績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)外文翻譯---公共部門中的績(jī)效悖論

1、<p>　　公共部門中的績(jī)效悖論</p><p><b>　　一、引 言</b></p><p>　　現(xiàn)在，國(guó)家投入了比以往任何時(shí)候都要多的注意力、時(shí)間和金錢在公共部門的績(jī)效衡量和評(píng)價(jià)上（經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織［OECD］，1996；Pollitt & Bouckaert，2000；p.87；Power，1997）?；诮Y(jié)果的管理是各級(jí)公共部門一整天的

2、話題，從地方、區(qū)域、國(guó)家，甚至前國(guó)家。學(xué)校和大學(xué)，地方政府，其他行政組織，發(fā)展援助機(jī)構(gòu)（非政府組織和國(guó)際非政府組織），和組織，世界銀行都參與績(jī)效結(jié)果上的數(shù)據(jù)和信息制造，如果可能的話，也包括對(duì)績(jī)效結(jié)果的影響。Power（1994，1997，2000）甚至提到“審計(jì)爆炸”或“審計(jì)的社會(huì)”。新公共管理領(lǐng)域的信徒將一個(gè)高度優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)歸于計(jì)量產(chǎn)出和成果。他們旨在根據(jù)這種理想信息基礎(chǔ)上的新政策和管理活動(dòng)，使得政策的執(zhí)行更有效率和效力。但是，評(píng)價(jià)研究表

3、明，很多試圖引進(jìn)基于結(jié)果的管理方式最后仍然不成功（例如Leeuw & Van Gils, 1999, 荷蘭研究述評(píng)）。不過(guò)，衡量產(chǎn)出、成果、和評(píng)價(jià)活動(dòng)的需要在政治家和行政人員發(fā)表的改善政府工作表現(xiàn)的聲明中仍然是一個(gè)重要的組成部分。</p><p>　　下面，我們將表明以下觀點(diǎn)：公共部門產(chǎn)出計(jì)量的增加會(huì)導(dǎo)致某些意想不到的后果，不僅可能會(huì)廢止公共部門績(jī)效的結(jié)論，也會(huì)消極地影響這個(gè)績(jī)效。我們將通過(guò)一些不同的例子

4、表明，公共部門的一些特征在發(fā)展和使用績(jī)效指標(biāo)之后還會(huì)適得其反。最后，我們將就如何處理公共部門中運(yùn)用績(jī)效評(píng)估造成的問(wèn)題提出一些建議。我們認(rèn)為，這個(gè)問(wèn)題非常重要。因?yàn)?，盡管存在問(wèn)題，績(jī)效衡量仍對(duì)公共部門的日常運(yùn)作，特別是公共支出，存在不菲的價(jià)值。</p><p>　　二、公共部門中的績(jī)效考核</p><p>　　隨著行政改革的崛起，公共部門中的績(jī)效考核得到了愈來(lái)愈多的關(guān)注（cf.power,2

5、000）。在上世紀(jì)80年代，大多數(shù)西方國(guó)家由于經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退和國(guó)際競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇，逐漸引發(fā)了這種改革。而這場(chǎng)改革的口號(hào)便是“新公共管理”。它的目標(biāo)是雙重的：削減預(yù)算，并提高政府官僚機(jī)構(gòu)的效力和效率。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)后一個(gè)目標(biāo)，市場(chǎng)型的機(jī)制，如私有化，和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的招標(biāo)，都被引進(jìn)了公共部門。另外，單位和部門被賣出進(jìn)入準(zhǔn)自治非政府組織。這種例子比比皆是（對(duì)10個(gè)OECD國(guó)家的評(píng)論，Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000）。</p>

6、<p>　　處于這些變化之下的實(shí)踐理論是，政治家應(yīng)該堅(jiān)持自己的核心業(yè)務(wù)，即制定新的政策來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)（政治）的目標(biāo)。奧斯本和蓋布勒（1992）的格言是“指導(dǎo)而不是爭(zhēng)吵”。根據(jù)這些新公共管理大師，政策的執(zhí)行應(yīng)留給市場(chǎng)，或者，如果這是不可能的，給（半）自治組織運(yùn)作中的準(zhǔn)市場(chǎng)環(huán)境（例如，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的學(xué)?；蜥t(yī)院）。這種分離的政策和管理是通過(guò)政府與實(shí)施政策的組織之間擬定的合同來(lái)提供便利的。該合同明確什么任務(wù)將被執(zhí)行，哪些代理人將會(huì)受到“獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)”。代理

