出口和外國直接投資作為替代戰(zhàn)略【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　EXPORTING AND FDI AS ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES</p><p>　　Material Source：OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY， VOL

2、. 20， </p><p>　　Author： Keith Head，John Ries</p><p>　　Exports and overseas production are alternative modes for serving foreign customers. Empirical studie

3、s usually find that foreign markets are served through both modes and that countries receiving high levels of exports also host large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper evaluates several possible ways

4、 to reconcile the facts about FDI and exports with the standard theory of multinational corporations. We argue that coexistence and correlation of FDI and exports are consistent w</p><p>　　I. INTRODUCTION<

5、;/p><p>　　Multinational corporations (MNCs) recurrently face the same question： should we supply product X to customers in country j using our existing factory in country i or should we invest in a facility tha

6、t can manufacture locally in country j? To give concrete examples， both authors of this paper drive cars manufactured by Japanese firms. One car was produced at Subaru’s main plant in Gunma， Japan， while the other was pr

7、oduced in Georgetown， Kentucky.These examples make it clear that， at thelevel of</p><p>　　This paper outlines alternative theories of the MNC to identify the economic mechanisms linking FDI and exports. We t

8、hen review the large literature on whether exporting and FDI are substitutes or complements. With few exceptions， most studies find a positive relationship between exports and FDI. Some authors interpret this as evidence

9、 of ‘complementarity’ between the two variables.Others question the econometrics， arguing that the positive relationship could be spurious. We argue that the empir</p><p>　　Why should we care whether exports

10、 and FDI are substitutes or complements? There do not appear to be any issues where the appropriate policy choice depends directly on the answer. However， governments formulating trade and foreign investment policies sho

11、uld benefit from a more complete understanding of how MNCs make international production decisions and the ramifications of these decisions for their home operations (including exporting).For example， would a less favour

12、able tax treatment for inc</p><p>　　II. SINGLE-PRODUCT MNCS AND THE CASE FOR SUBSTITUTION</p><p>　　We begin with the simplest possible model for considering the formation of an MNC. The firm pro

13、duces one product that it sells to consumers in both the home country (home， H) and the foreign country (foreign， F). Figure 1 illustrates the three options available to the firm. The default position of a firm as it fir

14、st serves a foreign market is ‘home centralization’. A second option is to open a plant in the foreign country to serve that market while continuing to serve the home market with the or</p><p>　　A third opti

15、on is to shut down the home plant and use a new factory in the foreign country to manufacture for both markets. This ‘foreign centralization’ form involves importing back into the home market.Presumably some head-office

16、activities (control) remain at home or else we would just see this as home centralization from the perspective of the foreign country. We will explicitly consider a twostage MNC later， but for now we want to retain the f

17、ocus on a single business unit.</p><p>　　We can use a little bit of algebra to make our analysis more precise. We take the size of each market for the firm’s product as given， with there being MH customers a

18、t home and MF customers in the foreign country. We specify the level of demand in each country exogenously to avoid having to consider pricing decisions. The underlying assumptions would be that each consumer has demand

19、for one unit for a price less than or equal to his or her valuation and zero units for any price above it. Therefo</p><p><b>　　Figure 1</b></p><p>　　Three Strategies for a Single-pro

20、duct Firm</p><p>　　We assume that there is a composite variable factor that we will refer to as labour and denote the composite variable factor prices as ‘wages’ WH at home and WF abroad. The individual firm

21、 possesses a unique technology allowing it transform variable inputs into final goods with productivity A that does not depend on the country in which it produces.</p><p>　　The total cost of home centralizat

22、ion， CH， is given as </p><p>　　CH = (wH /A) MH + (wH /A+TF ) MF +K (1)</p><p>　　Where wH /A is the marginal cost of home production，TF represents the trade costs incurred in exporting to the for

23、eign market， MF is the size of the foreign market， and K represents the fixed costs of the capital (land， buildings， equipment) deployed at the home factory. For simplicity， assume that this cost does not depend on which

24、 country a factory is built in. If the firm were to open another plant， it would have to incur the capital costs twice. However，it would be able to avoid trade costs </p><p>　　CR = (wH /A) MH + (wF /A) MF +2

