外文翻譯--政府當(dāng)押貸款供應(yīng)規(guī)定的作用來(lái)自美國(guó)的51個(gè)司法管轄區(qū)的證據(jù)

1、<p><b>　　中文3500字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The effects of government regulations on the supply of pawn loans: evidence from 5

2、1 Jurisdictions in the U.S.</p><p>　　Not we contribute to the modest amount of existing empirical research on the fringe banking industry by examining the effects of two jurisdiction-specific restrictive reg

3、ulations on the supply of pawn loans. Controlling for poverty levels, education levels, and population density, state-by-state data presented in this paper from the 51 political jurisdictions in the United States suggest

4、s considerable effects in expected ways on five aspects of supply from the two regulations. More specifically,</p><p>　　The lending activities of those working outside traditional depository financial instit

5、utions are sometimes characterized as fringe banking operations. Of the established fringe bankers, pawnshops constitute the most mature segment.1 Having been around for hundreds of years, pawnbrokers make very small (us

6、ually under $100) loans, for short periods of time (usually around 2 months), taking physical possession of personal items as collateral. In the standard pawn transaction, the collateral is ret</p><p>　　With

7、 a few notable exceptions (which will be examined in the next section), academic research on the pawnshop industry has suffered from neglect for a long time. As Caskey (1991) has pointed out, this neglect from the academ

8、ic community is unfortunate, as the percentage of the population served by the pawn industry may reach as high as 10%. Furthermore, Caskey (1991) states, B. . .economists will have a very incomplete understanding of cred

9、it markets if attention is not also given to the financi</p><p>　　In order to help correct this large gap in the academic literature, this paper will present a highly comprehensive study of the effect of two

10、 specific government regulations on five measures of the supply of pawn services. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First of all, we extend the work of Caskey (1991, 1994) about the effects of pawnshop re

11、gulations on the number of pawnshops in a state by expanding his sample from 28 states to 51 jurisdictions. We also use an additional measu</p><p>　　The second main way this paper contributes to the academic

12、 literature is by looking at the impact of pawnshop regulation on aspects of individual pawnshop behavior. We empirically test Johnson and Johnson’s (1998) hypotheses concerning the impact of pawnshop regulation on avera

13、ge loan amounts and loan/value ratios of individual pawnshops. We also look at the impact of regulation on the number of hours pawnshops operate. Overall, we find that pawnshop regulation has strong negative effects on f

14、iv</p><p>　　As noted above, the academic research on the pawn industry is not large. However, the work that has been done in recent years has provided key insights and has prompted further research as well.&

15、lt;/p><p>　　The Demand for Pawn Loans:</p><p>　　The research of Johnson and Johnson (1998) on the personal and financial characteristics of those borrowing from pawnshops makes it clear that the ty

16、pical pawn borrower is not one that traditional banking institutions want as a customer. Relative to most Americans, pawn borrowers tend to have less education, less accumulated wealth, lower incomes, less stable employm

17、ent, higher bankruptcy rates, and a host of demographic and lifestyle patterns that quite obviously do not fit well with the model </p><p>　　For those having the characteristics mentioned, the alternatives t

18、o pawnshop borrowing are few.2 This lack of borrowing alternatives suggests that the demand for pawn loans, while not large relative to the entire consumer loan market, is rather inelastic for the substantial segment of

19、the population meeting the characteristics noted.</p><p>　　The inelastic demand for pawn loans can also be understood in terms of time preferences. Understanding that time preferences can be a function of ma

20、ny things, it is easy to see that people having the characteristics described would tend to have high time preferences in the sense that they often tend to be somewhat desperate at the margin where they find it necessary

21、 to seek the services of a pawnshop.</p><p>　　In addition to their research on the characteristics of pawn borrowers, Johnson and Johnson (1998) specifically theorize that loan-to-value ratios and average lo

22、an sizes might be expected to vary in response to a pawn market burdened with restrictive regulations. They did not, however, attempt to test this empirically.</p><p>　　The Supply of Pawn Loans:</p>&

23、lt;p>　　On the supply side, the work of Caskey (1991, 1994, 1997) has been significant. Controlling for education levels, poverty levels, population density, and the requirement to return excess proceeds from the sale

