在新興市場如何處理債務重組外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2715字</b></p><p><b>　　英文2100單詞</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　外文題目 How to tackle debt restructuring in e

2、merging markets/ Mapping the dangers of debt restructuring </p><p>　　外文出處 國際金融法律評論/國際稅務回顧 </p><p>　　外文作者 卡格曼.史蒂文/克隆普.赫侖納

3、 </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　How to tackle debt restructuring in emerging markets</p><p>　　The present slowdown in the global economy has focused renewed att

4、ention on the issue of restructuring troubled loans in emerging markets. Debt restructurings in these markets often represent a unique amalgam of legal, business, financial and strategic issues.</p><p>　　TRY

5、ING TO MAKE TIMELY IN THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS</p><p>　　Many emerging market restructurings can, for various reasons, easily take a few years to complete, and the creditors and debtor may have sharply diver

6、gent perspectives on whether it is in their fundamental interest to achieve a relatively quick solution. It is not uncommon in restructuring situations for debtors to believe that time is on their side, and this percepti

7、on on the part of debtors is often grounded in reality. By contrast, the creditors may generally view time as their enemy. Since m</p><p>　　The debtor, on the other hand, may be less motivated to keep the pr

8、ocess moving forward with any type of alacrity. Assuming that it can continue to meet its working capital and other basic needs and otherwise continue to function as a going concern, some debtors may be perfectly content

9、 to maintain a debt service moratorium or debt standstill. By foregoing debt service payments, the debtor may be able to accumulate some cash on hand, which may well be beyond the reach or control of the creditors</p&

10、gt;<p>　　TIMETABLES</p><p>　　In light of these possibly divergent perspectives between the creditors and debtor on the urgency of the restructuring task, creditors may seek to establish timetables for

11、 accomplishing key milestones in the restructuring process. If possible, such timetables may be discussed with and agreed upon with the debtor. This process could involve some negotiation between the two sides on what ar

12、e realistic deadlines and what are the important milestones in the process. Each of the major phases of the r</p><p>　　The presence of a fairly specific and detailed timetable may help bring discipline to th

13、e process so that it does not proceed in a haphazard or desultory fashion. In addition, a timeline may help the creditors determine whether or not the debtor is trying to advance the restructuring process or is instead a

14、ttempting to deliberately delay the process. In certain restructurings, creditors will need to ask themselves whether the lack of progress is based on justifiable reasons, such as the complexi</p><p>　　DETER

15、MINING THE ROLE OF THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER IN THE RESTRUCTURED COMPANY</p><p>　　Many emerging market restructurings involve the phenomenon of the so-called controlling shareholder, meaning the shareholde

16、r that holds a controlling interest in the debtor company. These controlling shareholders may represent influential family interests in the host country. Such shareholders may not only hold a large and controlling equity

17、 stake in the debtor company, but various members of the family of the controlling shareholder may also occupy a number of the key management positions with </p><p>　　In certain restructurings, the creditors

18、 may believe, correctly or otherwise, that a fair amount of the debtor's financial travails can be attributed to the mismanagement of the company's affairs by the controlling shareholder. As a result, in the rest

19、ructuring process, the creditors may initially be interested in Grafting a restructuring plan that involves the removal of the controlling shareholder from any continuing role in management. Fundamentally, the creditors

20、may believe that they are fa</p><p>　　CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS</p><p>　　In many instances, the controlling shareholders may be deeply entrenched and hence very difficult to remove from their dom

21、inant position at the debtor company. As the Asian Development Bank noted in a 1999 report on insolvency law issues in the Asian-Pacific region, the owners of financially distressed corporations are often driven by a fea

22、r of loss of control of the corporation. (The same observation could be applied with equal force to certain emerging markets in other parts of the world). A s</p><p>　　However, if it is clear that the credit

23、ors will be unable to remove the controlling shareholders from management, the creditors as part of the restructuring plan may nevertheless try to institute a range of corporate governance reforms. Such reforms may be de

24、signed to limit and control the power and influence of the controlling shareholders in the restructured company.</p><p>　　CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS</p><p>　　Specifically, among a range of suc