7、人的業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)在績(jī)效指標(biāo)方面，如產(chǎn)品的數(shù)量或提供的服務(wù)?！巴度搿惫芾硪蚨脖粌A向于注重結(jié)果的“產(chǎn)出”管理所取代。類似的變化同樣發(fā)生在政府官僚機(jī)構(gòu)，在那里，自我管理和合同管理引入（部分）取代了分層指導(dǎo)。</p><p>　　上述變化導(dǎo)致公共部門采用大量私人機(jī)構(gòu)技術(shù)以衡量和改善績(jī)效，如績(jī)效指標(biāo)。指標(biāo)不僅使政治家來(lái)衡量和評(píng)價(jià)公共及私人政策執(zhí)行組織的業(yè)績(jī)，它們也增加了認(rèn)定業(yè)績(jī)的機(jī)會(huì)——行政改革的另一目標(biāo)。顯然，所有這些變化

8、都基于一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的信念，即公共部門的績(jī)效是可衡量的。但是，正如我們下面要討論的那樣，信仰可能過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單化（cf. Fountain, 2001）。</p><p><b>　　三、績(jī)效悖論</b></p><p>　　績(jī)效悖論指的是績(jī)效指標(biāo)和績(jī)效本身之間的薄弱聯(lián)系（Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer & O'Shaughness

9、y, 1993）。這種現(xiàn)象是被績(jī)效指標(biāo)減少一段運(yùn)行時(shí)間的趨勢(shì)所引起的。它們失去了作為績(jī)效衡量的價(jià)值，并且不能夠區(qū)分好和差的業(yè)績(jī)。因此，實(shí)際和報(bào)告出來(lái)的業(yè)績(jī)之間的關(guān)系便下滑了。</p><p>　　績(jī)效指標(biāo)的惡化是由四個(gè)過(guò)程引起的（Meyer & Gupta, 1994, pp. 330-342）。第一個(gè)過(guò)程被稱為積極的學(xué)習(xí)，也就是說(shuō)，業(yè)績(jī)的改善時(shí)，指標(biāo)失去了其檢測(cè)不良業(yè)績(jī)的靈敏度。事實(shí)上，當(dāng)指標(biāo)過(guò)時(shí)時(shí)，每

10、個(gè)人都會(huì)做得很好。第二個(gè)進(jìn)程是所謂的有害學(xué)習(xí)。當(dāng)組織或個(gè)人了解到哪些方面的業(yè)績(jī)被衡量（哪些不被衡量）的時(shí)候，他們可以利用這些信息來(lái)操縱他們的評(píng)估。例如，當(dāng)他們把所有的努力都用到要衡量的方面時(shí)，績(jī)效水平就上去了。但是，總體上可能沒(méi)有實(shí)際的改進(jìn)，甚至可能是另一方面績(jī)效的惡化（cf. tunnel vision）（Smith, 1995）。第三個(gè)進(jìn)程，選擇，指的是以績(jī)效高的更換績(jī)效低下者，從而降低績(jī)效差異。第四，當(dāng)績(jī)效中差異被忽略時(shí)，抑制就出

11、現(xiàn)了。</p><p>　　重要的是要認(rèn)識(shí)到，矛盾的是不是業(yè)績(jī)本身，而是有關(guān)的業(yè)績(jī)報(bào)告。與期望相反，指標(biāo)并沒(méi)有準(zhǔn)確地報(bào)告業(yè)績(jī)。這可能意味著績(jī)效比所報(bào)告的要差，但也有認(rèn)為比報(bào)告要好的情況。在后一種情況下，績(jī)效悖論可能被認(rèn)為沒(méi)有壞處。然而，在績(jī)效評(píng)估結(jié)果是用來(lái)評(píng)價(jià)組織或個(gè)人時(shí)，出現(xiàn)這些不公正的制裁的情況可能會(huì)上升。破案率下降，表明警方的績(jī)效在不斷惡化。但是，在研究期間內(nèi)，之前相比，更多的肇事者已被逮捕，起訴和懲罰，這