24、of collateral items, in an analysis of pawn activities in 28 states with effective interest rate ceilings, Caskey found the number of existing pawnshops to be positively related to the height of the ceilings. This resear

25、ch has been successful in demonstrating the importance of the pawn ind</p><p>　　Though the work by Caskey has been perhaps the only recent empirical research on pawnshop loan supply, his study was limited to

26、 only those states with effective interest rate ceilings, and it was limited in the aspects of supply that it measured. The small sample of 28 states versus the 51 jurisdictions covered in the current study may explain C

27、askey’s result showing a positive relationship between the collateral return regulation and the number of pawnshops. Also, studying five dimensions of pa</p><p>　　Price Regulation and Unintended Consequences

28、:</p><p>　　Any empirical examination of the effects of pawnshop regulations on the supply of pawnshop loans is likely to have much broader implications. For example, buying and selling continue, and the cons

29、tant effort to capture pure entrepreneurial gain keeps the market in perpetual motion’’ (Kirzner, 1985). This study adds to this line of research on price ceilings and consumer protection by providing important insights

30、on a heavily regulated credit market for low-income consumers.</p><p>　　The focus of this study is on the supply side of the pawn industry. Do government restrictions on the behavior of pawnbrokers have the

31、effect of limiting competition in the market for pawn loans? Or do regulations have the effect of enhancing competition through a leveling of the playing ?eld between borrowers and lenders? One way of attempting to answe

32、r these questions is to look at the differences in the ways pawnshops operate with varying degrees of regulation. In this study, this task is und</p><p>　　Article provides a summary of the essential portions

33、 of the results of the ?ve core equations for the ?ve hypotheses. This table shows a composite picture of the essential features of the study. All of the dependent variables, each of which represents a different way in w

34、hich pawnshops can re-arrange their affairs in a world of restrictive regulations, are in?uenced signi?cantly in the expected direction by either the RETURN restriction or the INT25 restriction, or both—after controlling

35、 for pop</p><p>　　These results suggest that the two legal restrictions on the behavior of pawnshops that were the focus of this study are exactly that—restrictions. They restrict economic activity. They are

36、 legal prohibitions against certain behaviors that are otherwise considered mutually advantageous from the perspectives of both borrowers and lenders. Viewing pawnshop regulations as restrictions or prohibitions helps us

37、 to understand the reduced levels of supply that are the core results of the study. </p><p>　　Overall, it appears that the percentage reductions in these different aspects of supply are likely to be larger t

38、han the percentage reductions in price or changes in other bene?ts accruing to the borrowers as a result of these regulatory measures. This implies a rather elastic supply. Especially those equations relating directly to

39、 the number of pawnshops point to a very elastic supply.</p><p>　　Conclusion:</p><p>　　Regulation of an unpopular and unimpressive industry is likely to be tempting for aspiring politicians and

40、others with strong moral intuitions who are willing to use the force of law to manipulate the rules that govern society. Kirzner (1985) has suggested:</p><p>　　Given sufficiently strong value judgments on th

41、e part of would-be regulators—whether in favor of environmental purity,or an egalitarian distribution of wealth, or freedom from pornography or from disease, or national prestige, or the enrichment of the arts, or about

42、whatever—criticisms of intervention from the perspective of these value judgments may (properly) carry little weight.</p><p>　　Conversely, criticisms of pawnshop regulations are not likely to be popular in a

43、 world where strong (though perhaps uninformed or misplaced) value judgments a rein vogue. And yet, as Frederic Bastiat (1845/1964) so eloquently pointed out over 150 years ago, the task of the economist is to ferret out

44、 the unseen or non-obvious consequences of alternative policies, so that those involved in crafting laws that govern society will not be guided by erroneous judgments of the likely consequences of the</p><p>

45、;　　To that end, this study is a marginal but valuable contribution to understanding some of the consequences of pawnshop regulations. Specifically, this study suggests that the supply of pawn services may be restricted i

46、n five ways through the enactment and implementation of restrictive regulations in the industry.</p><p>　　One promising area for future research concerns the issue of lax enforcement of interest rate ceiling

47、s and return requirements (Caskey, 1991, 1994). The fact that this study found strong effects of these two regulations in spite of the possibility of lax enforcement in some jurisdictions suggests two different explanati

48、ons. One is that the pawnshops that survive after regulations are enacted are the ones that are most adept at avoiding enforcement or are the most politically well connected. The </p><p>　　The question of wh

