外文翻譯---汽車業(yè)競爭的關鍵汽車金融中自由市場和消費者的保護

1、<p>　　外文題目：AUTO RACE TO THE BOTTOM: Free Markets and Consumer Protection in Auto Finance </p><p>　　出 處：Research Note November 16, 2009

2、 </p><p>　　作 者：Raj Date and Brian Reed </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　AUTO RACE TO THE BOT

3、TOM:</p><p>　　Free Markets and Consumer Protection in Auto Finance</p><p>　　Raj Date and Brian Reed</p><p>　　1.0 Introduction</p><p>　　Over the past several months, the

4、 Federal Reserve, Congress, and the Administration have been considering ways to strengthen and rationalize consumer protection in financial services. Central to that debate is the proposed creation of a new agency focus

5、ed exclusively on this issue, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency (the “CFPA”).</p><p>　　Despite pronounce industry opposition, a consensus appears to be developing among policy-makers that the prolifer

6、ation of dubiously structured and marketed consumer financial products helped fuel an unsustainable bubble in credit and asset values prior to the financial crisis, and visited widespread distress among households therea

7、fter. Proponents of the CFPA argue that it would help prevent similar problems in the future. </p><p>　　Even among proponents, however, there are varying conceptions of the scope and function of the CFPA. On

8、e of the most significant variations is in the treatment of auto finance. Specifically, the CFPA as envisioned by the House Financial Services Committee would exclude auto dealers from the CFPA’s coverage. The Administra

9、tion’s original proposal would have included them.</p><p>　　This research note does not address the issue of whether the CFPA itself is advisable. Instead, it is meant to inform debate on, assuming there is

10、a CFPA, whether auto dealers should be included in its mandate. In particular, it (a) summarizes the structure of the auto finance industry, and the role of dealers within it; (b) identifies the analytical premises for e

11、xcluding financial services activities from the CFPA’s scope; (c) evaluates, in light of that analytical framework, whether dealers s</p><p>　　2.0 Executive Summary</p><p>　　The exemption of aut

12、o dealers from the CFPA is conceptually flawed. It is logically discordant with the basic premises underpinning the CFPA; it further fuels long-term instability in U.S. financial services by discriminating against commun

13、ity banks and credit unions; it intervenes with the free market in a way that is both distorting and inequitable. </p><p>　　Notably, analysis of the dealer exemption need not even first evaluate whether the

14、CFPA itself is advisable. One need only acknowledge that, if Congress ultimately chooses to create the CFPA, it will be because it believes (1) that consumer protection is a materially important objective in financial se

15、rvices; (2) that comprehensive rule-making will prevent problematic opportunities for regulatory arbitrage; and (3) that centralized supervision of consumer protection is more effective than a dece</p><p>　　

16、Those logical premises are clearly relevant to auto dealers’ financing activities. Dealers are not a niche part of an immaterial market; they are the single largest channel (with 79% market share) in the origination of a

17、uto loans and leases, a business that (at more than $850 billion in out standings) is larger than the entire credit card industry. </p><p>　　Moreover, auto finance is demonstrably susceptible to unfair and d

18、eceptive practices, and those practices are demonstrably not held in check by private market forces alone. Intentionally creating a fragmented approach to regulation in auto finance -- one set of rules for auto dealers,

19、another set for banks and credit unions – would invite the kind of “race to the bottom” in consumer practices that was manifest during the credit bubble. At the same time, the exemption discourages a “race to the t</p

20、><p>　　The exemption would also encourage long term instability in the market’s structure. The auto finance market consists of two basic distribution channels: the dealer (or “indirect”) channel, which is gener

21、ally funded by a handful of large national banks and Wall Street capital markets platforms; and the retail (or “direct”) channel, which generally consists of credit unions and community and regional banks. By artificiall

22、y distorting the auto finance market in favor of the dealers’ distribution ch</p><p>　　3.0 Auto Finance Primer</p><p>　　Auto finance is big business in the United States. Although American house

23、holds’ credit obligations are dominated by mortgage and home equity debt, auto finance -- which includes both loans and leases -- constitutes the next largest category, edging out even revolving credit card balances. (Se

