歐共體紡織行業(yè)進(jìn)口政策【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　The EC's Import Policy for Textiles</p><p>　　Material Source: http://springer.lib.tsinghua.edu.cn/cont

2、ent/f42n1706124048j0/</p><p>　　Author:Hans-Dieter Kuschel, Bonn</p><p>　　The trade policy of the European Community in the textile and clothing sector has repeatedly encountered criticism. Indus

3、try and unions both were critical of the length of time it took the Community to make up its collective mind-from the Multilateral Textile Agreement concluded in Geneva in December 1973 until the start of the negotiation

4、s with the textile-exporting countries about export self-restraint agreements and the long drawn-out nature of these negotiations because in the meantime impo</p><p>　　The extent of the criticism and the co

5、ntrary nature of the opinions expressed show how difficult it was to develop a common import policy which would take account of industry's demands for a safeguard against market disruptions and at the same time allow

6、 for the interest of the consumer in comprehensive and cheap supplies. </p><p>　　Like most of the textile-exporting countries, the EC in implementing the Multilateral Textile Agreement opted for the instrum

7、ent of export self-restraint agreements. What can be said for such a solution is this: According to the criteria laid down in the Multilateral Textile Agreement export self-restraint agreements are already admissible in

8、cases where a real danger of a market disruption exists. With a number of products it would have been difficult to prove that a market disruption had actu</p><p>　　The European Community faced particular dif

9、ficulties in fulfilling its obligations under the Multilateral Textile Agreement. The introduction of common restrictions or the transition to a common liberalisation presupposed within the EC a harmonization of the ra

10、ther different trading policies of the member states. Such harmonization requires also an extensive standardization on the part of member states of their economic, and specially their structural, policies which are the

11、 cause of the div</p><p>　　With these different starting points and the relatively short time-limits laid down by the Multilateral Textile Agreement, a harmonization of the different trading policies which w

12、ould have totally corresponded with the objectives of that agreement could not be achieved immediately. A number of EC member states which had protected certain production lines by way of extremely small quotas would h

13、ave been unable to open up their markets at once without causing an accentuation of the structural</p><p>　　Global or Selective Import Restrictions</p><p>　　Between the principal textile-impor

14、ting areas-the EC and the USA-opinions began to differ soon after the Multilateral Textile Agreement had come into force on how to formulate the export self-restraint agreements. The  was should these restrictions b

15、e global or selective. </p><p>　　The export self-restraint agreements of the USA provide for a global restriction on imports of all kinds of textiles and clothing; the imports of non-sensitive products are l

16、eft free of all further restrictions until the moment the upper global ceiling is reached. For sensitive products a lower ceiling is fixed with firm growth rates in each case. </p><p>　　By contrast, the self

17、-restraint agreements of the EC are based on the principle of selectivity. The intention is to isolate a disturbance of the market, as far as this is economically justifiable and technically feasible,by concentrating o

18、n certain sub-items of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature.The clothing positions show this with particular clarity (6101/6102).Thus the disturbance of the market equilibrium in the case of a sub-item, say that of woven m

19、en's trousers, need not lead to a rest</p><p>　　The Textile Committee which was set up by the Multilateral Textile Agreement has expressed no opinion on the issue of global or selective restrictions, t

20、hus failing to seize the opportunity of unambiguously interpreting the meaning of Article 4 of the Multilateral Textile Agreement. A look at the unambiguous formulation of the relevant provisions of the Agreement leaves

21、 no doubt that it proceeds from the principle of selectivity.</p><p>　　The Principle of World-wide Opening-up of Markets</p><p>　　The Community favours a structural change also in the textile a

22、nd clothing sector, i. e. the principle of a world-wide opening-up of markets applies also to this sector. Should, however, the imports from certain countries lead to a market disruption in the EC,the business sectors

23、concerned need protection in order to facilitate the structural change. This is in accordance with the principles laid down in the Textile Agreement, provided the protection is confined to the countries that have caus<

24、;/p><p>　　The principle of a world-wide opening-up of markets is being confirmed by the EC's present textile trading policy.Thus in the years from 1973 to 1975 textile imports from third countries as a whol

