委托代理理論和人工信息不對(duì)稱【外文翻譯】

1、1外文文獻(xiàn)翻外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯譯譯文原文：PrincipalAgentTheyArtificialInfmationAsymmetryPrincipalsagentsasymmetryofinfmationTheinitialstepindevelopingtheiginalmodel’sunderlyingstructureisthedelegationoftaskstoanagentbyhisherprincipal.‘Therelat

2、ionshipofagencyisoneoftheoldestcommonestcodifiedmodesofsocialinteraction.Wewillsaythatanagencyrelationshiphasrisenbetweentwo(me)partieswhenonedesignatedastheagentactsfonbehalfofasrepresentativeftheotherdesignatedtheprinc

3、ipalinaparticulardomainofdecisionproblems’(Ross1973p.134).Thiscanbemotivatedbyalackoftimecapacitytoperfmthetaskthemselvesevensheerunwillingness.Thekeyassumptionisthatagentsprincipalspotentiallyhaveconflictingobjectives.I

4、fconflictingobjectivesareaccompaniedbyimperfectinfmationaboutanagenttheprincipalcannotcompletelycontrolhisheragent’sperfmance(LaffontMartimt2002).Theasymmetricaldistributionofinfmationismainlyofastructuralnature.Howevert

5、heinfmationgapisnotaxiomaticbutcanundercertaincircumstancesbebridgedmitigatedbypolicingeffts.Evenifmonitingistechnicallyfeasibleitisassumedtobesubjecttoacost–benefitanalysisthatislikelytorenderitastoocostlyinhighlycomple

6、xagencyrelationships.Thestructuraldisadvantageofasymmetricalinfmationcausesinefficiencyimperfectmarkets.Theprincipalcanapplyacostlystrategytoelicitprivateinfmationfromhisherchosenagentthusbalancingasymmetricalpatternsofi

7、nfmationdistribution.Wedistinguishbetweentwomodesofasymmetricalinfmation:(1)whenactionisunobservabletoaprincipalwerefertomalhazard(seeHlmstrom1979)hiddenaction(2)adverseion(Akerlof1970)referstotheriskarisingfromnotknowin

8、gthehabitacterofagents.Itistheprincipalwhobearsthecostofasymmetricalinfmationgoalvariancewhereastheagentcanshirkmegenerallypursue3pressuretoreassessitscentralproposition.Overalltheneedtorefmulateassumptionsaboutinfmation

9、controlgoalshasbeenrecognisedbytheeticaldevelopments.TheartificialityofinfmationasymmetryArtificialinfmationasymmetryreferstoatwodimensionalprincipal–agentrelationship.Itincludesagenuineagentagenuineprincipalbutalsoanact

10、whoisbothprincipalagent.Toillustratethispointassumethatapublicisaprincipalchoosingachiefexecutivefgoverningitspoliticalentity.Theagentissupposedtoactasarepresentativeonbehalfofhisherconstituencywhichhasdelegatedseveralta

11、skstohimher.Thisnewagentmaydelegatecertaintaskstofurtheragentsthusbecomingaprincipalhimherself.Inhighlycomplexenvironmentssuchastoday’spoliticalbureaucraticganisationalstructuresthismightcontinuecreatingseverallevelsofpr

12、incipal–agentsubgames.Fourpurposeofoutliningthebasicmechanismofastrategyofartificialinfmationasymmetryatwolevelmodelissufficient.webelieveitisadvisabletostretchtheclassicrationalchoiceapproachassumptionsthatonlyactsinsti

13、tutionsexertconstraintsthatactsareinstrumentallyrational.Theconceptofgoalvarianceimpliesthatanactcanhaveprivatemotivesthatareindependentevenopposedtothoseofhisherprincipal.Givenselfishmotivationwecanlogicallyexpectperson

14、alconstraints.PsychologicalideationalconstraintsmighteffectivelytaketheroleofaprincipalaswealreadyobservedwithQueenElizabeth.Personalsetsofmalvaluesbeliefscanlimitanact’sroomfmanoeuvre.Theagent’skeyproblemariseswhenheshe

15、deemsoptionsoutsidethislimitedpoolofalternativesnecessarywhichmeansthatheshehastoviolatetherulesofthegamenotactaccdingtotheprincipalhesherepresents.Hisheractualmotivationscanbemanifoldrangingfromasenseofraisond’tatdoctri

16、nesselfishness.Asaconsequenceanagentnaturallyseekstopursueastrategythatguaranteeshisherpreferredoutcomebutatthesametimeavoidsthepunishmentpredictedbytheclassicmodel.Theessenceoftheartificialinfmationasymmetryconceptisthe