農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的再思考【外文翻譯】

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： CROP INSURANCE RECONSIDERED </p><p>　　出 處： Amer. J. Agr. Econ.

2、 </p><p>　　作 者： JOSEPH W. GLAUBER </p><p>　　CROP INSURANCE RECONSIDERED</p><p>　　JOSEPH W. GLAUBER</p><p>　　During the late 1980s an

3、d early 1990s, there was much debate over how to fix what were perceived as the “failures” of the Federal crop insurance program. The Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Act of 1980 made crop insurance the primary form of

4、 disaster protection for agricultural producers, replacing a standing disaster assistance program with subsidized crop insurance. To encourage sales, private companies were enlisted to deliver the product and significant

5、ly share in the underwriting risks. </p><p>　　The perceived failures of crop insurance were many. At the time of passage of the 1980 Act, Congress envisioned a participation rate approaching 50% of eligible

6、acres by the end of the decade. Despite premium subsidies and expanded coverage, crop insurance participation grew very slowly. When a major drought struck the Midwest in 1988, only 25% of eligible acreage was enrolled i

7、n the program nationwide and participation was even less in states such as Illinois and Indiana (Chite).Widespread crop</p><p>　　In addition to its failure to replace disaster assistance, the actuarial perfo

8、rmance of the crop insurance program was dismal throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The aggregate loss ratio, that is, total indemnities divided by total premiums (including premium subsidies), exceeded 150% over 1981–

9、93. Poor actuarial performance was blamed on expansion of coverage into new areas without having adequate data to rate risks which contributed to adverse selection problems and the difficulty in monitor</p><p&

10、gt;　　Finally, despite large actuarial losses, companies shared little of the underwriting risks. Over 1981–90, total indemnities exceeded total premiums (including premium subsidies) by $2.3 billion. Over the same period

11、, companies recorded net underwritings “gains” of $102 million (Glauber and Collins). This prompted repeated criticism from the U.S. General Accounting Office (1981, 1987, 1992) that companies were not adequately sharing

12、 in risks.</p><p>　　Within ten years of the 1980 Act, poor performance of the crop insurance program prompted the Bush Administration to propose eliminating the crop insurance program and replacing it with a

13、 standing disaster program (Gardner 1994). The proposal received little interest in Congress, but the criticism of the crop insurance program remained unabated. </p><p>　　Widespread crop losses due to the 19

14、93 floods in the Midwest prompted yet another disaster bill. This time, however, Congress and the Clinton Administration agreed on the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which authorized additional premium subsidies to i

15、ncrease participation. Yet, despite increases in participation, Congress passed ad hoc disaster legislation covering losses in 1998, 1999, and 2000. In 2000, Congress passed the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, which pr

16、ovided further subsidies</p><p>　　Now, fifteen years and two reform bills later, the crop insurance program boasts an 80% participation rate with over 215 million acres enrolled and a total liability estimat

17、ed in excess of $46 billion for 2004 (Davidson). Over Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86 (Number 5, 2004): 1179–1195 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association 1180 Number 5, 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 57% of participa

18、ting acres are enrolled at coverage levels in excess of 65%. The loss performance of the crop insurance pro</p><p>　　Yet, have the program reforms since 1994 really addressed the fundamental failures raised

19、fifteen years ago? Despite large gains in participation, Congress continues to pass ad hoc disaster legislation; two years after passage of the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, Congress passed supplemental disaster assi

20、stance to cover 2002 crop losses. The costs of the program have risen dramatically as well. Expected annual costs of the program are over $3 billion—compared with less than one-third of that</p><p>　　In the

21、following sections, the paper reconsiders the crop insurance program and the problems of agricultural insurance more generally. It draws on the large literature that has emerged on crop insurance, particularly over the p

22、ast ten years. Economic research on crop insurance can be traced at least as far back as Valgren’s 1922 study of private insurance markets.2 However, the amount of research on crop insurance has increased dramatically ov

23、er the past ten years, paralleling the growth n the p</p><p>　　The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the demand for crop insurance and why participation in the crop insur-ance program

24、has depended on large subsidies. The following section examines the problems of rating agricultural production risks and how subsidies mask actuarial performance. The unintended effects of subsidized crop insurance on pr

