公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和董事會(huì)有效性外文翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p><b>　　中文1567字</b></p><p>　　Corporate governance and board effectiveness（節(jié)選）</p><p>　　Author：Kose John, Lemma W. Senbet</p><p>　　Nationality：The U.S.</p>&

2、lt;p>　　Derivation: Journal of Banking and Finance 22(1998)371-403</p><p>　　(P374-376) Agency problems and corporate governance</p><p>　　We view corporate governance in the context of control

3、mechanisms designed for efficient operation of a corporation on behalf of its stakeholders. The control mechanisms themselves are necessitated by separation of ownership and control that is endemic to a market economy. T

4、hus, corporate governance is a means by which various stakeholders exert control over a corporation by exercising certain rights as established in the existing legal and regulatory frameworks as well as corporate bylaws.

5、</p><p>　　To appreciate the role of corporate governance, let us begin by thinking about an idealized market system which supports the familiar framework of the Fisherian Separation Principle. Consider an ec

6、onomy with two classes of agents-consumers and producers.On the consumption side, consumer-investors make their decisions to maximize their utility through an appropriate allocation of their consumption over time and acr

7、oss commodities. On the production or real sector side, firms make investment decis</p><p>　　Thus, the key to a well-functioning economy is the existence of well-functioning markets which play a vital role i

8、n allocating resources efficiently, whereby resources are channeled to most productive uses. Unfortunately, the real economy is not as idealized as the Fisherian form. It is characterized by imperfect information, agency

9、 conflicts, and a host of market imperfections, such as transactions costs, taxes, and regulatory and institutional impediments to the arbitrage process in capital ma</p><p>　　The pay-off structure of the cl

10、aims of different classes of stakeholders is different. The degrees of alignment of interests with those of the agents in the firm who control the major decisions in the firm are also different. This gives rise to potent

11、ial conflicts among the stakeholders, and these incentive conflicts have now come to be known as`` agency (principal-agent) problems''. Left alone, each class of stakeholders pursues its own interest which may be

12、 at the expense of other stakeholders</p><p>　　See Berea et al.(1985)for more detailed classification and discussion of private agency problems, and John and Senbet (1996)for social agency problems.Agency pr

13、oblems detract from efficient operation of an enterprise. Departures from efficient investment strategies are detrimental to economic growth and development. Thus, the economic and financial environment, that fosters eff

14、icient corporate governance and efficient contracting among parties with diverse interests, promotes efficient allocatio</p><p>　　It may be useful to outline two classes of agency problems before we go into

15、a fullfledged discussion of corporate governance. First, managerialism refers to self-serving behavior by managers. Ownership of the modern corporation, particularly in the US, is widely diffused, with most large corpora

16、tions being owned by a large number of shareholders. But, under separation of ownership and control, the actual operations of the firm are conducted by managers who typically lack major stock ownership p</p><p

17、>　　公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和董事會(huì)有效性（節(jié)選）</p><p>　　作者：Kose John, Lemma W. Senbet</p><p>　　國(guó)籍：The U.S.</p><p>　　原文出處: Journal of Banking and Finance 22(1998)371-403</p><p>　?。≒374-376）代理問(wèn)

18、題和公司治理</p><p>　　筆者認(rèn)為在控制論背景下的公司治理是為代表股東的一種公司的有效運(yùn)營(yíng)而設(shè)計(jì)的。這種控制機(jī)制本身是因所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離而產(chǎn)生，同時(shí)是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)所特有的。因此，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是一種手段，它在現(xiàn)有的法律和管理框架下，各利益相關(guān)者以及公司法規(guī)制定者通過(guò)行使某些已在現(xiàn)有的法律和規(guī)章制度下制定了的權(quán)利，從而對(duì)公司實(shí)施控制。</p><p>　　為了理解公司治理的角色，我們首

19、先來(lái)思考這樣一種理想化的市場(chǎng)體系，它支持我們所熟悉的費(fèi)舍爾分離理論，并且考慮包含代理商-消費(fèi)者和生產(chǎn)商的經(jīng)濟(jì)。在消費(fèi)偏好方面，消費(fèi)投資者通過(guò)采用合適的分配方法來(lái)做決定自我消費(fèi)的時(shí)間和商品，從而使得效用最大化。在生產(chǎn)和實(shí)務(wù)角度，企業(yè)根據(jù)個(gè)人的消費(fèi)偏好做出投資決定。如果這是缺乏機(jī)會(huì)的借貸資本市場(chǎng)，經(jīng)理(區(qū)別于所有者)將不得不推斷出各自的投資者多樣化的消費(fèi)偏好。因此，達(dá)到關(guān)于投資和生產(chǎn)的一致同意的決策標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是不可能的。另一方面對(duì)于運(yùn)作良好的的資

