外文翻譯--歐洲的公共養(yǎng)老與私人養(yǎng)老(節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1500單詞，8700英文字符,2700漢字</p><p>　　出處： springer link，Filippo L. Calciano and Mario Tirelli/European View, 2008, Volume 7, Number 2, Pages 277-286</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p>

2、;<p>　　Public versus private old-age pensions in Europe</p><p>　　The modern idea of a ‘welfare state’ constitutes one of the most important achievements of European political thought. Old-age pensions

3、, in turn, are a crucial feature of a modern welfare state and a modern social market economy. Pensions are the main tool to provide citizens, on a large-scale basis, with acceptable welfare levels at retirement.</p&g

4、t;<p>　　In the face of this, demographic trends initiated in the past and now showing major effects are casting serious doubts on the future sustainability of national pension systems as they are organized today.

5、Countries worldwide are dealing with increasing budgetary problems in paying out pensions due to population ageing and, especially in Europe, to a historical tendency towards early retirement. Awareness of this phenomeno

6、n has triggered a widespread debate in all Member States of the European Un</p><p>　　However, pension system reform is a ‘sensitive target’, because of the very nature and importance of pensions. There are e

7、conomic, demographic, social and political aspects that must be considered. Furthermore, from a technical point of view, there is controversy about the empirical magnitude of the pension problem and the underlying econom

8、ic theory and, consequently, about best practices and policy advice for national governments. It is, therefore, no surprise that the debate on pension reform </p><p>　　What is a pension scheme?</p>&l

9、t;p>　　A pension is a contract under which an individual acquires the right to be transferred quotas of future output (the benefits) in exchange for quotas of his current output (the contributions). The contract establ

10、ishes a point in time—retirement age—when this transfer starts.</p><p>　　In principle, an individual could ‘sign a contract with himself’; that is, he could store part of his own current production for futur

11、e use. However, this is not viable for services and non-storable goods, for example health care and services for the elderly, clothing and food; these are precisely the basic kinds of good and services one is interested

12、in after retirement.</p><p>　　In face of this physical constraint on individual actions, modern societies have coordinated individual pension contracts into a pension system, where individuals do not need to

13、 consume their own past production during their retirement time, but instead, consume output produced by the individuals working actively during that time. Every modern pension system constitutes essentially a transfer o

14、f output, in each period, from the current young generation—meaning here as those actively working—to t</p><p>　　Pension systems fall theoretically into two broad categories.</p><p>　　In a pay-a

15、s-you-go system (PAYG), the current young generation contributes mandatory to the pension system through labor income taxes, whose revenues are partly transferred to the current old generation as pension benefits. In doi

16、ng so, the young generation acquires the right to receive pension benefits when they grow old. </p><p>　　In a funded pension system, the members of the current young generation mandatory contribute part of t

17、heir labor income to a pension fund, which invests in financial assets. When they retire, the fund pays out pension benefits in the form of lifetime annuities, which finance the pensioners’ consumption of goods and servi

18、ces produced by the current young generation.</p><p>　　Demographic change and public pension imbalances</p><p>　　This section discusses the problem of the current fiscal sustainability of public

19、 pension systems. A PAYG system is fiscally sustainable, or financially balanced, when in each period, the total nominal contributions—given as the contribution rate times the average wage times the number of workers—equ

20、al the total pension expenses—given as the average pension times the number of pensioners.</p><p>　　In OECD countries, public spending for retirement pensions—that is, the right-hand side of the balancing fo

21、rmula—is expected to rise dramatically in the coming decades. Recent projections for the period 2000–2050 show that public age-related expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, may rise on average by about seven points. In p

22、articular, the proportion of GDP represented by public spending for retirement pension and early-retirement programmers is projected to increase by almost 10% in Norway, by </p><p>　　For the European Union,

23、ECOFIN projects an increase of the gross (before taxes) public spending in pensions of 2.3 and 2.2 percentage points of GDP, respectively, for the EU-15 and EU-25. This implies that by 2050, the EU-15 will spend almost

24、13% of its GDP to finance public pensions, while the EU-25 will spend 12.8%.</p><p>　　The projected increase in longevity, combined with a tendency towards early retirement, is responsible for the expected i

