外文翻譯--公司的核心競爭力

1、<p><b>　　中文4890字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　外文題目 The Core Competence of the Corporation </p><p>　　外文出處 Harvar

2、d Business Review May-June 1990 </p><p>　　外文作者 普拉哈拉德 </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The Core Competence of the Corporation<

3、;/p><p>　　The most powerful way to prevail in global competition is still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their

4、corporations. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of the corporation it

5、self.</p><p>　　Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telecommunica

6、tions. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTE&

7、#39;s Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in rel</p><p>　　Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales were $16.46 billion, and NEC’s sal

8、es were considerably higher at $21.89 billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTE's other businesses are small in global terms. GTE has dive

9、sted Sylvania TV and Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of GTE has ero</p><p>　　NEC has emerge

10、d as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telecommunications products and computers. It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved beyond public switching and transmiss

11、ion to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop computers bridging the gap between telecommunications and office automation. NEC is the only company in the world to be in the t

12、op five in revenue in telecommunications, semi</p><p>　　Rethinking the Corporation </p><p>　　Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product mar

13、kets and admonish them to become world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new m

14、arkets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for manag</p><p>　　This is a deceptiv

15、ely difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western companies must assume responsibility for competitive decline. Every

16、one knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies

17、actually get from political or macroeconom</p><p>　　NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early

18、 in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and communications, what it called "C&C" Success, top management reckoned, would hinge on acquiring competencies, pa

19、rticularly in semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate "strategic architecture," summarized by C&C, and then communicated its inte</p><p>　　NEC constituted a "C&C Committee&qu

20、ot; of top managers to oversee the development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its strat

21、egic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad ar

22、ray of core competencies.</p><p>　　NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of technological and market evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large mainframes to di

23、stributed processing, components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communi

24、cations, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard to distinguish among them, an</p><p>　　NEC top management determined that semiconductors would be the company's most importa

25、nt "core product." It entered into myriad strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell a

26、nd Bull. Almost all the collaborative arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented toward technology access. As they entered collaborative arrangements, NEC’s operating managers understo</p><

27、;p>　　No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE. Although senior executives discussed the implications of the evolving information technology industry, no commonly accepted

28、 view of which competencies would be required to compete in that industry were communicated widely. While significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior line managers continued to act as if they wer

29、e managing independent business units. Decentralization made it diff</p><p>　　The Roots of Competitive Advantage</p><p>　　The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselv

30、es a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers wer

31、e once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over;whelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Can</p>

32、<p>　　In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to

33、 everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of

34、its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission m</p><p>　　In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the s

35、urvivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and le

36、ss important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than com</p><p>　　Senior executives who claim that they c

37、annot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is

38、 not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessa

39、rily limits the abili</p><p>　　The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end produc

40、ts. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a

41、tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”)</p><p>　　Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinat

42、e diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does no

43、t in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor desig</p><p>　　If

44、core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products,

45、 Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufa

46、cturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operati</p><p>　　Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many level

47、s of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together

48、constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportuniti</p><p>　　Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike ph

49、ysical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the g

50、lue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.</p><p&g

51、t;　　Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brou

52、ght to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of

53、 businesses belies a few shared core competencies.</p><p>　　In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable

54、 to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maint

55、ain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors </p><p>　　Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set

56、 almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the co

57、mpetitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.</p><p>　　Source:Harved Business Review May-June 1990</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p&

58、gt;<p>　　公司的核心競爭力 　　很多公司仍在苦苦尋找在全球競爭中克敵制勝的最有效方式。20世紀(jì)80年代，人們評價(jià)某個(gè)高管有沒有才能，主要看這個(gè)人能否重組公司、撥亂反正和精簡層級。然而，進(jìn)入20世紀(jì)90年代后，人們評價(jià)高管時(shí)，將看他們有沒有能力識別、培育和利用公司的核心競爭力(corecompetence，也稱核心能力)，為公司的