20、本市場(chǎng)來(lái)說(shuō)，經(jīng)理可以被委派做出投資和生產(chǎn)決定以便使公司所有者的利益(或公司價(jià)值) 最大化。資本市場(chǎng)價(jià)格成為生產(chǎn)決策的明顯信號(hào)，而消費(fèi)和生產(chǎn)決定則完全地分開(kāi)的。費(fèi)舍爾分離原則是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的基礎(chǔ),它是所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離，它也可以顯示出,在這些理想化的條件下,財(cái)富(價(jià)值)最大化就相當(dāng)于社會(huì)福利最大化。</p><p>　　因此，經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行良好的關(guān)鍵在于良好運(yùn)行的市場(chǎng)的存在，它能在資源有效配置上起到了非常重要的作用，從而藉

21、此資源將會(huì)被安排到最有生產(chǎn)力的用途。不幸的是,真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)不是像費(fèi)舍爾模式這般理想化，它的特點(diǎn)是信息不對(duì)稱、代理沖突,以及許多市場(chǎng)的不完善,如交易成本、稅收,以及在資本市場(chǎng)套利過(guò)程中監(jiān)督管理和制度上的障礙。我們從機(jī)構(gòu)的角度討論了公司治理的基本原則以及董事會(huì)有效性。事實(shí)上，公司可以看做是一張網(wǎng)或是一個(gè)契約網(wǎng)絡(luò)（Jensen and Meckling, 1976），連結(jié)著各種內(nèi)在或外在的利益相關(guān)者，例如股東、債券持有人、雇員和社會(huì)大眾。這就是

22、現(xiàn)在在金融界被人們廣泛接受的觀點(diǎn) 。</p><p>　　不同利益相關(guān)者對(duì)應(yīng)的索賠權(quán)都是不同的，而控制公司主要決策權(quán)和公司有相同利益程度的代理商也是不同的。而這引發(fā)出潛在的利益相關(guān)者之間的矛盾沖突,這些激勵(lì)現(xiàn)在來(lái)成為眾所周知的“代理問(wèn)題”(委托代理)。此外更不用說(shuō),各個(gè)階層的利益相關(guān)者通過(guò)追求自身的利益都可能會(huì)以犧牲其他的利益相關(guān)者的利益為代價(jià)。我們?cè)谔囟ǖ漠?dāng)事人之間的矛盾沖突的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)于代理問(wèn)題加以分類，例如

23、公司股東(負(fù)責(zé)人)和管理(代理人)，管理代理或管理主義之間(代理人),和公司債券存根簿上載明股東之間(負(fù)債代理),私人部門(mén)(代理人)和公共部門(mén)(機(jī)構(gòu)),甚至社會(huì)的代理商之間公共部門(mén)(例如,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu))和其他社會(huì)機(jī)構(gòu)或納稅人(政治代理)。</p><p>　　對(duì)私人代理問(wèn)題的更加詳細(xì)的分類和討論等參見(jiàn)Barnea (1985)和約翰和Senbet (1996)為社會(huì)代理問(wèn)題。代理問(wèn)題對(duì)企業(yè)的高效運(yùn)行有害，其有效的投資

24、策略將不利于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和發(fā)展。因此，良好的經(jīng)濟(jì)和財(cái)政環(huán)境，有助于構(gòu)建合理的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和高效的多方利益的契約平衡，促進(jìn)不同利益相關(guān)者的和諧，促進(jìn)資源的有效配置,因此最終使經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，我們的重心在于私人企業(yè)的公司治理。</p><p>　　在我們對(duì)公司治理進(jìn)行深入討論之前，概述兩類代理問(wèn)題是有用的。首先,管理主義指的是被管理者自私支配的行為?，F(xiàn)代公司的所有權(quán)的,尤其是在美國(guó),它被廣泛的稀釋，大多數(shù)大公司都擁有大量的股東

25、。但是，由于所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離，實(shí)際操作企業(yè)的專業(yè)經(jīng)理人通常處于缺乏股權(quán)的位置，出現(xiàn)在經(jīng)理和所有者之間的潛在的沖突體現(xiàn)以下幾方面。股東的管理沖突導(dǎo)致管理傾向?yàn)椋?a) 以資本貢獻(xiàn)者或所有者為代價(jià)，采用“帝國(guó)大廈'的形式擴(kuò)展控制范圍；(b) 過(guò)度的保守的投資的形式,尋求安全的但劣質(zhì)的項(xiàng)目,以維護(hù)安全的工資補(bǔ)償和他們自己的任期。其次，隨著債務(wù)代理的出現(xiàn)，由于債務(wù)合同會(huì)讓代表所有者(股東)工作經(jīng)理通過(guò)偏離價(jià)值最大化的原則，最適度地做