25、ncrease in the expenditure for retirement pensions. At the same time, projected pension contributions are expected to fall because of the decreasing fertility rates. Indeed, lower fertility rates tend to lead to a decrea

26、se in the working population and, under reasonable assumptions about productivity, to only a moderate expansion of GDP. As a result, given the current public p</p><p>　　Public versus private pension schemes&

27、lt;/p><p>　　This section discusses how increasing the role of funded pension schemes can help to maintain fiscal sustainability in the presence of population ageing. It also elaborates on the effects on private

28、 pensions, savings and growth, financial markets and the protection of individuals against various types of risk, making comparisons with a PAYG system when necessary.</p><p>　　Funding allows the system to b

29、e kept financially balanced in the face of population ageing. In a fully funded system each individual in a given generation, call it ‘generation A’, builds up her own ‘pile of financial activities’ during her working li

30、fe. At retirement, the accumulated activities get transformed into a pension annuity whose actual value exactly equals the value of the accumulated assets for each individual. Under population ageing, during the retireme

31、nt period of ‘generation A’ th</p><p>　　The fact that a funded system stays financially balanced does not mean that it can keep invariant the real levels of pension annuities in presence of ageing. The decre

32、ase of the working population implies—other things being equal—a decrease in output. Hence, when ‘generation A’s’ pensioners use their annuities to buy good and services, an excess of demand may arise, leading to an infl

33、ationary process which lowers the real value of A’s pension annuities.9</p><p>　　While this argument is correct, it is a somewhat minor concern. First, the funded pension system remains nominally balanced. M

34、ost importantly, financial imbalance may cause the system to break down. Second, the argument is essentially about economic growth. It is the lack of growth, due to the decrease in the working population, which lowers re

35、al pensions. But growth is a general problem that affects PAYG and funded systems, as well as the economy as a whole. Even if it is not known whether a fu</p><p>　　Towards private pensions: government regula

36、tion</p><p>　　This section discusses financial market regulation and identifies some specific directions of intervention. This article’s position is not one that calls for ‘more’ regulation. Rather, it favor

37、s a revision of current regulations in a direction that accounts for the peculiar characteristics of pension plans.</p><p>　　To start, consumer protection from contractual risk is important. It is precisely

38、a regulatory system that should avoid a situation in which consumers bear ‘too much risk’, especially of a type they are often unable to value, as opposed as to risk transferred to intermediaries or financial institution

39、s. </p><p>　　Regulation may mitigate these two common aspects of private pension schemes. The degree of liquidity of a pension scheme is partially due to the regulatory system, and can be increased. An examp

40、le is the recent experience of mortgage contracts, which in some countries can be renegotiated at reasonable cost. For pension schemes, renegotiation may also include the possibility to switch funds and their providers.

41、Clearly, this would call for a sufficiently high degree of standardization of pension </p><p>　　Conclusions</p><p>　　This paper takes a cautious position towards a wider participation of the pri

42、vate sector in current pension systems. It argues that this may be a successful strategy provided that the transition is coupled by well-considered policy interventions fostering financial regulation. The position is not

43、 one that calls for more regulation, rather one that favors the revision of regulations in a direction. </p><p>　　Here, we want to point out that whenever a pension system has a strong redistribution objecti

44、ve. In this respect the public sector has more financing opportunities than any private institution. </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　歐洲的公共養(yǎng)老與私人養(yǎng)老</p><p>　　“福利國家”這個現代理念構成了歐

45、洲政治思想的最重要的成就之一。養(yǎng)老，反過來，是現代福利國家和現代社會市場經濟的重要特征。養(yǎng)老金是提供給公民的主要工具，在大規(guī)模的基礎上，在退休時可接受的福利水平。</p><p>　　面對這個情況，過去和現在的人口發(fā)展趨勢顯示了人們對成現今國家養(yǎng)老制度未來的可持續(xù)發(fā)展表示嚴重懷疑。世界各國正在處理增加預算發(fā)放養(yǎng)老金的問題，由于人口老齡化，特別是在歐洲，提前退休是一個歷史趨勢。這一現象的認識引發(fā)了所有歐洲聯盟成員國

