公司的核心競爭力-外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　The Core Competence of the Corporation</p><p>　　Material Source:Harvard Business Review,May-June,1990 P79-

2、93 Author:C.K.Prahalad and Gary Hamel</p><p>　　C. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer

3、 in business policy and management at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article "Strategic Intent" (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research

4、funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.</p><p>　　The Roots of Competitive Advantage</p><p>　　The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of compete

5、ncies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the

6、low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now overwhelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Cano</p><p>　　In more establ

7、ished markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japan

8、ese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Can

9、on is now a player in facsimile transmission m</p><p>　　In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wav

10、e of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources o

11、f differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than com</p><p>　　Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competen

12、cies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior ex

13、ecutives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the abili<

14、/p><p>　　The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that

15、provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at

16、its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”)</p><p>　　Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skil

17、ls and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a comp

18、any the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor desig</p><p>　　If core competence is about

19、harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that te

20、chnologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahe

21、ad of others investing in an operati</p><p>　　Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all funct

22、ions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competenc

23、e must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportuniti</p><p>　　Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do d

24、eteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing b

25、usinesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.</p><p>　　Consider 3M's com

26、petence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared

27、 competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few

28、shared core competencies.</p><p>　　In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the compa

29、ny as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness i

30、n this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors </p><p>　　Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds

31、its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide r

32、ange of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.</p><p>　　How Not to Think of Competence</p><p>　　Since companies are in a race to build the competencies that determ

33、ine global leadership, successful companies have stopped imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of

34、customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be among leaders in computing, telecommunications,</p&

35、gt;<p>　　But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is H

36、onda's core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor

37、controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as co</p><p>　　Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the world's broadcast and print media and i

38、s aimed at building global "share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competi

39、tors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms </p><p>　　Let us be cle

40、ar. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics

41、 was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors.</p><p>　　Nor does core compe

42、tence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is t

43、ypically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow.</p><p>　　Building core compet

44、encies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream

45、 toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Can

46、on is not particularly integrated in its</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p><b>　　公司的核心競爭力</b></p><p>　　資料來源:《哈佛商業(yè)評論》1990，5-6，P79-93 </p><p>　　作者：普拉哈拉德和

47、哈默爾 </p><p>　　編者按：普拉哈拉德是美國密歇根大學研究公司策略和國際商務的教授。哈默爾是倫敦商學院研究企業(yè)政策和企業(yè)管理的講師。他們最近的《哈佛商業(yè)評論》文章《戰(zhàn)略意圖》（1989，,5-6），贏得了1989年的麥肯錫卓越獎。這篇文章是在比慈善基金會的資助下完成的。</p><p>　　競爭優(yōu)勢的根源　　NEC和GTE兩家公司的差別在于，前者把自己看成是一些

48、能力的組合，而后者則把自己視為一些業(yè)務的組合。這類情形在很多行業(yè)屢見不鮮。從1980年到1988年，與美國的施樂與克萊斯勒相比，日本的佳能公司增長了264％，本田公司增長了200％。如果說西方的經理們以前是為日本低價格，高質量的進口貨而擔憂，那么他們現(xiàn)在恐怕要驚嘆日本對手在創(chuàng)造新市場、發(fā)明新產品和改進提高方面的驚人速度了。佳能公司推出了個人復印機，本田把業(yè)務從摩托車擴展到了四輪越野車，索尼開發(fā)出了8毫米的攝像機，雅瑪哈推出了數(shù)字鋼琴，小

49、松公司研制了水下遙控推土機，而卡西歐的最新產品則是一種小屏幕彩色液晶電視機。誰曾預料得到會演化出這樣一些前衛(wèi)產品市場?　　在較為成熟的市場上，日本公司的挑戰(zhàn)也同樣令人不安。它們掀起了一場改進產品特點和功能的風暴，把尖端的技術引入到了人們的日用品中。比如，日本汽車制造商率先嘗試了四輪驅動、每缸四汽閥發(fā)動機，車內導航系統(tǒng)以及尖端的電子引擎管理系統(tǒng)。佳能憑借其產品的性能，在傳真機、臺式激光打印機甚至半導體生產設備等市場都謀得了一席之地?！?/p>