企業(yè)和國(guó)家層面的結(jié)構(gòu)治理機(jī)制對(duì)企業(yè)股利政策、現(xiàn)金持有量和[文獻(xiàn)翻譯]

1、原文：原文：TheEffectsofFirmCountrylevelGovernanceMechanismsonDividendPolicyCashHoldingsFirmValue:aCrosscountryStudyIntroductionThisstudyexaminestheeffectsoffirmcountrylevelcpategovernancemechanismsondividendscashholdingpolici

2、estheirjointimpactonfirmvalueusingasampleofover3000listedfirmsfrom21countries.FirmsoutsidetheUSareoftencontrolledbyalargeshareholder.FexampleClaessensDjankovLang(2000)tracetheultimateownersof2980publiclytradedfirmsfromni

3、neEastAsianeconomiesfindmethantwothirdsofthemhavecontrollingowners.FaccioLang(2002)carryoutasimilartaskfover5000firmsfrom13WesternEuropeancountries.TheyfindthatownershipconcentrationsamongtheseEuropeansfirmsareevenhigher

4、thanthoseofAsianfirms.Theprimaryagencyproblemffirmswithhighownershipconcentrationistheconflictbetweenthecontrollingshareholdersthoseofminityshareholders.Withdefactocontrolcoupledwithinsufficientlegalprotectionofinvestrig

5、htsinmanycountriesthecontrollingownersoftenengageinactivitiesthatincreaseprivatebenefitsattheexpenseofminityshareholders.Theseagencyconflictsarefurtherexacerbatedwhenthecontrollingownershaveexcesscontrolrights1.Thispaper

6、contributestotheliteratureoninternationalcpategovernanceinfourways.Firstitprovidesadditionalevidenceonthelinkagebetweenexcesscontroldividendcashholdingpoliciesfirmvaluerespectively.Italsodirectlytestthevaluationeffectsof

7、dividendcashholdingpolicies.Secondthisstudyextendsthestrofliteratureontheimptanceofinvestprotectionincpategovernance.Theempiricalanalysisrevealsthatthecountrylevelinvestprotectionmitigatesthe1Excesscontrolrightsarecomput

8、edasthedifferencebetweenthevotingrightsthecashflowrightsheldbythelargestowner.Thecommonuseofpyraalstructurecrossshareholdingsdualclasssharesothercontrolenhancingmechanismsresultinthelargestownershavingcontrolbeyondtheiro

9、wnershipstake[seeClaessensDjankovLang(2000)].asacountrylevelcpategovernanceregime.Theydiscoverthatthereexistssignificantdifferencesacrosscountriesinthedegreeofinvestrightsprotection.Firmsincountrieswithstronginvestprotec

10、tionhavelowownershipconcentrationbetteraccesstoexternalfinancingthanthoseincountrieswithpoinvestprotection.Theprimaryagencyconflictffirmswithconcentratedownershipstructureisbetweenthecontrollingownersminityshareholders.T

11、heinvests’legalrightsenfcementoflawmitigatesthisagencyconflict.Therefeanycrosscountrygovernanceanalysismustcontrolfthecountrylevelgovernanceeffect.DividendpolicyEasterbrook(1984)proposesthatdividendpaymentsfcefirmstorais

12、efundfromcapitalmarketswhichprovidemonitingofmanagers.Therefethemanagerialagencyproblemcanbemitigatedthroughdividendpolicy.Jensen(1986)positsthatmanagersmayuselowerdividendsindertoretainresourceswhichcanbeusedfexcessives

13、alaryperquisiteconsumptioninvestinginprojectsthatbenefitthemselvesattheexpenseofshareholders.FaccioLangYoung(2001)presentadifferentviewontheuseofdividends.Usingasampleofover5000firmswithconcentratedownershipstructurethey

14、documentthatdividendpaymentispositively(negatively)associatedwiththeexcesscontrolheldbythelargestshareholderoffirmsthataretightly(loosely)affiliatedwithbusinessgroups.Theycontendthatoutsidersperceivefirmsthataretightlyaf

15、filiatedwithbusinessgroupshavehighagencycoststherefediscountfirmvalueexante.Infearofvaluediscountthecontrollingownersusedividendsasabondingdevice.Howeveroutsidersseemtobelessalerttotheagencyproblemsinfirmslooselyaffiliat

16、edwithgroups.Therefethecontrollingownersareabletoretaindividends.Fasampleofover4000firmsfrom33countriesLLSV(2000)findthatfirmsoperatingincountrieswithbettershareholderprotectionpayhigherdividends.Takentogetherbothfirmcou