59、成長找到新的途徑?？磥?，高管們該重新思考一下公司這個(gè)概念本身了。</p><p>　　讓我們首先以美國的GTE*和日本的NEC**兩家公司為例，探討十年來它們各自的發(fā)展軌跡。20世紀(jì)80年代初期，信息技術(shù)已初顯欣欣向榮的景象，GTE憑借自己的地位，極有希望成為該行業(yè)的主力軍。這家公司在電信業(yè)非常活躍，其業(yè)務(wù)橫跨多個(gè)領(lǐng)域，包括電話、交換與傳輸系統(tǒng)、數(shù)字化專用自動(dòng)小交換機(jī)（PAXB）半導(dǎo)體、分組交換、衛(wèi)星、國防系統(tǒng)以

60、及照明產(chǎn)品等等。此外，GTE旗下的娛樂產(chǎn)品集團(tuán)(EntertainmentProductsGroup)，也就是喜萬年(Sylvania)彩電的制造者，在相關(guān)的顯示器技術(shù)領(lǐng)域也占有一席之地。1980年，GTE的銷售額為99．8億美元，凈現(xiàn)金流17．3億美元。與之相比，NEC當(dāng)時(shí)還只是一個(gè)小字輩，銷售收入僅為38億美元。盡管擁有與GTE不相上下的技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)和計(jì)算機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)，但NEC在電信領(lǐng)域尚無任何經(jīng)驗(yàn)。</p><p>

61、　　然而，到了1988年，NEC卻后來者居上，銷售額達(dá)到218．9億美元，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于GTE公司的164．6億美元。這時(shí)，GTE實(shí)際上已經(jīng)淪為一家以經(jīng)營電話業(yè)務(wù)為主的公司，盡管它在國防和照明產(chǎn)品方面仍占有一席之地。這家公司的其他業(yè)務(wù)從全球的角度看已經(jīng)變得很小。在過去的幾年中，GTE公司已經(jīng)把喜萬年電視機(jī)和Telenet業(yè)務(wù)剝離了出去，把交換機(jī)、傳輸設(shè)備和數(shù)字PABX等產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)交給合資公司生產(chǎn)，而半導(dǎo)體業(yè)務(wù)則已關(guān)張大吉。在這個(gè)過程中，GTE公司

62、的國際地位一路下滑。1980到1988年間GTE在美國以外地區(qū)的銷售收入從過去占總收入的20％降到了15％。</p><p>　　相比之下，NEC卻一躍成為世界半導(dǎo)體工業(yè)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，并且在電信產(chǎn)品和計(jì)算機(jī)領(lǐng)域也躋身一流企業(yè)。它鞏固了自己在大型計(jì)算機(jī)方面的領(lǐng)先地位，還跨出了公用交換和傳輸領(lǐng)域，把觸角伸到了手機(jī)、傳真機(jī)和手提電腦等所謂的生活時(shí)尚產(chǎn)品(1ifestyleproducts)領(lǐng)域，在電信和辦公自動(dòng)化之間架起了

63、橋梁。NEC成為惟一一家在電信、半導(dǎo)體、大型計(jì)算機(jī)三個(gè)領(lǐng)域的全球銷售收入均名列前五位的公司。為什么這兩家在起步時(shí)業(yè)務(wù)組合基本相近的公司，在幾年后的表現(xiàn)卻如此懸殊?主要是因?yàn)镹EC能夠從“核心競爭力”的角度考慮企業(yè)問題，而GTEZ卻沒有。</p><p>　　對公司的重新思考　　經(jīng)營多元化公司曾經(jīng)是一項(xiàng)很簡單的工作，總部只需指示其業(yè)務(wù)單位把注意力放到某個(gè)特定的最終產(chǎn)品市場，并督促它們成為該領(lǐng)域的世界領(lǐng)先者即可。然

