過度投資的自由現(xiàn)金流量外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3780字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Over-investment of free cash flow</p><p>　　This paper examines firm i

2、nvesting decisions in the presence of free cash flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, prior research has documented a po

3、sitive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relation is a manifestation of an agency problem, where ma

4、nagers in firms with free cash flow en</p><p>　　This paper focuses on utilizing accounting information to better measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment, thereby allowing a more powerful

5、 test of the agency-based explanation for why firm level investment is related to internally generated cash flows. In doing so, this paper is the first to offer large sample evidence of over-investment of free cash flow.

6、 Prior research, such as Blanchard, Lopez-di-Silanes, and Vishny (1994), document excessive investment and acquisition ac</p><p>　　The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the paper uses an acco

7、unting-based framework to measure both free cash flow and over-investment. Free cash flow is defined as cash flow beyond what is necessary to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments. Over-investm

8、ent is defined as investment expenditure beyond that required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments in positive NPV projects. To measure over-investment, I decompose total in</p><

9、p>　　Under the agency cost explanation, management has the potential to squander free cash flow only when free cash flow is positive. At the other end of the spectrum, firms with negative free cash flow can only squand

10、er cash if they are able to raise ‘‘cheap’’ capital. This is less likely to occur because these firms need to be able to raise financing and thereby place themselves under the scrutiny of external markets (DeAngelo, &

11、; Stulz, 2004; Jensen, 1986). Consistent with the agency cost explanati</p><p>　　Finding an association between over-investment and free cash flow is consistent with recent research documenting poor future p

12、erformance following firm level investment activity. For example, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) show that firms with extensive capital investment activity and growth in net operati

13、ng assets respectively, experience inferior future stock returns. Furthermore, Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan(2005) find that cash flows retained within th</p><p>　　The second set of empirical analyses examin

14、e whether governance structures are effective in mitigating over-investment. Prior research has examined the impact of a variety of governance structures on firm valuation and the quality of managerial decision making. C

15、ollectively, the ability of cross-sectional variation in governance structures to explain firm value and/or firm decision making is relatively weak. Consistent with this, I find evidence that out of a large set of govern

16、ance measures onl</p><p>　　The next section develops testable hypotheses concerning the relation between free cash flow and over-investment. Section 2 describes the sample selection and variable measurement.

17、 Section discusses empirical results for the over-investment of free cash flow. Section 4 contains empirical analysis examining the link between corporate governance and the over-investment of free cash flow, while secti

18、on 5 concludes.</p><p>　　1. Free cash flow and over-investment</p><p>　　This section describes in detail the various theories supporting a positive relation between investment expenditure and ca

19、sh flow and then develops measures of free cash flow and over-investment that can be used to test the agency based explanation.</p><p>　　1.1. Explanations for a positive relation between investment expenditu

20、re and cash flow</p><p>　　In a world of perfect capital markets there would be no association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash flows. If a firm needed additional cash to

21、finance an investment activity it would simply raise that cash from external capital markets. If the firm had excess cash beyond that needed to fund available positive NPV projects (including options on future investment

22、) it would distribute free cash flow to external markets. Firms do not, however, operate in such a </p><p>　　The agency cost explanation introduced by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) suggests that monitoring

23、difficulty creates the potential for management to spend internally generated cash flow on projects that are beneficial from a management perspective but costly from a shareholder perspective (the free cash flow hypothes

24、is). Several papers have investigated the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis on firm investment activity. For example, Lamont (1997) and Berger and Hann (2003) find eviden</p><p>　　Collectively, p

25、rior research is suggestive of an agency-based explanation supporting the positive relation between investment and internally generated cash flow. However, these papers are based on relatively small samples and do not me

26、asure over-investment or free cash flow directly. Thus, the findings of earlier work may not be generalizable to larger samples nor is it directly attributable to the agency cost explanation. More generally, a criticism

27、of the literature examining the relation betw</p><p>　　In addition to prior empirical work on agency based explanations for the link between firm level investment and internally generated free cash flow, the

28、re exists a stream of research dedicated to examining the role of financing constraints (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Whited (1992) and Hubbard (1998))

29、. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that information asymmetries increase the cost of capital for firms forced to raise external f</p><p>　　Some early work in this area examined the sensitivity of investment t

