ceo報酬和公司績效的關(guān)系【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVES ON CEO COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE</p><p>　　Material Source: RISEC,Volume

2、 Author: MAHMOUD M.NOURAYI </p><p>　　1 Introduction</p><p>　　A significant component of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation con

3、tracts. A well-designed incentive system can deal effectively with both adverse-selection and moral hazard issues in an agency contract. The main objective of this study is to identify the influence of incentive contract

4、s and performance measures on executive compensation. We also assess the sensitivity of CEO pay to cash incentives as compared to stock-based incenti</p><p>　　The relationship between executive compensation

5、and corporate performance has been extensively studied by researchers from various perspectives. Research has confirmed the positive relation between firm size and executive compensation as well as the influence of firm

6、performance on executive pay. For the most part, interest has converged on the implications of agency theory with a concentration on the linkages between executive compensation and firm performance.</p><p>　

7、　Murphy (2000) indicates that a majority of companies use multiple measures of performance in rewarding their executives. The most popular forms of reward seem to be cash and company stock. Majority of public companies o

8、ffer stock options or restricted stock in order to assure the congruity of the manager’s welfare and the owner wealth-maximization objectives. Cash compensation to executives has two predominant components, fixed salary

9、and bonus. Bonuses are generally linked to some performance m</p><p>　　Stock grants and stock option grants are intended to reward the executives for choices that influence positive changes in the stock pric

10、es and as such may be considered a future-oriented reward system, as opposed to bonuses that are typically based on some accounting measure of profitability. However, it has been argued that accounting-based measures are

11、 ex-post, historical measures of performance, and are thus conceptually less relevant from the shareholder’s perspective. Conversely, market ret</p><p>　　2 Research Hypotheses</p><p>　　The amoun

12、t of compensation realized by the CEO as the result of stock-based incentives such as stock option grants and restricted stock grants, depends on the contractual restrictions as well as economic variables that affect res

13、tricted stock and stock option values. The stock options exercise price, the stock price at the time of grant and exercise, the volatility of stock</p><p>　　price, competitive market, the fiscal and monetary

14、 policies, as well as variables that influence the company’s stock price fluctuations between the grant date and the exercise date, all influence the stock-based compensation and are not entirely controllable by the CEO

15、. Therefore, stock-based compensation introduces a significant amount of risk into the agency relationship, Bertrand and Mullaiathan (2000) observe a lower sensitivity of CEO compensation to the rate of return to shareho

16、lders as t</p><p>　　Executive compensation research findings to date with respect to the explanatory power of accounting-based versus market-based measures of performance are not conclusive. We hypothesize t

17、hat various performance measures manifest themselves differently depending on the type of compensation. That is, cash components in the compensation package tend to be measured on the basis of accounting metrics, while s

18、tock-based components of compensation are likely to be influenced by stock market returns (Mu</p><p>　　Two measure of executive compensation are used in this study: cash compensation and total (cash and non-

19、cash ) compensation . Cash compensation (CASHCOMP) is defined as the sum of salary and bonus. Total compensation (TOTALCOMP) includes both cash and non-cash compensation. Non-cash compensation is composed of long-term in

20、centive payouts , the value of restricted stock grants, the value of stock option grants and any other compensation item for the year. The most popular incentives offered by th</p><p>　　Firm performance is m

21、odeled using both accounting-based and market -based measures. Market-based performance is measured as the total one-year shareholder return on common stock (TRS), defined as the closing price at fiscal year-end plus div

22、idends divided by the closing price of the prior fiscal year-end. Accounting-based performance is measured by return on assets (ROA), defined as income before tax, extraordinary items, and discontinued operations divided

23、 by average total assets. Finally, the </p><p>　　3 Sample Selection, Variable Measurements</p><p>　　This section describes the sample, data sources and variable measurement. All data for this st

24、udy are drawn from Standard & Poor’s (2004) ExecuComp database. The sample consists of panel data from 455 US firms and covers the period 1996-2002. This sample is obtained from an initial sample of 2,394 US firms af

25、ter imposing the condition that the CEO tenure extended over the entire period of 1996 to 2002, with full years of tenure in the period1997-2002, and at least 6 months of tenure in 1996. </p><p>　　Detailed i

26、nformation about industry composition of the sample is presented in Panel B of Table 1. The sample encompasses 25 industries, Electrical equipment is the industry with the largest sample representation, with 42 firms or

27、about 9.2 percent of the sample, followed by ‘insurance and other financial services’ and services, each with 32 firms or about 7 percent of the sample, and the chemical industry with 31 firms or about 6.8 percent of the