64、而，隨著市場邊界的變化越來越快，目標(biāo)開始變得飄忽不定，對目標(biāo)市場的占領(lǐng)頂多只是暫時(shí)性的。但也有幾家公司屬于長袖善舞的一類，它們善于創(chuàng)造新市場，能夠快速打入新興市場并且在業(yè)已成熟的市場中大力改變客戶的選擇模式。這些公司自然成為大家效仿和學(xué)習(xí)的對象。對于公司的管理層來說，關(guān)鍵任務(wù)就是使自己的組織能夠在產(chǎn)品中加入令人無法抗拒的功能，或者更高明一些，創(chuàng)造出消費(fèi)者需要但是還未曾想到過的產(chǎn)品。</p><p>　　這項(xiàng)任務(wù)的

65、艱巨性超乎我們的想像。最終，只有從根本上改變大型公司的管理才能完成這項(xiàng)任務(wù)。首先，西方企業(yè)的高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)需要為競爭力的下降承擔(dān)責(zé)任。人們或許會(huì)把競爭力下降歸咎于高利率、日本的保護(hù)主義、過時(shí)的反托位斯法、愛鬧事的工會(huì)以及缺乏耐性的投資者。但是，另一方面，人們卻較難意識到或者羞于承認(rèn)這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)：政治上或者宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)上的“救濟(jì)”并不會(huì)給公司提供多少動(dòng)力。其實(shí)是西方管理的理論和實(shí)踐在拖我們的后腿，真正需要改革的是我們在管理中遵循的原則。</p

66、><p>　　像許多其他的對比案例一樣，NEC與GTE之間的比較可以給我們很多啟迪。我們旨在通過這些對比分析來了解爭奪全球領(lǐng)先地位所依靠的基礎(chǔ)發(fā)生了什么變化。早在20世紀(jì)70年代初期，NEC公司的管理層就清楚地闡明了把計(jì)算機(jī)與通信技術(shù)相融合的戰(zhàn)略意圖(strategicintent)，即所謂的“C&C”（computer&</p><p>　　Communication，計(jì)算機(jī)

67、與通信)。NEC公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)認(rèn)為，這一戰(zhàn)略成功與否關(guān)鍵在于能否獲得必要的核心競爭力，尤其是在半導(dǎo)體領(lǐng)域的核心競爭力。該公司的管理層采納了一個(gè)合適的戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)(strategicarchitecture)，將其簡稱C&C，然后在70年代中期將其意圖傳達(dá)給了整個(gè)組織以及外界人士。</p><p>　　NEC公司成立了一個(gè)由高層經(jīng)理組成的“計(jì)算機(jī)與通信委員會(huì)”，以指導(dǎo)核心產(chǎn)品與核心競爭力的開發(fā)。此外，NEC還打破了

68、各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)的利益界限，建立了一些協(xié)調(diào)小組和協(xié)調(diào)委員會(huì)。按照其戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)，NEC把大量的資源調(diào)配到元件和中央處理器項(xiàng)目上，以加強(qiáng)公司在該領(lǐng)域的地位。它通過相互協(xié)作方式使得公司的內(nèi)部資源成倍增長，借此積累起了多方面的核心競爭力。</p><p>　　NEC仔細(xì)地辨明了三種相互關(guān)聯(lián)的技術(shù)和市場發(fā)展潮流。管理層認(rèn)為，計(jì)算技術(shù)將從大型主機(jī)架構(gòu)向分布式處理轉(zhuǎn)變，元件將從簡單的集成電路(1C)發(fā)展為“超大規(guī)模集成電路”(VLSl)

69、，通信方面則從機(jī)械式縱橫交換機(jī)演化為復(fù)雜的數(shù)字傳輸系統(tǒng)，即我們所說的ISDN(綜合業(yè)務(wù)數(shù)字網(wǎng))。隨著形勢進(jìn)一步發(fā)展，NEC認(rèn)為，計(jì)算、通信和元件業(yè)務(wù)將逐漸重疊和交織在一起，以至于最后很難將它們區(qū)分開來。如果一家公司具備了服務(wù)于這三個(gè)市場的核心競爭力，那么到那時(shí)，必然會(huì)獲得巨大的商機(jī)。</p><p>　　NEC的高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)決定把半導(dǎo)體列為公司最重要的“核心產(chǎn)（coreproduct）。它隨后與很多公司結(jié)成了戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟

