彼得森經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所-美國生產(chǎn)力復(fù)興的案例-12頁

1、1750MassachusettsAvenueNW|WashingtonDC200361903USA|202.328.9000Tel|202.328.5432Fax|POLICYBRIEF1726TheCasefanAmericanProductivityRevivalLeeBranstetterDanielSichelJune2017LeeBranstetterisaprofessofeconomicspublicpolicyatCa

2、rnegieMellonUniversityanonresidentsenifellowatthePetersonInstitutefInternationalEconomics.DanielSichelisaprofessofeconomicsatWellesleyCollege.TheythankDavidByrneRobertGdonRobinMcKnightStephenOlinerRobertSolowSteveWeisman

3、thesenifellowsofthePetersonInstitutefhelpfulcomments.SichelreceivedmaterialfinancialsupptoverthepastyearfrelatedproductivitypricemeasurementresearchfromtheFederalReserveBankofBostonwherehewasavisitingscholaraswellasfromt

4、heBureauofEconomicAnalysistheNationalTelecommunicationsInfmationAdministration.?PetersonInstitutefInternationalEconomics.Allrightsreserved.LabproductivityperfmanceintheUnitedStateshasbeendismalfmethanadecade.Butproductiv

5、ityslowdowns—evenlengthyones—arenothingnewinUSeconomichisty.ThisPolicyBriefmakesthecasethatthecurrentslowdownwillcometoanendasanewproductivityrevivaltakeshold.WhytheoptimismOfficialpriceindexesindicatethatinnovationinthe

6、technologysecthasslowedtoacrawlbutbetterdataindicaterapidprogress.Stardmeasuresfocusedonphysicalcapitalsuggestthatbusinessinvestmentisweakbutbroadermeasuresofinvestmentthatincporateintellectualganizationalcapitalreptmuch

7、merobustinvestment.Newtechnologicalopptunitiesinhealthcareroboticseducationthetechnologyofinventionitselfprovideadditionalreasonsfoptimism.ThisPolicyBriefgaugesthepotentialproductivityimpactofthesedevelopments.Theevidenc

8、epointstoalikelyrevivalofUSlabproductivitygrowthfromthe0.5percentaveragerateregisteredsince2010toapaceof2percentme.Aproductivityrevivalofthismagnitudewouldprovideasolidfoundationfsteadyincreasesinwagesimplythatthelongrun

9、growthrateofrealGDPcouldexceed2.5percentasignificantpickupfromcurrentrates.1Thisoutcomeismelikelyinthecontextofasupptivepolicyenvironment.Tofostersuchanenvironmentthefederalgovernmentshouldexpitssupptfbasicscientificrese

10、archallowmeimmigrationbyhighlyskilledscientistsengineersentrepreneurspreserveAmerica’slongstingcommitmenttoopentradeinvestmentpolicies.Itshouldalsostrengthenthesafetyratherthanparebacksupptfwkersdisplacedbytheinnovations

11、thatwilldrivefutureproductivitygrowth.Additionalpolicyinterventions(describedinthisPolicyBrief)arerequiredtotakefulladvantageofneweducationaltechnologies.IftheyavoidpolicyerrsPresidentTrumphissuccesscouldhavethegoodftune

12、ofpresidingoveraproductivityrevival.HISTICALUPSDOWNSOFPRODUCTIVITYGROWTHRecentweakperfmanceofproductivityhaspersuadedmanyobserversthattheeconomyfacesableak“newnmal.”2AccdingtoRobertGdon(aleadingproductivityexpertprofesso

13、feconomicsatNthwesternUniversity)theimpactoftoday’sdigitalinnovationscannotcomparewiththefundamentaltechnologicaldevelopments(suchaselectrificationmotization)thatboostedUSgrowthraisedlivingstardsbetween18701970.3Inhis201

14、6bookTheRiseFallofAmericanGrowth:TheUSStardofLivingsincetheCivilWarGdoncontends1.AlthoughconsiderablymeoptimisticthanthecurrentconsensusviewofproductivityprospectstherevivaldescribedinthisPolicyBrieffallswellshtofPreside

15、ntTrump’sstatedgoalof3.5–4percentrealannualGDPgrowthwhichmosteconomistsconsiderunrealistic(seeDanielE.Sichel“CantheUSEconomySustain3to4PercentEconomicGrowth”EconofactJanuary252017:econofact.gcantheuseconomysustain3%C2%BD

16、to4percenteconomicgrowth).2.Someobserversclaimthatthecurrentproductivityslowdownisamereartifactofmeasurementerr(becausetheeconomygrowsinwaysthattraditionalstatisticsfailtocapture).Theevidencehoweverstronglysupptstheviewt

17、hatlabproductivitygrowthhasslowedsharply(seeSyverson2016ByrneFernaldReinsdf2016).3.InadditiontoGdon(2016)seeFernald(2014)FernaldWang(2015).3PB1726June2017Indeedeconomistsswungtoofarintheoptimisticdirection:By2001theCongr