12、又表明，績(jī)效水平改進(jìn)了。Wiebrens和Essers （ 1999 ）表明，在荷蘭，犯罪模式走向了廢止（國(guó)際公認(rèn)的）指標(biāo)。例如，犯罪已經(jīng)越來(lái)越暴力，但是指標(biāo)卻沒(méi)有區(qū)分像重罪和輕罪這類的差別。此外，更多的犯罪團(tuán)伙由于一起犯罪被逮捕，比如破壞，這降低了刑事罪行的平均數(shù)目。Wiebrens和Essers得出結(jié)論，這不是警方的效果不好，而是指標(biāo)不好。因此它應(yīng)該被取代。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)績(jī)效悖論的例子存在于關(guān)于

13、超過(guò)代表性的事件中，它來(lái)自smith（1995）。在英國(guó)國(guó)民健康服務(wù)中心，與會(huì)者一致認(rèn)為，患者為做手術(shù)而等待的時(shí)間不得超過(guò)2年。這些項(xiàng)措施似乎取得成功，因?yàn)檩喓虻钠骄鶗r(shí)間減少了。然而，進(jìn)一步檢查發(fā)現(xiàn)，減少是因?yàn)榈却龝r(shí)間只有在第一次醫(yī)院協(xié)商之后才開始計(jì)算，而協(xié)商被推遲，以減少等待時(shí)間。事實(shí)上，等待時(shí)間并沒(méi)有減少，只是轉(zhuǎn)移了而已。該指標(biāo)沒(méi)有準(zhǔn)確地反映業(yè)績(jī)；它報(bào)告了一個(gè)本不存在的改善。</p><p>　　四、公共部門

14、中績(jī)效悖論的發(fā)現(xiàn)和預(yù)防</p><p>　　盡管大多數(shù)的讀者都承認(rèn)迄今為止我們已經(jīng)給的例子，但是在績(jī)效中跟蹤績(jī)效悖論仍然不容易。它不僅可以采取許多不同的形式，也可以無(wú)意間導(dǎo)致一些變數(shù)，如政府的要求，需要執(zhí)行的任務(wù)的要求，含糊不清或相互矛盾性質(zhì)的政策目標(biāo)，以及執(zhí)行機(jī)構(gòu)的能力。此外，一個(gè)人往往不知道績(jī)效悖論的存在，直到為時(shí)已晚。因?yàn)椋灰磺许樌?，或看似順利，沒(méi)有必要進(jìn)行干預(yù)（cf. Leeuw, 1995）。一個(gè)爆

15、竹廠爆炸的例子中發(fā)現(xiàn)，調(diào)查原因，這場(chǎng)災(zāi)難揭示了一系列“小”的問(wèn)題，這些問(wèn)題本身并不被視為是災(zāi)難性的。例如，這個(gè)事件中明顯缺乏地方和中央政府，監(jiān)察局，消防部門的監(jiān)督。缺乏適當(dāng)?shù)谋O(jiān)督，就會(huì)阻止對(duì)非法活動(dòng)發(fā)生的發(fā)現(xiàn)。因此，在住宅區(qū)經(jīng)營(yíng)的授權(quán)被不公正地?zé)o條件延長(zhǎng)了。當(dāng)火災(zāi)在工廠的地面上發(fā)生時(shí)，社區(qū)被摧毀，人喪生。小問(wèn)題的積累變成了大問(wèn)題，但顯然沒(méi)有任何機(jī)制或制度，以檢測(cè)和避免這樣的小錯(cuò)誤的積累。當(dāng)然，當(dāng)?shù)卣捅蛔肪控?zé)任，但只能是事后。這留給我們

16、一個(gè)問(wèn)題，即我們?cè)鯓硬拍軝z測(cè)和預(yù)防公共部門中績(jī)效悖論的發(fā)生。</p><p>　　一些策略用來(lái)跟蹤績(jī)效悖論是可行的。理想的情況下，比較實(shí)際的執(zhí)行情況和報(bào)告，是最好的方式。然而，這種比較一般很難，因?yàn)槿狈Ρ容^資料。替代方法是：（1）使用外部來(lái)源獲得的信息，如國(guó)家監(jiān)察員，基層組織，和客戶端小組的工作；（2）從現(xiàn)有的指標(biāo)制定新的業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)，例如，一個(gè)百分比評(píng)分替代總支出或總產(chǎn)出；或（3）分析的考核體系。</p>