25、K. (2)</p><p>　　Shutting down the home plant and relocating it to the foreign country can lower fixed costs back to K，assuming that all the home investment K is reversible (i.e. that it can be sold at full v

26、alue or relocated at zero cost). Under foreign centralization， trade becomes necessary again. The costs of importing foreign-made products into home， are denoted as TH. Therefore the costs of foreign centralization are g

27、iven by</p><p>　　CF = (wF /A) MF + (wF /A+ TH) MH +K. (3)</p><p>　　Multinational business strategy in this example just requires us to compare CH， CR， and CF and select the form that yields the

28、lowest cost.Three-way comparisons can be complicated， so we will set aside foreign centralization and consider the relative merits of home centralization (exporting) versus replication. Home centralization is preferred w

29、hen</p><p>　　CR – CH = K+( wF /A) MF –( wH /A+ TF) MF >0.(4)</p><p>　　Note that the costs of producing for the home market have cancelled each other out since both forms involve using the hom

30、e factory for that market.Dividing by the size of the foreign market， MF，we can see that exporting is preferable to replication when</p><p>　　wF /A +K/ MF > wH /A + TF. (5)</p><p>　　Figure 2

31、graphs the left- and right-hand sides of the inequality. It shows that replicating overseas investment can only be justified when the foreign market is large enough.</p><p>　　We can solve for the critical ma

32、rket size required tojustify replicating investment. This is the MF* that sets CH = CR：</p><p>　　MF*= K/[ TF –( wF – wH )/A]. (6)</p><p>　　Firms centralize production for both markets at home an

33、d export to the foreign market when MF <MF*. For larger foreign markets， they engage in FDI and serve the foreign market via exports. Each term in the expression corresponds to an important concept in the theory of th

34、e multinational. In the numerator， K indicates the importance of plantlevel economies of scale. The larger are scale economies， the larger will the foreign market have to be to justify the additional fixed costs of setti

35、ng up a </p><p>　　III. THE OBSERVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FDI AND EXPORTS</p><p>　　Straightforward intuition， supported by the algebra of section II， suggests that exports and FDI are alternative

36、 modes for serving foreign markets.Changes in trade costs， market sizes， relative production costs， or the importance of scale economies can shift relative benefits in one direction or the other， causing the firm to swit

37、ch from one mode to the other. It is natural (but incorrect) to suppose that this theoretical argument implies that one should seea negative relationship between FDI an</p><p>　　What kinds of data could be u

38、sed to investigate therelationship between exports and FDI? The most obvious sort are data on a cross-section of potential host countries. Consider a given source country. Its firms could choose to serve some of these fo

39、reign markets via exporting (the nearby， small markets with low tariffs) and some via FDI (the distant， large markets with high tariffs). What should we expecta graph of export levels versus FDI levels to look like? Taki

40、ng the section II theory seriou</p><p>　　Figure 3 illustrates the actual relationship betweencross-national variation in FDI and exports using data from the Appendix of Brainard (1997). Each point in Figure

41、3 represents a country， with twoletter International Standards Organization (ISO) codes used as labels. The measure of FDI is the sales of US-owned affiliates located in each country.Export amounts are totals (i.e. not l

42、imited to US parents or affiliates). The striking aspects of this figure are that FDI and exports coexist (both ar</p><p>　　A second type of cross-section variation comes from selecting a single host country

43、 and examining how sales of foreign-owned affiliates there relate to imports from a cross-section of origin countries.Figure 4 uses data on US inward FDI， relating sales of foreign-owned affiliates in the USA to total US

44、 imports from the FDI source country. The statistical relationship is positive in this case as well， although it is intriguing to note that， with an elasticity of 0.26，it is substantially weaker.</p><p>　　Th

45、e theory of section II relates to firm-level decision making and it is， therefore， natural to examine crosssections of firms. In prior work， Head and Ries (2001， 2003) combine export information from annual reports with

46、a published survey of Japanese overseas investment. Figure 5 graphs exports of 26 large (domestic employment over 15，000) Japanese manufacturing firms versus employment at overseas manufacturing affiliates.</p>&l

47、t;p>　　Once again we find that FDI (here measured by affiliate employment instead of affiliate sales) and exports coexist and exhibit a raw positive correlation.All Japanese manufacturing firms with more than 15，000 em

