中國企業(yè)年金制度變遷博弈分析與經(jīng)濟仿真.pdf

1、首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學碩士學位論文中國企業(yè)年金制度變遷博弈分析與經(jīng)濟仿真姓名：姜金秋申請學位級別：碩士專業(yè)：數(shù)量經(jīng)濟學指導教師：王文舉20100601首都經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學碩士學位論文中國企業(yè)年金制度變遷博弈分析與經(jīng)濟仿真IIAbstractMinistryofCivilAffairsreptedthattheagingproblemofChinahasenteredarapiddevelopmentstageby2008.Lowfertility

2、agingpopulationhystereticsocialsecuritysystemshavebecomethemajrisksfdevelopmentinthefuture.TherefesomeproblemsoftheoldageinsuranceofenterpriseemployeesinChinashouldbeconcernedtheenterpriseannuitysystemwhichshouldbesuitab

3、lefChinawillbeconstructed.AbovetwofacetsarethekeylinksftheinnovationofoldageinsurancesysteminChinawhichisverymeaningfulfimprovingthesocialsecuritysystemofourcountry.Howeveraboveproblemsshouldbeovercomebefethecrisisofsoci

4、alsecuritygettingserious.Firstlythisthesiselabatestherelationallybasictheyaboutthecontentsoftheenterpriseannuitysystemsystemtraitsbasicoldageinsurancecommercialinsurancetherelationshipoffinancialcapitalmarketsoon.itisuse

5、fulfanalyzingthesubstantiveacteristicsofenterpriseannuitysystem.AtthesametimethepropertylocationdevelopmentoftheenterpriseannuityinChinawasfoundwithacrosssectionview.Abovetheachievementsareobtainedbycomparativeanalysisof

6、sometypicalfeigncountries.Secondlythecompatibleoperationmanagementpatternoftheenterpriseannuitysystemcouldbeanalyzedbyeconomicalprinciple.Thisthesisagreestotakeahighgovernmentinterventionmanagementmodelftheenterpriseannu

7、itysystemifthemacroperspectivewaschosen.HoweverfromthemicroperspectivethispapercombineswiththeSamuelson’soverlappingmodelitalsointroducestheenterpriseannuitysystemsotheDCmodelisobtainedwhichcouldreducetheburdenofthefinan

8、cethepotentialburdenfgovernmentwillalsobeavoided.Soitismesuitableftheactualnationalsituationofourcountry.Furthermethisthesisprofoundlyinterpretsthegameprocessamongthecesubjectsoftheenterpriseannuitybyusingthetheyofevolut

9、ionarygame.threedifferentevolutionarygamemodelsofgovernmententerprisetheconnectionaboveareconstructedwhichanalyzethecompellingsystemtransitionbygovernmenttheinductivetransitionbyenterpriseanothertransitionbygovernmentent

10、erprise.Italsoshowstheoptimalstrategywithdifferenttransitionstylethetwoconditionsarefoundwhichareessentialfthetransitionofenterpriseannuitysystem.FinallythisthesissimulatestheprocessofthetransitionofChina’senterpriseannu

11、itysystembyusingmatlabitalsoverifiesthetransfmation.Meoveraboveresultsshowthattheidealequilibriumconclusioncanbegottenjustinthestageofmarketientedregulationoftheenterpriseannuitysystem.Afterfurthersimulatingtheinfluencef

12、theequilibriumresultsofdifferentparameterstheconclusionindicatesthatincreasingthetaxpreferenceimprovingthecapitalmarketreducingthepoliticalcostofproclaimingthepolicycanallpromotethetransitionoftheenterpriseannuitysystemt