24、e Figure 1).</p><p>　　Despite its size, the industry is not especially complex. That said, evaluating policy alternatives for the business does require a basic understanding of the industry’s (1) distributio

25、n channels, (2) funding models, and (3) key changes during the credit bubble and crisis.</p><p>　　3.1 Distribution channels</p><p>　　As in the mortgage business, auto loans are originated throug

26、h both direct and indirect channels. (See Figure 2). </p><p>　　“Direct channels” -- which include branch-based, telephone-based, and online models -- involve lenders interacting with borrowers themselves. Al

27、though direct channels have become more efficient over time, their share of overall originations remains stubbornly low, at only a fifth of the market. </p><p>　　“Indirect” channels involve some manner of in

28、termediation -- a middleman – between the lender (like a bank or finance company) and the borrower. In auto finance, the finance and insurance staff at auto dealers (typically called the “F&I office”) serve that midd

29、leman function. Like other credit intermediaries, F&I staff obtain borrower information sufficient to obtain loan approvals from lenders, persuade the borrower to agree to a loan, and document the loan as necessary.

30、As with mortgage broker</p><p>　　Although individual lenders can, and frequently do, participate in both direct and indirect channels, most lenders skew towards either working directly with customers themsel

31、ves, or working through auto dealers. (See Figure 3). The “captive” finance companies (that is, those finance companies, like GMAC, historically owned by manufacturers) favor the indirect channel. Because auto manufactur

32、ing is an enormously scale-intensive business, manufacturers tend to feel pressure to artificially stimula</p><p>　　In notable contrast to the captive finance companies, credit unions tend to have relatively

33、 strong consumer franchises, and no meaningful commercial business with dealers, so they disproportionately favor the direct channel. Put another way, credit unions have a competitive advantage working directly with cust

34、omers, and very little to lose in their relationships with auto dealers. </p><p>　　Commercial banks’ channel preferences tend to vary according to their size. Most community banks are too small too co

35、mpete meaningfully in the indirect channel, and instead participate directly with their retail customers. Many of the largest commercial banks, by contrast, are large players in the dealer channel.</p><p>　　

36、3.2 Funding models</p><p>　　The split between direct and indirect distribution channels also has major implications on the funding model for auto finance.</p><p>　　Auto dealers, of course, have

37、no privileged access to funding with which to make consumer loans. As a result, in the vast majority of cases, dealers originate loans knowing that they will be assigned to lenders with whom they work.</p><p&g

38、t;　　The lenders that work with dealers, in turn, are more often than not the captive finance companies. Captive finance companies are not banks. Among other things, this means that they lack the branch networks or commer

39、cial customer bases to reliably attract low cost, stable deposit funding. Instead, they rely heavily on capital markets funding, which is typically raised by Wall Street firms’ unsecured or asset backed securities origin

40、ation businesses. Indeed, even GMAC, which has been the benefici</p><p>　　By contrast, because the most significant lenders in the direct channel tend to be credit unions and smaller banks, the funding model

41、 for direct auto loans tends to rely more heavily on traditional deposits than on the capital markets. Most small banks and credit unions lack the scale to reliably access the asset-backed markets, and simply selling who

42、le loans to Wall Street (so that they might be packaged with other small banks’ loans and securitized) is problematic as well, because it would typ</p><p>　　3.3 Impact of the Bubble and Crisis</p><

43、;p>　　Not surprisingly, auto lending has suffered mightily since the onset of the credit crisis. Credit deterioration has afflicted both prime and subprime auto loans. (See Figure 5). </p><p>　　Like other

44、consumer lending categories, subprime constitutes a meaningful component of overall auto lending, and a greater component of industry profitability. But unlike in mortgage, the auto finance industry did not particularly

45、expand its level of subprime borrowing during the course of the bubble. The fraction of overall lending attributable to subprime remained roughly constant: approximately 20% of loans to borrowers below FICO 660.</p>

46、;<p>　　This is an intuitive result: for lower-income Americans, in most parts of the country, car ownership is often a practical requirement to commute to and from work. Unlike subprime homeownership, subprime car

47、 ownership was not a one-time luxury transformed into an attainable “necessity” by the availability of easy credit. Rather, subprime car ownership has actually been a necessity, not a luxury, all along.</p><p&

