農(nóng)業(yè)保險的再思考外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3330字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： CROP INSURANCE RECONSIDERED </p><p>　　出 處：

2、Amer. J. Agr. Econ. </p><p>　　作 者： JOSEPH W. GLAUBER </p><p>　　CROP INSURANCE RECONSIDERED</p><p>　　JOSEPH W. GLAUB

3、ER</p><p>　　During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was much debate over how to fix what were perceived as the “failures” of the Federal crop insurance program. The Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Ac

4、t of 1980 made crop insurance the primary form of disaster protection for agricultural producers, replacing a standing disaster assistance program with subsidized crop insurance. To encourage sales, private companies wer

5、e enlisted to deliver the product and significantly share in the underwriting risks. </p><p>　　The perceived failures of crop insurance were many. At the time of passage of the 1980 Act, Congress envisioned

6、a participation rate approaching 50% of eligible acres by the end of the decade. Despite premium subsidies and expanded coverage, crop insurance participation grew very slowly. When a major drought struck the Midwest in

7、1988, only 25% of eligible acreage was enrolled in the program nationwide and participation was even less in states such as Illinois and Indiana (Chite).Widespread crop</p><p>　　In addition to its failure to

8、 replace disaster assistance, the actuarial performance of the crop insurance program was dismal throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The aggregate loss ratio, that is, total indemnities divided by total premiums (inclu

9、ding premium subsidies), exceeded 150% over 1981–93. Poor actuarial performance was blamed on expansion of coverage into new areas without having adequate data to rate risks which contributed to adverse selection problem

10、s and the difficulty in monitor</p><p>　　Finally, despite large actuarial losses, companies shared little of the underwriting risks. Over 1981–90, total indemnities exceeded total premiums (including premium

11、 subsidies) by $2.3 billion. Over the same period, companies recorded net underwritings “gains” of $102 million (Glauber and Collins). This prompted repeated criticism from the U.S. General Accounting Office (1981, 1987,

12、 1992) that companies were not adequately sharing in risks.</p><p>　　Within ten years of the 1980 Act, poor performance of the crop insurance program prompted the Bush Administration to propose eliminating t

13、he crop insurance program and replacing it with a standing disaster program (Gardner 1994). The proposal received little interest in Congress, but the criticism of the crop insurance program remained unabated. </p>

14、<p>　　Widespread crop losses due to the 1993 floods in the Midwest prompted yet another disaster bill. This time, however, Congress and the Clinton Administration agreed on the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, w

15、hich authorized additional premium subsidies to increase participation. Yet, despite increases in participation, Congress passed ad hoc disaster legislation covering losses in 1998, 1999, and 2000. In 2000, Congress pass

16、ed the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, which provided further subsidies</p><p>　　Now, fifteen years and two reform bills later, the crop insurance program boasts an 80% participation rate with over 215 mil

17、lion acres enrolled and a total liability estimated in excess of $46 billion for 2004 (Davidson). Over Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86 (Number 5, 2004): 1179–1195 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association 1180 Nu

18、mber 5, 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 57% of participating acres are enrolled at coverage levels in excess of 65%. The loss performance of the crop insurance pro</p><p>　　Yet, have the program reforms since 1994

19、really addressed the fundamental failures raised fifteen years ago? Despite large gains in participation, Congress continues to pass ad hoc disaster legislation; two years after passage of the Agricultural Risk Protectio

20、n Act, Congress passed supplemental disaster assistance to cover 2002 crop losses. The costs of the program have risen dramatically as well. Expected annual costs of the program are over $3 billion—compared with less tha

21、n one-third of that</p><p>　　In the following sections, the paper reconsiders the crop insurance program and the problems of agricultural insurance more generally. It draws on the large literature that has e

22、merged on crop insurance, particularly over the past ten years. Economic research on crop insurance can be traced at least as far back as Valgren’s 1922 study of private insurance markets.2 However, the amount of researc

