內(nèi)部資金分配和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以韓國(guó)企業(yè)集團(tuán)為例【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯原文InternalFundsAllocationtheOwnershipStructure:EvidencefromKeanBusinessGroupsMaterialSource:ReviewofQuantitativeFinanceAccountingAuth:ByungmoKimKooyulJungAbstract.Weexaminetherelationshipbetweenthecontrollingsharehol

2、der’scashflowrightsthefundstransferintheinternalcapitalmarketwithinKeanbusinessgroups(chaebols)duringtheperiodfrom1998to2001.Wefindthatthefundsallocationinthefirmswherecontrollingshareholdershavehighcashflowrightsisbette

3、ralignedwiththeinvestmentopptunitiestherefemeefficientthaninthefirmswheretheyhavelowcashflowrights.Thiseffectisstrongerwhentheyhavecontrollingpowerslargeenoughtoexpropriateminityshareholders.Howeverduringthefinancialcris

4、isperiodfundssimplymovetowardthefirmswherecontrollingshareholdershavehighcashflowrights.Theresultsevidencethetunnelingbehaviintheinternalcapitalmarketwithinachaebolthattheownershipstructuredisttstheallocationofinternalfu

5、ndsinsuchawayastobenefitthecontrollingshareholders.IntroductionRecentlymanystudiesexaminedfundsallocationintheinternalcapitalmarketinthediversifiedcompaniesinrelationtothediversificationdiscount.Howeverfewstudiesexaminet

6、hecapitalallocationbehaviwithintheinternalcapitalmarket.AsevidenceoftheinefficientallocationbehaviintheinternalcapitalmarketRajanServaesZingales(hereafterRSZ)(2000)suggestthatinternalpowerstrugglesbetweensegmentmanagersd

7、istttheallocationofresourceswhendiversityinresourcesopptunitiesarehigh.SfsteinStein(2000)arguethatdivisionalrentseekingbehavibysegmentmanagerscausesinefficientfundsallocationindiversifiedfirms.Theycallthefactthatweakerdi

8、visionsgetKeanbusinessgroupchaebolprovidesanappropriateexperimentalsettingtoexaminethetunnelinghypothesis.AccdingtoBaeKangKim(2002)thechaebol’sownershipstructureisacterizedasapyraalcrossownershipstructureinwhichacontrolo

9、fafirmspossiblewithmuchlessthanthemajityholdings.Theuniqueownershipstructureallowsthecontrollingshareholderstoeffectivelycontrolthewholememberfirmsinachaebolwithverysmallownershipholdings.Inadditionmarketmonitingmechanis

10、mshavenotbeeneffectiveinreducingtheagencyproblemsbetweenownermanagersminityshareholdersinKea.Henceminityshareholdersarenotabletoprotecttheirbenefitsagainstthehugecombinedcontrolpowersofthecontrollingshareholderothermembe

11、rfirms.KeaDevelopmentInstitute(KDI2003)reptsthatthecontrollingshareholdershaveanextensiveinfluenceevenontheindividualmemberfirms’investmentstrategiespersonnelmanagementaswellasonthegroupleveladjustmentfthebusinessstrateg

12、iesamongmemberfirms.Thisindicatesthattheinvestmentdecisionofachaebolfirmisdeterminedatthegrouplevelnotindividualfirmlevelthatitiscontrolledbythecontrollingshareholder.Thatistheinternalcapitalmarketisexposedtothecontrolli

13、ngshareholders’tunnelingincentivescreatedbytheuniqueownershipstructureofachaebol.Thecontrollingshareholderswouldliketoallocateinternalfundstomaximizetheirtotalprofitsfrominvestmentsinthegroupmemberfirms.Fprofitmaximizati

14、ontheyseetoitthatfundsallocationtothefirmswheretheyhavehighcashflowrightsisefficientsothatallgoodinvestmentopptunitiesarefullyfinancedwithoutfinancingconstraints.Thiswillresultintheinvestmentsbeingbetteralignedwiththeinv

15、estmentopptunitiesinthefirmswheretheyhavehighcashflowrightsthanthoseinthefirmswheretheyhavelowcashflowrights.Thentheywillhavemebenefitsftheinvestmentsinthefirmswheretheyhavehighcashflowrightsattheexpenseofefficientalloca

16、tioninthefirmswheretheyhavelowcashflowrights.Otherwiseiftheyfocusontheefficientfundsallocationonthewholememberfirmstheirtotalbenefitscoulddecreaseeventhoughthetotalprofitsofthegroupmayincrease.Asaconsequenceofsuchallocat

17、ionbehavifundsallocationinthefirmswheretheyhavelowcashflowrightstendstobeinefficientreducesthepotentialwealthoftheminityshareholdersofthefirmresultinginthetunnelingbehaviintheinternalcapitalmarket.Thenweexaminethetunneli