外文及翻譯-為作戰(zhàn)人員裝備網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)系統(tǒng)

1、<p>　　Equipment, network-centric warfare systems for the war fighter</p><p>　　[America] David Hardisty</p><p>　　Abstract：from the point of view of information connectivity technology means

2、discussed the importance of hardware support for network-centric warfare, pointed out the problems in this regard, the final proposed improvement measures.</p><p>　　Key words：The U.S. Military Transformati

3、on Military theory</p><p>　　Network Centric Warfare</p><p>　　一、the issues filed</p><p>　　About the network-centric warfare and the Navy is developing the FORCE net reported ove

4、rwhelming, one might think the Navy is rapidly developed into a perfect design, closely linked to the troops: it has a seamless data access through appropriate command and control sensor linked with our existing large nu

5、mber of weapons systems. However, at least in the near future, the situation is not the case. Navy in the network-centric warfare concepts to being used or in the development of weapons and sen</p><p>　　Effe

6、ctive implementation of network-centric warfare, and use it to our tactical forces skillfully linking, we must re-group. Anti-chain sequence - be carefully checked each task in the field of detection, decision-making, at

7、tack assessment, to determine information exchange requirements for that mission area between the platforms. Regrouping must combat personnel connected with the development and connection of our system of technical exper

8、ts together. The only way we can achieve combat systems,</p><p>　　Conceptually, the Navy has been using the network-centric warfare. "Naval Transformation Roadmap" to tomorrow's Navy Marine Cor

9、ps team portrayed as the "network connection, the joint integration of sea-based force projection forces". In order to implement the network-centric warfare, emphasizing the human factor, the Navy's FORCE n

10、et concept of "sensor networks, weapons, decision-support tools and soldiers from the seabed to space" connected together to provide faster decision-making at all leve</p><p>　　In the United States

11、 Navy, was commended for a common operational picture in the navy Global Command and Control system, and coordinated operations through which troops can conduct its own, but it is only from the tactical data link one-way

12、 passive feedback. Common operational picture contains information from other sources can not automatically be "extended", not even by "link an l6 data link to the way transmission of digital tactical plat

13、form. There is no such information to "extend", if not </p><p>　　The development of a joint network of fire is another important action of the network-centric warfare, designed to address the serio

14、us shortage exists in the positioning and the fight against fast moving targets, time-sensitive. Joint network of fire in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance management and carrier-based target selection an

15、d combat, command and control function integration has made remarkable progress, but it can quickly crack down on weapons systems can be a moving ta</p><p>　　Led by the Marine Combat Development Command, Nav

16、y experiments, focused on network-centric warfare, time-sensitive targeting and real-time to combat. Fleet battle experiments are to develop and test the concept of network of fire, which indicates that the current struc

17、ture for the deployment of a joint network of fire combat advantage. The experiment to promote on how to speed up the time-sensitive targeting and real-time understanding of the strike, but with the actual weapon system

18、integration</p><p>　　The implementation of Navy network-centric warfare, there is a fallacy: the distance in the information age does not matter. In the static world of fiber-optic cable to connect the land-

19、based system, this view may be correct. But in the hundreds of thousands, have only limited channels of communication and rapid mobility tactical platform world, this view is incorrect. At least the next l0 years, the ta

20、ctical decision-making level is still narrow information channel filled with a wealth of infor</p><p>　　Thus, network-centric warfare's second fallacy: I believe the free flow of information in the netwo

21、rk will produce the best results. In large-scale, time-sensitive complex engagement, this is a big mistake. Policy makers need to focus. Won the tactical engagement needs a faster rate than the enemy's use of anti-ch

22、ain. Irrelevant or incomplete information will cause confusion or delay in the decision-making process is fatal to their own troops. Combat simulation focused information processing in </p><p>　　二、Link a l6

23、"data link</p><p>　　Navy leaders understand the necessity of naval aviation and connected. To achieve this goal, the naval aviation has been the emphasis on building an effective tactical network, the m

24、ethod of procurement such as the Multifunctional Information Distribution System "link l6 data link system. Dependent link l6 "data chain is of great significance, because it is non-node, multi-functional, secu

25、rity, anti-electronic jamming. These important features will make the network-centric warfare operations eve</p><p>　　"Link 16" data link has been developed for decades, are now widely used fleet a

26、nd joint operations. This year there will be more than 1000 links a l6 "terminal bar installed four military services, will reach 2359 to 2005. The only F / A 18 modified machine in 2005 will install 274 terminals.