25、h possible corporate governance reforms, the creditors may try to reconfigure the company's board of directors and its committee structure. For example, the creditors may seek to have independent directors play a gre

26、ater role, and they may seek to have certain board committees, such as the audit committee, have direct oversight over certain management functions. The creditors may be aided in their efforts at such corporate governanc

27、e reform by changes in the loc</p><p>　　In addition, the creditors may seek greater internal management and audit controls in certain key areas of the debtor's operations such as in the finance functions

28、 of the debtor. By way of example, the creditors may attempt to impose greater control over the process by which company officials can approve disbursements and sign cheques, particularly for disbursements over specified

29、 dollar thresholds. The creditors may also seek to subject certain types of transactions, such as related party trans</p><p>　　In sum, in a number of emerging market restructurings, the creditors may be face

30、d with the unpleasant but stubborn reality that they will not be able to remove the controlling shareholder from management or eliminate the controlling shareholder's continued equity control of the debtor. The credi

31、tors may therefore have to shift their focus to developing an approach for a restructuring plan that seeks to contain and circumscribe the power and influence of the controlling shareholders in the restru</p><

32、p>　　Yet, in pursuing corporate governance reforms, the creditors may encounter strong resistance if the proposed reforms would have the effect of stripping the controlling shareholders of more power than they are will

33、ing to give up. Consequently, there may be considerable tension between the corporate governance reforms that the creditors may be seeking, on the one hand, and the limited amount of power that the controlling shareholde

34、rs may be willing to give up, on the other hand. This tension is an</p><p>　　It should be noted, however, that the manner in which this tension is addressed and resolved could have a spillover effect on how

35、the rest of the restructuring negotiation progresses. The breadth and scope of proposed corporate governance reforms may possibly affect how the controlling shareholder views the rest of the restructuring package, includ

36、ing the proposed economic terms of any restructuring deal. If the controlling shareholder views the proposed corporate governance reforms as being ove</p><p>　　In such circumstances, the creditors may be for

37、ced to consider how integral the proposed corporate governance reforms are to the overall restructuring deal. The creditors may therefore be faced with a difficult choice. One possibility is that the creditors may be wil

38、ling to walk away from the proposed overall restructuring deal (or consider the possibility of doing so) if, in the course of the negotiations, they cannot achieve all or even most of their important corporate governance

39、 objectives. </p><p>　　However, whether compromise on such issues is an acceptable course of action may be viewed differently by various creditors within the creditor body. For certain creditors, corporate g

40、overnance issues may involve important issues of principle and philosophy, and this may affect their willingness to compromise on these issues. Moreover, some creditors may view certain corporate governance issues, such

41、as having in place an effective system of cash controls, as having a critical impact on whether </p><p>　　In a number of emerging market jurisdictions, creditors may prefer to pursue an out-of-court restruct

42、uring solution precisely because the local insolvency law regime may be unfavorable to creditors.</p><p>　　The creditors may be faced with the unpleasant but stubborn reality that they cannot remove the cont

43、rolling shareholder from management or eliminate the controlling shareholder's continued equity control of the debtor.</p><p>　　資料來源：Kargman. Steven. International Financial Law Review, 2002：P41—45</p

44、><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　在新興市場如何處理債務重組</p><p>　　目前全球經(jīng)濟增長放緩，人們將注意力重新集中在新興市場的結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整貸款。債務重組在這些市場往往是一個獨特的混合法律、商業(yè)、金融和戰(zhàn)略問題。</p><p><b>　　要及時調(diào)整過程</b></p

45、><p>　　許多新興市場重組，由于種種原因，很容易數(shù)年才能完成，而債權(quán)人和債務人在是否符合他們的根本利益上可能有不同的觀點，實現(xiàn)相對快速的解決方案。這是常見的結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整情況，債務人相信時間是在他們一邊的，這種認識，債務人往往是基于現(xiàn)實。相比之下，債權(quán)人一般視時間為他們的敵人。由于許多債務重組涉及到一些服務暫停或暫停償債的形式，債權(quán)人會急著盡快達成一項重組方案。債權(quán)人顯然希望債務人能在盡可能早的日期還本付息。</

