股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與股利政策來自馬來西亞的實(shí)證研究【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯OwnershipStructureDividendPolicy:EvidencefromMalaysianCompaniesMaterialSource:InternationalReviewofBusinessResearchPapersVol.6Auth:NathasaMazna1.0IntroductionRecentstudiessuchasClaessensetal.(2000)Faccioetal.(2001)La

2、Ptaetal.(1999)observethatmanypubliclistedcompanieslocatedoutsidetheUSUKhavehighconcentrationofownershipwithasinglelargeshareholdershareholdergrouppredominantlycontrollingcompanies.Theevidenceoflargeshareholdersindevelope

3、dcountriesbesideUSUKEuropeancountriesEastAsiancountriesareagainsttheconceptoftheseparationofownershipfromcontrolviewedbyBerleMeans(1932).Theeffectivecontrolofthelargeshareholdersenablesthemtoinfluencethedecisionsregardin

4、ghowcompaniesarerunalsodecisionsoncpatepolicies.HoweverasstatedbyHolderness(2003)theroleoflargeshareholdersisnotwelldevelopedintheownershipliteratureespeciallytheroleofthelargestshareholder.Thelargestshareholderisaunique

5、groupofshareholderastheirholdingcanbeassociatedwithbenefitscostsespeciallytheunderinvestmentcosts(Claessensetal.2002TruongHeaney2007).Dividendpolicyisoneofcompanies’decisionsthatarefoundtobeinfluencebycpateownershipstruc

6、ture.Dividendscanbeusedtomitigateagencyproblemsinacompany(Easterbrook1984Jensen1986Rozeff1982)thussubstitutelargeownershipasmonitingtools.Ontheotherhlargeshareholderscouldusetheirpowertoexpropriatecpateresourcesftheirown

7、privateconsumption.Thiscouldlimitthedividendpaymentsofcompaniesthatareassociatedwithsevereagencyconflicts(Faccioetal.2001).Inviewofthisargumentitisessentialtoexaminetheassociationbetweenlargeshareholdersespeciallythelarg

8、estshareholderdividendpolicytogainbetterunderstingoncpatedividenddecisions.ThemainfocusofthisstudyistoinvestigatetheeffectofthelargestshareholderonthecpatedividendpolicybyexaminingMalaysianlistedcompaniesfrom2002to2006.M

9、alaysiaprovidesaninterestingbackgroundtoDividendsalsoplayasignificantroleincontrollingpossibleagencyconflictsbetweenlargeshareholdersminityshareholders.Bypayingdividendsaproratadistributioncanbeguaranteedtoallshareholder

10、slimitcpatewealthfromlargeshareholders’controlDividendscanalsobeutilisedbycontrollingshareholderstooffsettheminityshareholders’concerninanenvironmentwhereexpropriationbycontrollingshareholdersprevails(Faccioetal.2001).Ho

11、weverinthepresenceoflargeshareholderslowerdividendpaymentscanbeobservedasdividendsarenotneededtofunctionasanalternativeagencycontroldevice(Goergenetal.2005).Dividendsareviewedasasubstitutemechanismtolargeshareholderowner

12、shipinmitigatingagencyconflicts.Severalstudieshaveexaminedtherelationshipbetweenthelargestshareholderdividendpolicy.AnegativerelationshipbetweenthelargestshareholderdividendsareobservedbyGuglerYurtoglu(2003)MauryPajuste(

13、2002)MancinelliOzkan(2006)RenneboogSzilagyi(2006)RenneboogTrojanowski(2007)fcompaniesfromGermanyFinlItalyherlUKrespectively.WhileapositiveassociationbetweenthelargestshareholderdividendpayoutsisobservedbyTruongHeaney(200

14、7)basedonthesampledrawnfrom37countries.Recentstudieshasanalysetheeffectofotherlargeshareholdersbesidethelargestshareholderoncompaniesbasedfromagencyperspectives.Otherlargeshareholderscouldmonitthecontrollingshareholder(B

15、oltonvonThadden1998PaganoRoell1998).Themonitingroleplaybytheotherlargeshareholdersthuscouldlimittheexpropriationofminityshareholders’resources.Howeverotherlargeshareholdersmaycolludewiththecontrollingshareholderinexpropr

16、iatingcpateresourcessharetheprivatebenefits(Faccioetal.2001PaganoRoell1998).Empiricalevidenceontheimpactofotherlargeshareholdersondividendpolicyhasbeenlimited.Faccioetal.(2001)findthatthepresenceofmultiplelargeshareholde

17、rsinEuropeminimizestheexpropriationactivityofthecontrollingshareholderthusresultinginhigherdividendpaymentswhileinAsialowerdividendratesarebeingobserved.Theyconcludethatthecontrollingshareholdercollabatewithotherlargesha

18、reholderstoexpropriatetheminityshareholdersinAsia.Severalsinglecountrystudiesthatanalysetheeffectofotherlargeshareholdersparticularlythesecondlargestshareholderondividendpolicyyieldmixedresults.FFinlMauryPajuste(2002)sho