17、;<p>　　績(jī)效考核體系的分析將不得不把重點(diǎn)放到一些特征上。首先，指標(biāo)的數(shù)量是重要的，所有需要執(zhí)行的任務(wù)都要求制定相應(yīng)的指標(biāo)。由于很少為總績(jī)效的有限部分制定相應(yīng)指標(biāo)，這便促進(jìn)了績(jī)效悖論的發(fā)生。當(dāng)指標(biāo)過(guò)時(shí)卻仍不改變時(shí)，這種效果就會(huì)加強(qiáng)。接下來(lái)，應(yīng)注意指標(biāo)的制定者。制定自己績(jī)效指標(biāo)的組織有更多的機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)操縱信息以實(shí)現(xiàn)自己的利益，從而引起了績(jī)效悖論（凡泰爾，2001年）。第三，它需要建立問(wèn)責(zé)制以確定是否所有的要求都得到了滿足。如

18、果沒(méi)有，就需要知道代理人沒(méi)報(bào)告的業(yè)績(jī)及其原因?？?jī)效報(bào)告中的差距可以指向高于或低于績(jī)效方面的表現(xiàn)然后指出績(jī)效方面的矛盾。最后，應(yīng)該對(duì)行政和組織基礎(chǔ)的考核體系進(jìn)行調(diào)查。</p><p>　　公共部門績(jī)效評(píng)估不得不將公共服務(wù)的性質(zhì)用記事的方式來(lái)表現(xiàn)。專業(yè)服務(wù)的方式被生產(chǎn)和消費(fèi)，并且公共服務(wù)的方式被具有影響績(jī)效檢測(cè)的社會(huì)所重視。在公共部門，消費(fèi)者參與服務(wù)提供過(guò)程；影響產(chǎn)出和結(jié)果（cf. Fountain, 2001, p

19、.58）。此外，大部分產(chǎn)品是無(wú)形的。因此，績(jī)效指標(biāo)應(yīng)力求反映質(zhì)量和可靠性，而不是“硬性”的產(chǎn)品屬性。公共服務(wù)不僅有關(guān)效率和效益，更是關(guān)于正義，公平，平等和問(wèn)責(zé)制。Fountain （2001）警告說(shuō)，私人部門技術(shù)的應(yīng)用，如績(jī)效指標(biāo)，不能取代，甚至可能掩蓋如公共服務(wù)所提供的政治或民主成果。</p><p>　　McGuire（2001）探討了一個(gè)績(jī)效監(jiān)測(cè)框架的例子，似乎考慮到了之前討論過(guò)的一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)。這個(gè)框架是由生產(chǎn)

20、力委員會(huì)為澳大利亞政府理事會(huì)制定的，以此為基準(zhǔn)，來(lái)衡量教育、衛(wèi)生、住房和社區(qū)服務(wù)方面的績(jī)效（可以在www.pc.gov.au/gsp上查到）。該框架是澳大利亞所有政府合作制定的，它詳細(xì)討論了績(jī)效指標(biāo)的局限性，以及人類服務(wù)提供的復(fù)雜性。它包括程序和業(yè)務(wù)指標(biāo)，衡量效率（輸出）和有效性（成果）以及一些不同的層面。定量措施與服務(wù)系統(tǒng)的內(nèi)容分析相結(jié)合。</p><p>　　這個(gè)COAG績(jī)效信息被政府機(jī)構(gòu)用來(lái)評(píng)估業(yè)績(jī)，并確定

21、需求和資源。該框架的透明度，改善了業(yè)績(jī)和問(wèn)責(zé)制。然而，這透明度“增加，而不是解決了公共服務(wù)分配結(jié)果方面的政治沖突”（ McGuire, 2001, p. 17）。因?yàn)檎螞_突增加了問(wèn)責(zé)制的機(jī)會(huì)，而這不應(yīng)視為績(jī)效評(píng)估的一種消極后果。</p><p><b>　　五、結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　隨著上世紀(jì)八十年代和九十年代行政改革的進(jìn)行，公共部門中績(jī)效評(píng)估的增加已經(jīng)

22、產(chǎn)生了幾個(gè)意想不到的后果，且威脅到了看不到的績(jī)效和績(jī)效本身。為了對(duì)付這些后果，績(jī)效評(píng)估體系應(yīng)該將公共部門的特殊性質(zhì)考慮進(jìn)去。有爭(zhēng)議性的績(jī)效指標(biāo)需要使用多個(gè)指標(biāo)，即政策執(zhí)行的不同方面（有形和無(wú)形的）和反映各方（政治家，管理人員，供資者，供應(yīng)商，采購(gòu)商和消費(fèi)者）的利益。此外，必須在太多和沒(méi)有足夠措施的壓力兩者之間尋求平衡點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　一些新的監(jiān)督機(jī)制的增加，可能有助于打擊意想不到的后果，如績(jī)效悖論（cf.

