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1、<p> 畢業(yè)設(shè)計(論文)外文翻譯</p><p> 題 目:抓住歐洲深淵 </p><p> 英文題目:Staring into the abyss </p><p> 系 :經(jīng)濟與貿(mào)易
2、</p><p> 專 業(yè): </p><p> 班 級: </p><p> 學 號: </p><p> 姓 名:
3、 </p><p> 指導老師: </p><p> 填表日期: </p><p><b> 抓住歐洲深淵</b></p><p><b> 《經(jīng)濟學家》</b></p
4、><p> 摘要:歐洲官員仍然需要快速采取行動,執(zhí)行危機應對計劃,平息市場的波動。歐洲官員堅持要求通過希臘新聯(lián)合政府實行財政改革計劃獲得市場信心,IMF表示支持。一旦希臘的緊縮計劃獲得廣泛的支持,IMF將會完成對希臘財政狀況的審核,并就下一筆援助貸款的發(fā)放做出決定。</p><p> 關(guān)鍵詞:歐盟;經(jīng)濟;危機;貨幣;市場</p><p> 前言:歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟之所以陷
5、入如此境地,全是主權(quán)債務危機惹的禍。一段時期以來,雖然歐盟出臺了五花八門的救火舉措,但歐債危機非但沒有緩解,近來反倒急劇升溫。當前歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟局勢有惡化之勢。如今,歐元區(qū)第三大經(jīng)濟體意大利已成風暴眼,其融資成本達到不可持續(xù)的水平。</p><p> 歐洲經(jīng)濟危機喚醒了整個歐洲,與愛德華·卡爾說法相對立,更有可能的是,歐洲危機將導致經(jīng)濟下滑并達成妥協(xié)。</p><p> 1931
6、年英國放棄黃金準則,這一放棄,不僅僅是放棄了對貨幣管理的體系的管理,而且還以此確定了英國將無法承擔起帝王之稱這一說法。1971年美國打破貨幣限制,先進行貨幣下滑政策并持久進行,直到1980年保羅. 沃爾克重新建立貨幣政策并拾回信心。像奧地利偉大的經(jīng)濟學家約瑟夫·阿洛伊斯·熊彼特以此發(fā)表言論說:“一個人的貨幣政策反應了這個國家的需求,這個國家所行之事,這個國家所面臨與遭受的一切問題等相關(guān)事情?!?,</p>
7、<p> 同種情況,這次危機吞噬的不僅僅是歐元區(qū),取而代之的是整個歐盟。政府公債,股票價格,銀行異乎尋常的舉動和全球經(jīng)濟的蕭條給我們敲響了警鐘。當務之急是財政與經(jīng)濟的衰退。但是,只有了解歐洲發(fā)生的一切事情才能以此了解貨幣發(fā)生了怎樣的變化。</p><p> 對于一些歐洲回避數(shù)年的根本性問題,如果他們不予以回答將無法使歐盟安定下來。這些問題的根源在于一個國家如何回應人們周圍的一切會發(fā)生如此大地變化。
8、歐盟將會如何分割西部壟斷者的債務并變得更加富有,已成熟的歐洲開始持續(xù)觀察正在復蘇的亞洲的西部半島。</p><p> 一些歐洲經(jīng)濟學家打算在廣闊健康的市場周圍建精心設(shè)計的防御墻。另外一些包括人數(shù)正在劇增的平民政客,都希望向國家內(nèi)部發(fā)展,不僅要排除世界的影響還多多參考歐洲精英匯集成的計劃項目。還有一些——也是來自那些精英中的人,大多數(shù)支持各種各樣的方法來還債,這種解決的方法不是逃避全球一體化的行為,而是一心一意地
9、去解決問題。</p><p> 不同于哲學性選擇摘要,歐盟將進行激烈的斗爭,像在希臘進行的活動,喬治帕潘德里歐建立的是個失去勢力的臨時統(tǒng)一團結(jié)的政府。在法國和利比亞有無數(shù)被遺棄的工廠,這種情況浪費了下西班牙成千上萬人的生命。這場斗爭將會限制歐洲的一些福利國家并且決定德國與法國之間不平等的合伙關(guān)系,和正在急劇分裂的大不列顛國,這些都將是歐盟要發(fā)生的一切情況。這些情況都將決定布魯塞爾的高要求政策和歐洲平民注意的低要
10、求政策。不同國家的政策決定各自國家的策略的使用程度,約瑟夫·阿洛伊斯·熊彼特說必須看這些政策在歐洲實施的具體內(nèi)容.</p><p> 近期,整個歐洲正處于低迷時期。擔心欠債的國家摧毀歐洲銀行,這些欠債的國家有希臘,葡萄牙,愛爾蘭,西班牙等,更另人不可思議的是,意大利要承兌3萬億歐元(4.2萬億美元),這一行為將以債券形式將擊垮歐洲的數(shù)家銀行,破壞銀行的自信心與信譽度。對于財政的空前緊縮,這給
11、社會帶來了蕭條,使政府還不起債券的危機加劇,銀行將受更嚴重的打擊。</p><p> 歐元區(qū)還是有能力去阻止銀行和政府這次行動。作為一個整體,相比美國,所欠的債務和公共部門赤字還是較少的,如果有必要情況,歐元區(qū)還是有資金來填補希臘、葡萄牙、愛爾蘭等所欠款。歐洲中央行提及,原則上可以背后支持那些脆弱的政府通過對二級市場購買它們無限量的債券。但是歐盟所做得數(shù)次令人信服的救援都以失敗告終。在上個月末,最新的和最勇敢地
12、嘗試因為缺少市場,像其他一些國家一樣,還是失敗了。對于這種現(xiàn)象的原因是歐洲國家深深地陷在爭執(zhí)中,并對每個國家就何種如何解決有著很大的分歧。因此,歐盟這些國家一直都沒有解決這些爭端,花在爭執(zhí)不同見解的問題上的時間遠遠多于花在找一個共同解決辦法的時間上,一致的行為需要有一個定義說明歐洲不可能一直原地不動。</p><p><b> 導致災難的多種途徑</b></p><p&
13、gt; 世界不可能等著歐洲來做一個決定,否則伴隨著的是一場大災難。災難的形式有很多。歐盟協(xié)議有規(guī)定允許成員國撤出歐元區(qū),但又有誰能阻止政府的決定呢?歐洲的銀行將面臨著對自信心的致命打擊。面對已頒布的條款,意大利和西班牙沒有權(quán)利借款。政府將以另一種方法取代強加征稅來拒絕。任何方法都會帶來連貫性的影響并將世界經(jīng)濟帶入蕭條。</p><p> 一些業(yè)內(nèi)人士認為,歐元區(qū)將以德國為中心開始分裂。日耳曼人則認為歐元會升值
14、,銀行和企業(yè)會對外損失巨大財產(chǎn),出口商會處于不利的位置。除此之外,德國還嘲諷歐盟的協(xié)議如此得寸進尺,觸犯了所有歐盟成員國家的法律,有些竟是完全抵制。</p><p> 歐元區(qū)的一個中央銀行家承認自己最近在研究歷史大災難,例如第一次世界大戰(zhàn)期間,世界時怎么撞著了歐洲。他卻說:“在這次危機時期,做錯決定是多么輕而易舉的事情?!?lt;/p><p> 經(jīng)濟與貨幣聯(lián)盟(EMU)允許具有競爭性的貨幣