23、h on crop insurance has increased dramatically over the past ten years, paralleling the growth n the p</p><p>　　The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the demand for crop insurance and

24、why participation in the crop insur-ance program has depended on large subsidies. The following section examines the problems of rating agricultural production risks and how subsidies mask actuarial performance. The unin

25、tended effects of subsidized crop insurance on production are considered in section “Effects of Crop Insurance on Production.” The section “Alternative Crop Insurance Plans” examines al</p><p>　　The Demand f

26、or Crop Insurance</p><p>　　Table 1 shows the growth of the crop insurance program since 1981. Participation in the program grew slowly in the 1980s, reaching only 55.6 million acres in 1988, about 25% of eli

27、gible acreage. Participation reached 40% in 1989 and 1990, largely because of disaster legislation that required recipients of disaster payment in 1988 and 1989 to buy crop insurance in the subsequent crop year. By 1993,

28、 participation had</p><p>　　fallen to 32% of eligible area (Glauber and Collins).</p><p>　　Over the period 1981–93, participating producers received, on average, about $2 in indemnity payments f

29、or every $1 of premium paid. Why then did participation rates in the program remain so low throughout the 1980s and early 1990s? The most often cited reason is adverse selection (see, e.g., Miranda). Adverse selection pr

30、oblems arise when risks vary across insurance buyers and buyers know more about the risks they face than does the insurer who sets the rates (Hirshleifer and Riley). Thus, produ</p><p>　　By the end of the 19

31、80s, it was clear to policy makers that the subsidy levels provided under the 1980 Act were not sufficient to achieve50% participation without either making insurance purchases compulsory or increasing the level of the s

32、ubsidy. In their analysis of theU.S. crop insurance program, Gardner and Kramer concluded</p><p>　　that premiums would have to be subsidized as much as 50% to achieve 50% participation. Similar conclusions w

33、ere reached by Wright and Hewitt and Goodwin and Smith (1995).</p><p>　　Congress responded by both making insurance compulsory and increasing remium subsidies. Under the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, pr

34、oducers of insurable crops were eligible to receive a basic level of coverage, catastrophic risk protection (CAT), which initially covered 50% of a producer’s approved yield at 60% of the expected market price.3 CAT cove

35、rage was required for producers who participated in the commodity price support and production adjustment programs, farm credit, or other farm pr</p><p>　　To encourage further enrollment in higher coverage l

36、evels, Congress provided supplemental premium subsidies in the 1999 and 2000 crop years and in 2000 passed the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, which increased subsidy levels for most buy-up levels (table 2). Enrollment

37、 in the crop insurance program rose from 182 million acres insured in 1998 to over 217 million in 2003, almost a 20% increase. Where less than 8% of insured acres were enrolled at coverage levels greater than 65% in 1998

38、, over 5</p><p>　　The experience of the past twenty-five years suggests that with adequate subsidies, producers will buy crop insurance, but the marginal</p><p>　　costs are large. Because the de

39、mand for crop insurance is generally inelastic with respect to premium (Goodwin, Coble and Knight), the marginal per acre costs of enrolling additional acres into the program are high. Figure 1 shows premium subsidies pl

40、otted against buyup</p><p>　　acres over 1981–2003. It shows how the marginal costs of enrolling additional buy-up acres have increased as subsidy levels have increased</p><p>　　under successive

41、crop insurance reform legislation. Because subsidies are applied to all participating acres, it becomes more and more expensive to coax in acreage at the margin. Estimated at the mean buy-up acreage over the period, the

42、marginal cost per acre (in $2000) during 1981–94 was $3.31 per acre, compared to an average per acre subsidy of $2.73. During 1995–98, the marginal subsidy cost per acre was $10.51 compared with an average per acre subsi

43、dy of $4.99. From 1999 to 2003, the margina</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p><b>　　農(nóng)業(yè)保險的再思考</b></p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)80年代末和90年代初，人們對于如何解決被認(rèn)為“失敗”的聯(lián)邦農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃有很多的爭論。1980年頒布的