48、gt;　　Other underwriting criteria, however, did slip -- including loan-to-value ratios and, especially, the length of loan terms. (See Figure 6). Cars, of course, depreciate quickly over time. Because older cars are worth

49、 a good deal less than newer cars, when a borrower defaults near the end of a long loan term, the resale value of the repossessed vehicle is typically significantly less than the unpaid principal balance owed. Lower reco

50、veries on repossessed cars, in turn, mean worse loss severities, </p><p>　　Beyond the credit deterioration of existing portfolios, the bubble-era’s widespread availability of permissive LTVs and loan terms h

51、ad a second, more subtle, and potentially more corrosive effect. By temporarily boosting auto dealers’ sales volume, and especially their lending profitability, the credit bubble may well have forestalled actual structur

52、al change within the auto dealer sector.</p><p>　　At first glance, it would appear that, for years, auto dealers were able to defy free market gravity. The industry suffered a 200-basis point decline in new

53、car gross margins over the past 10 years. This would seem crippling, given that selling cars is a brutally thin-margin business, and dealerships tend to run only 150-basis point pretax net profit margins, even in good ti

54、mes. And yet, somehow, dealerships remained remarkably profitable -- running net profits at 20-25% of net worth throughout </p><p>　　The explanation for this other-worldly performance is actually quite simpl

55、e: As gross margins in the auto sales business deteriorated over the past decade, auto dealers managed to dramatically increase their sales of high-margin consumer loans, service contracts, and other profitable ancillary

56、 services. (See Figure 8).</p><p>　　By the end of the credit bubble, in other words, the financial viability of American auto dealers had become critically dependent on serving as a financial middleman, mark

57、ing up loans between money-losing captive finance companies on the one hand, and their increasingly cash strapped and wary customers on the other. Over the course of the bubble, auto dealerships -- employers of more than

58、 1 million Americans -- had managed to steer themselves into a strategic and financial dead end.</p><p>　　4.0 Evaluating the CFPA Exemption for Auto Dealers</p><p>　　It is within that industry c

59、ontext that the House Financial Services Committee voted to exclude auto dealers from the CFPA’s rule-making and enforcement scope. And it is within that industry context that the wisdom of the exemption should be gauged

60、. </p><p>　　Notably, evaluating the wisdom of the dealer exemption (or any other exemption, for that matter) need not first determine whether the CFPA itself is a good or bad idea. Because it is an exemption

61、 being evaluated, the creation of the CFPA is an assumption of the analysis. And given the lengthy substantive debate among policymakers regarding the CFPA, the logical premises that underpin the assumed creation of the

62、agency are clear.</p><p>　　There are three such premises. The CFPA will be enacted if, and only if, Congress decides that: (1) consumer protection is a materially important objective in financial services; (

63、2) comprehensive rule-making is superior to rules based on charter-type or other formal distinctions; and (3) centralized supervision and enforcement of consumer protection is better than a more decentralized approach ti

64、ed to prudential regulation. (See Figure 9). </p><p>　　If there is a CFPA, then, the only exemptions from the CFPA’s authority should be in those cases where the premises that justify the agency’s creation d

65、o not apply.</p><p>　　Because auto dealers do not have prudential regulators (like banks), the third stage of the framework is not relevant. Applying the first two prongs, though, makes clear that the exempt

66、ion is profoundly wrong-minded.</p><p>　　4.1 Importance of consumer protection in the dealer channel</p><p>　　Given the industry structure detailed above, consumer protection seems a critical re

67、gulatory concern with respect to auto dealers. 4.1.1 Role of dealers</p><p>　　Auto dealers are the dominant distribution channel in auto finance, and auto finance is the largest category of consumer credit o

68、utside of mortgage. Far from being passive administrators with respect to auto finance, auto dealers actively market and price borrowers’ loans.</p><p>　　Moreover, the dealers’ business model with respect to

69、 auto finance bears several red flags of potential abuse. They routinely mark up loan offers, typically collecting the equivalent of half of the resultant excess finance charges as a bounty; they have the ability to obsc

70、ure pricing among the several moving parts of an auto transaction (new car price, trade-in value, loan rate, loan fees, “garbage” fees, aftermarket services); they often receive incentives from lenders, or pay “dealer di