15、貶值,這一決定于1990年大大威脅了單一市場,并承諾把德國統(tǒng)一到歐盟國家里來,這為今后的政治聯(lián)盟做了鋪墊。如今這個說法還未完全銷聲匿跡,單一的市場卻再一次受到經(jīng)濟威脅。歐盟成員國正處于對立階段,德國正處于憤怒階段,歐盟與其所有成員國都比以往更加焦慮。歐洲歷史學家戴維說:“經(jīng)濟與貨幣聯(lián)盟確實是令人郁悶說明的聯(lián)盟?!?lt;/p><p> “2008經(jīng)濟危機表明,經(jīng)濟支配并不是他們所認為的經(jīng)濟支配那樣。”法國IMF前任
16、首領(lǐng)多米尼克.史特勞斯卡恩說,“如果歐洲失敗,歐洲只會有在經(jīng)濟支配和文化支配上有極小的進步?!睔W洲能逃離這個深淵嗎?只有在核心國家才能支持他們接受其他根本的政治、社會和經(jīng)濟改革。任何人都想象不出這將會有多困難。</p><p> 總結(jié):歐洲危機將要喚醒整個歐洲,更有可能的是,歐洲危機將導致經(jīng)濟下滑并達成妥協(xié)。</p><p> Staring into the abyss</p&
17、gt;<p> 《THE ECNOMICST》</p><p> Key words:the euro;economic;crisis;currency;market</p><p> The euro crisis might wake Europe up. But more likely, argues Edward Carr, it will lead to co
18、mpromise and decline</p><p> WHEN BRITAIN ABANDONED the gold standard in 1931, it was not only forsaking a system for managing the currency but also acknowledging that it could no longer bear the mantle of
19、empire. When America broke the dollar’s peg with gold in 1971, it ushered in a decline that continued until Paul Volcker re-established confidence in the currency in the early 1980s. As Joseph Schumpeter, the great Austr
20、ian economist, once wrote: “The monetary system of a people reflects everything that the nation wants, </p><p> In the same way, the crisis that has engulfed the European Union (EU) is about much more than
21、the euro. As government bonds, share prices and banks swoon and global recession knocks on the door, the first fear is of financial and economic collapse. But to understand what is happening to the currency you also need
22、 to look at what is happening to Europe. </p><p> The euro will not be safe until Europe answers some fundamental questions that it has run away from for many years. At their root is how its nations should
23、 respond to a world that is rapidly changing around them. What will it do as globalisation strips the West of the monopoly over the technologies that have made it rich, and an ageing Europe starts to look increasingly li
24、ke the western peninsula of a resurgent Asia?</p><p> Some Europeans would like to put up carefully designed fences around the EU’s still vast and wealthy market. Others, including a growing number of popul
25、ist politicians, want to turn their nations inward and shut out not just the world but also the elites’ project of European integration. And a few—from among those same elites, mostly—argue that the only means of paying
26、for Europe’s distinctive way of life is not to evade globalisation but to embrace it wholeheartedly.</p><p> This is not some abstract philosophical choice. It is a fierce struggle for Europe’s future, bein
27、g waged in Athens as George Papandreou loses power to a temporary government of national unity, in derelict factories in France and Belgium and in the wasted lives of millions of unemployed young Spaniards. This struggle
28、 will set the limits on Europe’s welfare state. It will determine how the unbalanced partnership between Germany and France, and an increasingly detached Britain, will shape the EU. I</p><p> Just now the e
