資本結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)績效【外文翻譯】

1、外文翻譯CapitalStructureFirmPerfmanceMaterialSource:BoardofGovernsoftheFederalReserveSystemAuth:AllenN.BergerAgencycostsrepresentimptantproblemsincpategovernanceinbothfinancialnonfinancialindustries.Theseparationofownershipc

2、ontrolinaprofessionallymanagedfirmmayresultinmanagersexertinginsufficientwkefftindulginginperquisiteschoosinginputsoutputsthatsuittheirownpreferencesotherwisefailingtomaximizefirmvalue.Ineffecttheagencycostsofoutsideowne

3、rshipequalthelostvaluefromprofessionalmanagersmaximizingtheirownutilityratherthanthevalueofthefirm.Theysuggeststhatthechoiceofcapitalstructuremayhelpmitigatetheseagencycosts.Undertheagencycostshypothesishighleveragealowe

4、quityassetratioreducestheagencycostsofoutsideequityincreasesfirmvaluebyconstrainingencouragingmanagerstoactmeintheinterestsofshareholders.SincetheseminalpaperbyJensenMeckling(1976)avastliteratureonsuchagencytheeticexplan

5、ationsofcapitalstructurehasdeveloped(seeHarrisRaviv1991Myers2001freviews).Greaterfinancialleveragemayaffectmanagersreduceagencycoststhroughthethreatofliquidationwhichcausespersonallossestomanagersofsalariesreputationperq

6、uisitesetc.(e.g.GrossmanHart1982Williams1987)throughpressuretogeneratecashflowtopayinterestexpenses(e.g.Jensen1986).Higherleveragecanmitigateconflictsbetweenshareholdersmanagersconcerningthechoiceofinvestment(e.g.Myers19

7、77)theamountofrisktoundertake(e.g.JensenMeckling1976Williams1987)theconditionsunderwhichthefirmisliquidated(e.g.HarrisRaviv1990)dividendpolicy(e.g.Stulz1990).Atestablepredictionofthisclassofmodelsisthatincreasingthelever

8、ageratioshouldresultinloweragencycostsofoutsideequityimprovedfirmperfmanceallelseheldequal.Howeverwhenleveragebecomesrelativelyhighfurtherincreasesgeneratesignificantagencycostsofoutsidedebt–includinghigherexpectedcostso

9、fbankruptcyfinancialdistress–arisingfromconflictsbetweenbondholdersshareholders.1Becauseitisdifficulttodistinguishempiricallyperfmanceonameasureofleveragemayconfoundtheeffectsofcapitalstructureonperfmancewiththeeffectsof

10、perfmanceoncapitalstructure.Weaddressthisproblembyallowingfreversecausalityfromperfmancetocapitalstructure.Wediscussbelowtwohypothesesfwhyfirmperfmancemayaffectthechoiceofcapitalstructuretheefficiencyriskhypothesisthefra

11、nchisevaluehypothesis.Weconstructatwoequationstructuralmodelestimateitusingtwostageleastsquares(2SLS).Anequationspecifyingprofitefficiencyasafunctionofthefirm’sequitycapitalratioothervariablesisusedtotesttheagencycostshy

12、pothesisanequationspecifyingtheequitycapitalratioasafunctionofthefirm’sprofitefficiencyothervariablesisusedtotesttheeffectsoftheefficiencyriskfranchisevaluehypotheses.Bothequationsareeconometricallyidentifiedthroughexclu

13、sionrestrictionsthatareconsistentwiththetheies.Thirdsomebutnotallofthepristudiesdidnottakeownershipstructureintoaccount.Undervirtuallyanytheyofagencycostsownershipstructureisimptantsinceitistheseparationofownershipcontro

14、lthatcreatesagencycosts(e.g.BarneaHaugenSenbet1985).Greaterinsidersharesmayreduceagencycostsalthoughtheeffectmaybereversedatveryhighlevelsofinsiderholdings(e.g.MckShleiferVishny1988).Aswelloutsideblockownershipinstitutio

15、nalholdingstendtomitigateagencycostsbycreatingarelativelyefficientmonitofthemanagers(e.g.ShleiferVishny1986).Exclusionoftheownershipvariablesmaybiasthetestresultsbecausetheownershipvariablesmaybecrelatedwiththedependentv

16、ariableintheagencycostequation(perfmance)withthekeyexogenousvariable(leverage)throughthereversecausalityhypothesesnotedabove.Toaddressthisthirdproblemweincludeownershipstructurevariablesintheagencycostequationexplainingp

17、rofitefficiency.Weincludeinsiderownershipoutsideblockholdingsinstitutionalholdings.Ourapplicationtodatafromthebankingindustryisadvantageousbecauseoftheabundanceofqualitydataavailableonfirmsinthisindustry.Inparticularweha

18、vedetailedfinancialdatafalargenumberoffirmsproducingcomparableproductswithsimilartechnologiesinfmationonmarketpricesotherexogenousconditionsinthelocalmarketsinwhichtheyoperate.Inadditionsomestudiesinthisliteraturefindevi