28、 sample. The industries with the smallest sample r</p><p>　　4 Analyses and Results</p><p>　　In this section we develop specific models of CEO compensation based on the general example presented

29、earlier. Both cash compensation (CASHCOMP) and total compensation (TOTALCOMP) are used as the dependent variables in empirical examinations. Consistent with prior research, we will use net annual sales as the proxy for f

30、irm size in all of our analyses. We use both accounting-based and market-based measures of performance in our models. More specifically, we include the total one-year shareholder</p><p>　　Initially we includ

31、e each performance measure in the model as a separate explanatory variable. We then include both measures of performance in the models and the year effect was included in every regression in the form of dummy variables a

32、s shown below:</p><p>　　(1) ln(CASHCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ1 TRSit+ γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(2) ln(CASHCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ2 ROAit + γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(3)

33、ln(CASHCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit) + δ1 TRSit + δ2 ROAit+ γ DUMYEARt+ εit</p><p>　　(4) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ1 TRSit+ γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(5) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = α + β ln(SAL

34、ESit)+ δ2 ROAit + γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(6) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit) + δ1 TRSit + δ2 ROAit + γ DUMYEAR +εit</p><p>　　Cross-section time-series regressions</p><p><

35、b>　　續(xù)表</b></p><p>　　The amount of increase (decrease) in the median CEO total compensation (TOTALCOMP) (Models 4 and 5) in response to a one percentage increase (decrease) in the market-based and th

36、e accounting-based returns are increases (decreases) of $9459 and $17780, respectively. Similar computations based on Model 6 produce results that are very close to those computed for model 5. The overall R2s are in the

37、0.35-0.37 range for cash compensation regressions (Models 1 through 3) compared to 0.29-0.31 for total</p><p>　　5. Concluding Remarks</p><p>　　This study contributes to the literature on executi

38、ve compensation and firm performance in several ways. Unlike past studies, we included both cash compensation and total compensation in our sample and analyzed the relationship between compensation structure and measures

39、 of performance. Our full-sample results indicate cash compensation is impacted by both accounting and market measures of performance while total compensation is more closely correlated with the market-based measure. We

40、find that</p><p>　　These points deserve closer attention. Studies examining the impact of a firm’s characteristics and CEO tenure on incentives and performance over a longer time period may produce additiona

41、l insights. Examinations of the relationship between CEO compensation and the performance of new economy firms, as well as firms within regulated industries, could produce useful information.</p><p><b>

42、;　　譯文</b></p><p>　　CEO報酬和公司績效的關(guān)系</p><p>　　資料來源：RISEC,Volume 作者：MAHMOUD M.NOURAYI </p><p><b>　　1 引言</b></p><p>　　管理人員控制系統(tǒng)的一個重大要素是以合同規(guī)定的薪酬為基

43、礎(chǔ)的激勵機(jī)制。一個設(shè)計好的激勵系統(tǒng)可能有效地應(yīng)付在代理合同中的有害選擇和代理人不可靠而產(chǎn)生的風(fēng)險問題。本文研究的主要目的是為了識別激勵的前提和以薪酬為激勵方式的影響。與股票的激勵比較，我們也估計了CEO對薪水激勵的敏感性。 </p><p>　　研究人員從不同角度研究了高級管理人員報酬同公司績效之間的關(guān)系。研究證實了企業(yè)規(guī)模和高管薪酬之間存在正相關(guān)以及高管薪酬對公司績效有影響。在大多數(shù)情況下，產(chǎn)權(quán)理論已經(jīng)融合了關(guān)

44、于代理理論的涵義，包含了高級管理人員報酬和公司績效之間的關(guān)系。 </p><p>　　墨菲（2000）表明，大多數(shù)公司對其高管的激勵，采取多種措施。激勵最主要的形式似乎是現(xiàn)金和公司股票。多數(shù)上市公司提供股票期權(quán)或限制性股票，以確保經(jīng)理的福利一致性和所有者財富最大化的目標(biāo)。高管的現(xiàn)金激勵有兩個主要組成部分，它們是固定工資和獎金。獎金與企業(yè)績效測度通常連接，而企業(yè)績效測度是通過企業(yè)的一些指標(biāo)來衡量。在這項研究中，我們

45、集中研究股票期權(quán)和獎金激勵。</p><p>　　股票獎勵和股票期權(quán)是企業(yè)給予高管的一種預(yù)期選擇，它受股票價格的影響，因此可以被認(rèn)為是面向未來的激勵制度，而不像獎金是企業(yè)通過一些會計利潤指標(biāo)來確定支付的。然而，有人認(rèn)為，會計為基礎(chǔ)的措施是事后，歷史的措施，相反，市場回報率使股票價格產(chǎn)生變化，這個在會計方面沒有明確的定義。從理論上講，基于市場的措施是事前，前瞻性的性能指標(biāo)，因為它們反映的是管理者決策能力，促使企業(yè)未