44、聯(lián)邦農(nóng)業(yè)保險改進法把農(nóng)業(yè)保險作為農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)者災(zāi)難保護的主要形式，用農(nóng)業(yè)保險補助來替代一個長期的災(zāi)難援助計劃。為了鼓勵銷售，私營企業(yè)被贊許交付產(chǎn)品，這樣很大程度上分擔(dān)了保險的風(fēng)險。幾乎一夜之間，農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃從一項只提供國家有限范圍內(nèi)，有限數(shù)量的農(nóng)業(yè)物的試點計劃轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐豁椇w最主要的農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)地區(qū)的最主要的農(nóng)作物的全國性計劃。</p><p>　　被認(rèn)為失敗的農(nóng)業(yè)保險有很多。在1980年通過的法案里，國會預(yù)想十年后有將近

45、50%農(nóng)保參與率的合格農(nóng)田數(shù)。不管額外的保險補貼和擴充的保險范圍，農(nóng)業(yè)保險發(fā)展的非常的緩慢。1988年的一場干旱，嚴(yán)重影響了美國的中西部，當(dāng)時只有25%的合格的土地面積，像伊利諾州和印第安那等地方的農(nóng)業(yè)保險參與率則更加少(Chite)。廣泛的農(nóng)作物損失和低的農(nóng)業(yè)保險參與率使得國會通過補充災(zāi)難援助的法條，在十年內(nèi)花了近50億美元在災(zāi)難援助上，包括1988年和1989年的農(nóng)作物損失(格勞伯和柯林斯)。</p><p>

46、;　　除了替代災(zāi)害援助的失敗之外，在整個80年代和90年代初，農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃的保險統(tǒng)計的業(yè)績也是相當(dāng)糟糕的。合計的損失率，即總的賠償金比上總保險金額（包括保險補貼），在1981到1993年這段時間超過了150%。低的保險統(tǒng)計業(yè)績被歸咎于在擴大新的區(qū)域的覆蓋范圍時，沒有適當(dāng)?shù)臄?shù)據(jù)來評估導(dǎo)致逆向選擇的問題，也就是在監(jiān)控農(nóng)業(yè)工人行為上的困難，即由于道德危機（投保人可能不可靠）而形成的風(fēng)險（美國審計院，1993）。</p><

47、p>　　最終，雖然大量的保險損失，但公司只承擔(dān)了少量的保險風(fēng)險。在1981-90年間，總的賠償金超過總的保險金額達23億，在相當(dāng)?shù)臅r期，公司記載的凈保險收益為一億兩百萬，這個被美國審計院反復(fù)提出批評（1981,1987,1992）說公司并沒有分擔(dān)足夠的風(fēng)險。</p><p>　　在1980年法案后的十年內(nèi)，農(nóng)業(yè)保險的差的效果致使布什政府建議廢除農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃，用長期的災(zāi)難計劃來代替（加德納 1994）。這項提

48、議雖然并沒引起國會的重大興趣，但是對農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃的批評并沒有減弱。</p><p>　　1993年美國中西部的洪災(zāi)所引發(fā)的廣泛的農(nóng)作物損失引起了另外一種災(zāi)難法案。這次，然而，國會和克林頓政府贊成1994年的農(nóng)業(yè)保險改良法，提供進一步附加保險費補貼來增加參與。然而，盡管參與的增加，國會通過了特設(shè)災(zāi)難立法來替代損失在1998年，1999年和2000年。在2000年，國會通過的農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險保護法，提供了進一步的補貼來鼓勵農(nóng)

49、業(yè)保險購買。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)在，15年來的兩個改革法案后，農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃已經(jīng)很成功了，在2004年已經(jīng)有百分之八十的參與率，登記的合格用地面積超過兩億一千五百萬英畝，總負(fù)債達到460億(Davidson)。在2004年農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟協(xié)會出版的“美國農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟”中的1180頁中提出57%的多人參與英畝被登記在超過65%的覆蓋水平上。農(nóng)業(yè)保險的壞的業(yè)績也有所提升。在1994-2003年中，農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃總計的損失率為98

