戰(zhàn)略學(xué) strategy 主題1

1、戰(zhàn)略學(xué) 主題1: 戰(zhàn)略學(xué)導(dǎo)論,內(nèi)容皆為研究生學(xué)習(xí)期間課程課件，謹(jǐn)供各位學(xué)習(xí)交流，紕漏之處，望各位不吝賜教翻譯：Eason LiuLiu-y5@email.ulster.ac.uk,什么是戰(zhàn)略？,根據(jù)你的理解，寫(xiě)出你自己關(guān)于戰(zhàn)略的定義你會(huì)使用什么樣的詞匯來(lái)描述？,什么是戰(zhàn)略？,“戰(zhàn)略是關(guān)于一個(gè)組織長(zhǎng)期的定位和視野,它在變化的環(huán)境中通過(guò)對(duì)資源和人才配置，來(lái)達(dá)到滿(mǎn)足股東期望的目的，并以此來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的優(yōu)勢(shì)”(Johnson et a

2、l., 2011),什么是戰(zhàn)略？,“…競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略是關(guān)于如何和別人有所不同. 也就是精巧的選擇一組不同的活動(dòng)來(lái)傳達(dá)一個(gè)獨(dú)特的價(jià)值組合” (Porter, 1996)“…是一種組織的內(nèi)部能力（internal capabilities）和外部關(guān)系（external relationships）間的組合” (Kay, 1993),Mintzberg – 戰(zhàn)略的5Ps模型,戰(zhàn)略是一種計(jì)劃－在行動(dòng)之前的考慮和制定戰(zhàn)略是一種計(jì)謀－威脅要對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手

3、的行為采取行動(dòng)｛不一定要真正的實(shí)施該行動(dòng)｝戰(zhàn)略是一種模式－一些具有一致性的行為流（stream of actions）｛計(jì)劃和模式間流動(dòng)的動(dòng)態(tài)的戰(zhàn)略觀點(diǎn)｝戰(zhàn)略是一種定位－使得公司能夠有效的競(jìng)爭(zhēng) 戰(zhàn)略是一種視角－組織成員所共有的觀點(diǎn)或概念,戰(zhàn)略決策是關(guān)于:,一個(gè)組織長(zhǎng)期的定位一個(gè)組織行為的范圍超越競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者而得到優(yōu)勢(shì) (競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，competitive advantage)強(qiáng)調(diào)在商業(yè)環(huán)境中的改變 (外部的，external)以資

4、源和能力為基礎(chǔ)(戰(zhàn)略能力，strategic capabilities) – （內(nèi)部的，internal） 持股人的價(jià)值和預(yù)期,因此, 它們是:,天生就具有復(fù)雜性的在不確定的環(huán)境之中被制定的會(huì)影響到具體的操作決策的需要一種綜合的方法 關(guān)乎大量的改變的,戰(zhàn)略的三水平:,戰(zhàn)略的三水平:,公司層面戰(zhàn)略,涉及到： 組織總的范圍和目標(biāo)價(jià)值是如何被附加到組織內(nèi)的不同部門(mén)上的,戰(zhàn)略的三水平:,涉及到 涉及到組織內(nèi)的特別的，詳細(xì)的（Pa

5、rticular）戰(zhàn)略業(yè)務(wù)單元（Strategic Business Units, SBUs)如何在特別的，具體的市場(chǎng)中成功競(jìng)爭(zhēng)最佳價(jià)值（“Best value”） (公共部門(mén)),事業(yè)層面戰(zhàn)略,戰(zhàn)略的三水平:,涉及到 組織的資源，流程和人員是如何有效地傳達(dá)公司層面和事業(yè)層面的戰(zhàn)略的,經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略,戰(zhàn)略三層次的關(guān)鍵？,戰(zhàn)略的這三個(gè)層面只見(jiàn)必須是相互協(xié)調(diào)和一致的（integrated & consistent）這一點(diǎn)為什么很重要

6、？,既定戰(zhàn)略的和應(yīng)急戰(zhàn)略（Prescriptive & emergent strategy）,你是如何理解這兩個(gè)條目的？,既定戰(zhàn)略,既定的(打算中的)戰(zhàn)略是一種有序的，有邏輯的戰(zhàn)略觀點(diǎn)，并且它假設(shè)：目標(biāo)是被提前界定清晰的。未來(lái)是可預(yù)測(cè)的且環(huán)境是穩(wěn)定的。它不隨著時(shí)間的改變而改變。由管理者深思熟慮的構(gòu)思和規(guī)劃,既定戰(zhàn)略,應(yīng)急戰(zhàn)略,應(yīng)急戰(zhàn)略: 是一種隨著時(shí)間而不間斷發(fā)展的程序和戰(zhàn)略。有不清晰的目標(biāo)(但隨著時(shí)間發(fā)展而愈發(fā)清

