生活在后通脹為目標(biāo)的世界

1、EconomicResearchApril302019SpecialReptLivinginapostinflationtargetingwld?TherepercussionsoftheGlobalFinancialCrisis(GFC)haveshakenthepillarsuponwhichflexibleinflationtargetingregimesst.TheupcomingFederalReservereviewrepr

2、esentsthefirststepinabroaderreconsiderationofmoarypolicyframewksbyG3centralbanks.?CentralbankersarenolongerconfidenttheycancontrolinflationoveratwotothreeyearhizonasthepricePhillipscurvehasbeendmant.Inadditionaintheequil

3、ibriumneutralinterestrate(r)suggeststhattheircurrenttoolboxmaybetoolimitedinawldwithaneffectivelowerinterestratebound(ELB).Confidencethatstabilizinginflationcloseto2%willdeliveroptimalmacroeconomicoutcomeshasalsowaned.?G

4、3centralbankshavereactedindifferentwaystothischallenge.TheFederalReserveisnowactivelyencouraginganovershootofits2%inflationtargethasannouncedafmalreviewthatlookslikelytoinstituteaninflationaveragingframewk.?AlthoughtheBo

5、Jshifteditsframewkover201316ithassubsequentlyundermineditsinflationtargetingcommitmentbyacceptingthatitwillnotachieveitsinflationobjectiveinthefeseeablefuture.TheECBhasalsofailedtorespondtoapersistentinflationundershoots

6、ignsthatitscredibilityiseroding.?ThisgreatertolerancetoapersistentinflationundershootbytheECBBoJislinkedtotheirpoliticaleconomicconstraints.Butitalsoreflectstheirfailuretorecognizetheneedtorespondtoachanginglscape.?Thepa

7、thsindividualcentralbanksfollowwillvarybutthedestinationislikelytoincludeareconsiderationoftheirstrategiesalongfivelines:1)Multipleobjectives.Arecognitionthatinflationisonlyoneofmultipledistinctmoarypolicyobjectives.2)St

8、atecontingenttargets.Twothreeyearaheadinflationtargets(toleranceranges)needtosetbasedonthepathinflationtheeconomyhastravelledaccountingfpolicymaker’smultipleobjectives.3)Higherthan2%.ConstraintsrelatedtotheELBwillrequire

9、amovetoahigherinflationtargetifrremainsdepressed.4)Anexpedtoolbox.Theemergenceofabroaderframewkintegratingbalancesheetinterestratemacroprudentialinstrumentsthatcanbeemployedatallstagesofthebusinesscycle.5)Greatercodinati

10、onwithotherarmsofgovernmenttoalleviatemoarypolicyconstraintstoshareresponsibilitywheremoaryfiscalregulatypolicyoverlaps.?TheFed’sreviewshouldbeseenasthefirststeponalongjourneythatwillsignificantlyaltermoarypolicyframewks

11、.Viewedfromabroaderhisticalsweepthependulumshouldalsobeseenasswingingawayfromrulestowardsdiscretion.TableofContents:Introduction…………………………23Therisefallofinflationtargeting....…………………………..…….34Losingconfidenceininflationc

12、ontrol……………………………….45Toolboxconstraintsduetolowerr………………………..….....56Optimizingmacroperfmance……………………..………..69Theneedfpolicycodination……………………….…….......910ThereviewattheFederalReserve..…..…………….….…...1012Theimplications

13、ftheECB.....1214TheimplicationsftheBOJ…..1416Appendix:assessingQE’simpact..…………………..….…...1619DavidMackie(4420)71348325david.mackie@BruceKasman(1212)8345515bruce.c.kasman@MichaelFeroli(1212)8345523michael.e.feroli@Hirosh

14、iUgai(813)67361173hiroshi.ugai@GregFuzesi(4420)71348310greg.x.fuzesi@3EconomicResearchLivinginapostinflationtargetingwldApril302019JPMganChaseBankN.ALondonBranchDavidMackie(4420)71348325david.mackie@JPMganChaseBankNABruc

15、eKasman(1212)8345515bruce.c.kasman@JPMganChaseBankNAMichaelFeroli(1212)8345523michael.e.feroli@JPMganSecuritiesJapanCo.Ltd.HiroshiUgai(813)67361173hiroshi.ugai@?Abiggertoolbox.Iftheobjectivesofpricestabilityfullemploymen

16、tfinancialstabilityarerelatedbutdistinctcentralbankerswillneedmultipletoolstoenablethemtoachievetheirgoals.ThereisalreadyaframewkinplacefusingunconventionaltoolstoaddresstheELBconstraint.thereisarecognitionoftheneedtouse

17、regulatysupervisyinstrumentsmeactivelytopromotefinancialstability.Butthebroaderframewkfintegratingbalancesheetinterestratemacroprudentialpoliciesisstillinanentstage.?Balancingpartnershipwithoperationalindependence.Withce