46、來的盈利能力的提高。然而在實踐中，股票價格是一個非常嘈雜的信號，因為他們經(jīng)常受到重大的市場范圍內(nèi)波動，反映了經(jīng)濟(jì)周期因素以及財政和貨幣政策的影響，因此不完全反映激勵效能。</p><p><b>　　2 研究假設(shè)</b></p><p>　　CEO得到的來自于諸如股票期權(quán)和限制性股票授予等股票激勵計劃的薪酬的數(shù)額，不僅取決于合同的限制，還受那些影響限制性股票和股票期權(quán)

47、價值變化的經(jīng)濟(jì)因素的限制。股票期權(quán)的行權(quán)價格、股票在贈與和行權(quán)時的價格、股價的波動性、競爭市場、財政和貨幣政策，以及在贈與日和行權(quán)日對公司股價的波動產(chǎn)生影響的變量，都會影響股票薪酬，并且這些因素都不能完全被CEO所控制。然而，股票薪酬制度給委托代理關(guān)系帶來了大量風(fēng)險；此外，根據(jù) Aggarwal和Samwick (1999)的觀點，薪酬作為考核績效的一種方法，已經(jīng)變得愈發(fā)不敏感。Bertrand和Mullaiathan (2000) 觀

48、察發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于股票變得更有波動性，CEO的薪酬對股東（投資）回報率的敏感程度變得更低。</p><p>　　迄今為止，關(guān)于高級管理人員的報酬研究 已經(jīng)找到了一個公認(rèn)的說法，以會計為基礎(chǔ)結(jié)合市場業(yè)績考核方式相結(jié)合。我們假設(shè)，根據(jù)各種業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)來確定各種報酬激勵。那就是說，現(xiàn)金激勵根據(jù)會計指標(biāo)來衡量，而股票激勵則受股市的影響(墨菲2000年; 霍爾和墨菲2002)。評價CEO薪酬和公司績效之間的關(guān)系，我們研究普遍的激

49、勵結(jié)構(gòu)，如高級管理人員的獎金激勵或者是股票期權(quán)激勵。據(jù)預(yù)計，這種激勵措施將會在CEO的決策過程中產(chǎn)生激勵效果，這種效果將會反映在公司結(jié)構(gòu)和公司特征中。我們通過兩分法將公司分成兩種，一種是有獎金激勵或股票期權(quán)激勵的公司，一種是沒有獎金激勵或股票期權(quán)激勵的公司。</p><p>　　在我們研究中，高級管理人員的兩種報酬是是現(xiàn)金報酬和總報酬（現(xiàn)金和非現(xiàn)金）現(xiàn)金報酬(CASHCOMP)被定義為固定工資和獎金的總和?？倛蟪?/p>

50、(TOTALCOMP)包含了現(xiàn)金和非現(xiàn)金報酬。非現(xiàn)金報酬是長期報酬支出，限制性股票的價值、股票期權(quán)的價值和其他的激勵項目是按年的計算的。最受歡迎激勵機(jī)制是在公司提供現(xiàn)金激勵的獎金和非現(xiàn)金的股票期權(quán)</p><p>　　企業(yè)績效的評估是同時使用以會計和市場為基礎(chǔ)指標(biāo)的方法。以市場為基礎(chǔ)衡量業(yè)績的指標(biāo)是為期一年的普通股股東回報率（TRS），其定義是在會計年度結(jié)束，公司上一會計年度末收盤價除以紅利。以會計基礎(chǔ)衡量業(yè)績的

51、指標(biāo)是資產(chǎn)報酬率（ROA），其為息稅前凈利潤除以總資產(chǎn)總額。最后,每年凈銷售(銷售)是代理企業(yè)的尺寸</p><p>　　3 樣本的選擇，變量的測量</p><p>　　本節(jié)描述了樣本，數(shù)據(jù)來源和變量的測量。本研究的所有數(shù)據(jù)都來自標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾（2004）ExecuComp數(shù)據(jù)庫。樣本包括來自455個美國公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)，涵蓋了1996-2002年期間。這個樣本是從2394個美國公司的初始樣本中選