7、晰)。與組織的實(shí)際活動(dòng)相一致。 考慮到人和組織文化的因素。,應(yīng)急戰(zhàn)略,那么，解決方案是什么呢？,在戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展中，我們既需要既定戰(zhàn)略，又需要應(yīng)急戰(zhàn)略要去發(fā)展和完成具有清晰和富有邏輯性的方案：既定戰(zhàn)略然而，與此同時(shí)，嘗試其他可能的戰(zhàn)略：應(yīng)急戰(zhàn)略,1. 依據(jù)這種分類(lèi)，你會(huì)如何來(lái)描述你所在公司的戰(zhàn)略？2. 它有沒(méi)有隨著時(shí)間的改變而變化？是如何變化的？并且為何會(huì)發(fā)生如此變化？,在清晰表述戰(zhàn)略上的困難,你能用少于35個(gè)字來(lái)總結(jié)你的組織的戰(zhàn)略

8、么？并且，是否你的同事也是這么認(rèn)為的呢？“有這樣一個(gè)不可告人的小秘密，大多數(shù)的執(zhí)行官不能夠簡(jiǎn)明而清晰的表述他們公司的目標(biāo)，范圍和優(yōu)勢(shì)。而且，如果他們不能夠做得到的話(huà)，沒(méi)有其他人能做得到?！?Collis & Rukstad (2008),好的戰(zhàn)略表述的組成因素(Collis & Rukstad, 2008),“水晶般清澈的”…目標(biāo), 范圍, 和優(yōu)勢(shì),好

9、的戰(zhàn)略表述的組成因素(Collis & Rukstad, 2008),任何的戰(zhàn)略表述必須以一個(gè)此戰(zhàn)略被設(shè)計(jì)要達(dá)到的最終目的的定義來(lái)開(kāi)始(目標(biāo)/objective).同時(shí)，明確商業(yè)活動(dòng)的范圍也很重要：打算把公司開(kāi)在哪里？.保持低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的界限是什么？例如：如果你打算進(jìn)入酒店業(yè)，你要提供哪種類(lèi)型的服務(wù)？是讓顧客在此就餐還是外帶？是隨意輕松的氛圍還是奢華的環(huán)境？你會(huì)提供什么類(lèi)型的食物等等問(wèn)題？,好的戰(zhàn)略表述的組成因素(Collis

10、& Rukstad, 2008),戰(zhàn)略的目標(biāo)和范圍是不夠的你的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性?xún)?yōu)勢(shì)（competitive advantage）才是你的戰(zhàn)略的核心與菁華：你的公司如何做的與別人不同或優(yōu)于別人決定了那些最重要的方面，也就是說(shuō)，你會(huì)籍此完成既定的目標(biāo),好的戰(zhàn)略表述的組成因素(Collis & Rukstad, 2008),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)有著充作的外部和組成成分： 一個(gè)解釋了為什么目標(biāo)客戶(hù)群(targeted customer)一定要選

11、擇你的產(chǎn)品而不是別人的價(jià)值主張(value proposition)， 也是一個(gè)關(guān)于為什么內(nèi)部的活動(dòng)必須保持均衡一致，所以也就只有你的公司才能夠傳遞那個(gè)價(jià)值主張的描述。,什么是戰(zhàn)略管理？,“戰(zhàn)略管理包括對(duì)一個(gè)組織的戰(zhàn)略位置(strategic position)的理解, 為將來(lái)做出戰(zhàn)略選擇(strategic choices), 和對(duì)實(shí)際行動(dòng)中戰(zhàn)略（strategy in action）的管理?！?(Johnson et al., 2

12、011),什么是戰(zhàn)略管理？,影響戰(zhàn)略位置的因素有:外部的環(huán)境(the external environment); 一個(gè)組織的戰(zhàn)略能力－資源和人員能力(resources & competences);以及持股人的預(yù)期和影響。,什么是戰(zhàn)略管理？,戰(zhàn)略選擇涉及到:從業(yè)務(wù)單位(business unit)和公司層面(corporate levels)理解未來(lái)戰(zhàn)略的基礎(chǔ); 發(fā)展方向和發(fā)展方法兩個(gè)方面來(lái)制定戰(zhàn)略的選擇; 甄別