27、Link a l6 "data link channel as a tactical platform, network-centric warfare, the Navy will be able to with a number of planned equipment" link l6 "data link of the joint forces and multinational forces co

28、m</p><p>　　Link a l6 "data link capacity is a problem. At present, the common packet structure, the capacity of the terminal is probably close to 54 kilobytes per second to reduce anti-jamming margin in

29、creased capacity l times. Importantly, the Link 16 data link using an iterative storage network structure, there are many units of different networks at different times for different work. This makes the effective bandwi

30、dth of the forces to be increased, rather than through a l6 "link" data link every bit of</p><p>　　Link a l6 "data link using a definition is very clear and very strict message format. Informa

31、tion standards can actually be used to support tactical network-centric warfare required for each function, but the criterion of change is a complicated process, and to some extent limited flexibility. The benefits of th

32、is standardization is that the Navy network-centric warfare network connected to the data link and link a l6 can with other countries, other services, sensors and weapons connection. With</p><p>　　三、Establis

33、hment of new institutions for the victory</p><p>　　Due to the current organizational structure, we are losing. We've been asked to implement network-centric warfare, but our organizational structure rema

34、ins unchanged. Because there is no specific indication of network-centric warfare, the platform project office had to find its own implementation. Tactical data link operational requirements continue to be subject to the

35、 control of operational collaboration needs group. However, this group does not see network-centric warfare need to make a great</p><p>　　A description of the primary network-centric warfare concept of "

36、;common development". Under this concept, with the development of network-centric warfare concept of operations, doctrine, preparation, command and control, weapons systems, education, training, personnel "woul

37、d change accordingly. Core institutions must establish a tactical network-centric warfare, and is equipped with smart combat personnel to coordinate tactical network-centric warfare and common development action. Tactica

38、l netw</p><p>　　Tactical network-centric warfare institutions initial focus is to quickly correct the current lack of interoperability, but its task-field-based analysis will lead to the development of long-

39、term network-centric warfare program together with other services. The agency must include the Marine Corps combat personnel, providing an interface to all relevant systems in the Marine Corps.</p><p>　　The

40、new tactical network-centric warfare institutions will be part of a new Naval Network Warfare Command, Fleet Forces Command and Fleet commanders reported as the Command, and was assigned to the space, demand for IT, netw

41、ork and information operations(Support the Navy at sea and ashore units) "authority. Taking into account the wide range of responsibilities and coordination requirements, new tactical network-centric warfare institu

42、tions should be a knowledgeable leadership of the Navy captai</p><p>　　Department of Defense and the Navy is committed to the development of network-centric warfare and as a transformation of the basis. Unfo

43、rtunately, the acute shortage of tactical-level network-centric warfare equipment. At the tactical level, there is no programmatic network-centric warfare vision or plan, platform-centric decision-making caused by these

44、problems, and left us with a non-compatible equipment. No interest in the Contractor to combine our existing system, but to sell us the ability </p><p>　　We need to make our existing system by re-grouping to

45、gether to play a role, the important information sent to the appropriate locations so that at the appropriate time. We need to take a systematic approach to development support detection, decision-making, attack, assess

46、the ability of the task. The experiment will help us to improve the ability to attack. Through the existing system to maximize the effectiveness of information flow, the limitations of the network will highlight the futu

47、re of t</p><p>　　(U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings "in 2003, 9)</p><p>　　為作戰(zhàn)人員裝備網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)系統(tǒng)</p><p>　　【美】戴維?哈迪斯蒂</p><p>　　摘要： 本文從信息連接技術(shù)手段的角度，論述為網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)提供硬件設(shè)備支撐的重要性，指出在這方面

48、存在的問(wèn)題，最后提出改進(jìn)措施。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：美軍 軍事轉(zhuǎn)型 軍事理論 網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)</p><p><b>　　-、問(wèn)題的提起</b></p><p>　　由于有關(guān)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)和美國(guó)海軍正在發(fā)展部隊(duì)網(wǎng)的報(bào)道鋪天蓋地而來(lái)，人們可能認(rèn)為海軍正在快速發(fā)展成為-支設(shè)計(jì)完美、聯(lián)系緊密的部隊(duì)：它擁有的無(wú)縫數(shù)據(jù)通道能夠通過(guò)適當(dāng)?shù)闹笓]和控制，