25、oduction are considered in section “Effects of Crop Insurance on Production.” The section “Alternative Crop Insurance Plans” examines al</p><p>　　The Demand for Crop Insurance</p><p>　　Table 1 s

26、hows the growth of the crop insurance program since 1981. Participation in the program grew slowly in the 1980s, reaching only 55.6 million acres in 1988, about 25% of eligible acreage. Participation reached 40% in 1989

27、and 1990, largely because of disaster legislation that required recipients of disaster payment in 1988 and 1989 to buy crop insurance in the subsequent crop year. By 1993, participation had</p><p>　　fallen t

28、o 32% of eligible area (Glauber and Collins).</p><p>　　Over the period 1981–93, participating producers received, on average, about $2 in indemnity payments for every $1 of premium paid. Why then did partici

29、pation rates in the program remain so low throughout the 1980s and early 1990s? The most often cited reason is adverse selection (see, e.g., Miranda). Adverse selection problems arise when risks vary across insurance buy

30、ers and buyers know more about the risks they face than does the insurer who sets the rates (Hirshleifer and Riley). Thus, produ</p><p>　　By the end of the 1980s, it was clear to policy makers that the subsi

31、dy levels provided under the 1980 Act were not sufficient to achieve50% participation without either making insurance purchases compulsory or increasing the level of the subsidy. In their analysis of theU.S. crop insuran

32、ce program, Gardner and Kramer concluded</p><p>　　that premiums would have to be subsidized as much as 50% to achieve 50% participation. Similar conclusions were reached by Wright and Hewitt and Goodwin and

33、Smith (1995).</p><p>　　Congress responded by both making insurance compulsory and increasing remium subsidies. Under the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, producers of insurable crops were eligible to recei

34、ve a basic level of coverage, catastrophic risk protection (CAT), which initially covered 50% of a producer’s approved yield at 60% of the expected market price.3 CAT coverage was required for producers who participated

35、in the commodity price support and production adjustment programs, farm credit, or other farm pr</p><p>　　To encourage further enrollment in higher coverage levels, Congress provided supplemental premium sub

36、sidies in the 1999 and 2000 crop years and in 2000 passed the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, which increased subsidy levels for most buy-up levels (table 2). Enrollment in the crop insurance program rose from 182 mill

37、ion acres insured in 1998 to over 217 million in 2003, almost a 20% increase. Where less than 8% of insured acres were enrolled at coverage levels greater than 65% in 1998, over 5</p><p>　　The experience of

38、the past twenty-five years suggests that with adequate subsidies, producers will buy crop insurance, but the marginal</p><p>　　costs are large. Because the demand for crop insurance is generally inelastic wi

39、th respect to premium (Goodwin, Coble and Knight), the marginal per acre costs of enrolling additional acres into the program are high. Figure 1 shows premium subsidies plotted against buyup</p><p>　　acres o

40、ver 1981–2003. It shows how the marginal costs of enrolling additional buy-up acres have increased as subsidy levels have increased</p><p>　　under successive crop insurance reform legislation. Because subsid

41、ies are applied to all participating acres, it becomes more and more expensive to coax in acreage at the margin. Estimated at the mean buy-up acreage over the period, the marginal cost per acre (in $2000) during 1981–94

42、was $3.31 per acre, compared to an average per acre subsidy of $2.73. During 1995–98, the marginal subsidy cost per acre was $10.51 compared with an average per acre subsidy of $4.99. From 1999 to 2003, the margina</p

43、><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　?。ㄗⅲ和馕念}目、出處、作者的英文為Times New Roman字體；譯文題目字體為黑體小二號(hào)，一級(jí)標(biāo)題以三號(hào)黑體居中打?。幌驴找恍校ㄐ虚g距22磅）為二級(jí)標(biāo)題,以四號(hào)黑體左起空兩行打印,三級(jí)標(biāo)題以小四號(hào)黑體左起空兩行打印，換行后以小四號(hào)宋體空兩行打印正文。）</p><p><b

44、>　　農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的再思考</b></p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)80年代末和90年代初，人們對(duì)于如何解決被認(rèn)為“失敗”的聯(lián)邦農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃有很多的爭論。1980年頒布的聯(lián)邦農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)改進(jìn)法把農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)作為農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)者災(zāi)難保護(hù)的主要形式，用農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)助來替代一個(gè)長期的災(zāi)難援助計(jì)劃。為了鼓勵(lì)銷售，私營企業(yè)被贊許交付產(chǎn)品，這樣很大程度上分擔(dān)了保險(xiǎn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。幾乎一夜之間，農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃從一項(xiàng)只提供國家有限范圍內(nèi)，有限

