shè)。它也增加了企業(yè)融資行為的文獻(xiàn)。 舍福林和斯德曼（1984）開(kāi)發(fā)投資者特選的行動(dòng)理論根據(jù)自我控制的股息，勘察理論，并且后悔反感。我們的理論更接近以安全管理決策的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)的理性反應(yīng)的研究思路。例如，貝克和沃勒（2000）和貝克，格

40、林伍德和沃勒（2003）查看證券發(fā)行的決定，以知覺(jué)錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)的反應(yīng)，貝克和沃勒（2002年）發(fā)展成為資本結(jié)構(gòu)市場(chǎng)時(shí)機(jī)認(rèn)為，這是放寬市場(chǎng)效率假設(shè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)無(wú)關(guān)的證明。 舍爾佛和衛(wèi)詩(shī)（2003年）制定的兼并.默克，施萊弗市場(chǎng)時(shí)機(jī)理論，和衛(wèi)詩(shī)（1990），斯坦因（1996年），波爾克和羅馬大學(xué)（2002），貝克施.泰因和沃勒（2003）研究企業(yè)投資效率低下資本市場(chǎng)。格雷厄姆和哈維（2001）和簡(jiǎn)特（2001）提供進(jìn)一步的證據(jù)，管理人員應(yīng)對(duì)錯(cuò)誤定

41、價(jià)，或至少表示定價(jià)的看法。</p><p>　　我們提出根據(jù)股息不相關(guān)證明的松弛效率提出假設(shè)的股息。它增加了股利理論，放寬證明其他假設(shè)的集合。餐飲理論的精華是經(jīng)理給予投資者他們目前想要的。在股息的情況下，餐飲理論意味著當(dāng)投資者分紅派息相對(duì)高價(jià)格的股票，并往往省略分紅時(shí)，投資者寧愿不繳納。一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的模型形式化的關(guān)鍵權(quán)衡參與，并提供可檢驗(yàn)的預(yù)測(cè)。 </p><p>　　我們的實(shí)證工作的重點(diǎn)是預(yù)

42、測(cè)，啟動(dòng)和遺漏的股息率取決于當(dāng)前的“紅利溢價(jià)”，或者納稅人之間的當(dāng)前股票價(jià)格和不繳納差異。我們測(cè)試這個(gè)成形四個(gè)股票股利溢價(jià)價(jià)格為基礎(chǔ)的代理預(yù)測(cè)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，總引發(fā)速率與我們所有代理的四個(gè)股票顯著正相關(guān)（這是一種情況，這并不等于多個(gè)普遍的趨勢(shì)）。此外，四個(gè)代理保費(fèi)與兩個(gè)遺漏股息率顯著負(fù)相關(guān)?；仡櫶娲僬f(shuō)后，我們認(rèn)為，餐飲理論是最自然的解釋。結(jié)果表明，股息與股票價(jià)值高度相關(guān)，但在不同的時(shí)間不同的方向。此外，管理人員顯然認(rèn)可并滿足投資者需求變化

43、的派息。 </p><p>　　最后，我們?cè)儐?wèn)有關(guān)投資者對(duì)股息的需求來(lái)源。我們沒(méi)有找到太多的它與傳統(tǒng)顧客群反彈的證據(jù)。反而，情緒似乎是一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素。這是建議在與封閉式基金折價(jià)和溢價(jià)股息變化的連接上的，并且是關(guān)于股息紅利溢價(jià)效應(yīng)的估計(jì)。在貝克和沃勒（2002），我們回顧資本市場(chǎng)和歷史新聞文章的學(xué)術(shù)歷史更好了解股息的投資者的態(tài)度為什么隨著時(shí)間的推移改變了。</p><p>　　最后，我們提醒讀