46、和整個世界關于國家養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)改革的廣泛討論。目前，幾乎每一個經合組織國家和歐盟成員國都在討論養(yǎng)老問題，并開展其自己的改革。</p><p>　　然而，養(yǎng)老制度改革是一個“敏感對象”，因為養(yǎng)老金的性質和重要性。經濟，人口，社會和政治方面是必須考慮的。此外，從技術角度來看，有關養(yǎng)老金的重要的經驗和潛在的經濟理論是有爭議的，因此，各國政府都有自己的最佳做法和政策。因此，關于養(yǎng)老改革的爭論變得更加激烈和跨越各種尺度也就不足

47、為奇：從確定適當的辦法計算養(yǎng)老金，整體經濟影響不同養(yǎng)老金制度的設計，到更多的政治問題的社會共識和實施。</p><p><b>　　什么是養(yǎng)老金計劃？</b></p><p>　　養(yǎng)老金是根據合同取得的個人獲得的為他現在產出（貢獻）的配額來交換將來產出（利益）的配額的權力。從該合同規(guī)定的時間點（退休的年齡時），這個點開始轉換。</p><p>

48、　　原則上，個人可以“和自己簽訂合同”，也就是說，他可以把目前擁有的產出的部分用來存儲以便將來使用。然而，這對服務和不耐儲存貨物是不可行的，例如醫(yī)療保健和老年服務，服裝和食品；恰恰是這些基本的商品和服務，是老人在在退休后有興趣的。</p><p>　　即使身體狀況約束了個人的行動，現代社會已經把個人養(yǎng)老合同協調到養(yǎng)老制度中，這樣在退休時個人不需要消費自己過去的生產，而是使用在養(yǎng)老合同那個時候個人積極工作的產出。每

49、一個現代養(yǎng)老制度本質上構成了一個輸出轉移，即在每一時期，從現在的年輕一代（這里為那些積極工作的）到目前的老一代（被淘汰的）。</p><p>　　養(yǎng)老制度理論上分為兩大類。</p><p>　　現收現付制，目前的年輕一代通過勞動所得稅強制性地貢獻到養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)，他們的收入被部分轉移到目前的老年一代作為養(yǎng)老福利。在這樣做時，年輕一代獲得在他們年老的時候領取退休金的權利。</p>&

50、lt;p>　　基金養(yǎng)老制，目前的年輕一代強制性地貢獻部分勞動收入到養(yǎng)老基金，投資于金融資產。當他們退休時，該基金以終身年金的形式支付養(yǎng)老福利，退休者消費的商品和服務的資金由目前的年輕一代產出。</p><p>　　人口變化和公共養(yǎng)老不平衡</p><p>　　本節(jié)討論了目前的公共養(yǎng)老金制度在財政上的可持續(xù)性問題。現收現付制是一個財政上可持續(xù)的，或財政平衡，每一個時期，總的名義的捐款（

51、當時平均工資的貢獻比率乘以工人數量），等于總的養(yǎng)老金開支，即被給予的平均的養(yǎng)老金乘以領取養(yǎng)老金的人數。</p><p>　　在經合組織國家中，退休養(yǎng)老金的公共支出，也就是說，在右邊的平衡公式，預計在未來數十年顯著增加。最近的預測從2000——2050年間顯示公共年齡相關性支出占國內生產總值的百分比，可能平均上升約7點。特別是，公共退休養(yǎng)老金和提前退休計劃為代表的國內生產總值的比例預計在挪威將增加近10％，西班牙和

52、韓國有8%,德國占5%，法國近4％。</p><p>　　對于歐洲聯盟，歐盟財政經濟部長計劃總共（稅前）增加公共支出占2.3%養(yǎng)老金和2.2%的GDP，分別為歐盟15國和歐盟25國。這意味著，到2050年，歐盟15國將花費近13％的GDP來資助公共養(yǎng)老金，而歐盟25國將斥資12.8％的GDP。</p><p>　　預計壽命的增加和提前退休的結合，是退休養(yǎng)老金支出預期增加的主要原因。與此同時