25、e rose by 24 p.c., those of clothing by 61 p.c. Imports from developing countries registered an increase of 19 p.c. for textiles and of 67 p.c. for articles of clothing.The considerably higher growth rate for imports of

26、clothing reflects the fact that, compared with the textile industry, the manufacture</p><p>　　In all, compared to the old restrictive policies of its member states, the new textile trading policy of the EC h

27、as led to a considerable advance towards liberalization.This applies particularly to France, Italy and Great Britain, but also to the Federal Republic of Germany where the extent of the previous restrictions, measured i

28、n six-digit items in the German Foreign Trade statistics, have been reduced by roughly 50 p.c. </p><p>　　The selective protective measures are being applied not statically but dynamically in response to a

29、particular market situation.The textile trading policy of the European Community has, therefore, brought about a shift in the previous restrictions. For the acceptance of the structural change and the principle of a wo

30、rld-wide opening-up of markets imply the abandonment of the habit of keeping for ever in force restrictions which have once been introduced. Changes that arise with regard to in</p><p>　　Existing restricti

31、ons in the member states of the EC in regard to countries from which market disruptions no longer threaten have been cancelled. Among such countries are the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, El Salvador, and Mexico. Restri

32、ctions have been reduced in the following cases:India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Japan, and Romania.The relaxation of the restrictions on imports from Japan reflects the change in the competitive situation between the Japa

33、nese and the European textile and clothing</p><p>　　The self-restraint agreement with Hong Kong has led to a reduction of the degree of liberalization which Germany had reached in its trade policy towards H

34、ong Kong. This backward move was due in the main to two factors; firstly, the attitude of EC member countries towards imports from Hong Kong varied considerably from country to country and these different policies need

35、ed bringing into line. Secondly, there was a sharp rise in the share of imports from Hong Kong in the domestic consumption. </p><p>　　Difficulties in Implementing the Export Self-restraint Agreements</p&

36、gt;<p>　　The self-restraint agreements are based on the principle of export limitation, i e. the exporting countries issue licences without which a product subject to the quota system may not be exported to the

37、EC. In the importing country the licence will be accepted as valid only if it contains confirmation of the fact that the exported quantity in question has been deducted from the quota for the particular member state.<

38、;/p><p>　　Leaving the administration of the quota system to the importing countries would presumably have been found an unacceptable proposition by the exporting countries and also among the member countries of

39、 the European Community only the Federal Republic of Germany made such a demand. An argument in favour of administering the quota system on the import side was the experience with previous export self-restraint agreemen

40、ts.The fixed export quotas had frequently been exceeded which necessitated the </p><p>　　In the case of products subject to export restrictions, a traffic in quotas has frequently sprung up - a development

41、 for which the quota administration has been severely criticised by the German trade. The quotas for manufactures for which the absorptive capacity of the Common Market exceeded the agreed export volume were brought

42、 and sold at considerable premiums; these in the case of T-shirts for men at one time amounted to as much as 70 p.c. of the selling price.</p><p>　　Two different systems may be chosen for the quota administr

43、ation. According to the procedure current in most industrial countries quotas are on principle non-transferable. In order to prevent un-used licences from expiring, German procedural law imposes on the holder of the lice

44、nce the obligation to return it, if he no longer intends to make use of it (30, part 1, External Trade Law; article 3, item 2, External Trade Regulations). As under this system unused licences are as a rule not returned

45、 </p><p>　　To avoid this danger, the quotas are declared transferable by most of the exporting countries, as for instance by Hong Kong and South Korea. If producers who have more orders than they have licenc

46、es for are thereby enabled to aquire at a premium licences from other manufacturers whose licences exceed their orders, well and good. This practice can only help to achieve the best possible use of the export quotas. F

47、requently, however, the traffic in licences is in the hands of a professional trader</p><p>　　The speculative activity of the broker no longer helps to achieve the best possible use of the available export q

48、uotas, but simply procures for him an extra profit which in the majority of cases is then passed on to the buyer of the imported goods in the form of a price increase. A reform of the quota administration system should,