49、ether or not pawnshop regulations really do assist the poor is another promising area for future research. The answer to this question, of course, ultimately entails a value judgment that is not within the scope of this

50、study. But to the extent the conclusions of this study assist with understanding the consequences of pawnshop regulations, the study may be of great importance to those who are willing to make such normative judgments on

51、 the matter. There is, however, one thing </p><p>　　Source: Joshua D. Shackman and Glen Tenney,2006 “The Effects of Government Regulations on the Supply of Pawn Loans: Evidence from 51 Jurisdictions in the U

52、.S.</p><p>　　” . Journal of Financial Services Research,vol.30,no.1,april,pp.69-91.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　政府當(dāng)押貸款供應(yīng)規(guī)定的作用：來(lái)自美國(guó)的51個(gè)司法管轄區(qū)的證據(jù)</p><p>　　我們通

53、過(guò)檢驗(yàn)關(guān)于當(dāng)押貸款供應(yīng)的兩個(gè)專門管轄規(guī)定的作用，促成了目前關(guān)于邊緣銀行業(yè)的實(shí)證研究。本文利用了來(lái)自美國(guó)的51個(gè)政治司法管轄區(qū)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，分析了對(duì)于貧困水平，教育水平，人口密度的控制與這兩個(gè)規(guī)定的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)這兩個(gè)規(guī)定在預(yù)期的方向?qū)ξ鍌€(gè)方面供應(yīng)有相當(dāng)大的影響作用。更確切的說(shuō)，該項(xiàng)研究表明，利率上限和以出售抵押品來(lái)超額收益的需求，將會(huì)導(dǎo)致商店?duì)I業(yè)時(shí)間，貸款/價(jià)值比率，貸款次數(shù)的減少，以及現(xiàn)有典當(dāng)行數(shù)量的減少。</p><p

54、>　　那些傳統(tǒng)托管所以外金融機(jī)構(gòu)的借貸活動(dòng)，有時(shí)被稱作邊緣銀行業(yè)。其中，典當(dāng)行是已設(shè)立的邊緣銀行業(yè)者中最成熟的部分。幾百年來(lái)，典當(dāng)行發(fā)放的貸款都很少(通常低于100美元)，貸款時(shí)間也很短（通常2個(gè)月左右），通常需要拿個(gè)人物品的來(lái)做抵押。在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的典當(dāng)交易中，抵押品會(huì)根據(jù)借款人的還款情況歸還到借款人手里。如果借方選擇不償還借款，物品所有權(quán)將自動(dòng)轉(zhuǎn)移到貸方。</p><p>　　除了少數(shù)明顯的例子例外（將在下一節(jié)

55、審查），關(guān)于典當(dāng)行業(yè)的學(xué)術(shù)研究，很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間被人們所忽視。正如卡斯基（1991）所指出的那樣，學(xué)術(shù)界的這一忽視是不正確的。因?yàn)榈洚?dāng)行業(yè)所服務(wù)的人口比例可能高達(dá)10％。此外，卡斯基（1991）指出，如果不考慮到金融市場(chǎng)正面臨數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的美國(guó)人獨(dú)立運(yùn)營(yíng)銀行體系的局面，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對(duì)信貸市場(chǎng)將有一個(gè)不完全的理解。</p><p>　　為了幫助糾正這種現(xiàn)象在學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)中的大差距，本文將就兩個(gè)明確的政府規(guī)定對(duì)五個(gè)典當(dāng)服務(wù)的供應(yīng)措

56、施的作用，做了非常全面的研究。本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)是雙重的?？ㄋ够?991，1994）研究了，在一個(gè)國(guó)家，關(guān)于典當(dāng)行數(shù)量的規(guī)定有什么作用呢？首先，我們延續(xù)了他的研究，把他取自28個(gè)國(guó)家的樣本，擴(kuò)展到51個(gè)司法管轄區(qū)。我們還在每個(gè)管轄區(qū)內(nèi)典當(dāng)行密度采取了附加措施。我們肯定卡斯基（1991，1994）的研究結(jié)果中利率上升和典當(dāng)行的數(shù)量呈正相關(guān)這一說(shuō)法，但是在抵押品歸還關(guān)系的存在和典當(dāng)行的數(shù)量之間呈現(xiàn)巨大的消極關(guān)系這方面，我們否認(rèn)他的結(jié)果。<