71、scount”</p><p>　　In many of these ways, dealers’ F&I functions bear a striking resemblance to mortgage brokers; both warrant consumer protections.</p><p>　　4.1.2 Market-based forces insuffic

72、ient</p><p>　　Recent history suggests that market-based forces alone -- that is, the vigilance and skepticism of auto lenders and borrowers -- are insufficient to reliably ensure those consumer protections.&

73、lt;/p><p>　　For example, it is certainly theoretically true that lenders should prevent dealers from levying excessive after-market fees, or exorbitant loan markups. After all, cash that flows from the borrower

74、 to the dealer is cash that is not available to support the new loan obligation. Moreover, customers that find themselves susceptible to high aftermarket fees are also an adversely selected credit pool (among two seeming

75、ly identical borrowers, the one who buys undercarriage protection, statistically, </p><p>　　4.2 Regulatory arbitrage</p><p>　　Exempting auto dealers also creates precisely the potential for regu

76、latory arbitrage that the CFPA is intended to prevent – and invites the potential for further unintended weakening in the industry’s structure.</p><p>　　4.2.1 Market distortion</p><p>　　Exemptin

77、g one class of market participants from consumer protection rules of general applicability creates the risk that those participants will use their special status to distort the marketplace in their favor, and to consumer

78、s’ detriment.</p><p>　　This risk is particularly acute in the case of auto dealers. Dealers are already the dominant channel in auto finance, and their F&I business model already carries with it an array

79、 of features that make it susceptible to abuse. Given a special, less-demanding consumer protection regime, it is difficult to conceive of why the already-dominant dealer channel would not quickly squeeze other, more tra

80、nsparent business models further to the periphery of the business.</p><p>　　Ideally, more transparent, more customer friendly business models would out complete more dubious practices over time. Such busines

81、s models -- principally at credit unions and smaller banks -- are possibly, even now, slowly taking root with customers. (See Figure 10). Essentially, the regulatory exemption risks artificially crippling more customer-f

82、riendly business models, instead of letting them compete on an even playing field.</p><p>　　4.2.2 Market instability</p><p>　　The Wall Street-dominated funding of the auto dealer-originated loan

83、s has a longer-term destabilizing impact away from issues of consumer protection. As the crisis has demonstrated, capital markets funding can be extraordinarily fickle, particularly in the asset-backed markets. When poli

84、cy-makers artificially favor</p><p>　　Wall Street-funded businesses over traditional deposit-funded banks (e.g. through TARP capital infusions to the largest banks; through TALF leverage for asset backed sec

85、urities; through TLGP’s FDIC debt guarantees for finance companies; and now, through a special regulatory regime for auto dealers) they are risking rebuilding precisely the same unstable shadow banking system that just p

86、roved its own frailty.</p><p>　　Most obviously, the exemption is an affirmative step in the wrong direction for consumer protection in auto finance. It seeks to protect the players with the most dubious cust

87、omer practices, and it discriminates against the relatively customer friendly direct channel strategies pursued by community banks and credit unions. </p><p>　　The exemption also offends even the most basic

88、principles of regulatory equity. Free market adherents should be dismayed by the notion of special regulatory treatment for some classes of market participants (car dealers, national banks, Wall Street firms) over others

89、 (community banks, credit unions) that appear equally distressed in the current crisis.</p><p>　　Perhaps even more troubling than the auto dealer exemption itself, given the large, bipartisan majority of the

90、 House Financial Services Committee that supported it, is what it implies more broadly: The bipartisan zeal for, and growing comfort with, special interest subsidies that distort free markets in favor of the largest and

91、most politically entrenched participants.</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　汽車業(yè)競爭的關鍵：汽車金融中自由市場和消費者的保護 </p><p>　　在過去的幾個月里，美聯(lián)儲、國會和政府一直在考慮如何加強對消費者金融服務的保護。辯論的核心是要不要設立一個新的機構，即消