48、ployees in Japan conduct FDI and export. Relaxing the size cut-off to the 44 firms with 10，000 or more domestic employees， there are just two firms with zero exports (a printing company and a baking company).</p>

49、<p><b>　　Figure 2</b></p><p>　　The Critical Foreign Market Size to Justify Replicating Investment</p><p><b>　　Figure 3</b></p><p>　　Overseas Sales of US

50、-owned Affiliates and Total US Exports， 1989</p><p>　　Source： Brainard (1997， Table A1).</p><p>　　The best-known Japanese makers of cars and consumer electronics—Toyota， Nissan， Honda，Matsushita

51、， Sony， and Toshiba—all appear in the ‘north-east’ section of the figure， where both overseas employment and exports are largest. Theelasticity in a log–log regression is 0.45 (t-statistic of 3.4).</p><p>　　

52、How can we account for the finding that both FDI and exports are positive across the board and highly correlated with each other? One possibility is that the basic theory is wrong in an important way：overseas production

53、actually complements exports instead of displacing them. We consider this</p><p><b>　　Figure 4</b></p><p>　　US Sales of Foreign-owned Affiliates and Total US Imports， 1989</p>

54、<p>　　Source： Brainard (1997， Table A1).</p><p><b>　　Figure 5</b></p><p>　　Japanese Firm-level Overseas Employment and Exports， 1989</p><p>　　hypothesis later in t

55、he paper. The intuition behind a substitutive relationship is very strong and should be taken seriously. Consequently， we next investigate explanations that can reconcile core aspects of the section II theory with the em

56、pirical facts shown in Figures 3， 4， and 5.</p><p>　　In the next section of the paper， we extend the simple model of the export and FDI decision to explain why exports and FDI can coexist in equilibrium.The

57、following section identifies reasons for their positive correlation.</p><p>　　IV. EXPLAINING THE COEXISTENCE OF FDI AND EXPORTS</p><p>　　The theory outlined so far assumes that FDI and exports a

58、re substitute modes through which to reach foreign markets. Yet in the data we observe both.Below we outline three situations where exporters and investors coexist in equilibrium. The first two pertain to single-product

59、firms. We consider representative firms first and then firms that are exogenouslyheterogeneous. The third situation ariseswhen firms produce more than one good.</p><p>　　(i) Single-product， Representative Fi

60、rms</p><p>　　In the absence of price effects and competitor interactions， the simple theory predicts that， given a particular combination of market sizes， trade costs，wages differences， and plant-level fixed

61、 costs， all firms make the same mode decision. While useful to portray the forces that influence the FDI versus export decision， it abstracts from the effects of mode decision on price and quantity sold.</p><p

62、>　　Traditional theories of horizontal FDI in the economics literature assume imperfect competition between representative firms. Important examples include Brainard (1997) and Markusen (2002). While one might expect t

63、hat identical initial conditions would imply a common mode choice， this does not necessarily occur. Asymmetry in outcomes can arise from what is called the ‘market-crowding’effect. When more firms produce locally oversea

64、s，the prospective profits for the next firm decline. This would no</p><p>　　To understand the market-crowding effect， consider an initial situation where all firms export (home centralization). A fall in pla

65、nt-level fixed costs then makes it more profitable for at least some firms to engage in FDI while maintaining their home plants to serve the home market (replication in Figure 1).Firms begin to switch to FDI and will con

66、tinue to do so as long as the additional benefits of overseas production associated with avoiding trade costs exceed the fixed costs of operating a s</p><p>　　To see the market-crowding effect in a simple se

67、gmented market， Cournot setting， consider a foreign foreign market with inverse demand P = a – bQ for the goods produced by home firms. Let N denote the total number of firms serving the foreign market. A share s serve t

68、he market via FDI， producing output qI each. There are (1–s)N exporters that produce qX each. In this setup， ΠI = bqI2 and ΠX = bqX2. Output for each firm depends on s， the share of firms that are multinationals. Market-

69、crowding occ</p><p>　　?( ΠI – ΠX)/ ?s = 2b(qI ?qI/?s – qX ?qX /?s ) < 0. (7)</p><p>　　It turns out that with linear demand， ?qI /?s = ?qX /?s < 0. Thus</p><p>　　?( ΠI – ΠX)/?s

