外文翻譯--縣級(jí)地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)芬蘭和挪威的效益審計(jì)效率性研究

1、<p>　　2420漢字，,1640單詞,9300英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Johnsen Å, Meklin P, Oulasvirta L, et al. Performance auditing in local government: an exploratory study of perceived efficiency of municipal value for mon

2、ey auditing in Finland and Norway[J]. European accounting review, 2001, 10(3): 583-599.</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯 </b></p><p>　　Performance auditing in local government: an exploratory s

3、tudy of perceived efficiency of municipal value for money auditing in Finland and Norway</p><p>　　Author: Age Johnsen, Pentti Meklin , Jarmo Vakkuri</p><p>　　There was an unambiguous, positive a

4、ttitude to performance audit among the three Norwegian informants. Performance audit was not regarded as an unnecessary mandatory task, but some instrumental task with the purpose of improving the municipal management. I

5、n particular it was regarded as an important and efficient tool for control and reform of the public sector. Performance auditing was regarded as a part of a double-loop learning process. The chief administrative officer

6、 of the county did, howe</p><p>　　Our informants estimated that 15?20% of the resources were used in performance auditing, but that 40?50% was desirable. Our finds are relatively similar to an earlier Norweg

7、ian study of desired and factual use of resources on performance auditing Schwanitz, 1997. She reported results indicating that in 1995 only 13% of the Norwegian municipal auditors’ resources were used in performance aud

8、iting. According to her survey the municipal auditors claimed that the desired level of performance auditin</p><p>　　The performance audit intended functions the 3Es were only partly achieved. The two chief

9、administrative officers thought the main reason for this could be poorly performed audits, mainly due to lack of competence among the auditors. However, they both pointed out that there had been a noticeable improvement

10、of the audits in later years. The informant from the municipal audit, on the other hand, thought that if the resources had been adequate according to the audit tasks, the quality of the audi</p><p>　　In so f

11、ar as there were audit reports of good quality, these were, according to the two chief administrative officers, used actively. The county chief administrative officer had the strong impression that the reports first of a

12、ll were used by the management leadership and by the politicians. Lower in the organizational hierarchy there was little interest in the work of the municipal auditor. He mentioned that poor quality of the audit reports

13、could be a possible reason for this lack of interest </p><p>　　The municipal chief administrative officer pointed out that the marginal utility of performance audits most likely was larger than the marginal

14、utility of traditional financial audit. With the use of sampling and the more recent development in audit information technology, this could be likely. On our question if the performance audit was performed to the detrim

15、ent of traditional financial audit, the informants answered that the resources were fixed. The extension of the scope of operation from </p><p>　　Regarding our two propositions on decoupling and symbolic use

16、 of information, the results in general did not warrant us to state that there were widespread symbolic and decoupled use of performance audit, rather on the contrary. It is in this respect necessary to devote attention

17、to the link between performance audit information and the ambiguity of goals in local government. The ways of using audit information are related with the conceptions of auditors, auditees and other stakeholders on the &

18、lt;/p><p>　　It seems to be fair to conclude that performance auditing has specific instrumental functions in local government. Moreover, performance audit reports are used, albeit somewhat differently than migh

19、t have been expected, by the symbolic and decoupling propositions. Compared to financial statement auditing, performance auditing has a more conspicuous connection to both performance improvement and day-to-day managemen

20、t processes in the municipalities and counties. Particularly, our third propositio</p><p>　　We think our study has two major implications for theory and practice in enhancing the understanding of how perform

21、ance audit in political institutions may have important instrumental and political functions. First, it is necessary to pose a question as to what extent performance audit can be a part of the process of determining ‘cor

22、rect’ and ‘incorrect’ goals for local government. This is one of the prominent future dilemmas in performance auditing. What if there are no explicit goals to audit?</p><p>　　Second, performance auditing in

23、local government in its modern form may still be relatively new. Over time, one may expect more loosely coupled but still highly rational use of performance auditing information. By this we mean that due to the instituti

24、onal context under which different actors employ performance audits, different actors may use this kind of information rationally according to their specific circumstances. For example: the political ruling coalition, th

25、e majority, could select and</p><p>　　The logic in the performance audit success paradox is that even though performance auditors could be relatively successful agents for society at large as principal in pr

26、oviding performance information as a collective good and thus function as watchdogs for democracy and transparency, the society is not a homogenous entity. The citizens have different preferences and the different politi

27、cal parties and interest groups have their different manifestos and agendas. </p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p>　　縣級(jí)地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì):芬蘭和挪威的效益審計(jì)效率性研究</p><p>　　作者:約翰森,麥克林,耶莫</p&g