46、p><p>　　債務人，另一方面，可能不會想去盡快的還本付息。假設它能夠繼續(xù)滿足其營運資金及其他基本需要，否則繼續(xù)作為一個持續(xù)經(jīng)營，有些債務人可以完全滿足于維持暫停償債或債務停頓。通過上述償還債務的，債務人可以積累一些現(xiàn)金，這很可能達到或超出了債權(quán)人的控制。在這種情況下，不難想象，有些債務人，因此可能對積極尋求和達成與債權(quán)人的重組方案比較感興趣。然而，應該注意到，并非所有債務人都是這樣的。例如，債務人是真正關心他們的

47、長遠利益和聲譽，尤其是他們能夠利用資本和信貸市場在未來可能采取較少傲慢的態(tài)度來推進結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整過程。</p><p><b>　　時間表</b></p><p>　　鑒于這些可能存在不同觀點的債權(quán)人和債務人對時間的緊迫性，在重組過程中債權(quán)人可以要求建立關鍵的還債時間表。如果可能的話，債權(quán)人會跟債務人討論并確定這個時間表。這個過程可能涉及到雙方之間的一些現(xiàn)實的還債截止日期是

48、什么，以及對于確定時間表的談判。每個改組過程中的主要階段 - 如債權(quán)人對債務人的盡職調(diào)查，談判的投資條件清單，處理文檔的結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整，并最終完成交易將有它自己的時間表。例如，在盡職調(diào)查階段的過程中，有關的時間表可能包括，除其他外，下列各項：（1）談判和簽署的指導委員會成員和他們的外部顧問的保密協(xié)議（2）達成盡職調(diào)查工作的適當范圍（這將有可能是由一個財務顧問的指導委員會）（3）從債務人那接受特定的金融和商業(yè)信息，如商業(yè)計劃、現(xiàn)金流量預測、銷售

49、和價格信息(歷史和預測)等等。</p><p>　　一個非常具體和詳細的時間表可能給重組進程帶來極大的幫助。此外，時間表可以幫助債權(quán)人了解債務人是在努力推動重組進程，還是企圖故意拖延這一進程。在某些重組中，債權(quán)人需要問自己缺乏進展是否有正當理由，如記錄某一重組交易的復雜性或債務人的企業(yè)組織結(jié)構(gòu)，復雜或者是否延遲，基于跡象顯示債務人沒有談判的誠意。在后一種情況下，債權(quán)人可能被迫得出結(jié)論，一個擁有這樣一個共識性重組債

50、務人可能不是一個現(xiàn)實的或可行的選擇。</p><p>　　確定重組公司的控股股東的作用</p><p>　　許多新興市場重組涉及到所謂的控股股東的現(xiàn)象，股東持有該債務人公司的控股權(quán)。這些控股股東不僅持有該公司的大量控股權(quán)，同時也可能占據(jù)了很多主要的管理職位?？傊?，在很多新興市場地區(qū)，某些債務人沒有考慮到控股股東的獨特作用。</p><p>　　在某些重組中，債權(quán)人可

51、以相信，一個債務人的財務困難時期可以歸因于該公司的事務由控股股東的管理不善所致。因此，在重組過程中，債權(quán)人最初可能有興趣嫁接重組計劃，包括取消任何控股股東的繼續(xù)管理職能。從根本上講，債權(quán)人可以相信他們面對的是一個簡單的二元選擇，即保持現(xiàn)有的管理或為了現(xiàn)有的管理被迫離開公司。然而，現(xiàn)實可能會讓他失望，債權(quán)人在現(xiàn)實中往往面臨很明確的選擇。</p><p><b>　　控股股東</b></p

