防策略性社會選擇機制設計的探討.pdf

1、西南交通大學碩士學位論文防策略性社會選擇機制設計的探討姓名：張鄰申請學位級別：碩士專業(yè)：應用數(shù)學指導教師：宋振明20050301西南交通大學碩士研究生學位論文第l|頁Abstract‘【heGlbbard—SatterthwaiteTheoremstatesthatwhentheretSnestrictiononadmissiblepreferences，onlydictatorialrulessatisfystrategyproofn

2、essTheunrestricteddomainassumption，however，doesnotholdinmosteconomicenvironmentsofinterestThemainobjectiveofthisthesisistOinvestigatethepossibilityofdesigningstrategyproofrulesinsuchrestrictedenvironmentsThethesismainlyc

3、onsistsofthefollowing：1Westudy2agentexchangeeconomiesWeintroducegeneralpropertyIofpreferencedomainsandshowthatgivenanydomainsatisfyingpropertyIdictatorialrulesaretheonlyefficientandstrategy—proofrules2Wefocusonn—agentexc

4、hangeeconomiesWeshowthatdictatorialaretheonlyrulessatisfyingefficiency，continuity，andstrategy—proofness，whenthedomainsatisfiespropertyBWeproofthateveryefficientandcontinuousruleis“diagonallydictatorial一，andproofthatarule

5、isefficient，continuousmadstrategy—proofifandonlyifitisdictatorial，whenthedomainsarisfypropertyB3Weconsidertheproblemofchoosingasubsetofasetofindivisibleobjects(publicprojects，laws，etc)Whenpreferencesare“separable”，wechar

6、acterizestrategyproof‘votingrules”satisfyingseveralcombinationsofthefollowingaxioms：null—independence，efficiency，votersovereignty，anonymity，andneutralityWeconcludethatavotingrulesatisfiesstrategy—proofness，null—independe

7、nceandefficiencyifandonlyifitisdictatorial，andconcludethatavotingrulesatisfiesstrategy—proofness，null—independenceandweakefficiencyifandonlyifitisdictatorialruleinClassm’whenthedomainsatisfiespropertyPandsatisfiespropert