外文翻譯---自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資

1、<p>　　1990單詞,3470漢字</p><p>　　出處: Scott A.Richardson,2006. “Over-investment of free cash flow” .Review of Accounting Studies, vol.11, no.2-3,Novemer,pp.159-189.</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p>

2、<p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Over-investment of free cash flow</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　This paper examines firm investing decisions in the presence of free ca

3、sh flow. In theory, firm level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, prior research has documented a positive relation between investment expenditure

4、and cash flow (e.g., Hubbard, 1998). There are two interpretations for this positive relation. First, the positive relation is a manifestation of an agency problem, where managers in firms with free cash flow </p>

5、<p>　　The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the paper uses an accounting based framework to measure both free cash flow and over-investment. Free cash flow is cash flow beyond what is necessary to m

6、aintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments. Over-investment is defined as investment expenditure beyond that required to maintain assets in place and to finance expected new investments in positive N

7、PV projects. To measure over- investment, I decompose total investment e</p><p>　　Explanations for a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow</p><p>　　This section describe

8、s in detail the various theories supporting a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow and then develops measures of free cash flow and over- investment that can be used to test the agency based exp

9、lanation.</p><p>　　In a world of perfect capital markets there would be no association between firm level investing activities and internally generated cash flows. If a firm needed additional cash to finance

10、 an investment activity it would simply raise that cash from external capital markets. If the firm had excess cash beyond that needed to fund available positive NPV projects (including options on future investment) it wo

11、uld distribute free cash flow to external markets. Firms do not, however, operate in such a </p><p>　　Primary hypothesis</p><p>　　As described in the earlier section, in a world of perfect capit

12、al markets (no frictions for raising external finance, no information asymmetries and associated moral hazard problems, no taxes etc.), there should be no association between firm level investment and internally generate

13、d cash flows. However, when it is costly for external capital providers to monitor management, and it is costly for the firm to raise external finance, an association is expected. Specifically, there should be a posi<

14、/p><p>　　This relation, however, could be due to several factors. It could reflect management engaging in additional investment on self-serving projects rather than distribute the cash to shareholders. Such dec

15、isions can include: (i) empire building, (ii) perquisite consumption, (iii) diversifying acquisitions, and (iv) subsidizing poorly performing divisions using the cash generated from successful ones instead of returning

16、the cash to shareholders. Alternatively, it could reflect the increased investm</p><p>　　Uses of free cash flow</p><p>　　The focus of this paper is the over-investment of free cash flow.

17、However, over- investment is but one of many alternate uses of free cash flow. Using information obtained from the statement of cash flows, I am able to allocate free cash flow flows into six categorie

18、s. This is simply a re-characterization of the statement of cash flows, where cash generated must equal cash used. The six categories are: (i) over-investment, , (ii) net payments to shareholders, ?Equity, (</p>&

19、lt;p>　　FCF≡ Iε + ?Equity + ?Debt + ?Financial Asset + Other Investments + Other </p><p>　　The final two categories contain miscellaneous reconciling items that are not important empirically (very little

20、variation in the sample). The main concern from the perspective of shareholders is the first category, over-investment, because this imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders. However, it is less clear what the be

21、st use of free cash flow is beyond avoiding over-investment. Payments to shareholders will be affected by the tax status of the firms’ investor base (Allen and Michael</p><p>　　Data and sample selection</

22、p><p>　　The main empirical tests employ financial statement data from the Compustat annual database (inclusive of active and inactive securities). I exclude financial institutions from my analysis (SIC codes be

23、tween 6000 and 6999) because the demarcation between operating, investing, and financing activities is ambiguous for these firms. The sample period covers the fiscal years 1988-2002 with 58,053 firm-year observations.<

24、;/p><p>　　In the empirical analysis that follows I scale all financial variables by average total assets (results are similar using sales as an alternative deflator). To minimize the influence of outliers I del

25、ete firms where the deflated value of free cash flow or any of the potential uses of free cash flow exceeds one in absolute value. </p><p>　　Analysis of investment expenditure and free cash flow</p>&

26、lt;p><b>　　Table 1</b></p><p>　　Analysis of investment expenditure.</p><p>　　This table examines the properties of investing cash flows as a function of growth opportunities. The

27、sample covers 58,053 firm years with available data on Compustat for the period 1988-2002. </p><p>　　Panel A: Descriptive statistics for investment expenditure </p><p><b>　　= + +– </b&

28、gt;</p><p><b>　　= –</b></p><p>　　Table 1 reports details on investment expenditure and the determination of free cash flow. The average firm undertakes investment activity equal to

29、13.1 percent of its asset base. The major component of investment is capital expenditure, followed by research and development expenditure. Of the total investment expenditure 44 percent is spent maintaining existing ass