70、，到1987年聯(lián)盟數(shù)量已達(dá)到100多個(gè)，其目的就是為了以低成本快速構(gòu)建企業(yè)的核心競爭力。在大型主機(jī)領(lǐng)域，NEC最著名的合作伙伴是美國的霍尼韋爾公司(Honeywell)與法國Bull公司。在半導(dǎo)體元件領(lǐng)域，幾乎所有的合作項(xiàng)目都是以獲取技術(shù)為目的。在結(jié)盟時(shí)，NEC的運(yùn)營經(jīng)理對合作動(dòng)機(jī)和目的非常明確：吸收和消化合作伙伴的技能。NEC的研發(fā)總監(jiān)曾這樣總結(jié)20世紀(jì)70年代和80年代獲取技能的經(jīng)歷：“從投資角度分析，這種方式使我們能夠以更低的成本

71、迅速掌握國外技術(shù)。我們沒有必要自己開發(fā)新的創(chuàng)意?！?lt;/p><p>　　而GTE似乎并沒有如此明確的戰(zhàn)略意圖和戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)。盡管高層決策者也曾討論過信息技術(shù)的發(fā)展將帶來怎樣的影響，但對于在信息技術(shù)行業(yè)競爭將需要什么樣的能力(competencies)，并沒有形成一致的觀點(diǎn)，更談不上將其在公司中廣泛傳播了。雖然公司做了大量工作來確認(rèn)關(guān)鍵技術(shù)，但高層業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)理依然我行我素，仿佛他們經(jīng)營的業(yè)務(wù)單元與別的單元毫不相干。權(quán)力分散

72、導(dǎo)致公司無法集中發(fā)展核心競爭力。相反，各業(yè)務(wù)單元越來越依靠外面的公司來獲得關(guān)鍵技能，而對外合作則成了一種分階段退出的途徑。今天，在新的管理層上臺后，GTE已重新定位，要把自己的能力應(yīng)用于電信服務(wù)領(lǐng)域的新興市場。</p><p><b>　　競爭優(yōu)勢的根源：</b></p><p>　　NEC和GTE兩家公司的差別在于，前者把自己看成是一些能力的組合，而后者則把自己視為

73、一些業(yè)務(wù)的組合。這類情形在很多行業(yè)屢見不鮮。從1980年到1988年，日本的佳能公司(Canon)增長了264％，本田公司(Honda)增長了200％。相比之下，美國的施樂(xerox)與克萊斯勒(Chrysler)則落了下風(fēng)，如果說西方的經(jīng)理們以前是為日本進(jìn)口貨的價(jià)廉質(zhì)高而憂心忡忡，那么他們現(xiàn)在恐怕要為對手在創(chuàng)造新市場、發(fā)明新產(chǎn)品和改進(jìn)提高方面的驚人速度而慨嘆了。佳能公司推出了個(gè)人復(fù)印機(jī)，本田把業(yè)務(wù)從摩托車擴(kuò)展到了四輪越野車，索尼(S

74、ony)開發(fā)出了8毫米的攝像機(jī)，雅瑪哈(Yamaha)推出了數(shù)字鋼琴，小松公司(Komatsu)研制了水下遙控推土機(jī)，而卡西歐(Casio)的最新產(chǎn)品則是一種小屏幕彩色液晶電視機(jī)。誰曾預(yù)料得到會(huì)演化出這樣一些前衛(wèi)產(chǎn)品市場?</p><p>　　在較為成熟的市場上，日本公司的挑戰(zhàn)也同樣令人不安。它們掀起了一場改進(jìn)產(chǎn)品特點(diǎn)和功能的風(fēng)暴，把尖端的技術(shù)引入到了人們的日用品中。比如，日本汽車制造商率先嘗試了四輪驅(qū)動(dòng)、每缸四