50、%，農(nóng)業(yè)部秘書的結(jié)論是：“這個全國規(guī)模的計劃在有健全的財政，適當(dāng)?shù)脑u估，和有效的管理” (克曼)。政府和私營企業(yè)之間的新的再保險金額協(xié)議規(guī)定在遇到大范圍的農(nóng)作物損失時，企業(yè)要保留更大的風(fēng)險和承擔(dān)更多的保險損失。</p><p>　　然而15年前1994年提出的這個計劃的改革真的解決了根本的問題了嗎？盡管在參與率上有很大的提高，但國會仍繼續(xù)通過特設(shè)的災(zāi)難法規(guī)；在通過農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險保護法的兩年后，國會通過了許多附加的災(zāi)難援

51、助，包括2002年代的災(zāi)難損失。這個計劃的花費也同樣的劇烈的上升。該計劃預(yù)期的年度花費超過了30億美元，不少于15年前的三分之一的成本。增加的補貼反過來使使人們對于產(chǎn)品的農(nóng)業(yè)保險的扭曲效果產(chǎn)生了憂慮。雖然總計的保險統(tǒng)計的業(yè)績提高了，但大的地區(qū)差異也形成了。最后，雖然私營企業(yè)承擔(dān)了更多的風(fēng)險，但是他們因為從這個計劃中賺得的巨大的保險收益也使得企業(yè)遭受越來越多的批評。</p><p>　　在接下來的段落里，這篇論文重

52、新考慮了農(nóng)業(yè)保險和一般農(nóng)業(yè)保險所出現(xiàn)的問題。它運用了大量的關(guān)于農(nóng)業(yè)保險的文獻，特別是這十年里的。關(guān)于農(nóng)業(yè)保險的經(jīng)濟研究最早要追溯到1992年Valgren的私人保險市場的研究中。然而，在過去十年內(nèi)，隨著這個計劃本身的增長，相應(yīng)的關(guān)于農(nóng)業(yè)保險的文獻研究也劇烈的增加。例如，在1981年到1993年間，在美國農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟日報上發(fā)表了10篇農(nóng)業(yè)保險的文章，而從1994年開始，已經(jīng)已經(jīng)有51篇文章發(fā)表了，在2003年和2004年間就發(fā)表了20多篇。&

53、lt;/p><p>　　這篇文章的組織如下所示。下一章調(diào)查了農(nóng)業(yè)保險的要求和農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃的參與量取決于龐大的補貼。再接著一段分析了評定農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險的問題和補貼如何掩蓋了保險統(tǒng)計的業(yè)績?！八綘I公司和風(fēng)險共享”這章說了私營部門在計劃交付和風(fēng)險分享中扮演了什么角色?！稗r(nóng)業(yè)保險對生產(chǎn)的影響”這章說了在生產(chǎn)上補助的農(nóng)業(yè)保險的非計劃中的影響。替代農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃說了替代選擇對經(jīng)營生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險的重要性，包括區(qū)域產(chǎn)量期權(quán)和露天的衍生產(chǎn)品。摘

54、要和總結(jié)構(gòu)成了最好一章。</p><p><b>　　農(nóng)業(yè)保險的要求</b></p><p>　　表1顯示了從1981年以來農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃的增長。該計劃的參與量在20世紀(jì)80年代增長是十分緩慢的，在1988年只達到了5660萬英畝，合格土地面積大約在25%。但在1989年到1990年的參與率達到了40%，其主要原因是由于當(dāng)時的災(zāi)難條例規(guī)定1988-1989年的災(zāi)難補助的