49、therefore, start with the eradication of these malpractices. There are several ways of stopping this nuisance. In the first place it should be considered to allow quot</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p>

50、;<p>　　歐共體紡織行業(yè)進(jìn)口政策</p><p>　　資料來源:http://springer.lib.tsinghua.edu.cn/content/f42n1706124048j0/</p><p>　　作者：Hans-Dieter Kuschel, Bonn</p><p>　　歐共體在紡織品與服裝領(lǐng)域的貿(mào)易政策已多次遭到批評。工業(yè)和工會都批

51、評歐共體為了下決心花的時(shí)間太長——從1973年11月制定的日內(nèi)瓦多邊紡織品協(xié)議，到與紡織品出口國關(guān)于出口自限協(xié)定的談判的開始。由于談判同時(shí)期內(nèi)進(jìn)口增長迅速，根據(jù)多邊紡織品貿(mào)易協(xié)議規(guī)定，這又要求具有更高價(jià)值的協(xié)定，這些都導(dǎo)致談判的長時(shí)性。進(jìn)口貿(mào)易尤其反對針對香港和臺灣的限度的增加，服裝行業(yè)進(jìn)口的小幅度增長以及進(jìn)口商品限額導(dǎo)致的價(jià)格增長。</p><p>　　批評的范圍以及各種意見的矛盾展示了要達(dá)到一個(gè)能兼顧生產(chǎn)業(yè)和

52、消費(fèi)者兩者利益的政策困難，這個(gè)政策要既能使生產(chǎn)業(yè)免受市場混亂之苦又能保障消費(fèi)者以低廉的價(jià)格享受到豐富的產(chǎn)品。</p><p>　　與大多數(shù)紡織品出口國一樣，歐共體在執(zhí)行多邊紡織品協(xié)議時(shí)選擇了出口自限協(xié)定的手段。對這個(gè)選擇做出的解釋是：根據(jù)多邊紡織品協(xié)議的規(guī)則，當(dāng)市場混亂的危險(xiǎn)真的出現(xiàn)時(shí)，出口自限協(xié)定是已公認(rèn)的規(guī)則。由于商品眾多，要證明市場混亂已經(jīng)存在具有很大困難，但是又很有必要，以防單邊實(shí)施限制。出口自限協(xié)定使得

53、進(jìn)口政策在針對特定出口國時(shí)具有安全的契約性的基礎(chǔ)，比如說，協(xié)議可以在商品的自由流動中各種沖突允許的范圍內(nèi)達(dá)成。再者，矛盾的雙方都享有的制定協(xié)議的自由，使得他們可以通過提供統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)的交換，來提前分辨判斷出實(shí)際正在發(fā)生的或者即將發(fā)生的市場混亂，然后商議出共同對付的步驟。</p><p>　　在多邊紡織品協(xié)議規(guī)定之下，歐共體要完成自己的責(zé)任面臨著極大的困難。共同限制的引進(jìn)，或者說共同自由的過度，是以歐共體內(nèi)部各成員國之

54、間不同政策的協(xié)調(diào)為前提的。這種協(xié)調(diào)要求各成員國的經(jīng)濟(jì)、特別是使得貿(mào)易政策產(chǎn)生分歧的結(jié)構(gòu)政策，達(dá)到相當(dāng)高的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化。結(jié)構(gòu)政策顯示了各國在以下三方面的內(nèi)容：對外貿(mào)易的限制度，在各國經(jīng)濟(jì)效率所允許的情況下的進(jìn)口配額大小，以及各國給予本國紡織業(yè)和服裝業(yè)的扶助。</p><p>　　由于有這么多的分歧，在多邊紡織協(xié)議所給的相對短的時(shí)間限制內(nèi)，要使不同的貿(mào)易政策達(dá)到與協(xié)議完全一致的協(xié)調(diào)是不可能馬上實(shí)現(xiàn)的。許多歐共體成員國曾經(jīng)通