75、汽閥發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)，車內(nèi)導(dǎo)航系統(tǒng)以及尖端的電子引擎管理系統(tǒng)。佳能憑借其產(chǎn)品的性能，在傳真機(jī)、臺式激光打印機(jī)甚至半導(dǎo)體生產(chǎn)設(shè)備等市場都謀得了一席之地。</p><p>　　在短期內(nèi)，一個(gè)公司的競爭優(yōu)勢源于現(xiàn)有產(chǎn)品的性價(jià)比特性。但是在第一輪全球競爭中存活下來的企業(yè)，無論是西方公司還是日本公司，現(xiàn)在都已趨向于采用相似的嚴(yán)格的產(chǎn)品成本和質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。達(dá)到這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)際上已經(jīng)成為繼續(xù)留在競爭隊(duì)伍中的最低要求，它們對于形成差異化優(yōu)勢的重要

76、性已越來越小。從長期來看，競爭優(yōu)勢將取決于企業(yè)能否以比對手更低的成本和更快的速度構(gòu)建核心競爭力，這些核心競爭力將為公司催生出意想不到的產(chǎn)品。管理層有能力把整個(gè)公司的技術(shù)和生產(chǎn)技能整合成核心競爭力，使各項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)能夠及時(shí)把握不斷變化的機(jī)遇，這才是優(yōu)勢的真正所在。</p><p>　　有些高層經(jīng)理宣稱他們無法打造核心競爭力，因?yàn)闃I(yè)務(wù)單元的自主性是不可侵犯的，或者因?yàn)樗麄儽痪o張的季度預(yù)算束縛住了手腳。這些人應(yīng)該反省。在很多

77、西方企業(yè)中，問題并不是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層在能力上遜于日本同行，或者企業(yè)的技術(shù)能力比日本公司差一大截，而是這些企業(yè)的管理層死抱著一個(gè)陳舊的公司概念。這個(gè)陳舊的概念，限制了業(yè)務(wù)部門的能力，使它們無法充分利用很多歐美公司所擁有的技術(shù)能力寶藏。</p><p>　　多元化公司就好比一棵大樹，樹干和幾個(gè)主要枝杈是核心產(chǎn)品，較纖細(xì)的樹枝則是業(yè)務(wù)單元，葉、花與果實(shí)則屬于最終產(chǎn)品。為大樹提供養(yǎng)分和起支撐固定作用的根系就是公司的核心競爭力。如

78、果你只通過看最終產(chǎn)品來評價(jià)競爭對手的實(shí)力，你就會(huì)看走眼，好比你只看樹葉來判斷樹的強(qiáng)壯程度一樣。</p><p>　　核心競爭力是組織內(nèi)的集體學(xué)習(xí)能力，尤其是如何協(xié)調(diào)各種生產(chǎn)技能并且把多種技術(shù)整合在一起的能力。索尼的微型化能力和飛利浦(Philips)的光介質(zhì)專長就是兩種核心競爭力。雖然在理論上可以把收音機(jī)組裝在一個(gè)芯片上，但這種理論知識并不能確保公司有能力生產(chǎn)出如名片般大小的微型收音機(jī)。為了把設(shè)想變?yōu)楝F(xiàn)實(shí)，卡西歐

79、必須把公司在微型化、微處理器設(shè)計(jì)、材料科學(xué)和超薄精密封裝等方面的技術(shù)專長融為一體，這些也正是它在微型名片式計(jì)算器、袖珍電視機(jī)以及數(shù)字手表中所采用的技術(shù)。</p><p>　　核心競爭力不僅僅是整合各種技術(shù)，同時(shí)它還意味著對工作進(jìn)行組織和提供價(jià)值。索尼公司的核心競爭力之一是微型化。為了使產(chǎn)品實(shí)現(xiàn)微型化，索尼必須保證技術(shù)專家、工程師和市場營銷人員對客戶需求達(dá)成共識，并了解技術(shù)上的可能性。核心競爭力的作用不僅在制造業(yè)中

