用經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值指標(biāo)改善對(duì)經(jīng)理人員的激勵(lì).pdf

1、北方交通大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文用經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值指標(biāo)改善對(duì)經(jīng)理人員的激勵(lì)姓名：李學(xué)林申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別：碩士專業(yè)：工商管理指導(dǎo)教師：王冬梅2002.1.1AbstractAbstractWiththeseparationofownershipandmanagement，principal—agentrelationshipisformedbetweenthestockholdersandthemanagement，namelytheformerispri

2、ncipalsandthelaReLagentsDuetocomplexityanduncertaintyoftheenvironment，boundedrationalityofthehuman，incompletenessandasymmetricaldistributionofinformation，agencycontractwillineluctablybeincomplete，inotherwords，gapsorlooph

3、olescanbefoundinagentcontractSo，opportunismbehaviorsandmoralhazardsareprobablyactedbyagentsInordertopreventsuchactsandtoimproveagemefficiencyprincipalshavetodesignastimulatingcontractthatcompensatesagentsOilthebaseofthei

4、rperformanceItreconcilestheagents’interestwiththeprincipals’Agentswouldworkhardtomaximizetheinterestofprincipals，fortheycallalsogaincorrespondingrewardsExactmeasurementoftheperformancedemonstratesthecontributionsoftheman

5、agementandunderlinesthefunctionofincentivescheme。Whereas，thepresentmethodofmeasurementfailstoshowthecontributionsofmanagementWithouttakingintoaccountthecapitalcost，theincompletecostcalculationignoresthestockholders’right

6、sTheincentiveschemebasedonitmaybedistortstheactionofthemanagementEconomicvalueaddedisaninnovativemethodofperformancemeasurementItcanaccuratelyreflectthecontributionsmadebythemanagementFurthermore，it，asanincentivescheme，e