57、;/p><p>　　本文也通過(guò)觀察個(gè)人典當(dāng)行行為規(guī)定的作用，來(lái)幫助研究學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)。約翰遜和約翰遜（1998年）的假設(shè)關(guān)系是關(guān)于平均貸款額和個(gè)人典當(dāng)行的貸款/價(jià)值比率的典當(dāng)行規(guī)定有什么作用？我們以實(shí)證驗(yàn)證了它。同時(shí)，我們也審視了典當(dāng)行營(yíng)業(yè)時(shí)間規(guī)定的影響?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，典當(dāng)行規(guī)定在典當(dāng)行貸款供應(yīng)的五個(gè)不同方面有很強(qiáng)的負(fù)面影響。這些結(jié)果暗示，金融服務(wù)行業(yè)作為一個(gè)整體，對(duì)研究?jī)r(jià)格上限和其他行業(yè)的法規(guī)也有影響。綜上所述，以

58、前所做的典當(dāng)行業(yè)學(xué)術(shù)研究并非很深。然而，近幾年來(lái)所做的工作，為探索典當(dāng)行業(yè)提供了重要的見(jiàn)解，并且促進(jìn)了人們對(duì)典當(dāng)行業(yè)更進(jìn)一步的研究。</p><p><b>　　當(dāng)押貸款的需求：</b></p><p>　　約翰遜和約翰遜（1998）對(duì)當(dāng)押貸款的個(gè)人特點(diǎn)和財(cái)務(wù)特征做的研究表明，傳統(tǒng)的銀行機(jī)構(gòu)不想要這種典型的當(dāng)押借款人做自己的客戶。因?yàn)橄鄬?duì)于大多數(shù)美國(guó)人來(lái)說(shuō)，當(dāng)押借款人

59、往往受教育程度較低，累積的財(cái)富少，收入較低，沒(méi)有穩(wěn)定的職業(yè)，破產(chǎn)率高，而且還有很多不同的生活方式。這明顯不符合人們心中固有的傳統(tǒng)銀行貸款環(huán)境。當(dāng)押商已認(rèn)識(shí)到這部分人口的特點(diǎn)，并在這個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上，以一個(gè)完全不同的方式改變了他們的服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)，以適應(yīng)這一類客戶的需求。為了有利地服務(wù)這部分人口，在典當(dāng)行貸款時(shí)無(wú)需調(diào)查貸款人的信用狀況，存款賬戶余額和就業(yè)經(jīng)歷。但（如上所述）抵押物的實(shí)際所有權(quán)歸放款人所有。</p><p>

60、　　對(duì)于符合上述特點(diǎn)的那些貸款人來(lái)說(shuō)，他們沒(méi)有太多選擇的余地，只好選當(dāng)押貸款。與整個(gè)顧客借貸市場(chǎng)無(wú)關(guān)，對(duì)滿足上述特征的大部分人口來(lái)說(shuō)，當(dāng)押貸款是解決了他們的迫切需求的。</p><p>　　對(duì)當(dāng)押貸款的無(wú)條件需求，也可以理解為時(shí)間優(yōu)待。時(shí)間優(yōu)待是很多其他貸款沒(méi)有的功能。擁有上述特征的人群往往處在邊緣絕望時(shí)，才意識(shí)到典當(dāng)行當(dāng)押貸款的必要性，因?yàn)樗麄儗⒌玫胶芨叩臅r(shí)間優(yōu)待。</p><p>　　

61、除了對(duì)當(dāng)押借款人特征的研究，約翰遜和約翰遜（1998年）的推論明確指出，典當(dāng)市場(chǎng)一直被規(guī)定所限制，作為回報(bào)，貸款與價(jià)值比率和平均貸款規(guī)模將會(huì)有相應(yīng)的變化。然而，他們還沒(méi)有用實(shí)證驗(yàn)證這一觀點(diǎn)。</p><p><b>　　當(dāng)押貸款的供應(yīng)：</b></p><p>　　在供應(yīng)方面，卡斯基（1991年，1994年，1997年）的結(jié)論很重要。對(duì)于控制貧困水平，教育水平，人口密