55、接受者必須在下一個生產(chǎn)年度購買農(nóng)業(yè)保險。在1993年，合格土地面積跌到了32%(格勞伯和柯林斯)。</p><p>　　在1981年到1993年期間，參與的生產(chǎn)者平均投保每1美元相應(yīng)的能收到2美元的補償金。為何然后在該計劃中的參與率仍然很低，在整個八十年代和九十年代初？最常見的一種說法是逆向選擇。風(fēng)險而異保險買家和買家知道更多有關(guān)風(fēng)險他們面對比承保人設(shè)置率時，就會引發(fā)逆向選擇的問題（赫什利佛-萊利），預(yù)期的賠償超

56、過保險費的生產(chǎn)者最可能購買保險；其成本超過其預(yù)期的賠償金是不太可能購買。第二，研究顯示那些農(nóng)民和農(nóng)莊主人使用各種風(fēng)險管理策略來減輕他們所面對的風(fēng)險(哈伍德以及美國總審計局)。在這段期間作物保險參與實證研究證實許多這些做法的意見對參與產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面的影響(見 Knight and Coble 1997)。</p><p>　　到20世紀(jì)80年代末，政策制定者很清楚1980年法中的提供的補貼水平并不能達到50%的參與率，

57、在既沒有制定保險強制購買，也沒有增加補貼水平的情況下。在他們對美國農(nóng)業(yè)保險計劃的研究中，加德納和克雷默推斷如果要達到50%的參與率，必須再增加50%的保險補助。萊特、休伊特、古德溫和史密斯在1995年提出了類似的結(jié)論。</p><p>　　大會作出反應(yīng)，使保險強制性，同時增加保險費補貼。在1994年的農(nóng)業(yè)保險改良法下，保作物的生產(chǎn)者都有資格領(lǐng)取基本級別的覆蓋范圍最初所涵蓋的一個生產(chǎn)核準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)量預(yù)期市場價格的 60%5

58、0%的災(zāi)難性的風(fēng)險保護 (CAT)。類覆蓋范圍是需要生產(chǎn)者參加了商品價格支持和生產(chǎn)調(diào)整方案、 農(nóng)場信用或其他農(nóng)場程序。雖然類覆蓋的地價成本完全由政府資助，但是生產(chǎn)者也要付每郡沒產(chǎn)量50美元的注冊費。另外，1994年的法案給予額外的補貼給覆蓋水平超過50%的（購買水平）。1995年超過兩億兩千萬英畝的土地登記在這個計劃中，有80%以上的合資格畝 (不包括干草)，其中一半以上達到了氧化氫酶水平。國會對生產(chǎn)者的批評作出回應(yīng)，消除在1996年引

59、起氧化氫酶水平下降的強制性規(guī)定。然而，購買覆蓋率繼續(xù)增加，在1998年達到了一億兩千萬英畝（格勞伯和柯林斯）。為了進一步鼓勵更加高的登記的覆蓋水平，國會通過農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險保護法在1999年到2000年度增加了額外的保險補貼，并對大部分購買水平增加了補貼的檔次（表2）。登記入的農(nóng)業(yè)保險參與率出1998年的一億八千兩百萬增加到了2003年的二億一千七百萬，幾乎增加了20%。凡低于 8%的保險</p><p>　　由過去的2

60、5年經(jīng)驗可以看出，如果有充足的保險補貼，生產(chǎn)者就會參加農(nóng)業(yè)保險，但是邊際花費是巨大的。因為對農(nóng)業(yè)保險的需求和保險費一般是非彈性的（Goodwin, Coble and Knight)，該計劃每畝注冊的邊際成本很高。圖1是根據(jù)1981年到2003年的保險購買數(shù)而繪制的。它解釋了在連續(xù)的農(nóng)業(yè)保險補貼改良下，當(dāng)補貼水平上升時，增加的保險購買的邊際成本是如何增加的。因為補貼將應(yīng)用于所有參與畝，用來有誘導(dǎo)英畝數(shù)所花的成本將更昂貴。估計平均的買盤面