外文翻譯-----中國國有企業(yè)會計(jì)監(jiān)督模式的進(jìn)化和思考

1、<p>　　Evolution and Thinking of the Accounting Supervision Mode of China’s State-owned Enterprises</p><p>　　Guo Yaxiong</p><p>　　School of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Eco

2、nomics, P.R.C, 330013</p><p>　　4. COUNTERMEASURES</p><p>　　4.1. IMPLEMENT MODE COMBINATION MANAGEMENT</p><p>　　Accounting supervision modes of state-owned enterprises are various. F

3、ull implementation of these modes would be a waste of resources, increase the difficulty of accounting management. It’s necessary to targeted select two or more accounting supervision modes to implement accounting superv

4、ision according to operation characteristics of the supervised state-owned enterprises. The author believes that, generally, the internal audit system is a conventional system. If you want to select systems amo</p>

5、<p>　　4.2. Improve the efficiency of accounting supervision.</p><p>　　Asymmetric information theory suggests that private information possessed by agents is unobservable, hidden action is unverifiable

6、, thus the biggest problem brought is the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, it’s not necessary to emphasize the diversified forms of accounting supervision of state-owned enterprises, but necessary to emphasize the actu

7、al results, the efficiency of the accounting supervision, and limit opportunistic behavior of agents. Firstly, the appointment and assignment personne</p><p>　　4.3. Make clear the limits of accounting superv

8、ision</p><p>　　In the case of separation of ownership and management, insider control theory tells us that directors of enterprise in fact or in law control the enterprise, and make use of available informat

9、ion and the facility of management to gain more interests in enterprise management and decision-making. Accounting supervision is to maintain the economic order and prevent insider control to ensure normal economic activ

10、ity of state-owned enterprises. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, t</p><p>　　4.4. Develop incentive and restraint system</p><p>　　According to principal-agent theory, as the

11、 principal need the help and cooperation of agents to accomplish the intended goal, the client will use a series of incentives to motivate agents to work hard to maximize the value of the overall agent, so as to achieve

12、a balanced relationship between principal and agent. Under the circumstance of market economy, incentive and restraint mechanisms of accounting supervision are particularly important and directly related to the efficienc

13、y of the accounti</p><p>　　中國國有企業(yè)會計(jì)監(jiān)督模式的進(jìn)化和思考</p><p><b>　　4 應(yīng)對措施</b></p><p>　　4.1 實(shí)施模式組合管理</p><p>　　國有企業(yè)的會計(jì)監(jiān)管模式是多方面的。全面實(shí)施這些模式將會浪費(fèi)資源,提高會計(jì)管理的難度。針對性的選擇兩個(gè)或兩個(gè)以上的

14、會計(jì)監(jiān)管模式來實(shí)現(xiàn)會計(jì)監(jiān)督根據(jù)運(yùn)行特點(diǎn)監(jiān)督國有企業(yè)是非常必要的。筆者認(rèn)為,一般來說,內(nèi)部審計(jì)系統(tǒng)是一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)的系統(tǒng)。如果你想選擇系統(tǒng)分配的會計(jì)系統(tǒng)中,分配的監(jiān)事會制度和外部董事系統(tǒng),系統(tǒng)數(shù)量的選擇更好的不超過兩個(gè)。與此同時(shí),你就不需要實(shí)現(xiàn)分配會計(jì)師系統(tǒng)和調(diào)度的監(jiān)事會制度在相同的企業(yè),它不太合適,促進(jìn)外部董事系統(tǒng)在較大范圍的。</p><p>　　4.2 提高效率的會計(jì)監(jiān)管。</p><p>

15、　　信息不對稱理論表明,私人信息被察覺到的代理,隱藏的行動是無憑無據(jù),因此帶來的最大問題是投機(jī)行為。因此,不需要強(qiáng)調(diào)國有企業(yè)會計(jì)監(jiān)督的多種形式,但有必要強(qiáng)調(diào)實(shí)際結(jié)果,會計(jì)監(jiān)管的效率,并限制代理的機(jī)會主義行為。首先,任命和分配任務(wù)人員應(yīng)迅速掌握企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)信息如財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績、經(jīng)營成果、現(xiàn)金流量,熟悉企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)和經(jīng)營活動。其次,責(zé)任必須分配到個(gè)人,保障機(jī)制的實(shí)施措施應(yīng)該被建立,某人應(yīng)該分配給追蹤、監(jiān)督、檢測和評價(jià)這一制度的實(shí)施。第三,建立一個(gè)國有

16、企業(yè)的全國的會計(jì)監(jiān)管專家的數(shù)據(jù)庫,加強(qiáng)職業(yè)培訓(xùn),在企業(yè)管理方面建立一個(gè)有高水平和豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)的專業(yè)的團(tuán)隊(duì)。最后,在會計(jì)監(jiān)督模式實(shí)施過程中所獲得的各種各樣的信息應(yīng)該被共享。國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會應(yīng)組織各種交流會議,現(xiàn)場會議和研討會,能吸引更多的任命和作業(yè)人員參加,磋商出現(xiàn)在會計(jì)監(jiān)督和溝通措施中的問題并提出解決方案。</p><p>　　4.3 明確會計(jì)監(jiān)督的權(quán)限</p><p>　　在所有權(quán)和管

17、理權(quán)分離的情況下，內(nèi)部控制理論告訴我們,企業(yè)董事在事實(shí)上或法律控制企業(yè),并利用管理過程中有效的信息和設(shè)施,在企業(yè)的管理和決策中獲得更多的利益。會計(jì)監(jiān)督是維護(hù)經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序,防止內(nèi)部人控制以確保國有企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動正常進(jìn)行。國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會,人事任命和分配應(yīng)該清楚地理解會計(jì)監(jiān)督的性質(zhì)和局限性。會計(jì)監(jiān)督應(yīng)根據(jù)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益,專注于企業(yè)的長遠(yuǎn)利益。監(jiān)管不僅應(yīng)該適當(dāng)?shù)?也應(yīng)該適度進(jìn)行,不應(yīng)該直接干預(yù)或參與日常管理活動。職員可以作為“裁判

18、”,但不應(yīng)該作為“參賽選手”,更不應(yīng)充當(dāng)二者的結(jié)合。</p><p>　　4.4 發(fā)展激勵(lì)和約束制度</p><p>　　根據(jù)委托-代理理論,委托人需要代理人的幫助和合作以完成預(yù)期目標(biāo),委托人將使用一系列的獎勵(lì)措施來激勵(lì)代理人努力使得代理總體價(jià)值最大化,從而平衡委托人和代理人之間的關(guān)系。在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下,企業(yè)激勵(lì)機(jī)制和約束機(jī)制的會計(jì)監(jiān)督是十分重要的，并且和會計(jì)監(jiān)管的效率直接相關(guān)。會計(jì)監(jiān)督的