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1、河北工程大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文基于人力資本的經(jīng)營者收益分配與持股模式研究姓名:劉濤申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別:碩士專業(yè):企業(yè)管理指導(dǎo)教師:姚立根20070601Abstract IIAbstract Modern firm theory argues that enterprise is a complicated contract composed of human capital and non-human capital. Lying in the
2、core position of human capital, the manager’s human capital shares enterprise’ returns, which is the important content of transformation of modern corporate. In modern enterprise, the manager’s human capital participatin
3、g in the enterprise distribution of residual returns embodies concretely for stock incentive model. This thesis takes modern contract theory, property theory, human capital theory and incentive theory as the basic theor
4、y. It mainly deals with the model of management stock holding through theoretical and empirical analysis. Firstly, on the basis of the above analysis, the logical rationality is demonstrated that human capital shares ent
5、erprise residual returns. The necessity of manager’s distribution of returns and stock incentive is proposed. Secondly, the negotiations strength model with non-human capital is set up. And also, the corporate governance
6、 effect of human capital rights is analyzed. Then, based on human capital’s sharing enterprise residual returns, manager’s human capital share model is established composed of four models: yearly salary system; stock opt
7、ion incentive; spiritual incentive; fringe benefits. The model of management stock holding is the representative model of this thesis. At last, the model of management stock holding is classified. This thesis highlights
8、three main incentive models of enterprise managers: short-term stock, restricted stock, and stock option. It focuses on the research on their basic concepts, operation processes, and comparison of advantages and disadvan
9、tages with the relevant cases. This thesis tries to bring a very significant effect on enterprise governance and management incentive. Key words: human capital; distribution of returns; management stock holding; effect;
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