80、表現(xiàn)明顯，在服務(wù)業(yè)中也是?；ㄆ旒瘓F(tuán)(Citicorp)率先投資了一套運(yùn)營系統(tǒng)，這套系統(tǒng)使它能夠全天24小時(shí)介入全世界的市場，由此帶來的核心競爭力使花旗脫穎而出，把很多金融服務(wù)公司甩在身后。</p><p>　　核心競爭力是溝通，是參與，是對跨越組織界限協(xié)同工作的深度承諾。它涉及所有職能部門和很多級別的員工。世界級的研究項(xiàng)目，比如激光或陶瓷的研發(fā)工作，能夠在公司的實(shí)驗(yàn)室中開展，但是不會(huì)對公司的任何業(yè)務(wù)部門產(chǎn)生影響。

81、因此，組合在一起構(gòu)成公司核心競爭力的各種技能，必定是匯集在思維開闊的人身上。如果目光狹窄的話，人們就不會(huì)意識到他們有機(jī)會(huì)把別人的專長以新穎的方式與自己的專長結(jié)合到一起。</p><p>　　核心競爭力并不會(huì)隨著使用的增多而減少。有形資產(chǎn)會(huì)隨著時(shí)間的流逝而減損，但核心競爭力卻會(huì)隨著應(yīng)用和共享的增多而增強(qiáng)。但是，核心競爭力也需要培養(yǎng)和保護(hù)，因?yàn)橹R不用就會(huì)消亡。核心競爭力是把現(xiàn)有業(yè)務(wù)維系在一起的黏合劑。它們也是新業(yè)務(wù)

82、開發(fā)的動(dòng)力。多元化經(jīng)營和進(jìn)軍新市場或許也要以它們?yōu)橐罁?jù)，而不僅僅是看市場的吸引力。</p><p>　　以3M公司的黏性膠帶業(yè)務(wù)為例。在規(guī)劃多元化業(yè)務(wù)(包括報(bào)事貼、磁帶、照相膠卷、壓敏膠帶和砂帶)的過程中，該公司運(yùn)用了在基底、涂層以及黏合劑等產(chǎn)品中廣泛共享的技術(shù)能力，并設(shè)計(jì)了各種方法來組合它們。實(shí)際上，3M公司對這些技術(shù)的投資一直沒有間斷過。盡管它的業(yè)務(wù)組合看起來極為分散，但是繁雜表象的背后卻是少數(shù)幾項(xiàng)共享的核心

83、競爭力。</p><p>　　對比之下，有些大公司雖然具有打造核心競爭力的潛能，卻沒有成功，因?yàn)楦邔庸芾碚邇H把公司看做互不相干的業(yè)務(wù)集合。美國的通用電氣公司(GE)把很大一部分電子消費(fèi)品業(yè)務(wù)賣給了法國的湯姆森公司(Thomson)，聲稱在該領(lǐng)域中保持競爭優(yōu)勢已經(jīng)日益艱難。事實(shí)的確如此，然而，令人不解的是，通用電氣為這幾項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵業(yè)務(wù)相中的買主竟然是幾家在核心競爭力方面早已成了領(lǐng)袖的競爭對手——例如生產(chǎn)小型電機(jī)的百得公

84、司(Black&Decker)和電子廠商湯姆森公司，后者正急于在微電子領(lǐng)域建立自己的核心競爭力，并且在日本公司的啟發(fā)下，認(rèn)識到在電子消費(fèi)晶領(lǐng)域確立地位是打造這種核心競爭力的關(guān)鍵。</p><p>　　那些陷入戰(zhàn)略事業(yè)部(strategicbusinessunit，SBU)思維模式的管理者們幾乎無一例外地發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司中的各個(gè)業(yè)務(wù)部門已經(jīng)離不開外部供應(yīng)商所提供的必要元件，比如發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)和壓縮機(jī)。但公司不能把這些產(chǎn)品