70、 = 2b(?qI/?s) (qI – qX ). (8)</p><p>　　Since investors avoid trade costs and thereby have higher sales than exporters， qI > qX ， and ?( ΠI – ΠX)/?s <0. Thus， market crowding occurs. Intuitively，because

71、 investors avoid trade costs and sell more output in foreign markets than do exporters， the price-depressing effect of more firms choosing to become investors has a greater impact on MNC profits than it does on the profi

72、t of exporters.</p><p>　　Head et al. (2002) show that the market-crowding extends to single-plant firms choosing whether to centralize production at home or in a foreign market.This market-crowding effect is

73、 common to models of FDI with representative firms and imperfect competition and gives rise to the coexistence of exporters and investors in equilibrium.</p><p>　　(ii) Single-product， Heterogeneous Firms<

74、/p><p>　　We have shown that the critical determinants of the choice of FDI versus exporting are trade costs，plant-level fixed costs， comparative production costs，and market size. Trivially， if we allow these pa

75、rameters to vary across the firms that constitute the data set， we could observe FDI–export coexistence. An emerging literature examines how exogenous productivity differences across firms can predict whether a firm choo

76、ses to be an exporter or an investor.</p><p>　　Helpman et al. (2004) develop a monopolistic competition model where firms choose between a home centralization (exporting) and a replication strategy.Firms exo

77、genously differ in their level of productivity that is captured by differences in marginal costs of production. Each firm produces a unique variety and consumers have Dixit–Stiglitz preferences. Firms choose FDI over exp

78、orting if the benefits associated with avoiding transportation costs exceed the fixed costs of establishing a second pla</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　出口和外國直接投資作為替代戰(zhàn)略</p><p&

79、gt;　　資料來源：牛津經濟政策檢討，20 卷，第 3 號 作者：祁頭、約翰 Ries </p><p>　　出口和海外生產服務模式，并對國外客戶的選擇。實證研究通常發(fā)現，經過兩個外國市場，服務模式和接收高水平的出口國家同時舉辦大量的外國直接投資(FDI)。摘要本文評價了幾種可能的方法來協(xié)調關于FD

80、I與出口的事實與標準理論的跨國公司。我們認為，外商直接投資與東道國共存和相關性模型出口的地方是一致的，兩種模式都替代品。這個替代關系協(xié)同證據發(fā)現的效果提出了論文。然而，一個明顯的證據表明，外商直接投資通過mechanismof有時補充出口刺激出口中間產品使用的海外子公司。</p><p><b>　　一、導言</b></p><p>　　跨國公司也面臨著同樣的問題的循

81、環(huán)：我們應該供應X產品為客戶使用我們國家既有廠房內j國家或者我們應該投資在我的一種設施，可以制造在當地國家j ?給具體的例子，兩位作家的文章開汽車制造的日本企業(yè)。一輛汽車生產Gunma斯巴魯的主要植物，日本，而其他生產的喬治敦大學，肯塔基州。上述例子清楚說明，在thelevel一個單獨的產品，出口和外國直接投資(FDI)的備選戰(zhàn)略為達成的海外客戶。很多經驗性作品一直努力的試圖找尋統(tǒng)計證據來支持這一命題。</p><p

82、>　　本文概述了替代的理論來識別經濟機制跨國公司直接投資(FDI)和出口連接。然后，我們回顧文獻上的大型出口和外國直接投資是否都是互為補充的或補語。除了少數例外，大多數研究找到一個正面的關系出口和外國直接投資。有些作者此理解為“互補”的證據，這兩個變異數間。計量經濟學中的其他問題，認為良好的關系可能是偽造的。我們認為，實證結果并不矛盾理論預測的替代在產品水平。的確，替代被發(fā)現在研究專注于狹窄的產品線。然而，制造一個下游產品在國外可

83、誘發(fā)貿易在上游產品和therebylead對外國直接投資與出口呈正相關。實證文獻提供的直接和間接支持這種形式的經濟互補外商直接投資和出口。</p><p>　　我們?yōu)槭裁匆P心的都是互為補充的出口和外國直接投資或補充嗎?那里并沒有表現出任何問題在適當的政策選擇直接取決于答案。然而，政府制定貿易政策和對外貿易政策應該受益于更全面地理解跨國公司如何進行國際生產決策，這些決策所帶來的后果家庭操作(包括出口)。舉例來說，