45、數(shù)量的農(nóng)業(yè)物的試點(diǎn)計(jì)劃轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐豁?xiàng)涵蓋最主要的農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)地區(qū)的最主要的農(nóng)作物的全國性計(jì)劃。</p><p>　　被認(rèn)為失敗的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)有很多。在1980年通過的法案里，國會(huì)預(yù)想十年后有將近50%農(nóng)保參與率的合格農(nóng)田數(shù)。不管額外的保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)貼和擴(kuò)充的保險(xiǎn)范圍，農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)發(fā)展的非常的緩慢。1988年的一場干旱，嚴(yán)重影響了美國的中西部，當(dāng)時(shí)只有25%的合格的土地面積，像伊利諾州和印第安那等地方的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)參與率則更加少(Chite)

46、。廣泛的農(nóng)作物損失和低的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)參與率使得國會(huì)通過補(bǔ)充災(zāi)難援助的法條，在十年內(nèi)花了近50億美元在災(zāi)難援助上，包括1988年和1989年的農(nóng)作物損失(格勞伯和柯林斯)。</p><p>　　除了替代災(zāi)害援助的失敗之外，在整個(gè)80年代和90年代初，農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃的保險(xiǎn)統(tǒng)計(jì)的業(yè)績也是相當(dāng)糟糕的。合計(jì)的損失率，即總的賠償金比上總保險(xiǎn)金額（包括保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)貼），在1981到1993年這段時(shí)間超過了150%。低的保險(xiǎn)統(tǒng)計(jì)業(yè)績被歸咎于

47、在擴(kuò)大新的區(qū)域的覆蓋范圍時(shí)，沒有適當(dāng)?shù)臄?shù)據(jù)來評(píng)估導(dǎo)致逆向選擇的問題，也就是在監(jiān)控農(nóng)業(yè)工人行為上的困難，即由于道德危機(jī)（投保人可能不可靠）而形成的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)（美國審計(jì)院，1993）。</p><p>　　最終，雖然大量的保險(xiǎn)損失，但公司只承擔(dān)了少量的保險(xiǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在1981-90年間，總的賠償金超過總的保險(xiǎn)金額達(dá)23億，在相當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)期，公司記載的凈保險(xiǎn)收益為一億兩百萬，這個(gè)被美國審計(jì)院反復(fù)提出批評(píng)（1981,1987,1992

48、）說公司并沒有分擔(dān)足夠的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　在1980年法案后的十年內(nèi)，農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的差的效果致使布什政府建議廢除農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃，用長期的災(zāi)難計(jì)劃來代替（加德納 1994）。這項(xiàng)提議雖然并沒引起國會(huì)的重大興趣，但是對(duì)農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃的批評(píng)并沒有減弱。</p><p>　　1993年美國中西部的洪災(zāi)所引發(fā)的廣泛的農(nóng)作物損失引起了另外一種災(zāi)難法案。這次，然而，國會(huì)和克林頓政府贊成1994年的農(nóng)業(yè)

49、保險(xiǎn)改良法，提供進(jìn)一步附加保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼來增加參與。然而，盡管參與的增加，國會(huì)通過了特設(shè)災(zāi)難立法來替代損失在1998年，1999年和2000年。在2000年，國會(huì)通過的農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保護(hù)法，提供了進(jìn)一步的補(bǔ)貼來鼓勵(lì)農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)購買。</p><p>　　現(xiàn)在，15年來的兩個(gè)改革法案后，農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃已經(jīng)很成功了，在2004年已經(jīng)有百分之八十的參與率，登記的合格用地面積超過兩億一千五百萬英畝，總負(fù)債達(dá)到460億(Davidson)