49、將傳感器同我們現(xiàn)有的數(shù)量眾多的武器系統(tǒng)聯(lián)系起來(lái)。然而，至少在近期，情況并非如此。海軍在將網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)概念運(yùn)用到正在使用的或處于發(fā)展的武器和傳感器方面沒(méi)有取得明顯的進(jìn)展。在海軍航空兵方面，情況尤其如此。我們?nèi)匀灰耘c平臺(tái)中心戰(zhàn)相同的方法采購(gòu)和發(fā)展武器系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　要有效地實(shí)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)并用它把我們的戰(zhàn)術(shù)部隊(duì)巧妙地連接起來(lái)，我們就必須重新編組。必須仔細(xì)檢查每個(gè)任務(wù)領(lǐng)域的殺傷鏈順序—探測(cè)、決策、攻擊、評(píng)估，以

50、確定所有用于那個(gè)任務(wù)領(lǐng)域的平臺(tái)之間的信息交換需求。重新編組必須把作戰(zhàn)人員同發(fā)展和連接我們系統(tǒng)的技術(shù)專(zhuān)家連接起來(lái)。只有這樣，我們才能實(shí)現(xiàn)作戰(zhàn)系統(tǒng)、編制、作戰(zhàn)理論的同步發(fā)展，從網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)得到好處。</p><p>　　從概念上講，海軍已采用網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)?！逗＼娹D(zhuǎn)型路線(xiàn)圖》把明天的海軍-陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)團(tuán)隊(duì)描繪成為“網(wǎng)絡(luò)連接的、聯(lián)合-體的?；α客端筒筷?duì)”。為了實(shí)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)，強(qiáng)調(diào)人的因素，海軍的部隊(duì)網(wǎng)概念把“傳感器、網(wǎng)絡(luò)、武器、

51、決策輔助手段和從海底到太空的士兵”連接在-起，為各級(jí)指揮部門(mén)提供更快的決策速度和決策準(zhǔn)確性。為了實(shí)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)并建立部隊(duì)網(wǎng)，海軍正在做出種種努力，包括引進(jìn)和利用“21世紀(jì)信息技術(shù)”這樣的海基系統(tǒng)。這些主要以網(wǎng)絡(luò)為基礎(chǔ)，雖然它們顯著地改善了參謀機(jī)構(gòu)的工作和水面平臺(tái)的作戰(zhàn)行動(dòng)，但與海軍航空兵幾乎沒(méi)有任何聯(lián)系。</p><p>　　在美國(guó)海軍，受到贊揚(yáng)的通用作戰(zhàn)圖顯示在海軍全球指揮控制系統(tǒng)上，并被認(rèn)為通過(guò)它部隊(duì)就可自行

52、進(jìn)行協(xié)同作戰(zhàn)，但它只是從戰(zhàn)術(shù)數(shù)據(jù)鏈得到的單向被動(dòng)反饋信息。來(lái)自其他渠道的通用作戰(zhàn)圖包含的信息不能自動(dòng)地得到“延伸”，甚至不能通過(guò)“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈以數(shù)字的方式傳輸給戰(zhàn)術(shù)平臺(tái)。沒(méi)有這種信息“延伸”，假如不通過(guò)聲音傳送，就不能將重要的戰(zhàn)術(shù)信息傳送到擁有傳感器和武器的作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)，也就不能對(duì)目標(biāo)進(jìn)行打擊。實(shí)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)的編制存在巨大差距，從而阻礙了海軍網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)實(shí)現(xiàn)其預(yù)期目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　開(kāi)發(fā)聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)是網(wǎng)絡(luò)中

53、心戰(zhàn)的另-個(gè)重要行動(dòng)，旨在解決對(duì)快速移動(dòng)目標(biāo)進(jìn)行時(shí)間敏感的定位與打擊中存在的嚴(yán)重不足。盡管聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)在情報(bào)、監(jiān)視、偵察管理和艦載目標(biāo)選擇與打擊、指揮、控制功能-體化方面取得了顯著進(jìn)展，但它為能夠迅速打擊可移動(dòng)目標(biāo)的武器系統(tǒng)提供交戰(zhàn)信息的能力是有限的。</p><p>　　由海軍作戰(zhàn)發(fā)展司令部領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的海軍實(shí)驗(yàn)，主要致力于網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)、時(shí)間敏感目標(biāo)定位和即時(shí)打擊。艦隊(duì)?wèi)?zhàn)斗實(shí)驗(yàn)是發(fā)展和試驗(yàn)聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)概念的基礎(chǔ)，它表明當(dāng)前的