28、t;<p>　　在挪威,三個(gè)被調(diào)查者對(duì)績(jī)效審計(jì)有明確而積極的態(tài)度?？?jī)效審計(jì)是為了提高市政府的管理,尤其是對(duì)一些公共部門的控制與改革,它不是基于任務(wù)性的一項(xiàng)活動(dòng)。同時(shí)也是雙向?qū)W習(xí)的一部分。然而,一個(gè)縣的首席執(zhí)行官指出:它有一些功能障礙,會(huì)降低行政人員做事的合法性。在這方面,他指出有些參與到績(jī)效審計(jì)的政治家會(huì)利用媒體而借機(jī)夸大政治所得。除此之外,根據(jù)市政府法規(guī),審計(jì)報(bào)告必須首先上交給理事控制委員會(huì)的做法也是不可取的。他認(rèn)為這是

29、對(duì)“矛盾原則”的違反。就這個(gè)原則陳述的相關(guān)部分而言,在報(bào)告之前大家都應(yīng)該能夠熟悉文件的內(nèi)容,以防誤解并糾正缺點(diǎn)。 </p><p>　　雖然我們的檢舉人估計(jì)在績(jī)效審計(jì)中將用到15%-20%的資源,但是從實(shí)際情況來看40%-50%才是最為理想的。我們的資金調(diào)查與早前挪威的史瑞哲對(duì)績(jī)效審計(jì)的預(yù)期與實(shí)際利用結(jié)果的研究非常相似。她的報(bào)道結(jié)果表明:在1995年只有百分之十三的挪威市政審計(jì)師的資源用于績(jī)效審計(jì)。據(jù)她調(diào)查,市政

30、審計(jì)師宣稱績(jī)效審計(jì)的預(yù)期標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是利用總資源的30%。 </p><p>　　績(jī)效審計(jì)的預(yù)期功能經(jīng)濟(jì)性、效率性、效果性只有部分實(shí)現(xiàn)。兩個(gè)主要行政官員認(rèn)為,表現(xiàn)出不良審計(jì)的主要原因是缺乏能夠勝任的審計(jì)人員。 然而,他們兩個(gè)也指出審計(jì)的質(zhì)量在最近幾年有著顯著的提高。另一方面,市政審計(jì)師中的被調(diào)查者認(rèn)為,如果進(jìn)行審計(jì)的資源十分充沛的話,那么審計(jì)的質(zhì)量將會(huì)令人滿意。如果市政審計(jì)傳統(tǒng)上是檢查賬簿,那就沒有必要提出了解政治制度中

31、內(nèi)在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的前提。為了推動(dòng)這一挑戰(zhàn),市政審計(jì)部門在招聘員工時(shí)要求其教育背景需偏離傳統(tǒng)的審計(jì)規(guī)章。本招聘策略旨在通過合并以前單一的市政審計(jì)部門,從而確定更多的審計(jì)人員去加強(qiáng)執(zhí)行力度,這種策略似乎是一個(gè)對(duì)提高審計(jì)能力的有效措施。市首席行政官員說他的市政區(qū)已經(jīng)開始與相鄰的四個(gè)直轄市合作設(shè)立合并地區(qū)的市政審計(jì)師,這樣做主要是為了提高績(jī)效審計(jì)質(zhì)量。同時(shí),他也描述了一個(gè)不成功的績(jī)效審計(jì)項(xiàng)目:護(hù)理服務(wù)。上述問題產(chǎn)生的原因似乎在于方法不對(duì),那些實(shí)施方案相

32、對(duì)于他們的發(fā)現(xiàn)是被夸大了的。 </p><p>　　據(jù)兩位主要行政官員指出,只要有良好的審計(jì)報(bào)告質(zhì)量就會(huì)起積極效果。一方面,縣首席行政官員要對(duì)被政治家們和管理部門的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者使用的報(bào)告有很深刻的印象。政府等級(jí)越低,那么市政審計(jì)人員從中獲利就越少。另一方面,首席審計(jì)師說,市政審計(jì)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)非常明白,報(bào)道在哪里有用,組織就會(huì)用它們。但是,現(xiàn)在又一種趨勢(shì)就是最高層的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)會(huì)經(jīng)常使用它們,因?yàn)檫@些數(shù)據(jù)直接表明了他們的決定及表現(xiàn)如何

33、。 </p><p>　　市政首席執(zhí)行官指出,績(jī)效審計(jì)的邊際效用最有可能比傳統(tǒng)的財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)大。隨著抽樣調(diào)查的使用和審計(jì)信息技術(shù)在這些年的發(fā)展,這些都有可能相似的。關(guān)于我們的問題是否執(zhí)行績(jī)效審計(jì)能去除傳統(tǒng)的審計(jì)弊端,被調(diào)查者回答說,資源是固定的。從財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)到績(jī)效審計(jì)范圍的擴(kuò)大使得財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)顯得相對(duì)不重要,對(duì)于上述情況,關(guān)于審計(jì)師的效果性、效率性、工作機(jī)構(gòu)和管理部門,我們要站在審計(jì)師的角度要求增加革新和新思路。因此可以說