62、度和出售抵押品來(lái)取得超額收益的需求，在分析有實(shí)際利率上限的28個(gè)國(guó)家典當(dāng)活動(dòng)中，卡斯基發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)存的典當(dāng)行數(shù)量絕對(duì)與利率最高上限相關(guān)。約翰遜和約翰遜發(fā)現(xiàn)了當(dāng)押借款人的普遍特征。這項(xiàng)研究成功地證明了典當(dāng)行業(yè)對(duì)這群人的重要性。我們?cè)诳ㄋ够睦碚撝锌梢酝茢喑龅洚?dāng)行業(yè)有相當(dāng)靈活的供應(yīng)。這一靈活供應(yīng)讓許多投資商想進(jìn)入和退出典當(dāng)行業(yè)相對(duì)容易很多。</p><p>　　但是卡斯基的理論是近期關(guān)于當(dāng)押貸款供應(yīng)的唯一實(shí)證研究，而且他

63、的研究?jī)H限于那些擁有實(shí)際利率上限的國(guó)家和他所能想到的一個(gè)供應(yīng)方面，缺乏一定的周密性。這個(gè)涵蓋了28個(gè)國(guó)家和51個(gè)司法管轄區(qū)的近期研究樣本，不但說(shuō)明卡斯基的結(jié)論顯示：抵押品歸還法規(guī)和典當(dāng)行數(shù)量呈正相關(guān)。此外，還研究了典當(dāng)行供應(yīng)的五個(gè)方面，而不僅僅限于一個(gè)方面。針對(duì)靈活的當(dāng)押貸款供應(yīng)方面，開(kāi)展了更為廣闊的一面。</p><p>　　價(jià)格管制和出乎意料的后果：</p><p>　　人們就當(dāng)押貸款

64、供應(yīng)的典當(dāng)行規(guī)定具體有什么作用做了實(shí)證調(diào)查。任何類的實(shí)證調(diào)查都可能對(duì)該項(xiàng)研究具有更為廣泛的影響。例如，繼續(xù)購(gòu)買和出售，不斷地努力使企業(yè)獲取純利潤(rùn)，才可以維持市場(chǎng)永恒的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)（Kirzner，1985）。該項(xiàng)研究為低收入消費(fèi)者提供關(guān)于信貸市場(chǎng)的重要信息，加深了對(duì)價(jià)格上限的研究和對(duì)消費(fèi)者的保護(hù)的研究。</p><p>　　本研究的重點(diǎn)在典當(dāng)行業(yè)的供應(yīng)方面。政府對(duì)當(dāng)押商的管制，是否對(duì)限制市場(chǎng)的當(dāng)押貸款競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有影響？通過(guò)借方

65、和貸方達(dá)成協(xié)議，那些規(guī)章制度是否真的對(duì)加強(qiáng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有作用？有一個(gè)方法可以回答這些問(wèn)題，就是看典當(dāng)行改變經(jīng)營(yíng)監(jiān)管程度的差異。在這項(xiàng)研究中，這個(gè)任務(wù)以檢驗(yàn)五個(gè)量化假說(shuō)開(kāi)始。旨在為作為典當(dāng)行規(guī)定可能引起的數(shù)個(gè)變化，提供深刻的見(jiàn)解。</p><p>　　文章提供了五個(gè)假說(shuō)的五個(gè)核心部分的基本方程的結(jié)果概要。此表綜合的顯示了，該項(xiàng)研究的重要特征。典當(dāng)行可以以不同地方式在一個(gè)受嚴(yán)格管制的世界重新安排他們的事務(wù)。人口密度，貧困程度

66、和受教育程度在51個(gè)司法管轄區(qū)受到控制后，所有可依據(jù)的變量在預(yù)期的方向明顯受到嚴(yán)格管制和INT25規(guī)章的影響。</p><p>　　這些結(jié)果表明，兩個(gè)關(guān)于典當(dāng)行行為的法規(guī)其實(shí)是有限制。他們限制經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)。他們是相對(duì)于某些行為的法律禁令，例如，在不同的角度考慮了借方和貸方雙方的互利行為。把典當(dāng)行的規(guī)定視為限制或禁令，這樣可以幫助我們了解供應(yīng)強(qiáng)度的降低。這是該項(xiàng)研究的核心結(jié)果。</p><p>