52、><p>　　在許多情況下，控股股東可能是根深蒂固的，因此很難要求他們除去在債務人公司的主導地位。在1999年，亞洲及太平洋地區(qū)的一份報告中指出了亞洲開發(fā)銀行破產(chǎn)法的問題，那就是陷入財務困境的公司的業(yè)主往往帶動了該公司失去控制的恐懼。</p><p>　　然而，很明顯，如果債權(quán)人不能取消控股股東的管理，債權(quán)人的重組計劃中可嘗試建立一系列的公司治理改革。這些改革可能是旨在限制和控制股權(quán)重組的力量

53、和有影響力的控股股東。</p><p><b>　　公司治理改革</b></p><p>　　具體來說，其中一個可能的公司治理改革方案，債權(quán)人可以嘗試重新配置公司的董事會和其委員會結(jié)構(gòu)。例如，債權(quán)人可以要求有獨立董事發(fā)揮更大的作用，它們可能尋求有一定的董事會委員會，如審計委員會，擁有一定的管理職能的直接監(jiān)督。在當?shù)毓竞妥C券法律的幫助下，債權(quán)人可以通過他們的努力改變公

54、司的治理改革。例如，在墨西哥，證券法要求為公司建立獨立的審計委員會。</p><p>　　此外,債權(quán)人可以尋求更大的內(nèi)部管理和審計控制。債權(quán)人也可以尋求到某些類型的交易主體，如關聯(lián)交易或重大交易，包括提出企業(yè)兼并，收購或資產(chǎn)處置，由董事會或股東會以絕對多數(shù)批準的規(guī)定，視情況而定。這樣的公司治理改革建議應認真分析，以確保他們與當?shù)毓竞妥C券法是一致的。</p><p>　　總之，在一些新興的

55、市場結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整，債權(quán)人可能會面對不愉快的現(xiàn)實，他們將無法取消控股股東的管理控制職能。因此，債權(quán)人可以向他們的重點轉(zhuǎn)移到發(fā)展一個重組計劃，旨在遏制和限定控股股東在該公司的權(quán)力和影響力。如上所述,他們可以嘗試為完成這一目標而建立公司治理改革的整體重組計劃。</p><p>　　然而，在推行公司治理改革，債權(quán)人可能會遇到強大的阻力，如果改革的建議將會剝奪控股股東權(quán)力，他們更愿意放棄。因此，公司治理改革有可能會弄的相當緊張

56、，債權(quán)人可能會尋求一方面，而權(quán)力有限的控股股東可能愿意放棄另一方面。這種緊張關系是一個重要的實質(zhì)性問題，將要在債務人和債權(quán)人之間整體討論和談判。</p><p>　　應該指出的是，用這種方式解決問題，這種緊張可能影響重組的談判進展。擬議的公司治理改革可能會影響到控股股東的其他意見的結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整方案,包括經(jīng)濟方面的任何調(diào)整。如果控股股東提出的公司治理改革意見過于受限制，就有可能帶來消極作用，使控股股東關閉交易本身。&l

57、t;/p><p>　　在這種情況下，債權(quán)人可能被迫考慮如何組成的公司治理改革的建議是整體改制協(xié)議。因此，債權(quán)人可能會面臨一個艱難的選擇，一種可能性是，債權(quán)人可能愿意離開整體重組交易（或考慮這樣做）如果在談判過程中，他們不能實現(xiàn)所有或甚至大部分的公司治理的重要目標。另一種可能性是,債權(quán)人可能愿意作出某些妥協(xié)的公司治理問題，并接受了可能是一個“低于完美”在利益上達成一致的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，然后妥協(xié)最終收盤，整體改制協(xié)議。&l

58、t;/p><p>　　然而，對于某些債權(quán)人，公司治理問題可能涉及原則和哲學的重要問題，這可能會影響他們愿意在這些問題上作出妥協(xié)。此外，一些債權(quán)人可以查看某些公司治理問題，例如有一個現(xiàn)金控制的有效制度問題，這也可能影響到這些債權(quán)人愿意作出妥協(xié)。另一方面，可能有些債權(quán)人，由于種種原因，相對不太重視公司的治理問題?？傊钟胁煌庖姷膫鶛?quán)人對公司治理問題的觀點可能是一個問題，將需要加以處理。</p><