23、 also Power, 1997）。例如，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)使得公共部門績(jī)效信息可為每個(gè)人所知，這增加了作弊的代理人被抓的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。第二，公民憲章，開放的政府行為守則的實(shí)踐和新的申訴程序，增加了不滿意的客戶投訴處理表現(xiàn)不好的組織的機(jī)會(huì)。這些新的，更加橫向化的績(jī)效評(píng)估將補(bǔ)充公共部門中的績(jī)效評(píng)估體系。最后，學(xué)者應(yīng)該制定和測(cè)試能夠解釋績(jī)效悖論發(fā)生和其他不良后果的理論（Scott, 2001）。更多關(guān)于組織行為的理論、機(jī)構(gòu)和公共部門使用績(jī)效指標(biāo)的影響等方面的

24、知識(shí)，可以幫助政府真正實(shí)現(xiàn)績(jī)效指標(biāo)在公共領(lǐng)域的預(yù)期優(yōu)點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　THE PERFORMANCE PARADOX IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Nowadays, states spend more attention, time, and money on performan

25、ce measurement and evaluation in the public sector than ever before (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, p. 87; Power, 1997). Results-based management i

26、s the talk of the day at all levels of the public sector: local, regional, national, and even supra national. Schools and universities, local governments, other administrative agencies, developmental aid organizations<

27、;/p><p>　　Below, we will argue that this increase of output measurement in the public sector can lead to several unintended consequences that may not only invalidate conclusions on public sector performance but

28、 can also negatively influence that performance .We will show that a number of characteristics of the public sector can be counterproductive to developing and using performance indicators, illustrated by different exampl

29、es. Finally, we will conclude with some suggestions on how to deal with the prob</p><p>　　Performance Assessment in the Public Sector</p><p>　　The increased attention to performance assessment i

30、n the public sector coincides with the rise of administrative reform (cf. Power, 2000). In the 1980s, economic decline and increased international competition triggered such reform in most western states. New Public Mana

31、gement was the catchword (Hood, 1994). The objective was twofold: to cut budgets and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government bureaucracy. To achieve the latter objective, market-type mechanisms such as

32、privatiza</p><p>　　The practitioner theory underlying these changes is that politicians should stick to their core business that is, developing new policies to realize (political) goals. Osborne and Gaebler&

33、#39;s (1992) adage was "steering not rowing." According to these NPM gurus, policy implementation should be left to the market or, if that is not possible, to (semi)-autonomous organizations operating in a quas

34、i-market environment (e.g., competition between schools or hospitals).This separation of policy and admini</p><p>　　The aforementioned changes in the public sector led to the adoption of a large number of pr

35、ivate sector techniques to measure and improve performance, such as performance indicators. Not only do indicators enable politicians to measure and evaluate the performance of public and private policy-implementing orga

36、nizations, they also increase the opportunities to account for performance—another important goal of administrative reform (Jenkins, Leeuw, & Van Thiel, in press). Obviously, all these chan</p><p>　　The

37、Performance Paradox</p><p>　　The performance paradox refers to a weak correlation between performance indicators and performance itself (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer & O'Shaughnessy, 1993). This ph

38、enomenon is caused by the tendency of performance indicators to run down over time. They lose their value as measurements of performance and can no longer discriminate between good and bad performers. As a result, the re

39、lationship between actual and reported performance declines.</p><p>　　Deterioration of performance indicators is caused by four processes (Meyer & Gupta, 1994, pp. 330-342). The first process is called p

40、ositive learning; that is, as performance improves, indicators lose their sensitivity in detecting bad performance. In fact, everybody has become so good at what they do that the indicator becomes obsolete. The second pr