84、會有較少的稅務優(yōu)惠治療帶來的收益的海外子公司刺激制造業(yè)在家嗎?在某種程度上，外國直接投資和出口都是互為補充，提高稅收成本的外國直接投資可能會誘發(fā)更多的生產在家里。如果，相反，海外活動趨于補充國內活動，它可能不是真正處于國內工人利益的措施來防止海外投資。摘要收益如下。第二部分闡述始于一個簡單的標準模型的決策，并識別與出口外國直接投資的關鍵影響因素的選擇。該模型的預測，使企業(yè)能達到一個特定的外國市場既可以通過外商直接投資和出口似乎是有分歧的

85、國家——而且公司層面的證據說明了數字第三章。在這兩個部分的跟隨，我們討論標準模型的擴展，跨國公司，可以解釋的共存和正相關的外國直接投資和出口。第六章，我們調查的證據，描述方法回歸的方法，考察了export-FDI關系。結論部分提出了我國在第七什么課的理論，從跨國公司應汲取的實證文獻。</p><p>　　二、 單產品跨國公司和替代的理由</p><p>　　我們從一開始就有可能存在的最簡單

86、的模型，考慮成立一個跨國公司。該公司生產一種產品，把他賣給消費者，在這兩個國家(家，家H和外國(外國，F)。圖1說明了三個選項提供給公司。默認的立場堅定，因為它首先是服務于國外市場的家集中化”。第二個選擇是要打開一個植物在外國滿足這一市場在繼續(xù)為國內市場與原植物。我們把這稱為“復制”，因為它涉及到創(chuàng)造的復制品家工廠在外國。使用復制相關的形式消除了出口以來家跨國公司現在集中化服務每一位鋪墊。本文概述了替代的理論來識別經濟機制跨國公司直接投

87、資(FDI)和出口連接。然后，我們回顧文獻上的大型出口和外國直接投資是否都是互為補充的或補語。除了少數例外，大多數研究找到一個正面的關系出口和外國直接投資。</p><p>　　第三個選擇就是關閉家工廠和運用一種新的工廠在外國制造為這兩個市場。這個“外國集中化的形態(tài)包括進口回到國內市場。大概是一些控活動(控制)呆在家里，否則我們只會集中看到這是家的角度，從外國。我們將明確地考慮一個二級跨國公司后，但現在我們要保持

88、聚焦于一個單一的經營單位。</p><p>　　我們可以用一點點的代數，以使我們的分析更準確。我們把每個市場的大小為公司的產品被看成是給定的，MH國內外客戶物流客戶在國外。我們指定的水平的需求，以避免在每個國家exogenously不得不考慮的定價決策。潛在的假設，每個消費者已經將一個單位的需求以一個價格小于或等于他或她的估價和零單位以任何代價在上空。因此該公司收費價格等于每個消費者的支付意愿。這意味著骨料收入并

89、不依賴于戰(zhàn)略公司選擇和我們可以專注于識別cost-minimizing策略。這種方法適用于概述這個基本的案例，來替代。但是，當我們考慮此案的互補性，它將證明以允許downward-sloping重要需求曲線。</p><p><b>　　圖 1</b></p><p>　　單產品公司的三大戰(zhàn)略</p><p>　　我們假設有一個綜合的可變因素，

90、我們將介紹勞動和表示該復合變量因素作為王正坐席的工資價格在家里，WF在國外。個體公司具有獨一無二的技術使得它變換變量作為輸入到最終產品與生產效率，不依賴于居住的國家，它產生的。</p><p>　　總成本的家庭集中、 CH，是由于</p><p>　　CH = (wH /A) MH + (wH /A+TF ) MF +K (1)</p><p>　　凡 wH /A

91、邊際成本的家庭生產、 TF 代表出口到國外市場的貿易費用、 MF 是國外的市場的大小，K 代表首都 (土地、 建筑物的固定的成本設備） 部署在家庭工廠。為簡單起見，假設這種成本無關上哪個國家的工廠內置的。如果公司來打開另一種植物，便要承擔資本成本的兩倍。但是，它將能夠避免由服務本地市場的貿易成本。因此，獲復制成本</p><p>　　CR = (wH /A) MH + (wF /A) MF +2K. (2)<