54、聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)用于部署時(shí)表現(xiàn)出足夠的作戰(zhàn)優(yōu)勢(shì)。實(shí)驗(yàn)增進(jìn)我們對(duì)如何加快時(shí)間敏感目標(biāo)定位與即時(shí)打擊的理解，但在與實(shí)際武器系統(tǒng)-體化方面還存在薄弱環(huán)節(jié)。在“印度艦隊(duì)?wèi)?zhàn)斗實(shí)驗(yàn)”中，目標(biāo)信息經(jīng)由不常攜帶的AN/AWW-13“白星眼”數(shù)據(jù)鏈吊艙傳送到留空攻擊的戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)。海軍打擊和空戰(zhàn)中心強(qiáng)烈要求將所有的飛機(jī)同聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)飛機(jī)鏈接，而不僅僅是那些攜帶吊艙和處于直瞄線(xiàn)內(nèi)的少量飛機(jī)。該中心還要求未來(lái)的實(shí)驗(yàn)把聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)同海軍航空兵具有超視距能力的未來(lái)數(shù)據(jù)鏈，即

55、“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈連接起來(lái)。遺憾的是，海軍作戰(zhàn)發(fā)展司令部沒(méi)有對(duì)連接“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈給予足夠的重視?！禧惾~艦隊(duì)?wèi)?zhàn)斗實(shí)驗(yàn)”（2002）沒(méi)有把聯(lián)合火力網(wǎng)同“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈相連?！盎迮炾?duì)?wèi)?zhàn)斗實(shí)驗(yàn)（2003）”演示了同單個(gè)作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)（E-2實(shí)驗(yàn)車(chē)）軟件的連接。</p><p>　　在實(shí)施海軍網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)中有-種謬論：在信息時(shí)代距離無(wú)關(guān)緊要。在用光纖電纜連接的陸基系統(tǒng)的靜態(tài)世界，這種看法也許是正確的。但在成百上千的

56、、僅擁有有限通信渠道而又快速機(jī)動(dòng)的戰(zhàn)術(shù)平臺(tái)世界，這種看法是不正確的。至少在未來(lái)10年中，戰(zhàn)術(shù)決策層的情況仍然是狹小的信息通道充滿(mǎn)來(lái)自戰(zhàn)術(shù)傳感器的大量信息。要實(shí)施近期的網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)，我們必須確保來(lái)往于戰(zhàn)術(shù)平臺(tái)的帶寬能夠最好地支持我們的殺傷鏈。</p><p>　　于是，又出現(xiàn)了網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)的第二個(gè)謬論：相信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中自由流動(dòng)的信息將產(chǎn)生最佳效果。在大規(guī)模的、時(shí)間敏感的復(fù)雜交戰(zhàn)中，這是天大的錯(cuò)誤。決策者需要重點(diǎn)。贏(yíng)得戰(zhàn)術(shù)交戰(zhàn)

57、需要以比敵方更快的速度使用殺傷鏈。無(wú)關(guān)緊要的或殘缺不全的信息會(huì)引起混亂或延誤決策過(guò)程，對(duì)己方部隊(duì)是致命的。作戰(zhàn)模擬顯示把加工處理過(guò)的突出重點(diǎn)的信息，以適當(dāng)?shù)母袷絺鬏斀o分散的決策者會(huì)增強(qiáng)戰(zhàn)斗力。確保網(wǎng)絡(luò)能夠傳送適用于戰(zhàn)斗準(zhǔn)備的信息，應(yīng)是網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)努力的重點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　二、“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈</p><p>　　海軍領(lǐng)導(dǎo)明白把海軍航空兵與網(wǎng)絡(luò)相連的必要性。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)，海軍航

58、空兵-直強(qiáng)調(diào)建設(shè)行之有效的戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)，方法是采購(gòu)諸如多功能信息分發(fā)系統(tǒng)和“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈這樣的系統(tǒng)。依賴(lài)“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈具有重大意義，因?yàn)樗鼰o(wú)節(jié)點(diǎn)、多功能、安全、抗電子干擾。這些重要的特點(diǎn)將會(huì)使網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)行動(dòng)甚至可以在別國(guó)領(lǐng)土上進(jìn)行，并且與國(guó)防部另-條轉(zhuǎn)型指導(dǎo)原則—“保護(hù)信息系統(tǒng)免受攻擊”相-致。</p><p>　　“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈已經(jīng)發(fā)展了幾十年，現(xiàn)在正大量應(yīng)用于艦隊(duì)和聯(lián)合作戰(zhàn)。今年將有1000多個(gè)“