13、哪些選擇會(huì)成功，哪些會(huì)失敗。,什么是戰(zhàn)略管理？,行動(dòng)中的戰(zhàn)略（Strategy in action）涉及到：保證選定的戰(zhàn)略被實(shí)際運(yùn)用到實(shí)踐之中,Reading,Johnson et al (2011) – Chapter 1Lynch (2009) – Chapters 1 & 2Ansoff, I., 1991. Critique of Henry Mintzberg’s ‘The Design School: Reco

14、nsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management’. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 449-461.Collis, D.J. and Rukstad, M.G. (2008) Can you say what your strategy is?, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4, pp. 82

15、-90.Mintzberg, H., 1990. Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 171-195.Porter, M.E., 1996. What is Strategy? Harvard Business Review, November-December, 61-78.,樣例:

16、20世紀(jì)80年代到90年代的IBM,案例比較簡(jiǎn)單，而且網(wǎng)上也比較容易找到，就是IBM出售PC部之前的一系列決策失誤。大家自己網(wǎng)上了解一下吧，我接著翻譯第二部分啦Liu－y5@email.ulster.ac.uk,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 1,During this period, the world’s largest computer company IBM was in serious troubl

17、eIBM’s launch of its first personal computer eventually cost the company US$16 billion between 1991 and 1993 – why? Because it made a series of strategic mistakes….,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 2,During the 1980s, IBM

18、gained market dominance of large computers – called computer ‘mainframes’IBM then decided to move in a new broad strategic direction: into the growing market for ‘personal computers’ - PCs,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 3

19、,IBM had major resources: including its people, its brand name, its reputation as ‘Big Blue’ and its quality research and developmentIts competitive resources were easily the best in the computer businessSo why did it

20、fail with PCs?,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 4,Up to the late 1980s, IBM was highly profitable: it was adding value to its inputsBut then everything went wrong and IBM succeeded in losing value to the extent of US$16 bil

21、lion,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 5,During the late 1980s, there were many changes in the strategic environmentIBM’s own resources were also changing fast‘Strategy dynamics’ were volatile and relatively difficult to pr

22、edict,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 6,But just because the environment and resources are changing fast, it does not necessarily mean that a powerful company like IBM should fail with its launch of PCsSo what happened? Wh

23、y was IBM’s PC strategy such a dismal failure?,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 7,During the 1970s and 1980s, IBM dominated the market and offered large, fast and reliable mainframe machinesSmall personal computers (PCs) we

24、re not sold by IBM, but small PC manufacturers were offering their individual machines – e.g. Atari, Sinclair ZX, CommodoreBut there was no industry standard for PCs,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 8,Having conquered the m

25、ainframe market, IBM decided to launch its own PC – sourcing software from a tiny company called Microsoft and computer chips from a very small company called IntelIBM PC launched in 1983 – an immediate success,IBM in t

26、he 1980s and 1990s – 9,Some reasons for the IBM strategic disaster:Increased competition: IBM standardisation allowed low-cost clones from Asia-Pacific to enter because a new technology standard had been set by IBM,IBM

27、in the 1980s and 1990s – 10,Some reasons for the IBM strategic disaster:‘IBM compatible’ became the common claim on new PCsStandardisation of the technology increased the production economies scaleThis allowed new man

28、ufacturers to increase their profitability,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 11,Some reasons for the IBM strategic disasterSuppliers were not contractually secured: IBM failed to protect its interests in its supplier’s techn

29、ology: IBM allowed Microsoft to sell the MS-DOS software - developed by Microsoft for the IBM PC - to other PC manufacturers without taking a royalty Although IBM took a share stake in Intel, it later sold this equity

30、and kept no ownership of the PC chips used in the IBM PC,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 12,Some reasons for the IBM strategic disaster:Branding by Intel and Microsoft shifted industry value added: IBM allowed Microsoft an

31、d Intel to develop their own independent supplier strategies, e.g. through brandingIndustry value added shifted from IBM to Microsoft and Intel Corporation,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 13,Some reasons for the IBM strate

32、gic disaster:IBM’s corporate culture was over-confident: IBM was so large and dominant that its senior managers felt IBM would always winMany senior managers inside IBM saw little personal opportunity in the new PC mar

33、ket,IBM in the 1980s and 1990s – 14,Result: IBM lost US$16 billion between 1991 and 1993Importantly in strategy, we need to distinguish between the content of the strategy – the disastrous launch of the IBM PC – and th