基于制造商的供應(yīng)鏈道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究.pdf

1、中南大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文基于制造商的供應(yīng)鏈道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究姓名：周斯斯申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別：碩士專業(yè)：管理科學(xué)與工程指導(dǎo)教師：許民利20090106ABSTRACTNowadays，thecompetitionofthemarketisbecomingmoreandmoreintenseandthedemandofthecustomeriSconstantlychangingInthisbackground，themodemmanagementtheo

2、ryofSupplyChainManagement(SCM)，withitspurposestoresponsethemarketquicklysatisfythevariousdemandofcustomerincreasetheflexibilityandreducethecost，hasobtainedhugeeconomicbenefitsinpracticeandhasbeenacceptedbyboththeglobalbu

3、sinesscirclesandtheacademiaActuallythesystemofSCMistheallianceofseveralinterestindependentagentsBecausetheexistenceofprivateinformationinthesupplychainmembers，theproblemsofasymmetricinformationarisefromtimetotimeandthenh

4、aveacrisisofmoralhazardThemanufacturerasthecoreenterprisesmustbuildupeffectivestimulatingmechanismSOastoavoidmoralhazardorreducetheharmofmoralharm，toharmonizetherelationshipwiththesupplierandretailertoimprovetheenthusias

5、mofthemThisarticlefirstexpoundssomeoftheessentialprobleminthesupplychain，includingtheroleofmanufacturerinthesupplychain，anddiscussesthemoralhazardinsupplychainAndthenthisarticlegivesanemphasisaccountofmoralhazarddescribi

6、ngtheformofmoralhazardSecondthispaperstudieshowtoavoidretailers’moralhazardbymanufacturerIntheguidanceofthestatictheoryoftransferpayments，itmocksthesupplychainmakingupbyamanufacturerandaretailerandbyamanufacturerandanumb

7、erofretailersestablishesmathematicalmodels，anddesignsincentivesmechanismtopreventmoralhazardThen，itverifiestheresultsoftheincentivemechanismbynumericalexamplesandsuppliessomequalitativemethodstoavoidmoralhazardThird，this

8、articleresearchesthesuppliers’moralhazardItmocksamoralhazardofsupplierbymodeling：themanufacturerhopesthatthesupplierswouldmakeresearchteducethecostofintermediategoods，butthesuppliersarereluctanttomakeitforincreasingtheco