[雙語翻譯]養(yǎng)老保險外文翻譯--中國勞動力市場狀況與社會保險（節(jié)選）

1、3200 英文單詞， 英文單詞，17500 英文字符，中文 英文字符，中文 5350 字文獻出處： 文獻出處：Rickne J . Labor market conditions and social insurance in China[J]. China Economic Review, 2013, 27(4):52-68.Labor market conditions and social insurance in ChinaJo

2、hanna RICKNEThis paper provides micro-level evidence on the relationship between labor market conditions and social insurance participation among Chinese industrial firms. I find that the increased scarcity of labor over

3、 this period was a quantitatively important driver of participation. Moreover, a comparison of the responses in different segments of the labor market shows that the response was relatively stronger in sectors with large

4、r shares of uninsured workers, namely in private firms, those with a larger share of low-educated workers, and those without labor unions. The results suggest that a tighter labor market in the years ahead can aid policy

5、 makers to implement social insurance programs and combat insurance inequality.Keywords: Social insurance; Employer participation; Labor market tightness; People's Republic of China1. IntroductionThe dramatic overhau

6、l of China's social insurance system is a major component of the country's ongoing economic transition. The endowment system for workers in the state-sector has been replaced with several different social insuran

7、ces. Industrial firms based in urban areas are required to make large payments to these programs. Adding up the benchmark payment rates, the overall level is among the highest in the world. It constitutes 30% of the firm

8、's payroll expenses, which can be compared to 10% of payroll in the U.S., 20% in Germany and 23% in Sweden (SSA, various country reports).High payment levels coupled with weak regulatory enforcement and a fragmented

9、administration of the programs have combined to make evasion of payments a serious concern (Dorfman et al., 2013; Feng Mao, Zhang, & Zhao, 2012). Yet, little is known about the determinants of evasion, in particular

10、 regarding the interplay between contextual economic factors and firm behavior.This paper investigates the relationship between labor market tightness and industrial firms' participation in the three largest social i

11、nsurance programs: pensions, medical insurance, and unemployment insurance. In a simple theoretical framework I show that a tighter labor market incentivizes employers to participate. The intuition is that when there are

12、 fewer unemployed workers for each vacant position, firms may offer social insurances as a way to compete more successfully in attracting labor and lower their recruitment costs.To empirically test this hypothesis I draw

13、 upon panel data for industrial firms observed in 2000–2007. The firms within the dataset together make up nearly 90% of China's industrial output and account for two thirds of industrial employment. Although the dat

14、a does not cover the most recent years, the conclusions we can draw remain relevant. The broader question of how the non-wage compensation of firms changes in response to labor market conditions is relevant for understan

15、ding the development of the labor market and the welfare state. In particular, it is relevant for the ongoing discussions of the impacts of the joint processes of an aging population and changing patterns of rural–urban

16、migration (see, for example, the insightful discussions provided by Cai, 2010, or Meng, 2012). In this context, firms' provision of social insurance Scheme (LIS).2 Besides its three main components of health insuranc

17、e, injured-worker insurance, and old-age insurance, many workers also benefitted from insurance for sickness, invalidity, maternity and death (Tang & Ngan, 2001).In recent decades, two key factors propelled policy ma

18、kers to engage in a dramatic overhaul of the workplace-based entitlement system. As the private sector grew, an increasing number of workers were excluded from social insurance coverage because the LIS only applied to th

19、e state-controlled sector. At the same time, State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) faced growing difficulties in competing with the private firms that were exempt from insurance costs. To overcome these problems, the LIS was de

20、composed into several different social insurance schemes and these schemes were applied equally to all ownership sectors. At the same time, the financial responsibility was moved from the individual firm to a system that

21、 pooled funds across numerous firms. These reforms improved the competitiveness of the SOEs by transferring liabilities that had accumulated under the LIS, especially in the case of pension payments, to the pooled funds

22、of the new system.Table 1 lists the current social insurance programs for urban industrial employees. Also listed are the years in which the main regulatory frameworks for these schemes were introduced, as well as benchm

23、ark contribution rates for employers and employees. Full compliance with the benchmark case amounts to the equivalent of a 30% payroll tax. Eligibility for benefits also requires payments to be made over a number of year

24、s, at a minimum 15 years for pensions and one year for unemployment insurance.Table 1.Benchmark contribution rates for China's urban social insurance programsIn addition to the schemes listed in Table 1, firms are al

25、so encouraged to participate in voluntary and supplementary insurances. One example is the Enterprise Annuity (EA) scheme that is a part of the pension system. In 2008, less than 5% of the firms that participated in the

26、main urban old-age insurance scheme also insured their workers through the EA (Dorfman et al., 2013).An important milestone in China's social insurance reform was the implementation of a Social Insurance Law in July

27、2011. This document unified the main regulations for the five insurances listed in Table 1 and set the tone for the future development of the system. Important provisions included the portability of pension and health ca

28、re benefits, expanded coverage for foreign workers, and the establishment of a unified social security ID system. The law also promoted responsible management of pooled funds and a more efficient system for collecting co

29、ntributions. A benchmark enforcement mechanism was outlined that prescribes a daily overdue payment fine of 0.05% for non-complying firms.The Social Insurance Law gave a set of broad policy parameters but left most of th

30、e implementation details for future clarification via additional regulations at the national and local Employer (% of payroll) Employee (% of wage)Basic pension scheme (1997) 20 8Urban employees basic medical insurance