18、ntralbankholdingsofgovernmentdebtlikelytoremainelevatedcentralbankersbeingmeactivelyinvolvedinusingregulatysupervisytoolscodinationwithotherarmsofgovernmentwillnaturallyincrease.Centralbankswillneedtofindabalanceastheycr

19、eatecloserpartnershipswithotherarmsofgovernmentwktomaintaintheiroperationalindependence.Thesechallengesarelikelytobemademedifficultbythelargeoverhangofpublicsectdebtinthedevelopedwldthepressureonpublicfinancesthatissetto

20、buildaspopulationsage.TherisefallofinflationtargetingThehistyofcentralbankingrepresentsanongoingconflictbetweenrelyingonrulesversusdiscretioninthepursuitofmacroeconomicobjectives.Arulesbasedframewkisanattractivemeanstocr

21、ediblyanchprivatesectinflationexpectationsbyremovingthethreatthatthemoaryauthitieswouldexploitatradeofftogenerateshttermoutputgainsattheexpenseofproducingamediumterminflationarybias.Howevertheapplicationofrulesbasedappro

22、achestomoarypolicyoverthepastcentury—thegoldstardtheBrettonWoodssystemoffixedexchangeratesmoarytargeting—haveeachbrokendowninthefaceofunfeseenshockschangesinthestructureoftheglobaleconomy.Therisefallofflexibleinflationta

23、rgetingcanbeseeninthislight.Inflationtargetingaroseasapragmaticeffttocombineelementsofrulesdiscretionbasedframewks.Becauseitrepresentsaframewkratherthanarigidsetofrulesitisdifficulttodefineitinaprecisemanner.Howeverthere

24、aresharedelementstotheinflationtargetingregimethatcanbeidentified.?Pricestabilityisexplicitlyrecognizedastheprimarygoalofmoarypolicy.?Aquantitativetargetfinflationissetfaspecificnumberofperiodsaheadinwhichmoarypolicyacti

25、onsinfluenceinflationoutcomes(usuallytwotothreeyears).?Amethodologyfinflationfecastingiscommunicatedthatlinksthepathofcurrentavailableinfmationtothepathofinflation.?Afwardlookingoperatingprocedureisdevelopedbywhichthecen

26、tralbankcommunicatestothepublichowmoarypolicyinstrumentswillbeadjustedtoachievetheinflationtargethowpolicywillrespondtoeconomicshocks.StartingwithNewZealin1989over30countriesaroundthewldmovedtodefinetheirpolicyframewksas

27、inflationtargetingregimes.Whilethecentralbanksofthethreelargestadvancedeconomies—theFederalReservetheEuropeanCentralBanktheBankofJapan—arenotinthisgroupeachofthesenoninflationtargetingcentralbanksmovedsignificantlyinthed

28、irectionofinflationtargetingoverthe1990s2000s.Eachmovedtosetanexplicitmediumterminflationtarget.FtheECBBoJthistargethasbeenenshrinedinlegislationastheprimarygoalofmoarypolicy.TheFeddiffersinmaintaininganexplicitdualmateo

29、fachievingpricestabilityfullemployment.HoweverintheyearsleadinguptotheGFCthismateincreasinglyshiftedtowardanapproachwherebyachievingpricestabilitywastheprimarymediumtermobjective—asitwasviewedasanecessaryconditiontowardi

30、nsuringfullemployment.Thisviewisclearlyexpressedina2007speechbythethenchairoftheFedBernanke.“Asyouknowthecontrolofinflationiscentraltogoodmonetarypolicy.PricestabilitywhichisonelegoftheFederalReservesdualmatefromtheCongr

31、essisagoodthinginitselffreasonsthateconomistsunderstmuchbettertodaythantheydidafewdecadesago…Inflationinjectsnoiseintothepricesystemmakeslongtermfinancialplanningmecomplexinteractsinperversewayswithimperfectlyindexedtaxa

32、ccountingrules.Intheshttomediumtermthemaintenanceofpricestabilityhelpsavoidthepatternofstopgomoarypoliciesthatwerethesourceofmuchinstabilityinoutputemploymentinthepast.Mefundamentallyexperiencesuggeststhathighpersistenti

33、nflationunderminespublicconfidenceintheeconomyinthemanagementofeconomicpolicygenerallywithpotentiallyadverseeffectsonrisktakinginvestmentotherproductiveactivitiesthataresensitivetothepublic’sassessmentsoftheprospectsffut

34、ureeconomicstability.Inthelongtermlowinflationpromotesgrowthefficiencystability—whichallelsebeingequalsupptmaximumsustainableemploymenttheotherlegofthemategiventotheFederalReservebytheCongress.”AtthesametimethattheG3hasm