55、過極小的進(jìn)口配額來保護(hù)某些生產(chǎn)行業(yè)，要使他們立即開放市場，而不引起結(jié)構(gòu)問題的惡化以及由此引起的社會—政治后果，這些后果在1974、1975年的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的背景下幾乎不被接受。首先要做的是，在聯(lián)邦德國的支持結(jié)構(gòu)變化的自由貿(mào)易政策和其他許多國家的以保護(hù)已有結(jié)構(gòu)為目的更加嚴(yán)格的貿(mào)易政策之間達(dá)成一致。</p><p>　　全球性的還是選擇性的進(jìn)口限制</p><p>　　在主要的紡織品進(jìn)口領(lǐng)域，多邊

56、紡織品協(xié)議開始實(shí)施不久，歐共體和美國在關(guān)于怎樣規(guī)劃出口自限協(xié)定的意見就開始產(chǎn)生分歧，那就是，這些限制應(yīng)該是全球性的還是選擇性的？</p><p>　　美國提供的出口自限協(xié)定提供了一份關(guān)于各種紡織品和服裝進(jìn)口的全球性限定；非敏感性的產(chǎn)品在達(dá)到更高層次的全球最高限額之前都不做限制。敏感性的產(chǎn)品被設(shè)定了更低的最高限額，在每種情況下以穩(wěn)定的速率增加。</p><p>　　與此不同的是，歐共體的自我

57、限定協(xié)定是以選擇性的原則為基礎(chǔ)。目的是為了擺脫對市場的擾亂，以經(jīng)濟(jì)上的公正性和技術(shù)上的靈活性為前提，集中于《布魯塞爾稅則分類目錄》的某些子項(xiàng)。服裝業(yè)的位置清楚地顯示了這一點(diǎn)（6101/6102）。這樣，一個(gè)子項(xiàng)，比如說男士機(jī)織褲的市場平衡被打破，不必引起對于其他子項(xiàng)，例如《目錄》同一條目下的別的子項(xiàng)的的限制，比如男士機(jī)織上衣，例如外套，夾克，浴袍，風(fēng)雨衣，等等。對所使用的面料（羊毛，棉，人造纖維）種類的區(qū)別對待也與選擇性原則一致，如果市

58、場擾亂主要集中于某種面料的產(chǎn)品，以及通過改變面料種類來規(guī)避限制難以實(shí)現(xiàn)時(shí)。本文受到德國方面的擁護(hù)，在其他成員國的反對下卻難以得到廣泛承認(rèn)，因此也只部分的反映了出口自我限定協(xié)定。</p><p>　　由多邊紡織品協(xié)議選舉的紡織品委員會對于選擇性還是全球性的限制沒有表達(dá)意見，因此也就失去了清楚的解釋多邊紡織品協(xié)議《文4》的機(jī)會?？v觀協(xié)議各相關(guān)條款的規(guī)劃，毫無疑問，協(xié)議是源自選擇性原則。</p><

59、p>　　面向全世界開放市場的原則</p><p>　　歐共體也提倡對紡織品和服裝行業(yè)進(jìn)行結(jié)構(gòu)性調(diào)整，比如面向全世界開放市場對原則也適用于這個(gè)領(lǐng)域。然而，如果從某些國家進(jìn)口導(dǎo)致歐共體市場混亂對話，為了幫助調(diào)整順利進(jìn)行，需要對相關(guān)商業(yè)領(lǐng)域進(jìn)行保護(hù)。這也是與紡織品協(xié)議的規(guī)定相符對，前提上保護(hù)只局限于已引起市場混亂的國家。歐共體對紡織品和服裝行業(yè)正在進(jìn)行一場深刻的結(jié)構(gòu)性調(diào)整——一場強(qiáng)度、速度和廣度都要遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過別的行

60、業(yè)的革命。這種結(jié)構(gòu)性調(diào)整反映在紡織品和服裝行業(yè)產(chǎn)量的停滯甚至萎縮，進(jìn)口比例的大幅增長，出口比例的緩慢增長，大量的公司的停止?fàn)I業(yè)，以及從業(yè)人員的穩(wěn)步減少上面。鑒于以上對種種情況，歐共體在將來將會仍然實(shí)施大量限制以緩和這種結(jié)構(gòu)性調(diào)整帶來對后果。</p><p>　　面向全世界開放市場的原則正被歐共體當(dāng)前的紡織品貿(mào)易政策確認(rèn)了。如此以來，從1973年至1975年，紡織品行業(yè)從第三國的進(jìn)口總量增加了24%，其中服裝行業(yè)增