41、ocess is called perverse learning. When organizations or individuals have learned which aspects of performance are measured (and which are not), th</p><p>　　It is important to understand that the paradox is

42、not about performance itself but about the reports on performance. Contrary to the expectation, indicators do not give an accurate report of performance. This could mean that performance is worse than reported (overrepre

43、sentation) but also that it is better than reported (under-representation). In the latter case, the performance paradox might be considered harm-less. However, when the results of performance assessment are used to evalu

44、ate organi</p><p>　　The percentage of crimes solved is decreasing, indicating that the police's performance is deteriorating. However, during the time period studied, more perpetrators have been arrested

45、, prosecuted, and penalized than before, which would indicate an improvement of performance. Wiebrens and Essers (1999) show that crime patterns in the Netherlands have developed in a way that invalidates the (internatio

46、nally well-established) indicator. For one, crime has become more violent, but the indicator does</p><p>　　An example of a performance paradox in a case of over representation is taken from Smith (1995). In

47、the British National Health Service, it was agreed that patients should be on a waiting list for an operation no longer than 2 years. This measure appeared successful, as the average waiting time decreased. However, on f

48、urther inspection it was found that because the waiting time only began to be counted after the first hospital consultation, consultation was postponed to decrease the waiting time</p><p>　　Detection and Pre

49、vention of a Performance Paradox</p><p>　　Although most readers will have recognized the examples we have given so far, it is not easy to trace a performance paradox in progress. Not only can it take on many

50、 different forms, it can also be the unintended result of a number of variables, such as government demands, the type of task to be carried out, the vagueness or contradictory nature of policy objectives, and the capabil

51、ities of the policy-implementing organization. Moreover, one is often not aware of the existence of a performance p</p><p>　　Several strategies are available to try to trace a performance paradox. Ideally, a

52、 comparison of reported and actual performance is the best way. However, such a comparison is generally very difficult to make because of the lack of comparative information. Alternative methods are (a) to use external s

53、ources to obtain information such as the national ombudsman, grassroots organizations, and client panels; (b) to develop new performance indicators from the existing indicators, for example, a perce</p><p>　

54、　An analysis of the performance assessment system would have to focus on a number of characteristics. First, the number of indicators is important, as well as whether indicators have been developed for all tasks that hav

55、e to be carried out. Few indicators for a limited part of total performance facilitate the occurrence of a performance paradox. This effect is reinforced when indicators do not change overtime. Next, attention should be

56、paid to the question of who develops the indicators. Organiza</p><p>　　Performance assessment in the public sector has to take the nature of public services into account (McGuire, 2001). The way professional

57、 services are produced and consumed (delivered) and the way public services are valued by the community have implications for performance monitoring (McGuire, 2001, p.8). In the public sector, consumers participate in th

58、e service delivery process; affecting output and outcome (cf. Fountain, 2001, p.58). Moreover, most products are intangible. Performance indicat</p><p>　　McGuire (2001) discusses an example of a performance-

59、monitoring framework that seems to take into account some of the lessons discussed before. This framework was developed for the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) by the Productivity Commission to benchmark the per

60、formance in the education, health, housing, and community services (available on the Internet at www.pc.gov.au/gsp).The framework is developed in cooperation with all governments in Australia. It discusses the limitation

61、s of pe</p><p>　　The COAG performance information is used by government agencies to assess performance and determine needs and resources. The framework improves the transparency of performance and accountabi

62、lity. However, this transparency also "increases rather than resolves political conflict over the distributional consequences of providing public services" (McGuire, 2001, p. 17). Because political conflict inc

63、reases the opportunities for accountability, it should not necessarily be considered to be a negativ</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　The increase in performance assessment in the public sector foll

64、owing the administrative reforms of the 1980s and 1990s has had several unintended consequences, threatening in sight into performance and performance itself. To counteract these consequences, performance assessment syst

65、ems should take the special characteristics of the public sector into account. The contested nature of performance indicators requires the use of multiple indicators, referring to different aspects of policy implemen<

66、/p><p>　　The rise of a number of new monitoring mechanisms could prove helpful in the fight against unintended consequences like the performance paradox (cf. also Power, 1997). For instance, the Internet makes

67、information on public sector performance accessible for everybody, increasing the risk for cheating executive agents to get caught. Second, Citizen Charters, the open government code of practice and new complaint procedu