30、ets in place and the remaining 56 percent is spent on new investments.</p><p><b>　　Table 2</b></p><p>　　Analysis of free cash flow and over-investment</p><p>　　The table

31、 examines the properties of free cash flow and how it relates to over-investment. All variables are scaled by average total assets. The sample covers 58,053 firm years with available data on Compustat for the period 1988

32、-2002. </p><p>　　Panel A: Descriptive statistics for free cash flow</p><p><b>　　= – </b></p><p>　　( is the fitted value from: </p><p>　　= α+ ++ + ++

33、 + + + )</p><p>　　Panel B: Relation between over-investment () and free cash flow (FCF)</p><p>　　=α+ FCF< + FCF> + ε</p><p>　　Table 2 panel A provides descriptive statistics

34、for the free cash flow measure. The average firm in my sample has cash flow from assets in place equal to 3.8 percent of its asset base. After subtracting expected investment on new projects (7.5 percent of a

35、sset base for the average firm), the average firm has a cash shortfall (i.e., negative free cash flow) equal to 3.6 percent of its asset base. 44.6 percent of sample firms have positive values of free cash flow. </p&g

36、t;<p>　　Panel B of table 2 contains the key result that over-investment is a function of free cash flow. I run the following regression:</p><p>　　=α+ FCF< + FCF> + ε</p><p>　　FCF<

37、;0 (FCF>0) is equal to FCF for values of FCF less (greater than) zero and zero otherwise. This allows the relation between over-investment and free cash flow to be asymmetric. In particular, allowing the slope coeffic

38、ient to vary based on the sign of free cash flow reveals that over-investment is concentrated in firms with positive free cash flow (the estimate of is 0.111 and the estimate of is 0.171, significantly different at the

39、 1% level). Panel B reports both pooled regression estimates</p><p>　　While not the focus of my paper, the regression results in table 2 also relate to under- investment. The positive coefficient on indicat

40、es that firms with negative free cash flow experience less over-investment. This relation is consistent with the notion that firms subject to cash short falls from operating activities scale back on investment activity.

41、But it is important to note that the strength of the relation between abnormal investment and free cash flow is muted for firms with negative f</p><p>　　Source: Scott A.Richardson,2006. “Over-investment of f

42、ree cash flow” .Review of Accounting Studies, vol.11, no.2-3,Novemer,pp.159-189.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p

43、>　　本文探討存在自由現(xiàn)金流量的公司投資決策。從理論上講，企業(yè)層次的投資，不應與內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量有聯(lián)系（莫迪利亞和米勒，1958年）。然而，以前的研究已證明投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量之間有著正相關的關系（例如，哈伯德，1998年）。有兩種解釋來解釋這種正相關的關系。第一，正相關的關系是一個機構的問題，有自由現(xiàn)金流量的公司管理者總是傾向于浪費開支（如，1986年的詹森和1990年的斯圖斯）。當經(jīng)理人的目標與股東的不同，超過維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新

44、的正凈現(xiàn)值項目所需經(jīng)費的內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流量的存在，為這些本來會被浪費的現(xiàn)金創(chuàng)造了潛在的價值。第二，這兩者的正相關反映了資本市場的不完善，昂貴的外部融資成本為內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量以擴大潛在可行的投資機會集創(chuàng)造了可能性（例如，法則瑞、哈伯特和彼得森，1988；哈伯特，1998）。</p><p>　　實證分析通過兩個階段進行。首先，本文采用會計基礎的框架來衡量自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資。自由現(xiàn)金流量，是指超過了維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新的投

45、資所需費用的現(xiàn)金流量。過度投資，被定義為超過維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)和新的正凈現(xiàn)值投資項目所需費用的投資開支。為了測量過度投資，我把總投資支出分解成兩個部分：（1）維持現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)所需的投資支出，以及（2）新的投資開支。然后，我將新的投資支出分解成對負凈現(xiàn)值項目的過度投資和預期投資支出，后者因公司的成長機會，融資約束，行業(yè)隸屬關系和其他因素不同而不同。</p><p>　　企業(yè)投資與現(xiàn)金流量正相關關系的解釋</p>

46、<p>　　本節(jié)詳細介紹各種支持投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量呈正相關關系的理論，然后開發(fā)自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資的測量方法，以用于依據(jù)這個理論來測試機構。</p><p>　　在一個完美的資本市場上，公司的投資活動與其內(nèi)部生成的現(xiàn)金流量是沒有關聯(lián)的。如果一個公司需要更多的現(xiàn)金為投資活動提供經(jīng)費，它只會到外部資本市場籌集現(xiàn)金。如果企業(yè)擁有的現(xiàn)金超過現(xiàn)有正凈現(xiàn)值項目（包括對未來的投資的期權）所需的資金，它將把自由現(xiàn)金