61、加了61%.從發(fā)展中國家的紡織品進(jìn)口增加了19%，服裝產(chǎn)品進(jìn)口增加了67%。服裝行業(yè)進(jìn)口量對高速增長反映了一個(gè)事實(shí)，相對紡織品行業(yè)來說，服裝生產(chǎn)行業(yè)更加具有勞動密集的特點(diǎn)，因此使得歐共體的服裝行業(yè)在這個(gè)行業(yè)領(lǐng)域沒有競爭優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　總之，相對以前各成員國的嚴(yán)格的貿(mào)易政策，歐共體的新的紡織品貿(mào)易政策已經(jīng)朝自由貿(mào)易化前進(jìn)了一大步。這個(gè)進(jìn)步尤其在法國，意大利，和英國表現(xiàn)得明顯，但是在德國也同樣，在《聯(lián)邦德

62、國外貿(mào)統(tǒng)計(jì)》中以六位數(shù)項(xiàng)目計(jì)量顯示，以前的限制幅度也已經(jīng)減少了大約50%。</p><p>　　選擇性的保護(hù)方式不是靜態(tài)地實(shí)施，而是動態(tài)地實(shí)施，為了應(yīng)對特別的市場環(huán)境。因此， 歐共體的紡織品貿(mào)易政策已經(jīng)在以前的限制中帶來了變化，因?yàn)閷τ跈C(jī)構(gòu)性調(diào)整的接受和世界范圍對開放市場原則將意味著放棄永久保留曾經(jīng)被引進(jìn)的限制的習(xí)慣。有關(guān)個(gè)別產(chǎn)品或國家的調(diào)整可能是由競爭性的環(huán)境和生產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整以及歐共體某些成員國的需求改變引起的

63、。</p><p>　　歐共體成員國內(nèi)已存在的關(guān)于那些市場混亂危脅已不復(fù)存在的國家的限制已經(jīng)被取消。這些國家有菲律賓，泰國，埃及，薩爾瓦多，和墨西哥。限制在以下國家被減少：印度，巴基斯坦，南斯拉夫，日本，和羅馬尼亞。從日本進(jìn)口的限制的緩解反映了日本與歐洲紡織品和服裝業(yè)的競爭環(huán)境的改變：日本現(xiàn)在從歐洲的進(jìn)口多于它對歐洲的出口量。由于結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整，對臺灣和南韓的進(jìn)口限制也有所改變?？傊瑢@兩個(gè)國家的限制調(diào)整已經(jīng)有相當(dāng)

64、程度的緩解。新增加的限制針對巴西，澳門，哥倫比亞，馬來西亞和新加坡。然而，對聯(lián)邦德國而言，與巴西，澳門，新加坡的自限協(xié)定并不包含限制。歐共體與哥倫比亞的協(xié)議只提供了關(guān)于某些成員國的地區(qū)性限制；與新加坡和馬來西亞的協(xié)議，除了地區(qū)性限制外，還包含了一個(gè)適用于整個(gè)歐共體的限制。然而，這個(gè)限制不會從實(shí)質(zhì)上影響德國因?yàn)橄嚓P(guān)的條款保證了德國人可以在最高限額內(nèi)分享，因?yàn)檎麄€(gè)歐共體只是被當(dāng)做一個(gè)可以隨時(shí)超越的目標(biāo)數(shù)字。巴西，澳門，哥倫比亞，馬來西亞，和

65、新加坡等國擁有新發(fā)展起來的、享有可觀的低薪優(yōu)勢的行業(yè)，而且，他們補(bǔ)助的出口已經(jīng)在最近幾年顯示出異常的增長。比如，1970至1975年，德國從巴西進(jìn)口的紡織品和服裝產(chǎn)品年</p><p>　　歐共體與香港的自限協(xié)定引起了德國原本針對香港的貿(mào)易政策的自由度的削減。這一退步主要?dú)w咎于兩個(gè)因素：第一，歐共體各成員國對從香港進(jìn)口的態(tài)度有很大的區(qū)別，而這些不同的政策又都必須被協(xié)調(diào)；第二，國內(nèi)消費(fèi)中從香港的進(jìn)口的份額已經(jīng)有很大