52、取的，條件是CEO任期在1996至2002年期間并且任職期間滿二年，在1997-2002年任職滿整年，并在1996年至少任期6個月。</p><p>　　有關(guān)行業(yè)的樣本構(gòu)成的詳細(xì)資料載于表1的B小組。樣品包括25個行業(yè)，電氣設(shè)備行業(yè)是最大的樣本，約42個企業(yè)，占總樣本的百分之9.2；其次是保險和其他金融服務(wù)，約32公司，占總樣本的百分之7；再次是化學(xué)工業(yè)，大約有31個公司，占總樣本的百分之6.8；最小樣本代表性的

53、行業(yè)是采礦業(yè)，有4家企業(yè)，約占0.9個百分點，其他行業(yè)有玩具制造業(yè)和建筑業(yè)，共5個公司，約占1.1百分點。</p><p><b>　　4 分析和結(jié)果</b></p><p>　　在本節(jié)中，我們建立一個CEO薪酬模型，具體的例子在前面介紹過。這現(xiàn)金補償（CASHCOMP）和總補償（TOTALCOMP）被用來作為因變量在實證檢驗中。根據(jù)先前的研究, 在我們所有的分析中，

54、我們將用每年凈銷售作為企業(yè)規(guī)模。我們用兩個以會計和市場為基礎(chǔ)的指標(biāo)在我們的模型中。更具體地說，我們的自變量包括以市場為基礎(chǔ)的測量指標(biāo)和以會計為基礎(chǔ)的測量指標(biāo)，具體為資產(chǎn)回報率（ROA）和股東回報率（TRS）。我們使用的模型中，對激勵數(shù)據(jù)和銷售數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行對數(shù)變換，以減少誤差項的異方差問題。</p><p>　　首先，我們包含的每一個績效措施在每一個模型中作為獨立的表達(dá)變量，然后，影響極小措施效果的因素作為解釋變量，如

55、下所示：</p><p>　　(1) ln(CASHCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ1 TRSit+ γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(2) ln(CASHCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ2 ROAit + γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(3) ln(CASHCOM

56、Pit) = α + β ln(SALESit) + δ1 TRSit + δ2 ROAit + γ DUMYEARt+ εit</p><p>　　(4) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ1 TRSit+ γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(5) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit)+ δ2

57、 ROAit + γ DUMYEARt + εit</p><p>　　(6) ln(TOTALCOMPit) = α + β ln(SALESit) + δ1 TRSit + δ2 ROAit + γ DUMYEAR +εit</p><p><b>　　橫截面時間序列回歸</b></p><p>　　平均CEO的總報酬數(shù)量的增加（減少）從模

58、型4和五可以得到結(jié)論，即一個百分點的增加（減少），則會計基礎(chǔ)和市場基礎(chǔ)分別增加9459美元個17780美元。而模型6產(chǎn)生的效果,非常類似于模型5?，F(xiàn)金激勵模型的R2是0.35-0.37，其中現(xiàn)金激勵模型是模型1到模型3。而總報酬模型的R2是從0.29-0.31，其中總報酬模型是模型4到模型6。觀察Wald χ 2 可知每一個模型的概率都是0，所以所有模型都顯著。</p><p><b>　　5 總結(jié)&l

59、t;/b></p><p>　　這項研究是對高級管理人員激勵和公司業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系的研究，其有文獻(xiàn)方面的貢獻(xiàn)。不同于過去的研究中，在我們的樣本中既包括現(xiàn)金激勵和總報酬激勵，分析他們績效結(jié)構(gòu)和措施之間的的關(guān)系。我們的全現(xiàn)金激勵結(jié)果表明，樣本受會計和市場表現(xiàn)的影響，而總報酬激勵的措施與市場更加密切相關(guān)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)規(guī)模是決定現(xiàn)金和報酬總額的重要變數(shù)。然而，這些結(jié)果似乎是與實行獎金或股票期權(quán)計劃的企業(yè)關(guān)系更大。我

60、們把過去的研究數(shù)據(jù)，根據(jù)激勵結(jié)構(gòu)是否存在獎金和股權(quán)激勵報酬進(jìn)行劃分。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，CEO報酬與股票期權(quán)合約，受市場為基礎(chǔ)的業(yè)績衡量的影響超出了會計為基礎(chǔ)的業(yè)績衡量的影響。研究結(jié)果還表明，對于沒有獎金或股票期權(quán)激勵的企業(yè)，規(guī)模似乎并不被視為重要的CEO薪酬決定因素。數(shù)據(jù)表明，沒有獎金激勵的企業(yè)都明顯比那些有獎金激勵的小。即不是基于市場的措施，也沒有會計基礎(chǔ)的措施，在沒有激勵計劃的公司里，總報酬似乎已經(jīng)沒有任何激勵意義。為了更具體而言，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)