92、費者金融保護局(CFPA)，這個機構來集中處理對消費者金融服務的保護。</p><p>　　盡管有人反對設立這樣一個機構，但大多數(shù)人都建議設立，政策制定者在觀察了住戶的情況后認為，金融危機之前，市場結構和消費金融產(chǎn)品的擴散，助長了信貸和資產(chǎn)價值的泡沫現(xiàn)象。CFPA的支持者認為，設立CFPA將有助于防止今后類似問題的發(fā)生。</p><p>　　有的支持者對CFPA的范圍和功能有不同觀點。最顯

93、著的變化是在汽車金融業(yè)的扶持方面。具體來說，CFPA會從其管轄范圍內排除汽車經(jīng)銷商。即使CFPA本身的建議是可取的，這項研究也不解決問題。相反，它是為了告知人們，假設有一個CFPA，汽車經(jīng)銷商是否應在其管轄范圍內。</p><p>　　這樣研究有以下功能：總結了汽車金融業(yè)的結構，以及經(jīng)銷商在其中的作用;在該分析性框架下，是否應把經(jīng)銷商排除，確定了CFPA的任務范圍;有可能制定法律來將其排除，突出了其影響。

94、 從CFPA中把汽車經(jīng)銷商排除，它在概念上是有缺陷的。這在邏輯上與支撐CFPA的基本前提是不一致的，美國金融服務對社區(qū)銀行和信用社支持力度長期不穩(wěn)定，它干預自由市場的方式是扭曲和不公平的。</p><p>　　值得注意的是，關于排除經(jīng)銷商，不需要先評估CFPA本身是否可取。人們只需要承認，如果國會最終選擇設立CFPA，那是因為國會認為消費者的保護是一項重大的金融服務目標;全面制定規(guī)則以防止監(jiān)管問題中出現(xiàn)套利機會;

95、對保護消費者的集中監(jiān)管比分散監(jiān)管更有效和審慎。</p><p>　　經(jīng)銷商在市場中的地位很重要，它們有最大的單一渠道汽車貸款和租賃（含79％的市場份額），這些汽車貸款和租賃的企業(yè)的規(guī)模（超過850美元的出榜上億美元）比整個信用卡行業(yè)還大。此外，汽車金融的某些方面是明顯不公平的，消費者容易受到欺騙，而這些做法靠私人力量是難以實現(xiàn)的。它們故意創(chuàng)造一個在汽車金融監(jiān)管方面競相殺價的假象（汽車經(jīng)銷商的另一個為銀行和信用社設

96、置規(guī)則）。</p><p>　　汽車金融市場由兩個基本分銷渠道：經(jīng)銷商（或“間接”）通道，通常是由國家大型銀行和華爾街的少數(shù)資本市場平臺組成;零售（或“直接”）通道，一般包括信用社和社區(qū)銀行和區(qū)域銀行組成。人為的扭曲汽車經(jīng)銷商的行為，有利于金融市場的分銷渠道，鼓勵更多使用華爾街的資金而不是銀行存款資金。由于受金融危機的影響，勉強將籌資模式從傳統(tǒng)的銀行和信用社形式轉變成華爾街的形式，這會給以后的發(fā)展帶來潛在危險。

97、 汽車金融在美國是大行業(yè)。美國家庭的信用義務主要由抵押貸款和房屋凈值債務組成，汽車金融（其中包括貸款和租賃）則構成了第二大類別，甚至險勝信用卡業(yè)務。</p><p>　　汽車金融行業(yè)盡管規(guī)模很大，但不是特別復雜。想要評估某項經(jīng)濟經(jīng)營政策，需要了解該行業(yè)的基礎，如汽車金融分銷渠道的基本認識，汽車金融的融資模式，汽車金融在信貸泡沫和危機下的關鍵變化。 在抵押貸款業(yè)務中，汽車金融是通過直接和間接的渠道

98、進行的。“直接通道”以分支機構為基礎，使用電話和在線的模式，即貸款人與借款人自己參與互動。雖然隨著時間的推移，直接渠道將越來越有效，但“直接渠道”所占份額比較低，只有市場份額的五分之一。</p><p>　　“間接”渠道是一種發(fā)生貸款人和借款人間的中介方式。汽車經(jīng)銷商處金融和保險的工作人員起到服務中介的功能。像其他信用中介機構一樣，金融和保險的員工利用其獲得的足夠的信息來說服借款人同意貸款。由于有按揭經(jīng)紀的存在，