66、的增長。在1970至1975年期間，德國從香港的進(jìn)口以20%的年增長率占據(jù)整個(gè)歐共體的首位。</p><p>　　貫徹出口自限協(xié)定的困難</p><p>　　自限協(xié)定是以出口限制原則為基礎(chǔ)的，比如說，沒有獲得出口國頒發(fā)的許可證的產(chǎn)品，不能出口到歐共體。只有該證書確認(rèn)其所出口的總量符合進(jìn)口國的配額這一事實(shí)時(shí)，該進(jìn)口國從會承認(rèn)該證書的有效性。</p><p>　　讓進(jìn)口

67、國實(shí)施限額制其實(shí)是出口國提出的一個(gè)不可能被接受的提議，在歐共體內(nèi)也只有聯(lián)邦德國提出這一要求。進(jìn)口方贊成承認(rèn)限額制的一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是其以前出口自限協(xié)定的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。既定的出口配額常常被超過，這就使得進(jìn)口方額外的核查成為必要。進(jìn)口與出口數(shù)據(jù)的統(tǒng)計(jì)的不同往往需要很長時(shí)期的談判來理清，而且最后結(jié)果常常是進(jìn)口方接受額外的進(jìn)口量。</p><p>　　以出口限制中的產(chǎn)品為例，非法交易常常凸顯出來——因?yàn)檫@種交易的發(fā)展，限額制常常遭到德國

68、客戶嚴(yán)厲的批評。當(dāng)共同市場的吸收能力超過了議定的出口總量時(shí)，生產(chǎn)配額內(nèi)的產(chǎn)品總是遠(yuǎn)高出市價(jià)的價(jià)格售出；其中的一個(gè)例子就是男士T恤，其售價(jià)一度曾高出市價(jià)70%。</p><p>　　限額制有兩種備選系統(tǒng)。根據(jù)大多數(shù)工業(yè)國家內(nèi)流通的程序，配額是以不可轉(zhuǎn)讓原則為基礎(chǔ)的。為了防止未使用過的許可證書失效，德國程序法規(guī)定，如果其持有者不再打算使用該證書，持有者應(yīng)該退回證書（30頁，第一部分，《外貿(mào)法》；文3，第二條，《外貿(mào)法

69、規(guī)》）。因?yàn)榘凑者@一系統(tǒng)規(guī)定，未使用過的證書不到其配額年限的最后是不能被返回的。這就存在著一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)，可能使生產(chǎn)容量沒有得到公正、最佳的利用。</p><p>　　為了避免這種危險(xiǎn)，大多數(shù)出口國都宣布限額可轉(zhuǎn)讓，香港和南韓就是如此。如果生產(chǎn)商的訂單超過其許可證書規(guī)定的總量，它可以有優(yōu)先的價(jià)格從其他許可的生產(chǎn)量大于其訂單的生產(chǎn)商手里取得證書。這是一種對生產(chǎn)配額利用的最好的實(shí)踐。然而，證書的交易常常是在職業(yè)的交易者的操

70、縱下進(jìn)行的，他們常常是不光作為中間人，而且是為了自己的利益，有目的地?cái)_亂市場。他們通過購買證書，使其暫時(shí)脫離市場，使得證書短缺，而導(dǎo)致其價(jià)格升高。</p><p>　　這種市場破壞者投機(jī)的活動是幫助利用生產(chǎn)配額的最好的方式，而是僅僅是給他帶來額外利潤的一種方式，在大多數(shù)情況下，這個(gè)利潤最終會以提價(jià)的方式分擔(dān)到進(jìn)口國內(nèi)的消費(fèi)者們的身上。因此，限額制的改革應(yīng)該首先消除這種非法活動。消除這種有害的活動有幾種方法。首先，