29、uro zone is caught in a dismal downward spiral. Fears about whether the governments in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and, most alarmingly, Italy will honour their €3 trillion ($4.2 trillion) or so of borrowing are wre
30、cking European banks, which own their debt. Struggling banks undermine confidence and credit. Coming on top of fiscal austerity, this is bringing on recession, deepening fears that governments will be unable to pay back
31、their debts, which further weakens the banks. </p><p> The euro zone still has the capacity to stop this run on its banks and governments. As a block, it is less indebted than America and its public-sector
32、deficit is lower. It has the money to fortify its banks against the default of Greece—and Portugal and Ireland, if need be. And it is minded by the European Central Bank (ECB), which can in principle stand behind those v
33、ulnerable governments by buying their debt in unlimited quantities on the secondary market. But the EU has repeatedly failed to p</p><p> Many roads to disaster</p><p> While the world waits f
34、or Europe to make up its mind, catastrophe is in the air. It could take many forms. A country might storm out of the euro—which the treaty forbids, but who could stop a determined government? European banks might suffer
35、a fatal loss of confidence. Italy or Spain might become unable to borrow on decent terms. Or a government trying to impose austerity might be replaced by one that rejects it. Any of these could cause contagion and plunge
36、 the world economy into depression.</p><p> A euro-zone central banker confesses that he has lately been thinking about historical catastrophes such as the first world war and wondering how the world blunde
37、red into them. “From the middle of a crisis”, he says ominously, “you can see how easy it is to make mistakes.”</p><p> Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was supposed to banish the competitive devaluations
38、that threatened the single market in the early 1990s. It promised to bind a unified Germany into the EU and pave the way for some sort of political union in Europe. Today that dream has not vanished altogether, but the s
39、ingle market is under threat once more. Europe’s nations are at loggerheads, Germany is in a state of outrage, and the link between the euro and the nation state is more fraught than ever. EMU t</p><p> “Th
40、e 2008 crisis shows that the dominant economies were not as dominant as they thought,” says Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the French former head of the IMF. “If Europe fails, it will suffer from low growth, economic domination
41、 and cultural domination.” Can Europe turn back from the abyss? Only if the core countries will support the rest as they submit themselves to radical political, social and economic reform. Nobody should be under any illu
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