47、分配到外部市場。但是，企業(yè)不是在這樣一個世界運作，資本市場的各種摩擦阻礙了管理者從外部資本市場籌集資金。此外，為確保自由現(xiàn)金流量確實分配給外部資本市場，還有相當可觀的交易與監(jiān)督管理費用。在均衡狀態(tài)，這些資本市場的摩擦可以作為公司的投資活動與內(nèi)部現(xiàn)金流量正相關的支持。</p><p><b>　　主要假設</b></p><p>　　正如前面一節(jié)所描述的，一套完善的資本

48、市場（沒有對外籌集資金的摩擦，沒有信息不對稱和道德風險相關的問題，沒有稅收等）下，不應該有企業(yè)層面的投資和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量的關系。然而，當外部資本提供者的監(jiān)測管理成本過高，并且企業(yè)的外部籌資成本過高時，它們之間的聯(lián)系就可以預期了。具體而言，企業(yè)層面的投資支出和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量應該呈正相關。</p><p>　　這種關系，然而，可能是基于以下幾個因素。這可能反映了管理層做自我服務項目的額外投資，而不是向股東派發(fā)

49、現(xiàn)金股利。這些決定包括：（1）帝國大廈；（2）額外補貼消費；（3）多元化收購；（4）利用差補貼的現(xiàn)金，而不是將現(xiàn)金返還給股東，成功地執(zhí)行產(chǎn)生的分歧。另外，它可以反映增加的投資機會，從（相對較便宜的）內(nèi)部資金。</p><p><b>　　自由現(xiàn)金流量的用處</b></p><p>　　本文的重點是自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資。然而，過度投資只是自由現(xiàn)金流量很多可選用途中的一

50、種。利用從現(xiàn)金流量表獲得的信息，我可以將自由現(xiàn)金流量分配到六個類別中。這只是對現(xiàn)金流量表的一種重新描述，其中產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金必須等于用掉的現(xiàn)金。這六大類是：（1）超額投資，；（2）股東的凈支付，ΔEquity；（3）債務持有人的凈本金支付，?Debt；（4）金融資產(chǎn)的凈變動，?Financial Asset；（5）其他投資， Other Investments；（6）混雜的現(xiàn)金流量，Other。用下面的恒等式來表示：</p>&

51、lt;p>　　FCF≡＋?Equity＋?Debt＋?Financial Asset＋Other Investments ＋ Other</p><p>　　最后兩個類別包含了各種各樣的調(diào)節(jié)項目，根據(jù)經(jīng)驗判斷是不太重要的（非常小的樣本變動）。從股東的角度來看，主要關注的是第一類，過度投資，因為這會為股東帶來大量的代理成本。不過，目前還不太清楚，什么是最好的自由現(xiàn)金流量用途，超過避免過度投資。向股東支付的股利

52、將受到與該公司投資者相關的稅收狀況的影響（阿倫和米夏埃利，2003）。另外，支付給股東和債權人款項將影響到公司的資本結構。在某種程度上，管理層在心中有一個最佳的資本結構。目前還不清楚什么是自由現(xiàn)金流量的最優(yōu)配置。對管理層來說，以金融資產(chǎn)的形式保留自由現(xiàn)金流也是一個有效的選擇。需要持有自由現(xiàn)金流量的理想水平，是根據(jù)公司的特征來決定的，例如現(xiàn)金流的可變性和能夠到達外部資本市場的途徑（例如，哈福德，1999）?，F(xiàn)金流不穩(wěn)定的公司傾向于在現(xiàn)金流

53、少的時期保留現(xiàn)金，更難籌集外部資本的公司將會渴望較大的現(xiàn)金持有量（例如，奧普勒等，1999）。我的主要焦點是過度投資的程度和治理結構在緩解過度投資中的作用。我把企業(yè)如何使用自由現(xiàn)金流量（不包括過度投資）的詳細審查留到未來的研究中去。</p><p><b>　　數(shù)據(jù)和樣本選擇</b></p><p>　　主要的實證分析采用標準普爾年度數(shù)據(jù)庫（包括活躍和呆滯的證券）的財

54、務報表數(shù)據(jù)。我把金融機構（SIC代碼在6000至6999之間）從我的分析中排除，因為這些企業(yè)的經(jīng)營、投資和融資活動界限不明確。樣本期間涵蓋1988－2002會計年度，取得58053個觀察值。</p><p>　　在接下來的實證分析中，金融變量以平均總資產(chǎn)的方式測量（結果是類似的，使用銷售作為替代平減指數(shù)）。為了盡量減少對離群值的影響，我刪去了自由現(xiàn)金流的調(diào)節(jié)值或者自由現(xiàn)金流的任一潛在使用價值超過絕對值1的企業(yè)。&

