委托代理關系下風險企業(yè)家的激勵約束機制.pdf

1、內(nèi)蒙古大學碩士學位論文委托代理關系下風險企業(yè)家的激勵約束機制姓名：李建軍申請學位級別：碩士專業(yè)：政治經(jīng)濟學指導教師：許柏年2002.6.4PRINCIPALAGENTRELATIONSHIP&THEINCENTIVECONSTRAINTMECHANISMFORVENTUREENTREPRENEURSABSTRACTVenturecapital(vc)isanemergingindustryinChinaMuchofthetheoreti

2、calexplorationexaminesthemacroeconomicaspectsofVC，coveringthehistoryofforeignVCindustrytherolethatVCplaysinitsnationaleconomytherelationshipbetweengovernmentandVCetcThesestudieshelpcreateafriendlyenvironment’forthegrowth

3、ofventurecapitalindustryandatthesametimecallforafurtherexplorationintothemicroeconomicaspectsofVCThisPaDer100ksintotheincentiveconstraintmechanismoftheventurecapitalistovertheventureentrepreneurundertheprincipal—agentrel

4、ationshipThefirmcontrolledbyagentsisthefundamentalorganizationformofthemodementerprisesystem，whichmostoftheventureenterprisestakeThemostsignificantcharacteristicsofthefirmisthatownershipisseparatedfrommanagementIntheterm

5、ofprincipal—agenttheorytheownersareprincipalsandthemanagersareagentsAsfarasVCisconcemed。theventurecapitalistsareprincipalsandtheventureentrepreneursareagentsBecauseofasymmetricinformation，uncertainty，MoralHazardandAdvers

6、eSelectionthefirmiSfacedwithanagencyproblemagentsmaytakeactions(eg，shirking，irresponsibility)whichbenefitshimselfbutdoharmtoothersThekeyorganizationalissueistodesignacontractualarrangementbetweendifferentparticipantsofth

7、efirmSOastomakeeachmemberresponsibleforhisownactionsAstheprincipal，theownersmustmakeanoptimalincentive—constraintschemetoinspirethemanagement(agents)toactfortheirbestinterestsaswellaskeeptheagentsfromdoinganyharmtotheown

8、ersBeginningwithanintroductiontotheprincipal—agenttheoryandtheagencyproblem，thisresearchpaperdealswiththecausesoftheagencyriskandthemanagementofitThentheauthorcomesuDwiththeincentive—constraintmechanismofventurecapitalis