59、鏈路-16”終端列裝４個(gè)軍種，到2005年將達(dá)到2359個(gè)。僅F/A-18改型機(jī)在2005年就將安裝274個(gè)終端。把“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈作為戰(zhàn)術(shù)平臺(tái)的主要網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)通道，海軍就能同許多計(jì)劃裝備“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈的聯(lián)合部隊(duì)和多國(guó)部隊(duì)作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)實(shí)現(xiàn)互操作。其他方法可能花費(fèi)更大，會(huì)降低互通性，而且會(huì)與國(guó)防部把“鏈路－16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈作為“主要戰(zhàn)術(shù)數(shù)據(jù)鏈”的原則相沖突。</p><p>　　“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈的容量是個(gè)問(wèn)題

60、。當(dāng)前，使用普通的數(shù)據(jù)包結(jié)構(gòu)，終端的容量大概接近每秒54千字節(jié)，降低抗干擾裕度，容量增加ｌ倍。重要的是，“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈?zhǔn)褂玫氖?種疊式存儲(chǔ)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)，有許多單位在不同的時(shí)間不同的網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行不同的工作。這就使部隊(duì)的有效帶寬得到增加，而不是通過(guò)“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈把每-點(diǎn)信息都送到每-個(gè)單位。任務(wù)甚至任務(wù)階段對(duì)平臺(tái)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的最優(yōu)化使用，能夠確保作戰(zhàn)人員在需要時(shí)，得到高度優(yōu)先的信息。計(jì)劃對(duì)“鏈路－16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈進(jìn)行的改進(jìn)，將提高其效率和信息處理能

61、力。</p><p>　　“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈?zhǔn)褂玫氖?種定義十分明確并且相當(dāng)嚴(yán)格的信息格式。盡管信息標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)際上可用于支持戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)所需要的每-種功能，但是改變標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的過(guò)程是復(fù)雜的，并且在某種程度上靈活性有限。這種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的好處在于，海軍網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)-旦與“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈相連，就能同其他國(guó)家、其他軍種的傳感器和武器連接。隨著終端數(shù)量的增多，網(wǎng)絡(luò)的威力增大。聯(lián)合部隊(duì)和多國(guó)部隊(duì)現(xiàn)在都在裝備“鏈路－16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈。

62、轉(zhuǎn)向另-種戰(zhàn)術(shù)信息通道會(huì)嚴(yán)重破壞未來(lái)十多年的互操作能力，因?yàn)橹挥械侥菚r(shí)新系統(tǒng)才能研制出來(lái)并大量裝備作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)?，F(xiàn)在是嘗試把其他網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)同“鏈路-16”數(shù)據(jù)鏈相連的時(shí)候了。</p><p>　　三、為勝利建立新機(jī)構(gòu)</p><p>　　由于目前的組織結(jié)構(gòu)，我們正在走向失敗。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)讓我們實(shí)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)，但我們的組織結(jié)構(gòu)保持不變。由于沒(méi)有具體的網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)指示，平臺(tái)項(xiàng)目辦公室只好自己尋求實(shí)施辦法。戰(zhàn)

63、術(shù)數(shù)據(jù)鏈的作戰(zhàn)需求繼續(xù)受作戰(zhàn)協(xié)作需求組控制。但這個(gè)組的人員看不到網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)需要做出巨大變革。負(fù)責(zé)“計(jì)劃、建立和維持海軍、聯(lián)合與合成指揮、控制、通信系統(tǒng)互操作”的海軍戰(zhàn)術(shù)系統(tǒng)互操作中心，也同樣沒(méi)有編入足夠的作戰(zhàn)人員，或者說(shuō)不是為了發(fā)展戰(zhàn)術(shù)級(jí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)器材概念而編組的。那么，誰(shuí)在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)改革呢？</p><p>　　描述初級(jí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)的一個(gè)中心概念是“共同發(fā)展”。根據(jù)這個(gè)概念，隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)的發(fā)展，“作戰(zhàn)、條令