30、o cash flow for high versus low dividend paying firms (Fazzari et al., 1988), comparing differing organizational structures where the ability to raise external financing was easier/harder (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein,

31、 1991, with Japanese keiretsu firms) and debt constraints (Whited, 1992). These papers find evidence of greater sensitivity of investment to cash flow for sets of firms which appeared to be financially constrain</p>

32、;<p>　　1.2. Primary hypothesis</p><p>　　As described in the earlier section, in a world of perfect capital markets (no frictions for raising external finance, no information asymmetries and associated

33、 moral hazard problems, no taxes etc.), there should be no association between firm level investment and internally generated cash flows. However, when it is costly for external capital providers to monitor management, a

34、nd it is costly for the firm to raise external finance, an association is expected. Specifically, there should be a posi</p><p>　　This relation, however, could be due to several factors. It could reflect man

35、agement engaging in additional investment on self-serving projects rather than distribute the cash to shareholders. Such decisions can include: (i) empire building (see e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), (ii) perquisite

36、 consumption (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), (iii) diversifying acquisitions (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990), and (iv) subsidizing poorly performing divisions using the cash generated from successful ones</

37、p><p>　　To focus on the agency-based explanation, the next section builds an investment expectation model that captures firm specific growth opportunities and measures of financing constraints. Firms with posit

38、ive residuals from this expectation model are likely to be over investing. The empirical tests focus on this group of firms and examine whether over-investment is related to available free cash flow at the time those inv

39、estments were made.</p><p>　　Source: Scott Richardson,2006 .“Over-investment of free cash flow”. Rev Acc Stud. November.pp.159-189.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　過度投資的自由現(xiàn)

40、金流量</p><p>　　這篇論文探討了在自由現(xiàn)金流量下企業(yè)的投資決策。從理論上來說，企業(yè)投資水平不應(yīng)與內(nèi)部自由現(xiàn)金流量有關(guān)系（莫迪利亞尼和米勒，1958年）。但是，以前的研究已經(jīng)證明投資支出與自由現(xiàn)金流量存在正相關(guān)的關(guān)系（例如，哈伯德，1998年）。對(duì)這種正相關(guān)的關(guān)系有兩種解釋。首先，這種正相關(guān)的關(guān)系是代理問題的一個(gè)表現(xiàn)，那些擁有自由現(xiàn)金流量的公司經(jīng)理浪費(fèi)了開支（例如，詹森，1986；斯圖爾茲，1990）。當(dāng)

41、經(jīng)理的目標(biāo)與那些股東不同，在內(nèi)部的存在產(chǎn)生自由現(xiàn)金流量超過那些需要保持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)的地方，新的明確的凈現(xiàn)值規(guī)劃創(chuàng)造的這些潛在的資金可能被浪費(fèi)掉。第二，這種正相關(guān)的關(guān)系反映資本市場(chǎng)的不完全，昂貴的外部融資創(chuàng)造了內(nèi)部潛在的自由現(xiàn)金流量，以擴(kuò)大潛在的可行的投資機(jī)會(huì)集（例如，法茲澤瑞，哈伯德和彼得森，1988；哈伯德，1998）。</p><p>　　本文重點(diǎn)介紹利用會(huì)計(jì)信息更好地衡量自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資，從而允許對(duì)代理理

42、論解釋堅(jiān)定的投資水平與內(nèi)部自由現(xiàn)金流量有關(guān)聯(lián)的原因做了更強(qiáng)大的測(cè)試。這樣做，本文是第一個(gè)提供大量樣本證明過度投資的自由現(xiàn)金流量。在此之前的研究，如布蘭查德，洛佩茲迪賽倫茲和魏施尼（1994），記錄了由于暴利引發(fā)的法律糾紛的11家公司的過度投資和獲得大量現(xiàn)金流量的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，哈福德（1999）發(fā)現(xiàn)使用收購(gòu)出價(jià)的487個(gè)樣本，即現(xiàn)金充裕的公司更可能進(jìn)行收購(gòu)，隨后經(jīng)歷經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的異常下降，貝茨（2005）發(fā)現(xiàn)了1990年至1998年400個(gè)銷售子公司