55、lt;/p><p>　　投資支出和自由現(xiàn)金流量的分析</p><p><b>　　表1</b></p><p><b>　　投資支出的分析</b></p><p>　　此表考察投資現(xiàn)金流量的性質(zhì)作為投資機會增長的功能。樣本包括標準普爾數(shù)據(jù)庫1988－2002年間的58053個可得到的觀測值。</p

56、><p>　　A組：投資開支的描述性統(tǒng)計。</p><p><b>　?。剑?lt;/b></p><p><b>　?。剑?lt;/b></p><p>　　表1詳細地列出了投資支出和現(xiàn)金流量的測定。一般公司進行投資活動等于其資產(chǎn)基礎的13.1％。投資的主要組成部分是資本支出，隨后是研究和開發(fā)支出?？偼顿Y支出

57、的44％用于適當?shù)鼐S護現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)，其余56％用于新的投資。</p><p><b>　　表2</b></p><p>　　自由現(xiàn)金流量和過度投資的分析</p><p>　　此表檢查現(xiàn)金流的性質(zhì)以及它如何與過度投資相關。所有的變量通過平均總資產(chǎn)測量。樣本包括標準普爾數(shù)據(jù)庫1988－2002年間的58053個可得到的觀測值。</p>&

58、lt;p>　　A組：自由現(xiàn)金流量的描述性統(tǒng)計。</p><p><b>　?。剑?</b></p><p>　?。ㄊ莵碜韵旅婀降臄M合值: </p><p>　　＝ α＋ ＋＋ ＋ ＋＋ ＋ ＋ ＋ ）</p><p>　　B組：過度投資和自由現(xiàn)金流量的關系。</p><p>

59、;　　＝α＋ FCF< ＋ FCF> ＋ ε</p><p>　　表2中的A組數(shù)據(jù)提供了自由現(xiàn)金流量測量的描述性統(tǒng)計。在我的樣本中，企業(yè)平均擁有的到位資金等于其資產(chǎn)基礎的3.8％。減去在新項目（總資產(chǎn)的7.5％，對一般企業(yè)來說）的預期投資，一般企業(yè)現(xiàn)金短缺（即現(xiàn)金流量為負），等于其資產(chǎn)基礎的3.6％。44.6％的樣本公司的自由現(xiàn)金流量是正值。</p><p>　　表2中的B組數(shù)

60、據(jù)包含了主要的成果，那就是過度投資是自由現(xiàn)金流量的一大功能。我運用下列公式：</p><p>　?。溅粒?FCF< ＋ FCF> ＋ ε</p><p>　　FCF<0（FCF>0）等于自由現(xiàn)金流量值小于（大于）0，否則自由現(xiàn)金流量為0。這使得過度投資和現(xiàn)金流量之間的關系是不對稱的。特別是，使斜率系數(shù)隨著基于自由現(xiàn)金流量的跡象而變動，表明過度投資集中在正自由現(xiàn)金流量

61、（即的估計值是0.111和的估計值是0.171，1％水平的顯著不同）的企業(yè)。B組數(shù)據(jù)報告了匯集回歸估計（使用穩(wěn)健的標準誤差）和從年度回歸而來的平均估計。從15年的回歸數(shù)據(jù)可知，統(tǒng)計上顯示有十一年，的估計值比的估計值大。當企業(yè)沒有自由現(xiàn)金流量（即FCF<0），過度投資的可能性就被減小了，因為此時企業(yè)會被迫為其他額外的投資進入外部資本市場籌集資金。資本市場在維持資金管理使用紀律方面扮演了額外的監(jiān)督角色。表2的回歸分析結果支持H1，結果

62、顯示，通常自由現(xiàn)金流量為正的企業(yè)更可能過度投資，每一美元的自由現(xiàn)金流量也更多地進行過度投資。重要的是要注意這個相對較低的回歸規(guī)范的解釋力。該模型描述了現(xiàn)金流量是過度投資的決定因素，但只能解釋過度投資隨現(xiàn)金流量變化的3.2％。然而，這種解釋力是增量到企業(yè)層次投資開支的其他因素的設置中的。所以，合并后的框架能夠解釋投資支出的很大一部分具有代表性的變化，并且找</p><p>　　雖然不是本文的重點，從表2的回歸結果也

63、表明投資不足。為正系數(shù)表明，負現(xiàn)金流量的企業(yè)經(jīng)歷較少的過度投資。這種關系與下面的概念是一致的：企業(yè)遭受經(jīng)營活動的現(xiàn)金短缺會減少投資活動。但是重要的是要注意，不正常的投資與自由現(xiàn)金流量的關系在自由現(xiàn)金為負（即比小很多）的企業(yè)會柔和些，因為這些企業(yè)能夠從外部資本市場籌集更多的現(xiàn)金。</p><p>　　出處：[美]斯科特A.查理森，《自由現(xiàn)金流量的過度投資》，會計研究評論，第11卷（2-3），2006（9）：159-