18、essionalBudgetOfficewasprojectingpotentiallabproductivitygrowthinthenonfarmbusinesssectof2.7percentayearfthefeseeablefuture.Bythe2010slabproductivitygrowthhadpedtolessthanonefifththatlevel.Thishisticalreviewsuggeststhatt

19、heproductivitygrowthoftherecentpastcanbeaverypoguidetofutureperfmancethatpoperfmanceoftengeneratesexcessivelypessimisticfecasts.WHYTHEPESSIMISTSMAYBEWRONGPessimistsoftenclaimthatthepaceofinnovationhasslowedthatbusinesses

20、arenotinvestingaggressivelyconcludingthatprospectsfproductivitygrowthremainbleak.Fseveralreasonstheirpessimismmaybemisplaced.OfficialDataSignificantlyUnderestimatetheRateofInnovationinInfmationTechnologyAdvancesininfmati

21、ontechnology(IT)drovethemostrecentproductivitysurgewhichtookoffinthe1990s.DuringthesecondhalfofthedecadesemiconductproducersimproveddesignsmanufacturingprocessescausingITpricestofallrapidly.Hasthatengineofprogressgroundt

22、oahaltRobertGdonmanyothereconomistshavenotedthatthepricesofhightechequipmenthavefallenatamuchslowerpaceinrecentyearsthaninearlierdecades.Indeedofficialpublishedmeasuresofpricesfmanyhightechproductsarebarelyfallingatall.G

23、donothersfocusonpricesbecauseeconomistsoftenusetrendsinrelativepricesinasecttoinferratesofinnovation.8Howeveragrowingbodyofliteraturesuggeststhatsignificantbiasesexistintheseofficialpricemeasures.ByrneOlinerSichel(fthcom

24、ing)developeda8.Mefmallythelinkbetweenpricesmultifactproductivityreliesonthe“dual”representationofaproductionfunction.SeeOlinerSichel(2002)ByrneOlinerSichel(20132017)fapplicationsofthisapproach.FacautionarynoteseeAizcbeO

25、linerSichel(2008).newindexfmicroprocesssusedindesktoppersonalcomputers.Theirpreferredindexfellatanaveragerateof42percentayearbetween20092013whilethemostcomparableofficialpricemeasure(theproducerpriceindexfmicroprocessuni

26、ts[MPUs])declinesbyanaveragerateofonly6percentayear.Thismeasurementgaparoseinthe2000sbecauseofamajchangeinthelifecyclepatternofIntel’spostedpricesfMPUs.Befethe2000sthepostedpricesofMPUstendedtofallasnewermodelswereintrod

27、uced.Thispricetrajectyallowedastardmethodologyusedfsemiconductsintheproducerpriceindex(matchedmodelindexes)tocapturequalitychangethroughtherapidpricedeclinesofoldermodels.Sincethe2000spostedpricesofIntelMPUshavetendedtor

28、emainstableevenaftertheintroductionofnewermepowerfulmodels.Reflectingtheserelativelyflatpriceprofilesamatchedmodelindexwillindicatelittlechangeinqualityadjustedpricesevenifthequalityofeachnewlyintroducedmodelismuchgreate

29、rthanitspredecess.ThenewpricemeasureByrneOlinerSicheldeveloped(anhedonicindex)mefullycapturesongoingqualitychangerevealsrapidpricedeclinesafterthisqualitychangeistakenintoaccount.Thisevidenceonfasterpricedeclinesindicate

30、sthatinnovationmultifactproductivitygrowthinsemiconducts—thegeneralpurposetechnologybehindmuchofthedigitalrevolution—hasbeenfarmerapidthanofficialindexessuggest.ByrneCrado(2016)documentrapidpricedeclinesfarangeofotherhig

31、htechproductspointingtoongoingbrisktechnicaladvancesinawiderangeofhightechsects.ThisevidencesuggeststhattheITrevolutionisstillgoingstrong.StardMeasuresUnderestimatetheStrengthofBusinessInvestmentTheshareoftheprivatesect’

32、straditionaltangibleinvestmentinGDPhasrecoveredinrecentyearsbutitremainsbelowitspeakinthe2000swellbelowitsvaluein2000(figure2).Fproductivitypessimiststhispersistentweaknessininvestmentreflectsthedispiritingviewthattherei

33、slittlenewexcitingproductivityenhancingtechnologyinwhichfirmscaninvest.Measuresofinvestmentinphysicalcapitaltellonlypartofthestyhowever.Inrecentyearsbusinesseshaveinvestedaggressivelyinintangiblecapital(aconceptthatinclu

34、desintellectualpropertybutisbroaderthanconventionaldefinitionsofintellectualproperty).TheUSGDPaccountsonlypartiallycapturethisinvestment.CradoHultenSichel(2009)arguefabroaderapproach.Theydefinebusinessinvestmentas“anyuse