mba論文內(nèi)生網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境下具有異質(zhì)連接費(fèi)用的局部策略互動(dòng)pdf

1、分類(lèi)號(hào)：0225 密級(jí)：公開(kāi)UDC： UDC：519.83 學(xué)校代碼：11065碩 士 學(xué) 位 論 文內(nèi)生網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境下具有異質(zhì)連接費(fèi)用的局部策略互動(dòng)內(nèi)生網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境下具有異質(zhì)連接費(fèi)用的局部策略互動(dòng)孫麗萍指 導(dǎo) 教 師 高紅偉 教授學(xué)科專(zhuān)業(yè)名稱(chēng) 運(yùn)籌學(xué)與控制論論文答辯日期 2015 年 5 月 28 日AbstractThis paper mainly deals with the local strategic interaction in

2、the context ofendogenous network formation, where players can only play coordination game with theirdirect neighbors. In the network formation process, the cost of link formation isheterogeneous (with two levels).Two new

3、 models are proposed in the dissertation. In the first model, the cost of linkformation is based on the partner’s action choice. Players would bear high-level costswhen establishing links with players who choose an effic

4、ient action, and would bearlow-level costs when establishing links with players who choose a risk-dominated action.In the second model, the cost of link formation is based on the player’s own action choice.Players would

5、bear one cost when he choose efficient action, and would bear another costwhen he choose risk-dominated action.In each case of heterogeneous link formation costs, the nature of network structureand players’ choices are g

6、iven explicitly in the equilibrium outcomes, and how the cost oflink formation affecting the equilibrium outcomes is studied analytically. When link costis low, the equilibrium network structure is complete and essential

7、. When link cost is high,the equilibrium network structure is empty. Players’ action choice depends on therelationship between link costs and payoff parameters.Key words: network game; local strategic interaction; hetero