67、　　總的來(lái)說(shuō)，這些不同方面的供應(yīng)比例的下降，可能比價(jià)格比例的下降和調(diào)整措施給借方帶來(lái)其他福利的變化比例更大。這意味著相當(dāng)靈活的供應(yīng)。尤其是那些方程，直接涉及到可以靈活供應(yīng)的典當(dāng)行數(shù)量。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論：</b></p><p>　　對(duì)不得人心且不起眼的一個(gè)行業(yè)監(jiān)管，很可能是為了吸引那些政客和人們的注意。因?yàn)樗麄兿胗梅傻牧α縼?lái)操作管理社會(huì)的規(guī)章?？茽?/p>

68、斯諾（1985）提到：不管是否有利于環(huán)境的凈化，財(cái)富的平等分配，色情或疾病的自由，國(guó)家的信譽(yù)維護(hù)，藝術(shù)的豐富或關(guān)于所有一切的可能性，對(duì)所有可能的調(diào)整，已給予充分強(qiáng)大的價(jià)值判斷。因此對(duì)來(lái)自價(jià)值判斷前景的干涉，人們不會(huì)有太多的批判。</p><p>　　相反，對(duì)典當(dāng)行規(guī)的批評(píng)可能不適合在一個(gè)具有強(qiáng)大的價(jià)值判斷控制時(shí)尚的世界里盛行。費(fèi)雷德里克巴斯夏（1845/1964）在150年前強(qiáng)有力的指出，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的任務(wù)就是搜集那

69、些非正統(tǒng)的政策所引起的未被發(fā)現(xiàn)或不明顯的現(xiàn)象，為的是讓那些被卷入管理社會(huì)的法律的人們，不會(huì)因所推薦的政策可能引起的結(jié)果，做出錯(cuò)誤的判斷，進(jìn)而而被誤導(dǎo)。</p><p>　　為此，該項(xiàng)研究為了解一些典當(dāng)行規(guī)定的影響，做了雖小但很有價(jià)值的貢獻(xiàn)。確切的說(shuō)，這項(xiàng)研究表明，制定和實(shí)施嚴(yán)格的行業(yè)法規(guī)后，典當(dāng)服務(wù)的供應(yīng)，可能在這五個(gè)方面有所限制。</p><p>　　這是一個(gè)今后很有研究希望的領(lǐng)域，關(guān)系

70、到對(duì)利率上限的管制松懈程度和回報(bào)需求的問(wèn)題（卡斯基，1991年，1994年）。盡管有些管轄區(qū)可能有執(zhí)法不嚴(yán)的可能性，但對(duì)這項(xiàng)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)這兩個(gè)法規(guī)的強(qiáng)大作用，有兩種不同的解釋。其中一種解釋是，那些善于避開(kāi)強(qiáng)制，或善于在政治上搞好關(guān)系的典當(dāng)行，才能在法規(guī)下生存。這些規(guī)定可能會(huì)減少典當(dāng)行的數(shù)量，對(duì)那些善于避開(kāi)強(qiáng)制的典當(dāng)行有效。還有一種可能性，就是該項(xiàng)研究實(shí)際上低估了這些規(guī)定的力量。如果可以找出一個(gè)測(cè)量實(shí)施程度的可靠方法，那就可以對(duì)兩個(gè)主要規(guī)定實(shí)

71、施調(diào)整測(cè)定，來(lái)確定這個(gè)調(diào)整是否對(duì)結(jié)果有所影響。對(duì)進(jìn)一步的研究來(lái)說(shuō)，這是一個(gè)成熟的領(lǐng)域。</p><p>　　典當(dāng)行規(guī)是否真的可以幫助窮人，是今后另一個(gè)有希望的研究領(lǐng)域。當(dāng)然，這個(gè)問(wèn)題的答案，最終需要一個(gè)價(jià)值判斷，但這不在該項(xiàng)研究的范圍內(nèi)。該項(xiàng)研究結(jié)果協(xié)助了解典當(dāng)行規(guī)定的重要性，對(duì)想要為此事做出規(guī)范性判斷的那些人很重要。不過(guò)只有一件事我們可以很自信的說(shuō)出：那就是我們?cè)谶@里研究過(guò)的典當(dāng)行規(guī)定，來(lái)自典當(dāng)服務(wù)供應(yīng)的其他方