64、、編制、指揮和控制方法、武器系統(tǒng)、教育、訓(xùn)練、人員”等概念也會(huì)發(fā)生相應(yīng)的變化。必須建立戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)核心機(jī)構(gòu)，并配備精明的作戰(zhàn)人員以協(xié)調(diào)戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)和“共同發(fā)展”行動(dòng)。戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該按作戰(zhàn)任務(wù)領(lǐng)域編組，并將直接與優(yōu)秀戰(zhàn)術(shù)中心和平臺(tái)項(xiàng)目辦公室協(xié)調(diào)。與優(yōu)秀戰(zhàn)術(shù)中心密切協(xié)調(diào)將確保網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)器材能夠解決重要作戰(zhàn)人員的工作負(fù)荷和人機(jī)接口問(wèn)題。戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)核心機(jī)構(gòu)、優(yōu)秀戰(zhàn)術(shù)中心、艦隊(duì)指揮官和海軍作戰(zhàn)發(fā)展司令部將協(xié)調(diào)進(jìn)行網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)新概念的

65、實(shí)驗(yàn)。與平臺(tái)項(xiàng)目辦公室的互動(dòng)將確保這個(gè)新戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)機(jī)構(gòu)了解作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)及其現(xiàn)有的和打算擁有的器材面臨的許多局限。因此，發(fā)展任務(wù)領(lǐng)域網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)概念的工作就將與其他軍種和國(guó)防部機(jī)構(gòu)協(xié)調(diào)進(jìn)行。通過(guò)這種協(xié)調(diào)，就能根據(jù)任務(wù)領(lǐng)域網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)的系統(tǒng)需求而不是特定平臺(tái)的重要性，就數(shù)據(jù)鏈作戰(zhàn)需求提出一致的建議，并對(duì)所需資源進(jìn)行分配。</p><p>　　盡管戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)機(jī)構(gòu)最初的重點(diǎn)是迅速改正當(dāng)前互通性方面的不足，但其以任務(wù)領(lǐng)域?yàn)?/p>

66、基礎(chǔ)的分析將導(dǎo)致制定與其他軍種協(xié)同實(shí)施的長(zhǎng)期網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)計(jì)劃。這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)必須包括陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)作戰(zhàn)人員，以便向陸戰(zhàn)隊(duì)所有相關(guān)系統(tǒng)提供接口。</p><p>　　這個(gè)新戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)機(jī)構(gòu)將隸屬于新的海軍網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)司令部，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)司令部向艦隊(duì)部隊(duì)司令部司令和艦隊(duì)指揮官報(bào)告工作，并被指派為“太空、信息技術(shù)需求、網(wǎng)絡(luò)和信息作戰(zhàn)（支援海軍海上和岸上部隊(duì)）”的主要權(quán)威?？紤]到其廣泛的責(zé)任和協(xié)調(diào)需求，新戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該由-名知識(shí)淵博的海

67、軍上校領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，任期為4～5年，以確保工作的-致性。軍事任務(wù)領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人應(yīng)該是海軍中?；蛸Y深的少校，并得到政府或承包商長(zhǎng)期雇用的技術(shù)人員親臨現(xiàn)場(chǎng)的支持。為保持每個(gè)任務(wù)領(lǐng)域的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和看法都得到反映，應(yīng)該從不同的單位指派領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。在系統(tǒng)司令部的指定接觸單位和獨(dú)立項(xiàng)目辦公室支持下，任務(wù)領(lǐng)域領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人協(xié)調(diào)其作戰(zhàn)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)部的共同發(fā)展。戰(zhàn)術(shù)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)機(jī)構(gòu)的人員配置應(yīng)該確保平臺(tái)具有廣泛的通用性。</p><p>　　國(guó)防部和海軍致力于發(fā)展網(wǎng)

68、絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)并將其作為轉(zhuǎn)型的基礎(chǔ)。遺憾的是，戰(zhàn)術(shù)級(jí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)器材奇缺。在戰(zhàn)術(shù)級(jí)，沒(méi)有綱領(lǐng)性網(wǎng)絡(luò)中心戰(zhàn)構(gòu)想或計(jì)劃，以平臺(tái)為中心的決策造成了這些問(wèn)題，給我們留下了不兼容的設(shè)備。承包商對(duì)把我們已有的系統(tǒng)結(jié)合起來(lái)毫無(wú)興趣，卻向我們兜售需要多年才能裝備部隊(duì)的能力，并且到那時(shí)仍然不能提供我們所需的聯(lián)合與多國(guó)互通能力。</p><p>　　我們需要通過(guò)重新編組使我們現(xiàn)有的系統(tǒng)-起發(fā)揮作用，以便在適當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)間把重要的信息送到適當(dāng)?shù)攸c(diǎn)。