50、。在2004年農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)會(huì)出版的“美國農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)”中的1180頁中提出57%的多人參與英畝被登記在超過65%的覆蓋水平上。農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的壞的業(yè)績也有所提升。在1994-2003年中，農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃總計(jì)的損失率為98%，農(nóng)業(yè)部秘書的結(jié)論是：“這個(gè)全國規(guī)模的計(jì)劃在有健全的財(cái)政，適當(dāng)?shù)脑u(píng)估，和有效的管理” (克曼)。政府和私營企業(yè)之間的新的再保險(xiǎn)金額協(xié)議規(guī)定在遇到大范圍的農(nóng)作物損失時(shí)，企業(yè)要保留更大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和承擔(dān)更多的保險(xiǎn)損失。</p>

51、<p>　　然而15年前1994年提出的這個(gè)計(jì)劃的改革真的解決了根本的問題了嗎？盡管在參與率上有很大的提高，但國會(huì)仍繼續(xù)通過特設(shè)的災(zāi)難法規(guī)；在通過農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保護(hù)法的兩年后，國會(huì)通過了許多附加的災(zāi)難援助，包括2002年代的災(zāi)難損失。這個(gè)計(jì)劃的花費(fèi)也同樣的劇烈的上升。該計(jì)劃預(yù)期的年度花費(fèi)超過了30億美元，不少于15年前的三分之一的成本。增加的補(bǔ)貼反過來使使人們對(duì)于產(chǎn)品的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的扭曲效果產(chǎn)生了憂慮。雖然總計(jì)的保險(xiǎn)統(tǒng)計(jì)的業(yè)績提高了，但

52、大的地區(qū)差異也形成了。最后，雖然私營企業(yè)承擔(dān)了更多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但是他們因?yàn)閺倪@個(gè)計(jì)劃中賺得的巨大的保險(xiǎn)收益也使得企業(yè)遭受越來越多的批評(píng)。</p><p>　　在接下來的段落里，這篇論文重新考慮了農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)和一般農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)所出現(xiàn)的問題。它運(yùn)用了大量的關(guān)于農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的文獻(xiàn)，特別是這十年里的。關(guān)于農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)研究最早要追溯到1992年Valgren的私人保險(xiǎn)市場的研究中。然而，在過去十年內(nèi)，隨著這個(gè)計(jì)劃本身的增長，相應(yīng)的關(guān)于農(nóng)

53、業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的文獻(xiàn)研究也劇烈的增加。例如，在1981年到1993年間，在美國農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)日報(bào)上發(fā)表了10篇農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的文章，而從1994年開始，已經(jīng)已經(jīng)有51篇文章發(fā)表了，在2003年和2004年間就發(fā)表了20多篇。</p><p>　　這篇文章的組織如下所示。下一章調(diào)查了農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的要求和農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃的參與量取決于龐大的補(bǔ)貼。再接著一段分析了評(píng)定農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)品風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的問題和補(bǔ)貼如何掩蓋了保險(xiǎn)統(tǒng)計(jì)的業(yè)績?！八綘I公司和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共享”這章說了

54、私營部門在計(jì)劃交付和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分享中扮演了什么角色?！稗r(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)對(duì)生產(chǎn)的影響”這章說了在生產(chǎn)上補(bǔ)助的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的非計(jì)劃中的影響。替代農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃說了替代選擇對(duì)經(jīng)營生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的重要性，包括區(qū)域產(chǎn)量期權(quán)和露天的衍生產(chǎn)品。摘要和總結(jié)構(gòu)成了最好一章。</p><p><b>　　農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的要求</b></p><p>　　表1顯示了從1981年以來農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃的增長。該計(jì)劃的參與量在20

55、世紀(jì)80年代增長是十分緩慢的，在1988年只達(dá)到了5660萬英畝，合格土地面積大約在25%。但在1989年到1990年的參與率達(dá)到了40%，其主要原因是由于當(dāng)時(shí)的災(zāi)難條例規(guī)定1988-1989年的災(zāi)難補(bǔ)助的接受者必須在下一個(gè)生產(chǎn)年度購買農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)。在1993年，合格土地面積跌到了32%(格勞伯和柯林斯)。</p><p>　　在1981年到1993年期間，參與的生產(chǎn)者平均投保每1美元相應(yīng)的能收到2美元的補(bǔ)償金。為何