92、;/p><p>　　家庭工廠關閉和轉移到國外可以降低回 K，假定所有家庭投資 K 可逆的固定的成本 （即，它可以出售的全部價值或遷往零成本）。根據外國的集中，貿易成為再次必要。導入家的外國制造的產品的成本被表示作為治療。因此獲外國集權的費用</p><p>　　CF = (wF /A) MF + (wF /A+ TH) MH +K. (3)</p><p>　　在此示例

93、中的跨國經營戰(zhàn)略只是要求我們比較 CH、 CR和 CF 并選擇的窗體，以最低的成本收益率。三路比較可以很復雜，所以我們會撥出外資集中考慮家庭集中 （導出） 而不是復制的優(yōu)點。當家庭集中是首選</p><p>　　CR – CH = K+( wF /A) MF –( wH /A+ TF) MF >0.(4)</p><p>　　請注意，在國內市場的生產成本已取消彼此出由于這兩種形式涉及

94、使用家庭工廠的這一市場。除以大小的國外市場，MF，我們可以看到導出最好進行復制時</p><p>　　wF /A +K/ MF > wH /A + TF. (5)</p><p>　　圖 2 圖左邊和右邊雙方的不平等。由此可見復制海外投資可以只合理的外國市場足夠大時。</p><p>　　我們可以解決復制投資的關鍵市場所需的大小 tojustify。這是 MF

95、 * 設置 CH = CR：</p><p>　　MF*= K/[ TF –( wF – wH )/A]. (6)</p><p>　　公司集中在國內兩個市場的生產和出口到國外市場何時 MF < MF *。較大的國外市場，他們從事外國直接投資和服務通過出口國外市場。在表達式中的每個詞對應于跨國公司理論中的一個重要概念。在表達式中的每個詞對應于跨國公司理論中的一個重要概念。在分子，K

96、表示火電規(guī)模經濟的重要性。較大的規(guī)模經濟，大將國外市場要證明的額外的固定成本設立海外新廠。作為分母的時候，我們看到了第一個貿易成本。越大它們，國外市場的臨界體積越小。括在圓括號中分母，我們看到了其本國的比較優(yōu)勢 (當wF – wH >0 時)。更大的家庭的比較優(yōu)勢，大國外市場便要理由復制投資。</p><p>　　三、觀察到外商直接投資與出口的關系</p><p>　　直截了當的直覺

97、，支持的代數II部分，表明出口和外國直接投資是替代模式為服務外國市場。在交易成本、市場變化大小、相對生產成本、或規(guī)模經濟的重要性相對利益轉移或另一方向，導致該公司能從一個切換模式給另一個人。它是自然的(但不正確)假設，這個理論的論點暗示每個人應該seea之間負相關關系的外國直接投資與出口數據。我們應該看到這中情況很少出現。在這部分中，我們采用三種數據直接看著變量之間的關系的興趣。</p><p>　　什么類型的數

98、據可以用于研究therelationship出口和外國直接投資之間?最明顯的是橫截面上的數據，那種潛在的東道國?？紤]一個給定的源的國家。它的公司可以選擇先發(fā)球其中的一些外國市場通過出口(附近的，小市場與低關稅)和一些通過FDI(那個遙遠的，較大的市場，與高關稅)。我們應該怎么福圖與FDI的出口水平層次看起來像這樣?以第二部分理論認真，我們預期所有的數據躺在水平軸(所有的企業(yè)都選擇FDI)或垂直軸(所有的企業(yè)都選擇出口)。外國直接投資與出

99、口之間的關系會必然是消極的。</p><p>　　圖 3 說明了外國直接投資的實際關系 betweencross 國家變化和出口使用布雷納附錄的德 （1997 年） 中的數據。在圖 3 中的每個點表示一個國家，用作標簽的 twoletter 國際標準組織 (ISO) 代碼。外國直接投資的措施是美國擁有的子公司，位于每個國家/地區(qū)的銷售。出口金額總計 （即不局限于我們的父母或附屬公司)。此圖的引人注目的方面是，外國