34、,市政審計(jì)師也將改善他們的執(zhí)行情況。 </p><p>　　關(guān)于我們對(duì)信息使用的不同見解,我們也無法提出相反的正當(dāng)理由。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)更加關(guān)注績(jī)效審查信息和當(dāng)?shù)卣哪繕?biāo)模糊之間的聯(lián)系。被審計(jì)人員和其他的利益相關(guān)者,運(yùn)用減少不確定性、目標(biāo)含糊性和增強(qiáng)公共服務(wù)的合法性,從而使得使用審計(jì)信息的方法符合審計(jì)師的使用概念。芬蘭和挪威兩例都提供了一些證據(jù)。 </p><p>　　這似乎直接能得出這樣的結(jié)論

35、:績(jī)效審計(jì)對(duì)評(píng)估地方政府來說是一個(gè)很好的測(cè)評(píng)工具。使用績(jī)效報(bào)告也很好,即使有時(shí)候這些報(bào)告與預(yù)期的有所差距或者只是形式上的。但是與財(cái)務(wù)審計(jì)相比,績(jī)效審計(jì)對(duì)市縣的績(jī)效和管理水平的提高更有幫助。尤其是,我們的第三個(gè)主張?jiān)谶@些研究發(fā)現(xiàn)下受到肯定。以我們的數(shù)據(jù)為基準(zhǔn),以強(qiáng)調(diào)管理為評(píng)判依據(jù)的私人會(huì)計(jì)事務(wù)所在芬蘭自治審計(jì)市場(chǎng)來看好像已經(jīng)形成了一種風(fēng)格,即績(jī)效審計(jì)。而挪威相較于芬蘭則不同,由于被審計(jì)人員參與度的不夠,審計(jì)人員更傾向于公共會(huì)計(jì)師的風(fēng)格。

36、</p><p>　　我們認(rèn)為我們的研究從理論和實(shí)踐兩方面做出了解釋,績(jī)效審計(jì)如何在政治組織機(jī)構(gòu)中發(fā)揮工具性和政治性作用。第一,必須提出一個(gè)問題:對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)卣畞碚f,績(jī)效審計(jì)以何種程度來評(píng)判他是對(duì)或是不對(duì)。這是一個(gè)重要的未來可能陷入困境的問題。如果沒有明確的目標(biāo)審計(jì)怎么辦?正如在芬蘭的例子中發(fā)現(xiàn)的那樣,這個(gè)是績(jī)效審計(jì)領(lǐng)域的一部分。從經(jīng)濟(jì)性、效率性、效果性的觀點(diǎn)來看,并不是所有的問題事前都被考慮成是重要的。服務(wù)質(zhì)量,公

37、平性,公正性和相關(guān)的評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)事后發(fā)現(xiàn)才是重要的。有許多問題在制定規(guī)定和進(jìn)行分配時(shí)沒有顯得很重要,但是當(dāng)審計(jì)時(shí)就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)其重要性了。從審計(jì)角度來看,就能清晰地了解地方政府在目標(biāo)設(shè)定時(shí)為何強(qiáng)調(diào)金錢的重要性。這同樣適用于地方政府活動(dòng)的績(jī)效測(cè)量與評(píng)價(jià),并以此來提高地方當(dāng)局的行政績(jī)效。這樣一來,對(duì)應(yīng)急費(fèi)用的模糊處理不應(yīng)該武斷的認(rèn)為是標(biāo)志性現(xiàn)象,而應(yīng)該用積極地,進(jìn)化的,政治的角度去探索。 </p><p>　　其次,在當(dāng)?shù)卣?/p>

38、績(jī)效審計(jì)的現(xiàn)代形式可能仍然是比較新的。隨著時(shí)間的推移,人們或許希望更寬松的但更高度合理的使用審計(jì)信息。這就意味著在不同的組織機(jī)構(gòu)下,不同的人會(huì)根據(jù)當(dāng)時(shí)的條件雇傭不同的審計(jì)人員,使用不同的信息。例如:執(zhí)政黨、多數(shù)派,可以選擇和披露績(jī)效審計(jì),如果它證實(shí)物有所值。同時(shí),政治反對(duì)派、少數(shù)派,媒體可以選擇和利用信息戰(zhàn)略時(shí),如果資料顯示貨幣價(jià)值低。這兩種合理使用政治的局面,是利用在市、縣信息外部連接到內(nèi)部機(jī)構(gòu)。而這種進(jìn)程可以提高沖突水平,并揭示出不

39、同的意識(shí)形態(tài)沖突,這或許能準(zhǔn)確地表達(dá)什么政治制度管理模式應(yīng)該做什么,預(yù)期或非預(yù)期的布魯森,1989年。然而,如果它是讓地方政府績(jī)效審計(jì)如我們描述的那樣在工作中用合理和對(duì)應(yīng)的方法,那么從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看,這還可能導(dǎo)致一種績(jī)效審計(jì)的成功悖論。 </p><p>　　在績(jī)效審計(jì)成功悖論中的邏輯就是, 雖然評(píng)審員可能是由社會(huì)中相對(duì)成功的代理人擔(dān)任,他們提供績(jī)效信息作為公共財(cái)產(chǎn),起著監(jiān)督民主和透明性的作用,但是社會(huì)不是同構(gòu)實(shí)體。公