56、然后在該計(jì)劃中的參與率仍然很低，在整個(gè)八十年代和九十年代初？最常見的一種說法是逆向選擇。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而異保險(xiǎn)買家和買家知道更多有關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)他們面對(duì)比承保人設(shè)置率時(shí)，就會(huì)引發(fā)逆向選擇的問題（赫什利佛-萊利），預(yù)期的賠償超過保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)的生產(chǎn)者最可能購買保險(xiǎn)；其成本超過其預(yù)期的賠償金是不太可能購買。第二，研究顯示那些農(nóng)民和農(nóng)莊主人使用各種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理策略來減輕他們所面對(duì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(哈伍德以及美國總審計(jì)局)。在這段期間作物保險(xiǎn)參與實(shí)證研究證實(shí)許多這些做法的意見對(duì)參與產(chǎn)

57、生了負(fù)面的影響(見 Knight and Coble 1997)。</p><p>　　到20世紀(jì)80年代末，政策制定者很清楚1980年法中的提供的補(bǔ)貼水平并不能達(dá)到50%的參與率，在既沒有制定保險(xiǎn)強(qiáng)制購買，也沒有增加補(bǔ)貼水平的情況下。在他們對(duì)美國農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)計(jì)劃的研究中，加德納和克雷默推斷如果要達(dá)到50%的參與率，必須再增加50%的保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)助。萊特、休伊特、古德溫和史密斯在1995年提出了類似的結(jié)論。</p&g

58、t;<p>　　大會(huì)作出反應(yīng)，使保險(xiǎn)強(qiáng)制性，同時(shí)增加保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)補(bǔ)貼。在1994年的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)改良法下，保作物的生產(chǎn)者都有資格領(lǐng)取基本級(jí)別的覆蓋范圍最初所涵蓋的一個(gè)生產(chǎn)核準(zhǔn)產(chǎn)量預(yù)期市場價(jià)格的 60%50%的災(zāi)難性的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保護(hù) (CAT)。類覆蓋范圍是需要生產(chǎn)者參加了商品價(jià)格支持和生產(chǎn)調(diào)整方案、 農(nóng)場信用或其他農(nóng)場程序。雖然類覆蓋的地價(jià)成本完全由政府資助，但是生產(chǎn)者也要付每郡沒產(chǎn)量50美元的注冊費(fèi)。另外，1994年的法案給予額外的補(bǔ)貼

59、給覆蓋水平超過50%的（購買水平）。1995年超過兩億兩千萬英畝的土地登記在這個(gè)計(jì)劃中，有80%以上的合資格畝 (不包括干草)，其中一半以上達(dá)到了氧化氫酶水平。國會(huì)對(duì)生產(chǎn)者的批評(píng)作出回應(yīng)，消除在1996年引起氧化氫酶水平下降的強(qiáng)制性規(guī)定。然而，購買覆蓋率繼續(xù)增加，在1998年達(dá)到了一億兩千萬英畝（格勞伯和柯林斯）。為了進(jìn)一步鼓勵(lì)更加高的登記的覆蓋水平，國會(huì)通過農(nóng)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)保護(hù)法在1999年到2000年度增加了額外的保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)貼，并對(duì)大部分購買水

60、平增加了補(bǔ)貼的檔次（表2）。登記入的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)參與率出1998年的一億八千兩百萬增加到了2003年的二億一千七百萬，幾乎增加了20%。凡低于 8%的保險(xiǎn)</p><p>　　由過去的25年經(jīng)驗(yàn)可以看出，如果有充足的保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)貼，生產(chǎn)者就會(huì)參加農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)，但是邊際花費(fèi)是巨大的。因?yàn)閷?duì)農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的需求和保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)一般是非彈性的（Goodwin, Coble and Knight)，該計(jì)劃每畝注冊的邊際成本很高。圖1是根據(jù)1981年

61、到2003年的保險(xiǎn)購買數(shù)而繪制的。它解釋了在連續(xù)的農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)貼改良下，當(dāng)補(bǔ)貼水平上升時(shí)，增加的保險(xiǎn)購買的邊際成本是如何增加的。因?yàn)檠a(bǔ)貼將應(yīng)用于所有參與畝，用來有誘導(dǎo)英畝數(shù)所花的成本將更昂貴。估計(jì)平均的買盤面積期間，每英畝 (在 2000美元) 在這期間 。1981–94期間的邊際成本是平均每畝補(bǔ)貼3.31美元，，平均補(bǔ)貼為每畝2.73美元。在 1995–98期間，，平均補(bǔ)貼為每畝10.51美元，平均成本為4.99美元。在1999年到20