43、的樣品，那些保留現(xiàn)金的企業(yè)相對(duì)于業(yè)界同行更傾向于投資。本文通過這些小樣本發(fā)現(xiàn)自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資是所有類型投資支出的系統(tǒng)現(xiàn)象。</p><p>　　在兩個(gè)階段的實(shí)證分析收益。首先，本文采用的會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的框架來衡量自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資。自由現(xiàn)金流量被定義為那些在適當(dāng)位置超出維持公司經(jīng)營(yíng)必要的資產(chǎn)和為預(yù)計(jì)的新的投資供給資金的現(xiàn)金流量。過度投資被定義為投資花費(fèi)超出必須在適當(dāng)位置保持資產(chǎn)和為預(yù)計(jì)為資金凈現(xiàn)值為正的項(xiàng)目

44、上投入資金的需要。為了估計(jì)過度投資，筆者將總投資分解成兩個(gè)部分：（1）為了在適當(dāng)位置保持資產(chǎn)而需要的投資開支，（2）新的投資開支。然后將新的投資支出分解成產(chǎn)生負(fù)的凈現(xiàn)值方案的過度投資和期望的投資支出，其中后者因公司的成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)，融資約束，行業(yè)隸屬和其他因素而各不相同。</p><p>　　根據(jù)代理成本的解釋，管理層有可能在自由現(xiàn)金流量為正時(shí)，浪費(fèi)自由現(xiàn)金流量。在范圍的另一端，如果能夠籌集到“便宜”的資金，擁有負(fù)的自

45、由現(xiàn)金流量的企業(yè)只能浪費(fèi)現(xiàn)金。這是不太可能發(fā)生的，因?yàn)檫@些企業(yè)需要能夠籌融資，從而將他們自己置于外部市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)督之下（迪安杰羅，斯圖而茲，2004；詹森，1986）。與代理成本的解釋相一致，我找到了一個(gè)企業(yè)過度投資和對(duì)企業(yè)的自由現(xiàn)金流量呈正相關(guān)的確定的關(guān)系。如58053事務(wù)所1988-2002年期間的樣本，我發(fā)現(xiàn)，自由現(xiàn)金流量為正的公司比一般公司過度投資20%的自由現(xiàn)金流量。此外，我發(fā)現(xiàn)自由現(xiàn)金流量大多以金融資產(chǎn)的形式保留。在我的樣本中平

46、均有41%的公司它們的自由現(xiàn)金流量不是以現(xiàn)金的形式就是以可交易的有價(jià)證券的形式存在。很少有證據(jù)表明，自由現(xiàn)金流量分布在外債持有人或股東手中。</p><p>　　找到過度投資和自由現(xiàn)金流量的聯(lián)合關(guān)系，與最近研究記載的以下未來表現(xiàn)欠佳的企業(yè)的投資活動(dòng)是一致的。例如，蒂特曼，魏，謝（2004），費(fèi)爾菲爾德，會(huì)森南特和約恩（2003）顯示擁有廣泛的資本投資活動(dòng)和經(jīng)營(yíng)性資產(chǎn)凈值的增長(zhǎng)分別體驗(yàn)未來股票收益的公司增長(zhǎng)較低。此

47、外，德誠(chéng)，理查德森，和斯?。?005）發(fā)現(xiàn)，現(xiàn)金流量在企業(yè)內(nèi)部保留（通過預(yù)提或投資于金融資產(chǎn)的資本化）與降低未來的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和未來的股票收益相關(guān)聯(lián)。這種性能的關(guān)系是與過度投資現(xiàn)金流量本文記載相一致。</p><p>　　第二組以實(shí)驗(yàn)為依據(jù)的解釋對(duì)管理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)減少過度投資是否有效做出了解釋。先前的研究檢驗(yàn)了公司各種管理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)公司估價(jià)和管理決策制定的影響。明顯地，公司管理結(jié)構(gòu)變動(dòng)的程度可以解釋公司價(jià)值和公司決策制定相對(duì)較

48、為薄弱的情況。與此相聯(lián)系，我發(fā)現(xiàn)眾多的管理方式只有小部分和過度投資有聯(lián)系的證據(jù)。例如，擁有活躍股東和擁有某些反收購(gòu)規(guī)定的公司過度投資他們的自由現(xiàn)金流量的可能性更小。</p><p>　　下一部分顯示關(guān)于自由現(xiàn)金流量與過度投資關(guān)系的可檢驗(yàn)假說。第二部分描述了樣本選擇和變量的測(cè)量。第三部分討論了過度投資的自由現(xiàn)金流量的實(shí)證結(jié)果。第四部分包含的實(shí)證分析與研究公司治理和過度投資的自由現(xiàn)金流量之間的聯(lián)系，第五部分得出結(jié)論。