53、，預計養(yǎng)老金捐款預計將下降，因為生育率的下降。事實上，低生育率往往導致勞動人口減少，而根據關于生產力合理的假設，只有國內生產總值的適度擴張。因此，鑒于目前的公共養(yǎng)老金計算公式，養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)將出現嚴重的財政不平衡。</p><p>　　公共與私人養(yǎng)老金計劃</p><p>　　本節(jié)討論在當前老齡化存在的情況如何增加基金養(yǎng)老計劃的作用去幫助維持財政的可持續(xù)性。還詳細闡述了對私人養(yǎng)老金，儲蓄和增長，

54、金融市場和個人的保護去抵抗各種風險，必要時與現收現付制比較。</p><p>　　基金允許制度在面臨的人口老齡化時保持財政上的平衡。在一個完全的基金制度中，每一個特定的一代人，把它稱作'一代A'，在她的工作生活中建立她自己的“經濟活動積累”。退休時，累積的活動轉化為養(yǎng)老年金，它的實際價值恰好等于每個人積累的資產的價值。在人口老齡化的情況下，在“一代A”退休期間的勞動人口將減少。然而，“一代A”的每

55、一個人已經積累了他退休前的養(yǎng)老基金。因此，養(yǎng)老系統(tǒng)必須計劃足夠的“錢”去支付A的養(yǎng)老金。這種說法對每一代人都是有效的，從而意味著基金養(yǎng)老制與現收現付制相背離，在人口老齡化的情況下仍然財政平衡。</p><p>　　事實上，基金制保持財政平衡并不意味著真實的養(yǎng)老年金在目前老齡化下保持不變。工作人口的減少意味著產值的減少。因此，當“一代A”的退休人員用他們的養(yǎng)老金去購買商品和服務時，可能出現供過于求，導致了通貨膨脹的

56、過程，降低了A的養(yǎng)老年金的實際價值。</p><p>　　雖然這種說法是正確的，但是有點小問題。首先，名義上基金養(yǎng)老制仍然保持平衡。最重要的是，金融不平衡可能導致系統(tǒng)崩潰。二，這個說法基本上是對經濟增長。這是缺乏經濟增長，由于勞動人口，從而降低實際退休金減少。但經濟增長是一個普遍的問題，影響到現收現付和年金制度，以及整個經濟。即使不知道是否有年金制度總是比現收現付制在預測經濟增長上有效，現收現付制和年金制度在缺乏

57、經濟增長的情況下都是脆弱的，但是年金制度至少保持了財政平衡。</p><p>　　對私人養(yǎng)老金：政府監(jiān)管</p><p>　　本節(jié)討論金融市場監(jiān)管，并確定一些具體的干預指導。本文的立場不是要求一對'多'監(jiān)管。相反，它主張在一個方向上對現行法規(guī)的修訂并解釋退休金計劃的特殊性質。</p><p>　　首先，從合同風險保護消費者是最重要的。一個正確的監(jiān)管體

58、系應該避免消費者承擔“太多的風險”的情況，特別是他們經常無法實現的價值類型，而不是作為風險轉移給中介機構或金融機構。</p><p>　　監(jiān)管可能減輕私人養(yǎng)老金計劃的兩個共同方面。養(yǎng)老金計劃的流動程度是不公平的，由于監(jiān)管制度，可以被增加。一個例子就是抵押貸款合同，這在有些國家，可以在合理的成本重新談判最近的經驗。養(yǎng)老金計劃，也可能包括重新談判的可能性，轉換基金和他們的供應商。顯然，這將要求對退休金計劃的標準化程度

59、相當高。在高標準化的方向行政干預也可能有助于提高個人的養(yǎng)老金產品的知識，從而減少其不確定性。</p><p><b>　　總結</b></p><p>　　本文謹慎地采取了在當前的養(yǎng)老體系中讓私營部門廣泛參與的立場。本文認為這可能是一個成功的戰(zhàn)略轉型因為其提供了經過深思熟慮的政策，促進金融監(jiān)管。目前不需要更多的規(guī)章，而是一個有利于修訂的指導性條例。</p>