49、</p><p>　　自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資</p><p>　　這個(gè)部分詳細(xì)介紹了支持投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量之間正相關(guān)關(guān)系的各種理論，然后發(fā)展自由現(xiàn)金流量和可以用于詳細(xì)解釋測(cè)試機(jī)構(gòu)措施的過度投資。</p><p>　　1.1解釋投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系</p><p>　　在一個(gè)完美的資本市場(chǎng)上不會(huì)有企業(yè)層面之間的投資活動(dòng)和內(nèi)部自由現(xiàn)金流

50、量的關(guān)聯(lián)。如果一個(gè)公司需要額外的現(xiàn)金為投資活動(dòng)供給資金，它只會(huì)過度投資來提高自由現(xiàn)金流量，從外部資本市場(chǎng)獲取現(xiàn)金。如果企業(yè)需要的資金已經(jīng)超越現(xiàn)有的正凈現(xiàn)值的項(xiàng)目（對(duì)未來的投資，包括期權(quán)），過量的自由現(xiàn)金流量將派發(fā)流入國(guó)外市場(chǎng)。但是，企業(yè)并沒有在這樣的一個(gè)世界上運(yùn)作。各種有摩擦的資本市場(chǎng)阻礙公司從外部資本市場(chǎng)獲得現(xiàn)金。此外，公司還有相當(dāng)可觀的交易成本與監(jiān)督管理，以確保自由現(xiàn)金流量確實(shí)分配給外部的資本市場(chǎng)的相關(guān)費(fèi)用。這些資本市場(chǎng)的摩擦可以作

51、為公司投資活動(dòng)和內(nèi)部自由現(xiàn)金流量積極關(guān)系均衡的支持。</p><p>　　代理成本理論被詹森和斯圖爾茲引用，他們提出，造成管理監(jiān)控難度的項(xiàng)目上花錢是從股東的角度來看有利于從管理的角度，但昂貴的內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量的潛力（自由現(xiàn)金流量假設(shè)）。有幾篇論文已經(jīng)調(diào)查了自由現(xiàn)金流量對(duì)企業(yè)投資活動(dòng)的影響。例如，拉蒙特（1997年）、伯杰和漢恩（2003年）發(fā)現(xiàn)證據(jù)與現(xiàn)金充裕段交叉補(bǔ)貼更差的企業(yè)進(jìn)行多元化段是一致的。然而，在這些

52、論文的證據(jù)也可以用市場(chǎng)摩擦一致抑制了公司外部籌集資金的能力，而不是一定是過度的投資的跡象。相關(guān)的證據(jù)也可以哈福德（1999）和歐普拉，匹克沃茲，斯圖而茲和威廉森（1999,2001）。哈福德使用了487個(gè)收購(gòu)出價(jià)的樣本文件，現(xiàn)金充裕的公司更可能進(jìn)行收購(gòu)，而這些現(xiàn)金充裕收購(gòu)在經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)不正常地下降之后。歐普拉等發(fā)現(xiàn)一些證據(jù)表明公司現(xiàn)金測(cè)量?jī)x過量使用（斟酌使用資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的現(xiàn)金信息）有較高的資本支出，并花費(fèi)更多的收購(gòu)，即使他們似乎有窮人的投資機(jī)

53、會(huì)（如托賓的Q衡量）。也許對(duì)過度投資的自由現(xiàn)金流量最直接的證據(jù)在布蘭查德等人的分析（1994年）。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，有11家公司意外出現(xiàn)的法律定居點(diǎn)從事浪費(fèi)的開支。</p><p>　　總的來說，以前的研究是一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)為基礎(chǔ)的配套投資和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量呈正相關(guān)的解釋暗示。然而，這些論文是基于相對(duì)小的樣本，沒有測(cè)量過投資或直接自由現(xiàn)金流量。因此，早期作品中的結(jié)果可能無法一般化到大樣本，也不是直接由于代理成本的解釋。更普遍的

54、是在研究投資于現(xiàn)金流量的關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)批評(píng)的是，找到一個(gè)積極的關(guān)系可能只是表面，現(xiàn)金流量作為服務(wù)有效的代理投資機(jī)會(huì)。我的目的是為了更好地衡量自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資結(jié)構(gòu)納入會(huì)計(jì)的發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)的措施，并測(cè)試關(guān)系是否是顯而易見的一個(gè)大樣本的公司。</p><p>　　除了先前解釋的基礎(chǔ)上機(jī)構(gòu)之間的工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)層次的投資和企業(yè)產(chǎn)生的自由現(xiàn)金流量環(huán)節(jié)，存在一個(gè)致力于融資約束作用的流的研究（法茲澤瑞（1988），保志，卡沙和沙爾夫史蒂

55、芬（1991），法茲澤瑞和皮特森（1993），懷特德（1992）和哈伯德（1998））。邁爾斯和麥吉羅夫（1984）認(rèn)為信息不對(duì)稱增加了企業(yè)外部融資成本，從而降低了可行的投資。因此，企業(yè)內(nèi)部存在自由現(xiàn)金流量，可以對(duì)更低的資本成本進(jìn)行投資。</p><p>　　在這一領(lǐng)域早期的研究，研究了高股利支付和低股利支付的公司投資現(xiàn)金流量的敏感性（法茲澤瑞等（1988）），比較不同組織結(jié)構(gòu)外部融資能力的強(qiáng)弱（保志，卡沙和沙爾

56、夫史蒂芬，1991和日本公司）和債務(wù)約束（懷特德，1992）。這些論文找到投資現(xiàn)金流量更敏感的公司出現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)上約束的證據(jù)（低股利支付公司，高負(fù)債公司和限制權(quán)利使用銀行資金的公司）。然而，最近的研究是人們對(duì)先前的結(jié)果產(chǎn)生了疑問。具體來說，卡普蘭和津加萊斯（1997,2000）發(fā)現(xiàn)在那些沒有面對(duì)融資約束的公司中投資對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量的敏感性依然存在。他們建造了一個(gè)小樣本公司事前融資約束措施，發(fā)現(xiàn)投資現(xiàn)金流量敏感性與這個(gè)措施呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，因此，使人對(duì)融

57、資約束假說產(chǎn)生疑問。盡管如此，在1.4節(jié)中描述的投資預(yù)期模型包括了用來捕捉各種融資約束措施。</p><p><b>　　1.2主要假設(shè)</b></p><p>　　正如前面一節(jié)所述，在一個(gè)完美的資本市場(chǎng)上（沒有對(duì)外籌集資金的摩擦，沒有信息不對(duì)稱和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的問題，沒有稅收等），公司投資水平和內(nèi)部自由現(xiàn)金流量之間沒有聯(lián)系。然而，當(dāng)外部資本的提供者的檢測(cè)管理成本很高，而且

58、對(duì)公司來說，籌集外部資金和建立期望的聯(lián)系是昂貴的。</p><p>　　這種關(guān)系可能是由于以下幾個(gè)因素。這反映管理人員可能在自我服務(wù)的項(xiàng)目增加額外投資，而不是向股東派發(fā)股利。這些決定可能包括：（i）絕對(duì)支配權(quán)的建立（例如見，施萊福和維什尼，1997），（ii）額外補(bǔ)貼消費(fèi)（詹森和麥克林，1976），（iii）多元化收購(gòu)（例如，默克，施萊福和維什尼，1990），（iv）利用成功項(xiàng)目獲得的現(xiàn)金補(bǔ)貼了表現(xiàn)糟糕的項(xiàng)目，而

59、不是將現(xiàn)金分派給股東（例如，伯杰和海恩，2003；詹森和麥克林，1976；拉蒙特，1997）。另外，它可以從（相對(duì)便宜的）內(nèi)置的資金來源反映增加的投資機(jī)會(huì)。</p><p>　　把重點(diǎn)放在基于機(jī)構(gòu)的解釋，下一部分構(gòu)建的投資預(yù)期模型來捕捉公司明確的發(fā)展機(jī)遇和融資限制措施。從這個(gè)期望模型出發(fā)，正殘值的公司可能超過投資。實(shí)證研究以這類公司為核心來檢驗(yàn)在這些投資過程中過度投資是否與可獲得的自由現(xiàn)金流量有關(guān)系。</p